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PREFACE
This edition of the World Investment Report provides valuable analysis that can inform global discussions 
on how to accelerate progress toward the Millennium Development Goals and shape a long-range vision 
for a more sustainable future beyond 2015.
The Report reveals an encouraging trend: after a decline in 2012, global foreign direct investment flows 
rose by 9 per cent in 2013, with growth expected to continue in the years to come. This demonstrates the 
great potential of international investment, along with other financial resources, to help reach the goals of 
a post-2015 agenda for sustainable development. Transnational corporations can support this effort by 
creating decent jobs, generating exports, promoting rights, respecting the environment, encouraging local 
content, paying fair taxes and transferring capital, technology and business contacts to spur development.
This year’s World Investment Report offers a global action plan for galvanizing the role of businesses in 
achieving future sustainable development goals, and enhancing the private sector’s positive economic, social 
and environmental impacts. The Report identifies the financing gap, especially in vulnerable economies, 
assesses the primary sources of funds for bridging the gap, and proposes policy options for the future.
I commend this Report to all those interested in steering private investment towards a more sustainable 
future. 
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GLOBAL INVESTMENT TRENDS
Cautious optimism returns to global foreign direct investment (FDI). After the 2012 slump, global FDI 
returned to growth, with inflows rising 9 per cent in 2013, to $1.45 trillion. UNCTAD projects that FDI flows 
could rise to $1.6 trillion in 2014, $1.7 trillion in 2015 and $1.8 trillion in 2016, with relatively larger increases 
in developed countries. Fragility in some emerging markets and risks related to policy uncertainty and 
regional instability may negatively affect the expected upturn in FDI.
Developing economies maintain their lead in 2013. FDI flows to developed countries increased by 9 per 
cent to $566 billion, leaving them at 39 per cent of global flows, while those to developing economies 
reached a new high of $778 billion, or 54 per cent of the total. The balance of $108 billion went to transition 
economies. Developing and transition economies now constitute half of the top 20 ranked by FDI inflows.
FDI outflows from developing countries also reached a record level. Transnational corporations (TNCs) from 
developing economies are increasingly acquiring foreign affiliates from developed countries located in their 
regions. Developing and transition economies together invested $553 billion, or 39 per cent of global FDI 
outflows, compared with only 12 per cent at the beginning of the 2000s. 
Megaregional groupings shape global FDI. The three main regional groups currently under negotiation (TPP, 
TTIP, RCEP) each account for a quarter or more of global FDI flows, with TTIP flows in decline, and the 
others in ascendance. Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) remains the largest regional economic 
cooperation grouping, with 54 per cent of global inflows. 
The poorest countries are less and less dependent on extractive industry investment. Over the past decade, 
the share of the extractive industry in the value of greenfield projects was 26 per cent in Africa and 36 per 
cent in LDCs. These shares are rapidly decreasing; manufacturing and services now make up about 90 
per cent of the value of announced projects both in Africa and in LDCs.
Private equity FDI is keeping its powder dry. Outstanding funds of private equity firms increased to a 
record level of more than $1 trillion. Their cross-border investment was $171 billion, a decline of 11 per 
cent, and they accounted for 21 per cent of the value of cross-border mergers and acquisitions (M&As), 
10 percentage points below their peak. With funds available for investment (“dry powder”), and relatively 
subdued activity in recent years, the potential for increased private equity FDI is significant.
State-owned TNCs are FDI heavyweights. UNCTAD estimates there are at least 550 State-owned TNCs 
– from both developed and developing countries – with more than 15,000 foreign affiliates and foreign 
assets of over $2 trillion. FDI by these TNCs was more than $160 billion in 2013. At that level, although 
their number constitutes less than 1 per cent of the universe of TNCs, they account for over 11 per cent of 
global FDI flows.
REGIONAL INVESTMENT TRENDS
FDI flows to all major developing regions increased. Africa saw increased inflows (+4 per cent), sustained by 
growing intra-African flows. Such flows are in line with leaders’ efforts towards deeper regional integration, 
although the effect of most regional economic cooperation initiatives in Africa on intraregional FDI has been 
limited. Developing Asia (+3 per cent) remains the number one global investment destination. Regional 
headquarter locations for TNCs, and proactive regional investment cooperation, are factors driving increasing 
intraregional flows. Latin America and the Caribbean (+6 per cent) saw mixed FDI growth, with an overall 
positive due to an increase in Central America, but with an 6 per cent decline in South America. Prospects 
are brighter, with new opportunities arising in oil and gas, and TNC investment plans in manufacturing.
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Structurally weak economies saw mixed results. Investment in the least developed countries (LDCs) 
increased, with announced greenfield investments signalling significant growth in basic infrastructure and 
energy projects. Landlocked developing countries (LLDCs) saw an overall decline in FDI. Relative to the 
size of their economies, and relative to capital formation, FDI remains an important source of finance there. 
Inflows to small island developing States (SIDS) declined. Tourism and extractive industries are attracting 
increasing interest from foreign investors, while manufacturing industries have been negatively affected by 
erosion of trade preferences. 
Inflows to developed countries resume growth but have a long way to go. The recovery of FDI inflows in 
developed countries to $566 billion, and the unchanged outflows, at $857 billion, leave both at half their 
peak levels in 2007. Europe, traditionally the largest FDI recipient region, is at less than one third of its 2007 
inflows and one fourth of its outflows. The United States and the European Union (EU) saw their combined 
share of global FDI inflows decline from well over 50 per cent pre-crisis to 30 per cent in 2013.
FDI to transition economies reached record levels, but prospects are uncertain. FDI inflows to transition 
economies increased by 28 per cent to reach $108 billion in 2013. Outward FDI from the region jumped by 
84 per cent, reaching a record $99 billion. Prospects for FDI to transition economies are likely to be affected 
by uncertainties related to regional instability.
INVESTMENT POLICY TRENDS AND KEY ISSUES
Most investment policy measures remain geared towards investment promotion and liberalization. At the 
same time, the share of regulatory or restrictive investment policies increased, reaching 27 per cent in 2013. 
Some host countries have sought to prevent divestments by established foreign investors. Some home 
countries promote reshoring of their TNCs’ overseas investments. 
Investment incentives mostly focus on economic performance objectives, less on sustainable development. 
Incentives are widely used by governments as a policy instrument for attracting investment, despite 
persistent criticism that they are economically inefficient and lead to misallocations of public funds. To 
address these concerns, investment incentives schemes could be more closely aligned with the SDGs. 
International investment rule making is characterized by diverging trends: on the one hand, disengagement 
from the system, partly because of developments in investment arbitration; on the other, intensifying and 
up-scaling negotiations. Negotiations of “megaregional agreements” are a case in point. Once concluded, 
these may have systemic implications for the regime of international investment agreements (IIAs). 
Widespread concerns about the functioning and the impact of the IIA regime are resulting in calls for 
reform. Four paths are becoming apparent: (i) maintaining the status quo, (ii) disengaging from the system, 
(iii) introducing selective adjustments, and (iv) undertaking systematic reform. A multilateral approach could 
effectively contribute to this endeavour. 
INVESTING IN THE SDGs: AN ACTION PLAN FOR PROMOTING PRIVATE 
SECTOR CONTRIBUTIONS
Faced with common global economic, social and environmental challenges, the international community 
is defining a set of Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). The SDGs, which are being formulated by the 
United Nations together with the widest possible range of stakeholders, are intended to galvanize action 
worldwide through concrete targets for the 2015–2030 period for poverty reduction, food security, human 
health and education, climate change mitigation, and a range of other objectives across the economic, 
social and environmental pillars. 
The role of the public sector is fundamental and pivotal, while the private sector contribution is indispensable. 
The latter can take two main forms, good governance in business practices and investment in sustainable 
development.  Policy coherence is essential in promoting the private sector’s contribution to the SDGs. 
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The SDGs will have very significant resource implications across the developed and developing world. 
Global investment needs are in the order of $5 trillion to $7 trillion per year. Estimates for investment needs 
in developing countries alone range from $3.3 trillion to $4.5 trillion per year, mainly for basic infrastructure 
(roads, rail and ports; power stations; water and sanitation), food security (agriculture and rural development), 
climate change mitigation and adaptation, health, and education.
The SDGs will require a step-change in the levels of both public and private investment in all countries. 
At current levels of investment in SDG-relevant sectors, developing countries alone face an annual gap of 
$2.5 trillion. In developing countries, especially in LDCs and other vulnerable economies, public finances 
are central to investment in SDGs. However, they cannot meet all SDG-implied resource demands. The role 
of private sector investment will be indispensable. 
Today, the participation of the private sector in investment in SDG-related sectors is relatively low. Only a 
fraction of the worldwide invested assets of banks, pension funds, insurers, foundations and endowments, 
as well as transnational corporations, is in SDG sectors. Their participation is even lower in developing 
countries, particularly the poorest ones.
In LDCs, a doubling of the growth rate of private investment would be a desirable target. Developing 
countries as a group could see the private sector cover approximately the part of SDG investment needs 
corresponding to its current share in investment in SDG sectors, based on current growth rates. In that 
scenario, however, they would still face an annual gap of about $1.6 trillion. In LDCs, where investment 
needs are most acute and where financing capacity is lowest, about twice the current growth rate of private 
investment is needed to give it a meaningful complementary financing role next to public investment and 
overseas development assistance (ODA).
Increasing the involvement of private investors in SDG-related sectors, many of which are sensitive or of 
a public service nature, leads to policy dilemmas. Policymakers need to find the right balance between 
creating a climate conducive to investment and removing barriers to investment on the one hand, and 
protecting public interests through regulation on the other. They need to find mechanisms to provide 
sufficiently attractive returns to private investors while guaranteeing accessibility and affordability of services 
for all. And the push for more private investment must be complementary to the parallel push for more 
public investment. 
UNCTAD’s proposed Strategic Framework for Private Investment in the SDGs addresses key policy 
challenges and options related to (i) guiding principles and global leadership to galvanize action for private 
investment, (ii) the mobilization of funds for investment in sustainable development, (iii) the channelling of 
funds into investments in SDG sectors, and (iv) maximizing the sustainable development impact of private 
investment while minimizing risks or drawbacks involved. 
Increasing private investment in SDGs will require leadership at the global level, as well as from national 
policymakers, to provide guiding principles to deal with policy dilemmas; to set targets, recognizing 
the need to make a special effort for LDCs; to ensure policy coherence at national and global levels; to 
galvanize dialogue and action, including through appropriate multi-stakeholder platforms; and to guarantee 
inclusiveness, providing support to countries that otherwise might continue to be largely ignored by private 
investors.
Challenges to mobilizing funds in financial markets include start-up and scaling problems for innovative 
financing solutions, market failures, a lack of transparency on environmental, social and corporate 
governance performance, and misaligned rewards for market participants. Key constraints to channelling 
funds into SDG sectors include entry barriers, inadequate risk-return ratios for SDG investments, a lack 
of information and effective packaging and promotion of projects, and a lack of investor expertise. Key 
challenges in managing the impact of private investment in SDG sectors include the weak absorptive 
capacity in some developing countries, social and environmental impact risks, and the need for stakeholder 
engagement and effective impact monitoring.
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UNCTAD’s Action Plan for Private Investment in the SDGs presents a range of policy options to respond to 
the mobilization, channelling and impact challenges. A focused set of action packages can help shape a 
Big Push for private investment in sustainable development:
•	 A new generation of investment promotion and facilitation. Establishing SDG investment development 
agencies to develop and market pipelines of bankable projects in SDG sectors and to actively facilitate 
such projects. This requires specialist expertise and should be supported by technical assistance. 
“Brokers” of SDG investment projects could also be set up at the regional level to share costs and 
achieve economies of scale. The international investment policy regime should also be reoriented 
towards proactive promotion of investment in SDGs. 
•	 SDG-oriented investment incentives. Restructuring of investment incentive schemes specifically to 
facilitate sustainable development projects. This calls for a transformation from purely “location-based” 
incentives, aiming to increase the competitiveness of a location and provided at the time of establishment, 
towards “SDG-based” incentives, aiming to promote investment in SDG sectors and conditional upon 
their sustainable development contribution.
•	 Regional SDG Investment Compacts. Launching regional and South-South initiatives towards the 
promotion of SDG investment, especially for cross-border infrastructure development and regional 
clusters of firms operating in SDG sectors (e.g. green zones). This could include joint investment promotion 
mechanisms, joint programmes to build absorptive capacity and joint public-private partnership models.
•	 	New forms of partnership for SDG investments. Establish partnerships between outward investment 
agencies in home countries and investment promotion agencies (IPAs) in host countries for the purpose 
of marketing SDG investment opportunities in home countries, provision of investment incentives and 
facilitation services for SDG projects, and joint monitoring and impact assessment. Concrete tools that 
might support joint SDG investment business development services could include online tools with 
pipelines of bankable projects, and opportunities for linkages programmes in developing countries. A 
multi-agency technical assistance consortium could help to support LDCs.
•	 Enabling innovative financing mechanisms and a reorientation of financial markets. Innovative financial 
instruments to raise funds for investment in SDGs deserve support to achieve scale. Options include 
innovative tradable financial instruments and dedicated SDG funds, seed funding mechanisms, and new 
“go-to-market” channels for SDG projects. Reorientation of financial markets also requires integrated 
reporting. This is a fundamental tool for investors to make informed decisions on responsible allocation 
of capital, and it is at the heart of Sustainable Stock Exchanges.
•	 Changing the business mindset and developing SDG investment expertise.  Developing a curriculum 
for business schools that generates awareness of investment opportunities in poor countries and that 
teaches students the skills needed to successfully operate in developing-country environments. This 
can be extended to inclusion of relevant modules in existing training and certification programmes for 
financial market actors.
The Action Plan for Private Investment in the SDGs is meant to serve as a point of reference for policymakers 
at national and international levels in their discussions on ways and means to implement the SDGs. It has 
been designed as a “living document” and incorporates an online version that aims to establish an interactive, 
open dialogue, inviting the international community to exchange views, suggestions and experiences. It 
thus constitutes a basis for further stakeholder engagement. UNCTAD aims to provide the platform for such 
engagement through its biennial World Investment Forum, and online through the Investment Policy Hub.
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Figure 1. FDI inflows, global and by group of economies, 1995–2013 and projections, 2014-2016
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OVERVIEW
GLOBAL INVESTMENT TRENDS 
Cautious optimism returns to global FDI
In 2013, FDI flows returned to an upward trend. Global FDI inflows rose by 9 per cent to $1.45 trillion 
in 2013. FDI inflows increased in all major economic groupings − developed, developing, and transition 
economies. Global FDI stock rose by 9 per cent, reaching $25.5 trillion.
UNCTAD projects that global FDI flows could rise to $1.6 trillion in 2014, $1.75 trillion in 2015 and $1.85 
trillion in 2016. The rise will be mainly driven by investments in developed economies as their economic 
recovery starts to take hold and spread wider. The fragility in some emerging markets and risks related to 
policy uncertainty and regional conflict could still derail the expected upturn in FDI flows. 
As a result of higher expected FDI growth in developed countries, the regional distribution of FDI may tilt 
back towards the “traditional pattern” of a higher share of developed countries in global inflows (figure 1). 
Nevertheless, FDI flows to developing economies will remain at a high level in the coming years. 
Developing economies maintain their lead
FDI flows to developing economies reached a new high at $778 billion (table 1), accounting for 54 per 
cent of global inflows, although the growth rate slowed to 7 per cent, compared with an average growth 
rate over the past 10 years of 17 per cent. Developing Asia continues to be the region with the highest 
FDI inflows, significantly above the EU, traditionally the region with the highest share of global FDI. FDI 
inflows were up also in the other major developing regions, Africa (up 4 per cent) and Latin America and the 
Caribbean (up 6 per cent, excluding offshore financial centres).
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Although FDI to developed economies resumed its recovery after the sharp fall in 2012, it remained at a 
historically low share of total global FDI flows (39 per cent), and still 57 per cent below its peak in 2007. 
Thus, developing countries maintained their lead over developed countries by a margin of more than $200 
billion for the second year running.
Developing countries and transition economies now also constitute half of the top 20 economies ranked by 
FDI inflows (figure 2). Mexico moved into tenth place. China recorded its largest ever inflows and maintained 
its position as the second largest recipient in the world. 
FDI by transnational corporations (TNCs) from developing countries reached $454 billion – another record 
high. Together with transition economies, they accounted for 39 per cent of global FDI outflows, compared 
with only 12 per cent at the beginning of the 2000s. Six developing and transition economies ranked among 
the 20 largest investors in the world in 2013 (figure 3). Increasingly, developing-country TNCs are acquiring 
foreign affiliates of developed-country TNCs in the developing world.  
Megaregional groupings shape global FDI 
The share of APEC countries in global inflows increased from 37 per cent before the crisis to 54 per cent 
in 2013 (figure 4). Although their shares are smaller, FDI inflows to ASEAN and the Common Market of the 
South (MERCOSUR) in 2013 were at double their pre-crisis level, as were inflows to the BRICS (Brazil, the 
Russian Federation, India, China and South Africa).
Table 1. FDI flows, by region, 2011–2013
(Billions of dollars and per cent)
Region FDI inflows FDI outflows
2011 2012 2013 2011 2012 2013
World  1 700  1 330  1 452  1 712  1 347  1 411
Developed economies  880  517  566  1 216  853  857
European Union  490  216  246  585  238  250
North America  263  204  250  439  422  381
Developing economies  725  729  778  423  440  454
Africa  48  55  57  7  12  12
Asia  431  415  426  304  302  326
East and South-East Asia  333  334  347  270  274  293
South Asia  44  32  36  13  9  2
West Asia  53  48  44  22  19  31
Latin America and the Caribbean  244  256  292  111  124  115
Oceania  2  3  3  1  2  1
Transition economies  95  84  108  73  54  99
Structurally weak, vulnerable and small economiesa  58  58  57  12  10  9
LDCs  22  24  28  4  4  5
LLDCs  36  34  30  6  3  4
SIDS  6  7  6  2  2  1
Memorandum: percentage share in world FDI flows
Developed economies  51.8  38.8  39.0  71.0  63.3  60.8
European Union  28.8  16.2  17.0  34.2  17.7  17.8
North America  15.5  15.3  17.2  25.6  31.4  27.0
Developing economies  42.6  54.8  53.6  24.7  32.7  32.2
Africa  2.8  4.1 3.9  0.4  0.9  0.9
Asia  25.3  31.2  29.4  17.8  22.4  23.1
East and South-East Asia  19.6  25.1  23.9  15.8  20.3  20.7
South Asia  2.6  2.4  2.4  0.8  0.7  0.2
West Asia  3.1  3.6  3.0  1.3  1.4  2.2
Latin America and the Caribbean  14.3  19.2  20.1  6.5  9.2  8.1
Oceania  0.1  0.2  0.2  0.1  0.1  0.1
Transition economies  5.6  6.3  7.4  4.3  4.0  7.0
Structurally weak, vulnerable and small economiesa  3.4  4.4  3.9  0.7  0.7  0.7
LDCs  1.3  1.8  1.9  0.3  0.3  0.3
LLDCs  2.1  2.5  2.0  0.4  0.2  0.3
SIDS  0.4  0.5  0.4  0.1  0.2  0.1
Source: UNCTAD, FDI-TNC-GVC Information System, FDI/TNC database (www.unctad.org/fdistatistics).  
aWithout double counting.
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Figure 3. FDI outflows: top 20 home economies, 2012 and 2013
(Billions of dollars)
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Figure 2. FDI inflows: top 20 host economies, 2012 and 2013
(Billions of dollars)
Colombia
Italy
Indonesia
Chile
Netherlands
Germany
India
Luxembourg 
Ireland
United Kingdom
Mexico
Spain
Australia
Canada
Singapore
Brazil
Hong Kong, China
Russian Federation
China
188
0
16
19
29
10
13
24
10
38
46
18
26
56
43
61
65
75
51
121
17
17
18
20
24
27
28
30
36
37
38
39
50
62
64
64
77
79
124
2013
2012
2013
2012
Developing and 
transition economies
Developed 
economies
161United States
xvi World Investment Report 2014: Investing in the SDGs: An Action Plan
Figure 4. FDI inflows to selected regional and interregional groups, average 2005–2007 and 2013
(Billions of US dollars and per cent)
Share in world Share in world
  G-20 59% 54% -5
  APEC 37% 54% 17
  TPP 24% 32% 8
  TTIP 56% 30% -26
  RCEP 13% 24% 11
  BRICS 11% 21% 10
  NAFTA 19% 20% 1
  ASEAN 4% 9% 5
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The three megaregional integration initiatives currently under negotiation – TTIP, TPP and RCEP – show 
diverging FDI trends. The United States and the EU, which are negotiating the formation of TTIP, saw their 
combined share of global FDI inflows cut nearly in half, from 56 per cent pre-crisis to 30 per cent in 2013. 
In TPP, the declining share of the United States is offset by the expansion of emerging economies in the 
grouping, helping the aggregate share increase from 24 per cent before 2008 to 32 per cent in 2013. The 
Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), which is being negotiated between the 10 ASEAN 
member States and their 6 free trade agreement (FTA) partners, accounted for more than 20 per cent of 
global FDI flows in recent years, nearly twice as much as the pre-crisis level.
Poorest developing economies less dependent on natural resources 
Although historically FDI in many poor developing countries has relied heavily on extractive industries, the 
dynamics of greenfield investment over the last 10 years reveals a more nuanced picture. The share of the 
extractive industry in the cumulative value of announced cross-border greenfield projects is substantial in 
Africa (26 per cent) and in LDCs (36 per cent). However, looking at project numbers the share drops to 8 
per cent of projects in Africa, and 9 per cent in LDCs, due to the capital intensive nature of the industry. 
Moreover, the share of the extractive industry is rapidly decreasing. Data on announced greenfield 
investments in 2013 show that manufacturing and services make up about 90 per cent of the total value 
of projects both in Africa and in LDCs. 
Shale gas is affecting FDI patterns in the Unites States and beyond
The shale gas revolution is now clearly visible in FDI patterns. In the United States oil and gas industry, 
the role of foreign capital is growing as the shale market consolidates and smaller domestic players need 
to share development and production costs. Shale gas cross-border M&As accounted for more than 80 
per cent of such deals in the oil and gas industry in 2013. United States firms with necessary expertise in 
the exploration and development of shale gas are also becoming acquisition targets or industrial partners 
of energy firms based in other countries rich in shale resources. 
Beyond the oil and gas industry, cheap natural gas is attracting new capacity investments, including 
greenfield FDI, to United States manufacturing industries, in particular chemicals and chemical products. 
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The United States share in global announced greenfield investments in these sectors jumped from 6 per 
cent in 2011, to 16 per cent in 2012, to 25 per cent in 2013, well above the average United States share 
across all industries (7 per cent). Some reshoring of United States manufacturing TNCs is also expected.
As the cost advantage of petrochemicals manufacturers in other oil and gas rich countries is being eroded, 
the effects on FDI are becoming visible also outside the United States, especially in West Asia. TNCs like 
Chevron Phillips Chemical, Dow Chemical and ExxonMobil Chemical are returning their focus to the United 
States. Even Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) petrochemical enterprises such as NOVA chemicals (United 
Arab Emirates) and Sabic (Saudi Arabia) – are investing in North America. 
Pharmaceutical FDI driven by the “patent cliff” and emerging market 
opportunities
Pharmaceutical TNCs have been divesting non-core business segments and outsourcing R&D activities 
in recent years, while engaging in M&A activity to secure new revenue streams and low-cost production 
bases. Global players in this industry have sought access to high-quality, low-cost generic drugs through 
acquisitions of producers based in developing economies, in response to growing demand. They have 
also targeted successful research firms and start-ups there. The share of cross-border M&A deals in the 
sector targeting developing and transition economies increased from less than 4 per cent before 2006, to 
10 per cent between 2010 and 2012, jumping to more than 18 per cent in 2013.
The availability of vast reserves of overseas held retained earnings in the top pharmaceutical TNCs facilitates 
such deals, and signals further activity. During the first quarter of 2014, the transaction value of cross-
border M&As ($23 billion in 55 deals) already surpassed the value recorded for all of 2013. 
Private equity FDI keeps its powder dry
In 2013, outstanding funds of private equity firms increased further to a record level of $1.07 trillion, an 
increase of 14 per cent over the previous year. However, their cross-border investment – typically through 
M&As – was $171 billion ($83 billion on a net basis), a decline of 11 per cent. Private equity accounted for 
21 per cent of total gross cross-border M&As in 2013, 10 percentage points lower than at its peak in 2007. 
With the increasing amount of outstanding funds available for investment (dry powder), and their relatively 
subdued activity in recent years, the potential for increased private equity FDI is significant.
Most private equity acquisitions are still concentrated in Europe (traditionally the largest market) and the 
United States. Deals are on the increase in Asia. Though relatively small, developing-country-based private 
equity firms are beginning to emerge and are involved in deal makings not only in developing countries but 
also in more mature markets. 
FDI by SWFs remains small, State-owned TNCs are heavyweights
Sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) continue to expand in terms of assets, geographical spread and target 
industries. Assets under management of SWFs approach $6.4 trillion and are invested worldwide, including 
in sub-Saharan African countries. Oil-producing countries in sub-Saharan Africa have themselves recently 
created SWFs to manage oil proceeds. Compared to the size of their assets, the level of FDI by SWFs is 
still small, corresponding to less than 2 per cent of assets under management, and limited to a few major 
SWFs. In 2013, SWF FDI flows were worth $6.7 billion with cumulative stock reaching $130 billion. 
The number of State-owned TNCs (SO-TNCs) is relatively small, but the number of their foreign affiliates 
and the scale of their foreign assets are significant. According to UNCTAD’s estimates, there are at least 
550 SO-TNCs – from both developed and developing countries – with more than 15,000 foreign affiliates 
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and estimated foreign assets of over $2 trillion. Some are among the largest TNCs in the world. FDI by 
State-owned TNCs is estimated to have reached more than $160 billion in 2013, a slight increase after four 
consecutive years of decline. At that level, although their number constitutes less than 1 per cent of the 
universe of TNCs, they account for over 11 per cent of global FDI flows.
International production continues its steady growth 
International production continued to expand in 2013, rising by 9 per cent in sales, 8 per cent in assets, 
6 per cent in value added, 5 per cent in employment, and 3 per cent in exports (table 2). TNCs from 
developing and transition economies expanded their overseas operations faster than their developed-
country counterparts, but at roughly the same rate of their domestic operations, thus maintaining – overall 
– a stable internationalization index.
Cash holdings by the top 5,000 TNCs remained high in 2013, accounting for more than 11 per cent of their 
total assets. Cash holdings (including short-term investments) by developed-country TNCs were estimated 
at $3.5 trillion, while TNCs from developing and transition economies held $1.0 trillion. Developing-country 
TNCs have held their cash-to-assets ratios relatively constant over the last five years, at about 12 per 
cent. In contrast, the cash-to-assets ratios of developed-country TNCs increased in recent years, from an 
average of 9 per cent before the financial crisis to more than 11 per cent in 2013. This increase implies that, 
at the end of 2013, developed-country TNCs held $670 billion more cash than they would have before – a 
significant brake on investment.
Table 2.  Selected indicators of FDI and international production, 
2013 and selected years
Value at current prices
(Billions of dollars)
Item 1990
2005–2007 
pre-crisis 
average
2011 2012 2013
FDI inflows  208 1 493 1 700 1 330 1 452
FDI outflows  241 1 532 1 712 1 347 1 411
FDI inward stock 2 078 14 790 21 117 23 304 25 464
FDI outward stock 2 088 15 884 21 913 23 916 26 313
Income on inward FDI  79 1 072 1 603 1 581 1 748
Rate of return on inward FDI 3.8 7.3 6.9 7.6 6.8
Income on outward FDI  126 1 135 1 550 1 509 1 622
Rate of return on outward FDI 6.0 7.2 6.5 7.1 6.3
Cross-border M&As  111  780  556  332  349
Sales of foreign affiliates 4 723 21 469 28 516 31 532 34 508
Value added (product) of foreign affiliates  881 4 878 6 262 7 089 7 492
Total assets of foreign affiliates 3 893 42 179 83 754 89 568 96 625
Exports of foreign affiliates 1 498 5 012 7 463 7 532 7 721
Employment by foreign affiliates (thousands) 20 625 53 306 63 416 67 155 70 726
Memorandum:
GDP 22 327 51 288 71 314 72 807 74 284
Gross fixed capital formation 5 072 11 801 16 498 17 171 17 673
Royalties and licence fee receipts  29  161  250  253  259
Exports of goods and services 4 107 15 034 22 386 22 593 23 160
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REGIONAL TRENDS IN FDI
FDI to Africa increases, sustained by growing intra-African flows
FDI inflows to Africa rose by 4 per cent to $57 billion, driven by international and regional market-seeking 
and infrastructure investments. Expectations for sustained growth of an emerging middle class attracted 
FDI in consumer-oriented industries, including food, IT, tourism, finance and retail. 
The overall increase was driven by the Eastern and Southern African subregions, as others saw falling 
investments. In Southern Africa flows almost doubled to $13 billion, mainly due to record-high flows to 
South Africa and Mozambique. In both countries, infrastructure was the main attraction, with investments 
in the gas sector in Mozambique also playing a role. In East Africa, FDI increased by 15 per cent to $6.2 
billion as a result of rising flows to Ethiopia and Kenya. Kenya is becoming a favoured business hub, not 
only for oil and gas exploration but also for manufacturing and transport; Ethiopian industrial strategy may 
attract Asian capital to develop its manufacturing base. FDI flows to North Africa decreased by 7 per cent 
to $15 billion. Central and West Africa saw inflows decline to $8 billion and $14 billion, respectively, in part 
due to political and security uncertainties.  
Intra-African investments are increasing, led by South African, Kenyan, and Nigerian TNCs. Between 2009 
and 2013, the share of announced cross-border greenfield investment projects originating from within 
Africa increased to 18 per cent, from less than 10 per cent in the preceding period. For many smaller, often 
landlocked or non-oil-exporting countries in Africa, intraregional FDI is a significant source of foreign capital. 
Increasing intra-African FDI is in line with leaders’ efforts towards deeper regional integration. However, for 
most subregional groupings, intra-group FDI represent only a small share of intra-African flows. Only in two 
regional economic cooperation (REC) initiatives does intra-group FDI make up a significant part of intra-
African investments – in EAC (about half) and SADC (more than 90 per cent) – largely due to investments 
in neighbouring countries of the dominant outward investing economies in these RECs, South Africa and 
Kenya. RECs have thus so far been less effective for the promotion of intraregional investment than a wider 
African economic cooperation initiative could be.
Intra-African projects are concentrated in manufacturing and services. Only 3 per cent of the value of 
announced intraregional greenfield projects is in the extractive industries, compared with 24 per cent for 
extra-regional greenfield projects (during 2009-2013). Intraregional investment could contribute to the build-
up of regional value chains. However, so far, African global value chain (GVC) participation is still mostly 
limited to downstream incorporation of raw materials in the exports of developed countries. 
Developing Asia remains the number one investment destination
With total FDI inflows of $426 billion in 2013, developing Asia accounted for nearly 30 per cent of the global 
total and remained the world's number one recipient region. 
FDI inflows to East Asia rose by 2 per cent to $221 billion. The stable performance of the subregion was 
driven by rising FDI inflows to China as well as to the Republic of Korea and Taiwan Province of China. With 
inflows at $124 billion in 2013, China again ranked second in the world. In the meantime, FDI outflows from 
China swelled by 15 per cent, to $101 billion, driven by a number of megadeals in developed countries. 
The country’s outflows are expected to surpass its inflows within two to three years. Hong Kong (China) 
saw its inflows rising slightly to $77 billion. The economy has been highly successful in attracting regional 
headquarters of TNCs, the number of which reached nearly 1,400 in 2013.  
Inflows to South-East Asia increased by 7 per cent to $125 billion, with Singapore – another regional 
headquarters economy – attracting half. The 10 Member States of ASEAN and its 6 FTA partners (Australia, 
China, India, Japan, the Republic of Korea and New Zealand) have launched negotiations for the RCEP. 
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In 2013, combined FDI inflows to the 16 negotiating members of RCEP amounted to $343 billion, 24 per 
cent of world inflows. Over the last 15 years, proactive regional investment cooperation efforts in East 
and South-East Asia have contributed to a rise in total and intraregional FDI in the region. FDI flows from 
RCEP now makes up more than 40 per cent of inflows to ASEAN, compared to 17 per cent before 2000. 
Intraregional FDI in infrastructure and manufacturing in particular is bringing development opportunities for 
low-income countries, such as the Lao People’s Democratic Republic and Myanmar. 
Inflows to South Asia rose by 10 per cent to $36 billion in 2013. The largest recipient of FDI in the 
subregion, India, experienced a 17 per cent increase in FDI inflows to $28 billion. Defying the overall trend, 
investment in the retail sector did not increase, despite the opening up of multi-brand retail in 2012. 
Corridors linking South Asia and East and South-East Asia are being established – the Bangladesh-China-
India-Myanmar Economic Corridor and the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor. This will help enhance 
connectivity between Asian subregions and provide opportunities for regional economic cooperation. The 
initiatives are likely to accelerate infrastructure investment and improve the overall business climate in South 
Asia. 
FDI flows to West Asia decreased in 2013 by 9 per cent to $44 billion, failing to recover for the fifth 
consecutive year. Persistent regional tensions and political uncertainties are holding back investors, although 
there are differences between countries. In Saudi Arabia and Qatar FDI flows continue to follow a downward 
trend; in other countries FDI is slowly recovering, although flows remain well below earlier levels, except in 
Kuwait and Iraq where they reached record levels in 2012 and 2013, respectively. 
FDI outflows from West Asia jumped by 64 per cent in 2013, driven by rising flows from the GCC countries. 
A quadrupling of outflows from Qatar and a near tripling of flows from Kuwait explained most of the increase. 
Outward FDI could increase further given the high levels of GCC foreign exchange reserves. 
Uneven growth of FDI in Latin America and the Caribbean 
FDI flows to Latin America and the Caribbean reached $292 billion in 2013. Excluding offshore financial 
centres, they increased by 5 per cent to $182 billion. Whereas in previous years FDI was driven largely by 
South America, in 2013 flows to this subregion declined by 6 per cent to $133 billion, after three consecutive 
years of strong growth. Among the main recipient countries, Brazil saw a slight decline by 2 per cent, 
despite an 86 per cent increase in flows to the primary sector. FDI in Chile and Argentina declined by 29 
per cent and 25 per cent to $20 billion and $9 billion, respectively, due to lower inflows in the mining sector. 
Flows to Peru also decreased, by 17 per cent to $10 billion. In contrast, FDI flows to Colombia increased 
by 8 per cent to $17 billion, largely due to cross-border M&As in the electricity and banking industries. 
Flows to Central America and the Caribbean (excluding offshore financial centres) increased by 64 per 
cent to $49 billion, largely due to the $18 billion acquisition of the remaining shares in Grupo Modelo by 
Belgian brewer AB InBev − which more than doubled inflows to Mexico to $38 billion. Other increases were 
registered in Panama (61 per cent), Costa Rica (14 per cent), Guatemala and Nicaragua (5 per cent each). 
FDI outflows from Latin America and the Caribbean (excluding offshore financial centres) declined by 31 
per cent to $33 billion, because of stalled acquisitions abroad and a surge in loan repayments to parent 
companies by foreign affiliates of Brazilian and Chilean TNCs. 
Looking ahead, new opportunities for foreign investors in the oil and gas industry, including shale gas in 
Argentina and sectoral reform in Mexico, could signal positive FDI prospects. In manufacturing, automotive 
TNCs are also pushing investment plans in Brazil and Mexico. 
The growth potential of the automotive industry appears promising in both countries, with clear differences 
between the two in government policies and TNC responses. This is reflected in their respective levels and 
forms of GVC participation. In Mexico, automotive exports are higher, with greater downstream participation, 
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and higher imported value added. Brazil’s producers, many of which are TNCs, serve primarily the local 
market. Although its exports are lower, they contain a higher share of value added produced domestically, 
including through local content and linkages. 
FDI to transition economies at record levels, but prospects uncertain 
FDI inflows to transition economies increased by 28 per cent to reach $108 billion in 2013. In South-East 
Europe, flows increased from $2.6 billion in 2012 to $3.7 billion in 2013, driven by the privatization of 
remaining State-owned enterprises in the services sector. In the Commonwealth of Independent States 
(CIS), the 28 per cent rise in flows was due to the significant growth of FDI to the Russian Federation. 
Although developed countries were the main investors, developing-economy FDI has been on the rise. 
Prospects for FDI to transition economies are likely to be affected by uncertainties related to regional 
instability.
In 2013, outward FDI from the region jumped by 84 per cent, reaching a record $99 billion. As in past years, 
Russian TNCs accounted for the bulk of FDI projects. The value of cross-border M&A purchases by TNCs 
from the region rose more than six-fold, and announced greenfield investments rose by 87 per cent to $19 
billion. 
Over the past decade, transition economies have been the fastest-growing host and home region for 
FDI. EU countries have been the most important partners in this rapid FDI growth, both as investors and 
recipients. The EU has the largest share of inward FDI stock in the region, with more than two thirds of the 
total. In the CIS, most of their investment went to natural resources, consumer sectors, and other selected 
industries as they were liberalized or privatized. In South-East Europe, EU investments have also been 
driven by privatizations and by a combination of low production costs and the prospect of association with, 
or membership of the EU. In the same way, the bulk of outward FDI stock from transition economies, mainly 
from the Russian Federation, is in EU countries. Investors look for strategic assets in EU markets, including 
downstream activities in the energy industry and value added production activities in manufacturing. 
Inflows to developed countries resume growth 
After a sharp fall in 2012, inflows to developed economies recovered in 2013 to $566 billion, a 9 per cent 
increase. Inflows to the European Union were $246 billion (up 14 per cent), less than 30 per cent of their 
2007 peak. Among the major economies, inflows to Germany – which had recorded an exceptionally 
low volume in 2012 – rebounded sharply, but France and the United Kingdom saw a steep decline. In 
many cases, large swings in intra-company loans were a significant contributing factor. Inflows to Italy and 
Spain rebounded sharply with the latter becoming the largest European recipient in 2013. Inflows to North 
America recovered to $250 billion, with the United States  – the world’s largest recipient  – recording a 17 
per cent increase to $188 billion. 
Outflows from developed countries were $857 billion in 2013 – virtually unchanged from a year earlier. 
A recovery in Europe and the continued expansion of investment from Japan were weighed down by a 
contraction of outflows from North America. Outflows from Europe increased by 10 per cent to $329 billion. 
Switzerland became Europe’s largest direct investor. Against the European trend, France, Germany and the 
United Kingdom registered a large decline in outward FDI. Outflows from North America shed another 10 
per cent to $381 billion, partly because United States TNCs transferred funds from Europe, raised in local 
bond markets, back to the United States. Outflows from Japan grew for the third successive year, rising to 
$136 billion. 
Both inflows and outflows remained at barely half the peak level seen in 2007. In terms of global share, 
developed countries accounted for 39 per cent of total inflows and 61 per cent of total outflows – both 
historically low levels.
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Although the share of transatlantic FDI flows has declined in recent years, the EU and the United States are 
important investment partners – much more so than implied by the size of their economies or by volumes 
of bilateral trade. For the United States, 62 per cent of inward FDI stock is held by EU countries and 50 per 
cent of outward stock is located in the EU. For the EU, the United States accounts for one third of FDI flows 
into the region from non-EU countries.
FDI inflows to LDCs up, but LLDCs and SIDS down
FDI inflows to least developed countries (LDCs) rose to $28 billion, an increase of 14 per cent. While 
inflows to some larger host LDCs fell or stagnated, rising inflows were recorded elsewhere. A nearly $3 
billion reduction in divestment in Angola contributed most, followed by gains in Bangladesh, Ethiopia, 
Mozambique, Myanmar, the Sudan and Yemen. The share of inflows to LDCs in global inflows remains 
small at 2 per cent.
The number of announced greenfield investment projects in LDCs reached a record high, and in value 
terms they reached the highest level in three years. The services sector, driven by large-scale energy 
projects, contributed 70 per cent of the value of announced greenfield projects. External sources of finance 
constitute a major part of the funding behind a growing number of infrastructure projects in LDCs. However, 
a substantial portion of announced investments has so far not generated FDI inflows, which can be due to 
structured finance solutions that do not translate into FDI, long gestation periods spreading outlays over 
many years, or actual project delays or cancellations. 
FDI flows to the landlocked developing countries (LLDCs) in 2013 fell by 11 per cent to $29.7 billion. 
The Asian group of LLDCs experienced the largest fall in FDI flows of nearly 50 per cent, mainly due to a 
decline in investment in Mongolia. Despite a mixed picture for African LLDCs, 8 of the 15 LLDC economies 
increased their FDI inflows, with Zambia attracting most at $1.8 billion. 
FDI remains a relatively more important factor in capital formation and growth for LLDCs than developing 
countries as a whole. In developing economies the size of FDI flows relative to gross fixed capital formation 
has averaged 11 per cent over the past decade but in the LLDCs it has averaged almost twice this, at 21 
per cent. 
FDI inflows to the small island developing States (SIDS) declined by 16 per cent to $5.7 billion in 2013, 
putting an end to two years of recovery. Mineral extraction and downstream-related activities, business and 
finance, and tourism are the main target industries for FDI in SIDS. Tourism is attracting increasing interest 
by foreign investors, while manufacturing industries − such as apparel and processed fish − that used to be 
a non-negligible target for FDI, have been negatively affected by erosion of trade preferences. 
INVESTMENT POLICY TRENDS AND KEY ISSUES
New government efforts to prevent divestment and promote reshoring
UNCTAD monitoring shows that, in 2013, 59 countries and economies adopted 87 policy measures affecting 
foreign investment. National investment policymaking remained geared towards investment promotion and 
liberalization. At the same time, the overall share of regulatory or restrictive investment policies further 
increased from 25 to 27 per cent (figure 5).  
Investment liberalization measures included a number of privatizations in transition economies. The majority 
of foreign-investment-specific liberalization measures reported were in Asia; most related to the telecom-
munications industry and the energy sector. Newly introduced FDI restrictions and regulations included 
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Figure 5. Changes in national investment policies,
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a number of non-approvals of foreign investment 
projects. 
A recent phenomenon is the effort by governments 
to prevent divestments by foreign investors. Af-
fected by economic crises and persistently high 
domestic unemployment, some countries have 
introduced new approval requirements for reloca-
tions and lay-offs. In addition, some home coun-
tries have started to promote reshoring of overseas 
investment by their TNCs. 
More effective use of investment incentives requires improved monitoring 
Incentives are widely used by governments as a policy instrument for attracting investment, despite 
persistent criticism that they are economically inefficient and lead to misallocations of public funds. In 2013, 
more than half of new liberalization, promotion or facilitation measures related to the provision of investment 
incentives.
According to UNCTAD’s most recent survey of investment promotion agencies (IPAs), the main objective 
of investment incentives is job creation, followed by technology transfer and export promotion, while the 
most important target industry is IT and business services, followed by agriculture and tourism. Despite 
their growing importance in national and global policy agendas, environmental protection and development 
of disadvantaged regions do not rank high in current promotion strategies of IPAs. 
Linking investment incentives schemes to the SDGs could make them a more effective policy tool to remedy 
market failures and could offer a response to the criticism raised against the way investment incentives have 
traditionally been used. Governments should also carefully assess their incentives strategies and strengthen 
their monitoring and evaluation practices.
 
Some countries scale up IIA treaty negotiations, others disengage
With the addition of 44 new treaties, the global IIA regime reached close to 3,240 at the end of 2013 
(figure 6). The year brought an increasing dichotomy in investment treaty making. An increasing number of 
developing countries are disengaging from the regime in Africa, Asia and Latin America. At the same time, 
there is an “up-scaling” trend in treaty making, which manifests itself in increasing dynamism (with more 
countries participating in ever faster sequenced negotiating rounds) and in an increasing depth and breadth 
of issues addressed. Today, IIA negotiators increasingly take novel approaches to existing IIA provisions 
and add new issues to the negotiating agenda. The inclusion of sustainable development features and 
provisions that bring a liberalization dimension to IIAs and/or strengthen certain investment protection 
elements are examples in point.
 
“Megaregional agreements” – systemic implications expected 
Negotiations of megaregional agreements have become increasingly prominent in the public debate, 
attracting both criticism and support from different stakeholders. Key concerns relate to their potential 
impact on contracting parties’ regulatory space and sustainable development. Megaregionals are broad 
economic agreements among a group of countries that have a significant combined economic weight and 
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Figure 6. Trends in IIAs signed, 1983–2013
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Figure 7. Participation in key megaregionals and OECD membership
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in which investment is one of the key subject areas covered. Taking seven of these negotiations together, 
they involve a total of 88 developed and developing countries. If concluded, they are likely to have important 
implications for the current multi-layered international investment regime and global investment patterns. 
Megaregional agreements could have systemic implications for the IIA regime: they could either contribute to 
a consolidation of the existing treaty landscape or they could create further inconsistencies through overlap 
with existing IIAs – including those at the plurilateral level (figure 7). For example, six major megaregional 
agreements overlap with 140 existing IIAs but would create 200 new bilateral investment-treaty relationships. 
Megaregional agreements could also marginalize non-participating third parties. Negotiators need to give 
careful consideration to these systemic implications. Transparency in rule making, with broad stakeholder 
engagement, can help in finding optimal solutions and ensure buy-in from those affected by a treaty. 
Growing concerns about investment arbitration 
The year 2013 saw the second largest number of known investment arbitrations filed in a single year (56), 
bringing the total number of known cases to 568. Of the new claims, more than 40 per cent were brought 
against member States of the European Union (EU), with all but one of them being intra-EU cases. Investors 
continued to challenge a broad number of measures in various policy areas, particularly in the renewable 
energy sector. 
The past year also saw at least 37 arbitral decisions – 23 of which are in the public domain – and the second 
highest known award so far ($935 million plus interest). With the potential inclusion of investment arbitration 
in “megaregional agreements”, investor-State dispute settlement (ISDS) is at the centre of public attention. 
A call for reform of the IIA regime 
While almost all countries are parties to one or several IIAs, many are dissatisfied with the current regime. 
Concerns relate mostly to the development dimension of IIAs; the balance between the rights and obligations 
of investors and States; and the systemic complexity of the IIA regime. 
Countries’ current efforts to address these challenges reveal four different paths of action: (i) some aim to 
maintain the status quo, largely refraining from changes in the way they enter into new IIA commitments; (ii) 
some are disengaging from the IIA regime, unilaterally terminating existing treaties or denouncing multilateral 
arbitration conventions; and (iii) some are implementing selective adjustments, modifying models for future 
treaties but leaving the treaty core and the body of existing treaties largely untouched. Finally, (iv) there is 
the path of systematic reform that aims to comprehensively address the IIA regime’s challenges in a holistic 
manner.
While each of these paths has benefits and drawbacks, systemic reform could effectively address the 
complexities of the IIA regime and bring it in line with the sustainable development imperative. Such a 
reform process could follow a gradual approach with carefully sequenced actions: (i) defining the areas for 
reform (identifying key and emerging issues and lessons learned, and building consensus on what could 
and should be changed, and on what should and could not be changed), (ii) designing a roadmap for 
reform (identifying different options for reform, assessing pros and cons, and agreeing on the sequencing 
of actions), and (iii) implementing it at the national, bilateral and regional levels. A multilateral focal point 
like UNCTAD could support such a holistic, coordinated and sustainability-oriented approach to IIA reform 
through its policy analysis, technical assistance and consensus building. The World Investment Forum 
could provide the platform, and the Investment Policy Framework for Sustainable Development (IPFSD) the 
guidance. 
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Investing in the SDGs: an action plan 
for promoting private sector contributions
The United Nations’ Sustainable Development Goals need a step-change in 
investment
Faced with common global economic, social and environmental challenges, the international community 
is defining a set of Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). The SDGs, which are being formulated by the 
United Nations together with the widest possible range of stakeholders, are intended to galvanize action 
worldwide through concrete targets for the 2015–2030 period for poverty reduction, food security, human 
health and education, climate change mitigation, and a range of other objectives across the economic, 
social and environmental pillars. 
Private sector contributions can take two main forms; good governance in business practices and investment 
in sustainable development.  This includes the private sector’s commitment to sustainable development; 
transparency and accountability in honouring sustainable development practices; responsibility to avoid 
harm, even if it is not prohibited; and partnership with government on maximizing co-benefits of investment. 
The SDGs will have very significant resource implications across the developed and developing world. 
Estimates for total investment needs in developing countries alone range from $3.3 trillion to $4.5 trillion 
per year, for basic infrastructure (roads, rail and ports; power stations; water and sanitation), food security 
(agriculture and rural development), climate change mitigation and adaptation, health and education.
Reaching the SDGs will require a step-change in both public and private investment. Public sector funding 
capabilities alone may be insufficient to meet demands across all SDG-related sectors. However, today, 
the participation of the private sector in investment in these sectors is relatively low. Only a fraction of 
the worldwide invested assets of banks, pension funds, insurers, foundations and endowments, as well 
as transnational corporations, is in SDG sectors, and even less in developing countries, particularly the 
poorest ones (LDCs).
At current levels of investment in SDG-relevant sectors, developing countries face 
an annual gap of $2.5 trillion
At today’s level of investment – public and private – in SDG-related sectors in developing countries, an 
annual funding shortfall of some $2.5 trillion remains (figure 8). Bridging such a gap is a daunting task, but 
it is achievable. Part of the gap could be covered by the private sector (in a “business as usual scenario”) if 
the current growth rate of private investment continues. For developing countries as a group, including fast-
growing emerging economies, the current growth of private investment could be sufficient, approximately, 
to cover the part of total SDG-related investment needs corresponding to the private sector’s current 
participation in SDG investments. However, at the aggregate level that would still leave a gap of about $1.6 
trillion per year, and the relative size of this gap would be far more important in least developing countries 
and vulnerable economies. Increasing the participation of the private sector in SDG financing in developing 
countries could potentially cover a larger part of the gap. 
At a disaggregated level, the relative size of investment gaps will vary by SDG sector – private sector 
participation in some sectors is low and likely to remain so – and for different groups of developing countries. 
The starting levels and growth rates of private investment in SDG sectors in less developed countries are 
such that the private sector will not even cover the part of investment needs to 2030 that corresponds to 
its current level of participation.
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Potential private sector contribution to bridging the gap
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Figure 8. Estimated annual investment needs and potential private sector contribution
(Trillions of dollars)
Structurally weak economies need special attention, LDCs require a doubling of 
the growth rate of private investment
Investment and private sector engagement across SDG sectors are highly variable across developing 
countries. Emerging markets face entirely different conditions to vulnerable economies such as LDCs, 
LLDCs and SIDS. In LDCs, official development assistance (ODA) – currently their largest external source 
of finance and often used for direct budget support and public spending – will remain of fundamental 
importance. 
At the current rate of private sector participation in investment in SDG sectors, and at current growth 
rates, a “business as usual” scenario in LDCs will leave a shortfall that would imply a nine-fold increase 
in public sector funding requirements to 2030. This scenario, with the limited funding capabilities of LDC 
governments and the fact that much of ODA in LDCs is already used to support current (not investment) 
spending by LDC governments, is not a viable option. Without higher levels of private sector investment, 
the financing requirements associated with the prospective SDGs in LDCs may be unrealistic.
A target for the promotion of private sector investment in SDGs in LDCs could be to double the current 
growth rate of such investment. The resulting contribution would give private investment a meaningful 
complementary financing role next to public investment and ODA. Public investment and ODA would 
continue to be fundamental, as covering the remaining funding requirements would still imply trebling their 
current levels to 2030. 
The potential for increased private sector investment contributions is significant, 
especially in infrastructure, food security and climate change mitigation
The potential for increasing private sector participation is greater in some sectors than in others (figure 9). 
Infrastructure sectors, such as power and renewable energy (under climate change mitigation), transport 
and water and sanitation, are natural candidates for greater private sector participation, under the right 
conditions and with appropriate safeguards. Other SDG sectors are less likely to generate significantly 
higher amounts of private sector interest, either because it is difficult to design risk-return models attractive 
to private investors (e.g. climate change adaptation), or because they are at the core of public service 
responsibilities and highly sensitive to private sector involvement (e.g. education and health care). Therefore, 
public investment remains fundamental and pivotal. However, because it is unrealistic to expect the public 
sector to meet all funding demands in many developing countries, the SDGs have to be accompanied by 
strategic initiatives to increase private sector participation.
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Figure 9. Potential private sector contribution to investment gaps at current and high participation levels
(Billions of dollars)
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Increasing the involvement of private investors in SDG-related sectors, many of 
which are sensitive or of a public service nature, leads to policy dilemmas
A first dilemma relates to the risks involved in increased private sector participation in sensitive sectors. 
Private sector service provision in health care and education in developing countries, for instance, can have 
negative effects on standards unless strong governance and oversight is in place, which in turn requires 
capable institutions and technical competencies. Private sector involvement in essential infrastructure 
industries, such as power or telecommunications can be sensitive in developing countries where this 
implies the transfer of public sector assets to the private sector. Private sector operations in infrastructure 
such as water and sanitation are particularly sensitive because of the basic-needs nature of these sectors. 
A second dilemma stems from the need to maintain quality services affordable and accessible to all. The 
fundamental hurdle for increased private sector contributions to investment in SDG sectors is the inadequate 
risk-return profile of many such investments. Many mechanisms exist to share risks or otherwise improve 
the risk-return profile for private sector investors. Increasing returns, however, must not lead to the services 
provided by private investors ultimately becoming inaccessible or unaffordable for the poorest in society. 
Allowing energy or water suppliers to cover only economically attractive urban areas while ignoring rural 
needs, or to raise prices of essential services, is not a sustainable outcome.
A third dilemma results from the respective roles of public and private investment. Despite the fact that 
public sector funding shortfalls in SDG sectors make it desirable that private sector investment increase to 
achieve the prospective SDGs, public sector investment remains fundamental and pivotal. Governments – 
through policy and rule making – need to be ultimately accountable with respect to provision of vital public 
services and overall sustainable development strategy. 
A fourth dilemma is the apparent conflict between the particularly acute funding needs in structurally weak 
economies, especially LDCs, necessitating a significant increase in private sector investment, and the fact 
that especially these countries face the greatest difficulty in attracting such investment. Without targeted 
policy intervention and support measures there is a real risk that investors will continue to see operating 
conditions and risks in LDCs as prohibitive.
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UNCTAD proposes a Strategic Framework for Private Investment in the SDGs
A Strategic Framework for Private Investment in the SDGs (figure 10) addresses key policy challenges and 
solutions, related to:
•	 	Providing Leadership to define guiding principles and targets, to ensure policy coherence, and to 
galvanize action. 
•	 	Mobilizing funds for sustainable development – raising resources in financial markets or through financial 
intermediaries that can be invested in sustainable development.
•	 Channelling funds to sustainable development projects – ensuring that available funds make their way to 
concrete sustainable-development-oriented investment projects on the ground in developing countries, 
and especially LDCs. 
•	 Maximizing impact and mitigating drawbacks – creating an enabling environment and putting in place 
appropriate safeguards that need to accompany increased private sector engagement in often sensitive 
sectors.
A set of guiding principles can help overcome policy dilemmas associated with 
increased private sector engagement in SDG sectors
The many stakeholders involved in stimulating private investment in SDGs will have varying perspectives on 
how to resolve the policy dilemmas inherent in seeking greater private sector participation in SDG sectors. 
A common set of principles for investment in SDGs can help establish a collective sense of direction and 
purpose. The following broad principles could provide a framework.
•	 Balancing liberalization and the right to regulate. Greater private sector involvement in SDG sectors may 
be necessary where public sector resources are insufficient (although selective, gradual or sequenced 
approaches are possible); at the same time, such increased involvement must be accompanied by 
appropriate regulations and government oversight. 
•	 Balancing the need for attractive risk-return rates with the need for accessible and affordable services. 
This requires governments to proactively address market failures in both respects. It means placing 
clear obligations on investors and extracting firm commitments, while providing incentives to improve 
the risk-return profile of investment. And it implies making incentives or subsidies conditional on social 
inclusiveness. 
•	 	Balancing a push for private investment with the push for public investment. Public and private investment 
are complementary, not substitutes. Synergies and mutually supporting roles between public and private 
funds can be found both at the level of financial resources – e.g. raising private sector funds with public 
sector funds as seed capital – and at the policy level, where governments can seek to engage private 
investors to support economic or public service reform programmes. Nevertheless, it is important for 
policymakers not to translate a push for private investment into a policy bias against public investment.
•	 Balancing the global scope of the SDGs with the need to make a special effort in LDCs. While overall 
financing for development needs may be defined globally, with respect to private sector financing 
contributions special efforts will need to be made for LDCs, because without targeted policy intervention 
these countries will not be able to attract the required resources from private investors. Dedicated private 
sector investment targets for the poorest countries, leveraging ODA for additional private funds, and 
targeted technical assistance and capacity building to help attract private investment in LDCs are desirable. 
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Figure 10. Strategic Framework for Private Investment in the SDGs
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Increasing private investment in SDGs will require leadership at the global level, 
as well as from national policymakers
Leadership is needed not only to provide guiding principles to deal with policy dilemmas, but also to: 
Set investment targets. The rationale behind the SDGs, and the experience with the Millennium Development 
Goals, is that targets help provide direction and purpose. Ambitious investment targets are implied by 
the prospective SDGs. The international community would do well to make targets explicit, and spell out 
the consequences for investment policies and investment promotion at national and international levels. 
Achievable but ambitious targets, including for increasing public and private sector investment in LDCs, are 
desirable. 
Ensure policy coherence and creating synergies. Interaction between policies is important – between 
national and international investment policies, between investment and other sustainable-development-
related policies (e.g. tax, trade, competition, technology, and environmental, social and labour market 
policies), and between micro- and macroeconomic policies. Leadership is required to ensure that the global 
push for sustainable development and investment in SDGs has a voice in international macroeconomic 
policy coordination forums and global financial system reform processes, where decisions will have an 
fundamental bearing on the prospects for growth in SDG financing.
Establish a global multi-stakeholder platform on investing in the SDGs. A global multi-stakeholder body 
on investing in the SDGs could provide a platform for discussion on overall investment goals and targets, 
fostering promising initiatives to mobilize finance and spreading good practices, supporting actions on the 
ground, and ensuring a common approach to impact measurement.  
Create a multi-agency technical assistance facility for investment in the SDGs. Many initiatives aimed at 
increasing private sector investment in SDG sectors are complex, requiring significant technical capabilities 
and strong institutions. A multi-agency institutional arrangement could help to support LDCs, advising 
on, for example, the set-up of SDG project development agencies that can plan, package and promote 
pipelines of bankable projects; design of SDG-oriented incentive schemes; and regulatory frameworks. 
Coordinated efforts to enhance synergies are imperative.
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A range of policy options is available to respond to challenges and constraints 
in mobilizing funds, channelling them into SDG sectors, and ensuring sustainable 
impact
Challenges to mobilizing funds in financial markets include market failures and a lack of transparency on 
environmental, social and governance performance, misaligned incentives for market participants, and 
start-up and scaling problems for innovative financing solutions. Policy responses to build a more SDG-
conducive financial system might include:
•	 	Creating fertile soil for innovative SDG-financing approaches. Innovative financial instruments and funding 
mechanisms to raise resources for investment in SDGs deserve support to achieve scale. Promising 
initiatives include SDG-dedicated financial instruments and Impact Investment, funding mechanisms that 
use public sector resources to catalyse mobilization of private sector resources, and new “go-to-market” 
channels for SDG investment projects. 
•	 Building or improving pricing mechanisms for externalities. Effective pricing mechanisms for social and 
environmental externalities – either by attaching a cost to such externalities (e.g. through carbon taxes) 
or through market-based schemes – are ultimately fundamental to put financial markets and investors 
on a sustainable footing. 
•	 Promoting Sustainable Stock Exchanges (SSEs). SSEs provide listed entities with the incentives and 
tools to improve transparency on ESG performance, and allow investors to make informed decisions on 
responsible allocation of capital.
•	 Introducing financial market reforms. Realigning rewards in financial markets to favour investment in 
SDGs will require action, including reform of pay and performance structures, and innovative rating 
methodologies that reward long-term investment in SDG sectors.
Key constraints to channelling funds into SDG sectors include entry barriers, inadequate risk-return ratios 
for SDG investments, a lack of information and effective packaging and promotion of projects, and a lack 
of investor expertise. Effective policy responses may include the following.
•	 Reducing entry barriers, with safeguards. A basic prerequisite for successful promotion of SDG 
investment is a sound overall policy climate, conducive to attracting investment while protecting public 
interests, especially in sensitive sectors. 
•	 Expanding the use of risk-sharing tools for SDG investments. A number of tools, including public-private 
partnerships, investment insurance, blended financing and advance market commitments, can help 
improve the risk-return profile of SDG investment projects. 
•	 	Establishing new incentives schemes and a new generation of investment promotion institutions. SDG 
investment development agencies could target SDG sectors and develop and market pipelines of 
bankable projects. Investment incentives could be reoriented, to target investments in SDG sectors and 
made conditional on social and environmental performance. Regional initiatives can help spur private 
investment in cross-border infrastructure projects and regional clusters of firms in SDG sectors.
•	 	Building SDG investment partnerships. Partnerships between home countries of investors, host countries, 
TNCs and multilateral development banks can help overcome knowledge gaps as well as generate joint 
investments in SDG sectors.
Key challenges in maximizing the positive impact and minimizing the risks and drawbacks of private 
investment in SDG sectors include the weak absorptive capacity in some developing countries, social and 
environmental impact risks, and the need for stakeholder engagement and effective impact monitoring. 
Policy responses can include:
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•	 Increasing absorptive capacity. A range of policy tools are available to increase absorptive capacity, 
including the promotion and facilitation of entrepreneurship, support to technology development, human 
resource and skills development, business development services and promotion of business linkages. 
Development of linkages and clusters in incubators or economic zones specifically aimed at stimulating 
businesses in SDG sectors may be particularly effective.
•	 Establishing effective regulatory frameworks and standards. Increased private sector engagement 
in often sensitive SDG sectors needs to be accompanied by effective regulation. Particular areas of 
attention include human health and safety, environmental and social protection, quality and inclusiveness 
of public services, taxation, and national and international policy coherence. 
•	 Good governance, strong institutions, stakeholder engagement. Good governance and capable 
institutions are a key enabler for the attraction of private investment in general, and in SDG sectors in 
particular. They are also needed for effective stakeholder engagement and management of impact trade-
offs.
•	 Implementing SDG impact assessment systems. Monitoring of the impact of investment, especially along 
social and environmental dimensions, is key to effective policy implementation. A set of core quantifiable 
impact indicators can help. Impact measurement and reporting by private investors on their social and 
environmental performance promotes corporate responsibility on the ground and supports mobilization 
and channelling of investment. 
Figure 11 summarizes schematically the key challenges and policy responses for each element of the 
Strategic Framework. Detailed policy responses are included in UNCTAD’s Action Plan for Private Investment 
in the SDGs.
Figure 11. Key challenges and possible policy responses
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A Big Push for private investment in sustainable development
UNCTAD’s Action Plan for Private Investment in the SDGs contains a range of policy options to respond 
to the mobilization, channelling and impact challenges. However, a concerted push by the international 
community and by policymakers at national levels needs to focus on a few priority actions – or packages. 
Figure 12 proposes six packages that group actions related to specific segments of the “SDG investment 
chain” and that address relatively homogenous groups of stakeholders for action. Such a focused set of 
action packages can help shape a Big Push for private investment in sustainable development:
1.  A new generation of investment promotion strategies and institutions. Sustainable development projects, 
whether in infrastructure, social housing or renewable energy, require intensified efforts for investment 
promotion and facilitation. Such projects should become a priority of the work of IPAs and business 
development organizations. 
The most frequent constraint faced by potential investors in sustainable development projects is the 
lack of concrete proposals of sizeable, impactful, and bankable projects. Promotion and facilitation of 
investment in sustainable development should include the marketing of pre-packaged and structured 
projects with priority consideration and sponsorship at the highest political level. This requires specialist 
expertise and dedicated units, e.g. government-sponsored “brokers” of sustainable development 
investment projects. Putting in place such specialist expertise (ranging from project and structured 
finance expertise to engineering and project design skills) can be supported by technical assistance from 
a consortium of international organizations and multilateral development banks. Units could also be set 
up at the regional level to share costs and achieve economies of scale. 
Promotion of investment in SDG sectors should be supported by an international investment policy 
regime that effectively pursues the same objectives. Currently, IIAs focus on the protection of investment. 
Mainstreaming sustainable development in IIAs requires, among others, proactive promotion of 
investment, with commitments in areas such as technical assistance. Other measures include linking 
investment promotion institutions, facilitating SDG investments through investment insurance and 
guarantees, and regular impact monitoring.
2.  SDG-oriented investment incentives. Investment incentive schemes can be restructured specifically to 
facilitate sustainable development projects. A transformation is needed from purely “location-based” 
incentives, aiming to increase the competitiveness of a location and provided at the time of establishment, 
towards “SDG-based” incentives, aiming to promote investment in SDG sectors and conditional upon 
sustainable performance.
3.  Regional SDG Investment Compacts. Regional and South-South cooperation can foster SDG investment. 
Orienting regional cooperation towards the promotion of SDG investment can be especially effective for 
cross-border infrastructure development and regional clusters of firms operating in SDG sectors (e.g. 
green zones). This could include joint investment promotion mechanisms, joint programmes to build 
absorptive capacity, and joint public-private partnership models.
4.  New forms of partnership for SDG investments. Cooperation between outward investment agencies 
in home countries and IPAs in host countries could be institutionalized for the purpose of marketing 
SDG investment opportunities in home countries, provision of investment incentives and facilitation 
services for SDG projects, and joint monitoring and impact assessment. Outward investment agencies 
could evolve into genuine business development agencies for investments in SDG sectors in developing 
countries, raising awareness of investment opportunities, helping investors to bridge knowledge gaps, 
and practically facilitate the investment process. Concrete tools that might support SDG investment 
business development services might include online pipelines of bankable projects and opportunities 
for linkages programmes in developing countries. A multi-agency technical assistance consortium could 
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Figure 12. A Big Push for private investment in the SDGs: action packages
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help to support LDCs. South-South partnerships could also help spread good practices and lessons 
learned.
5.  Enabling innovative financing mechanisms and a reorientation of financial markets. New and existing 
financing mechanisms, such as green bonds or impact investing, deserve support and an enabling 
environment to allow them to be scaled up and marketed to the most promising sources of capital. 
Publicly sponsored seed funding mechanisms and facilitated access to financial markets for SDG projects 
are further mechanisms that merit attention. Furthermore, reorientation of financial markets towards 
sustainable development needs integrated reporting on the economic, social and environmental impact 
of private investors. This is a fundamental step towards responsible investment behavior in financial 
markets and a prerequisite for initiatives aimed at mobilizing funds for investment in SDGs; integrated 
reporting is at the heart of Sustainable Stock Exchanges.
6.  Changing the global business mindset and developing SDG investment expertise. The majority of 
managers in the world’s financial institutions and large multinational enterprises – the main sources 
of global investment – as well as most successful entrepreneurs tend to be strongly influenced by 
models of business, management and investment that are commonly taught in business schools. Such 
models tend to focus on business and investment opportunities in mature or emerging markets, with 
the risk-return profiles associated with those markets, while they tend to ignore opportunities outside 
the parameters of these models. Conventional models also tend to be driven exclusively by calculations 
of economic risks and returns, often ignoring broader social and environmental impacts, both positive 
and negative. Moreover, a lack of consideration in standard business school teachings of the challenges 
associated with operating in poor countries, and the resulting need for innovative problem solving, 
tend to leave managers ill-prepared for pro-poor investments. A curriculum for business schools that 
generates awareness of investment opportunities in poor countries and that instills in students the 
problem solving skills needed in developing-country operating environments can have an important long-
term impact. Inserting relevant modules in existing training and certification programmes for financial 
market participants can also help. 
The Action Plan for Private Investment in the SDGs is meant to serve as a point of reference for policymakers 
at national and international levels in their discussions on ways and means to implement the SDGs and 
the formulation of operational strategies for investing in the SDGs. It has been designed as a “living 
document” and incorporates an online version that aims to establish an interactive, open dialogue, inviting 
the international community to exchange views, suggestions and experiences. It thus constitutes a basis 
for further stakeholder engagement. UNCTAD aims to provide the platform for such engagement through 
its biennial World Investment Forum, and online through the Investment Policy Hub.
Mukhisa Kituyi
Secretary-General of the UNCTAD
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Global FDI flows rose by 9 per cent in 2013 to 
$1.45 trillion, up from $1.33 trillion in 2012, despite 
some volatility in international investments caused 
by the shift in market expectations towards an 
earlier tapering of quantitative easing in the United 
States. FDI inflows increased in all major economic 
groupings − developed, developing, and transition 
economies. Although the share of developed 
economies in total global FDI flows remained low, 
it is expected to rise over the next three years 
to 52 per cent (see section B) (figure I.1). Global 
inward FDI stock rose by 9 per cent, reaching $25.5 
trillion, reflecting the rise of FDI inflows and strong 
performance of the stock markets in many parts of 
the world. UNCTAD’s FDI analysis is largely based 
on data that exclude FDI in special purpose entities 
(SPEs) and offshore financial centres (box I.1).
1. FDI by geography
a. FDI inflows
The 9 per cent increase in global FDI inflows 
in 2013 reflected a moderate pickup in global 
economic growth and some large cross-border 
M&A transactions. The increase was widespread, 
covering all three major groups of economies, 
though the reasons for the increase differed across 
the globe. FDI flows to developed countries rose 
by 9 per cent, reaching $566 billion, mainly through 
greater retained earnings in foreign affiliates in the 
European Union (EU), resulting in an increase in 
FDI to the EU. FDI flows to developing economies 
reached a new high of $778 billion, accounting for 
54 per cent of global inflows. Inflows to transition 
economies rose to $108 billion – up 28 per cent 
from the previous year – accounting for 7 per cent 
of global FDI inflows.
Developing Asia remains the world’s largest 
recipient region of FDI flows (figure I.2). All 
subregions saw their FDI flows rise except West 
Asia, which registered its fifth consecutive decline in 
FDI. The absence of large deals and the worsening 
of instability in many parts of the region have caused 
uncertainty and negatively affected investment. 
FDI inflows to the Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations (ASEAN) reached a new high of $125 billion 
– 7 per cent higher than 2012. The high level of 
flows to East Asia was driven by rising inflows to 
China, which remained the recipient of the second 
largest flows in the world (figure I.3). 
After remaining almost stable in 2012, at historically 
high levels, FDI flows to Latin America and the 
Caribbean registered a 14 per cent increase to 
$292 billion in 2013. Excluding offshore financial 
centres, they increased by 6 per cent to $182 billion. 
In contrast to the preceding three 
years, when South America was the 
main driver of FDI flows to the region, 
2013 brought soaring flows to Central 
America. The acquisition in Mexico of 
Grupo Modelo by the Belgian brewer 
Anheuser Busch explains most of the 
FDI increase in Mexico as well as in the 
subregion. The decline of inflows to South 
America resulted mainly from the almost 
30 per cent slump noted in Chile, the 
second largest recipient of FDI in South 
America in 2012. The decrease was 
due to equity divestment in the mining 
sector and lower reinvested earnings 
by foreign mining companies as a 
result of the decrease in commodity 
prices. 
A. current trenDS
Figure I.1. FDI inflows, global and by group of economies, 1995–2013
and projections, 2014–2016
(Billions of dollars)
Source: UNCTAD FDI-TNC-GVC Information System, FDI/TNC database 
(www.unctad.org/fdistatistics).
52%
 0
 500
1 000
1 500
2 000
2 500
19
95
19
96
19
97
19
98
19
99
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
20
09
20
10
20
11
20
12
20
13
20
14
20
15
20
16
World total 
Developing 
economies
Transition
economies 
Developed 
economies
Projection
CHAPTER I  Global Investment Trends 3
FDI inflows to Africa rose by 4 per cent to $57 
billion. Southern African countries, especially 
South Africa, experienced high inflows. Persistent 
political and social tensions continued to subdue 
flows to North Africa, whereas Sudan and Morocco 
registered solid growth of FDI. Nigeria’s lower levels 
of FDI reflected the retreat of foreign transnational 
corporations (TNCs) from the oil industry.
In developed countries, inflows to Europe were 
up by 3 per cent compared with 2012. In the EU, 
Germany, Spain and Italy saw a substantial recovery 
in their FDI inflows in 2013. In Spain, lower labour 
costs attracted the interests of manufacturing 
TNCs. The largest declines in inflows were observed 
in France, Hungary, Switzerland and the United 
Kingdom.
FDI flows to North America grew by 23 per cent 
as acquisitions by Asian investors helped sustain 
inflows to the region. The largest deals included 
the takeover of the Canadian upstream oil and 
gas company, Nexen, by CNOOC (China) for $19 
billion; the acquisition of Sprint Nextel, the third 
Box I.1. UNCTAD FDI data: treatment of transit FDI
TNCs frequently make use of special purpose entities (SPEs) to channel their investments, resulting in large amounts 
of capital in transit. For example, an investment by a TNC from country A to create a foreign affiliate in country B 
might be channeled through an SPE in country C. In the capital account of the balance of payments of investor home 
and host countries, transactions or positions with SPEs are included in either assets or liabilities of direct investors 
(parent firms) or direct investment enterprises (foreign affiliates) – indistinguishable from other FDI transactions or 
positions. Such amounts are considerable and can lead to misinterpretations of FDI data. In particular: 
(i)  SPE-related investment flows might lead to double counting in global FDI flows (in the example above, the 
same value of FDI is counted twice, from A to C, and from C to B); and
(ii)  SPE-related flows might lead to misinterpretation of the origin of investment, where ultimate ownership is not 
taken into account (in the example, country B might consider that its inflows originate from country C, rather 
than from Country A).
In consultation with a number of countries that offer investors the option to create SPEs, and on the basis of 
information on SPE-related FDI obtained directly from those countries, UNCTAD removes SPE data from FDI flows 
and stocks, in order to minimize double counting. These countries include Austria, Hungary, Luxembourg, Mauritius 
and the Netherlands (box table I.1.1).
Similar issues arise in relation to offshore financial centres such as the British Virgin Islands and Cayman Islands. 
UNCTAD’s FDI data include those economies because no official statistics are available to use in disentangling 
transit investment from other flows, as in the case of SPEs. However, for the most part UNCTAD excludes flows to 
and from these economies in interpreting data on investment trends for their respective regions. Offshore financial 
centres accounted for 8 per cent of global FDI inflows in 2013, with growth rates similar to global FDI; the impact on 
the analysis of global trends is therefore likely to be limited.
Source: UNCTAD.
Box table I.1.1. FDI with and without SPes reported by unctAD, 2013
Austria Hungary  Luxembourg Mauritius  Netherlands
FDI With SPE
Without SPE 
(UNCTAD use)
With SPE
Without SPE 
(UNCTAD use)
With SPE
Without SPE 
(UNCTAD use)
With SPE
Without SPE 
(UNCTAD use)
With SPE
Without SPE 
(UNCTAD use)
FDI inflows   11.4   11.1   2.4   3.1   367.3   30.1   27.3   0.3   41.3   24.4
FDI ouflows   13.9   13.9   2.4   2.3   363.6   21.6   25.1   0.1   106.8   37.4
Inward FDI stock   286.3   183.6   255.0   111.0  3 204.8   141.4   312.6   3.5  3 861.8   670.1
Outward FDI stock   346.4   238.0   193.9   39.6  3 820.5   181.6   292.8   1.6  4 790.0  1 071.8
Source:  UNCTAD, based on data from respective central banks.
Note:  Stock data for Mauritius refer to 2012.
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level (table I.1). APEC now accounts for more 
than half of global FDI flows, similar to the 
G-20, while the BRICS jumped to more than 
one fifth. In ASEAN and the Common Market 
of the South (MERCOSUR), the level of FDI 
inflows doubled from the pre-crisis level. Many 
regional and interregional groups in which 
developed economies are members (e.g. 
G-20, NAFTA) are all experiencing a slower 
recovery.
Mixed trends for the megaregional 
integration initiatives: TPP and RCEP 
shares in global flows grew while TTIP 
shares halved. The three megaregional 
integration initiatives – the Transatlantic Trade 
and Investment Partnership (TTIP), the Trans-
Pacific Partnership (TPP) and the Regional 
Comprehensive Economic Partnership 
(RCEP) – show diverging FDI trends (see 
chapter II for details). The United States 
Figure I.2. FDI inflows, by region, 2008–2013
(Billions of dollars)
Source: UNCTAD FDI-TNC-GVC Information System, FDI/TNC database 
(www.unctad.org/fdistatistics).
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Figure I.3. FDI inflows: top 20 host economies, 2012 and 2013
(Billions of dollars)
Source: UNCTAD FDI-TNC-GVC Information System, FDI/TNC database 
(www.unctad.org/fdistatistics).
Note:  British Virgin Islands is not included in the ranking because 
of its nature as an offshore financial centre (most FDI is in 
transit).
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largest wireless network operator in the United 
States, by Japanese telecommunications 
group Softbank for $21.6 billion, the largest 
deal ever by a Japanese company; and the 
$4.8 billion acquisition of the pork producer 
Smithfield by Shuanghui, the largest Chinese 
takeover of a United States company to date. 
FDI flows to the United States rose by 17 per 
cent, reflecting signs of economic recovery in 
the United States over the past year.
Transition economies experienced a 28 per 
cent rise in FDI inflows, reaching $108 billion 
– much of it driven by a single country. The 
Russian Federation saw FDI inflows jump by 
57 per cent to $79 billion, making it the world’s 
third largest recipient of FDI for the first time 
(figure I.3). The rise was predominantly ascribed 
to the increase in intracompany loans and the 
acquisition by BP (United Kingdom) of 18.5 
per cent of Rosneft (Russia Federation) as part 
of Rosneft’s $57 billion acquisition of TNK-BP 
(see box II.4).
In 2013, APEC absorbed half of global 
flows – on par with the G-20; the BRICS 
received more than one fifth. Among major 
regional and interregional groupings, two – 
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) 
countries and the BRICS (Brazil, Russian 
Federation, India, China and South Africa) 
countries – saw a dramatic increase in their 
share of global FDI inflows from the pre-crisis 
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and the EU, which are negotiating the formation 
of TTIP, saw their combined share of global FDI 
inflows cut nearly in half over the past seven years, 
from 56 per cent during the pre-crisis period to 30 
per cent in 2013. The share of the 12 countries 
participating in the TPP negotiations was 32 per 
cent in 2013, markedly smaller than their share in 
world GDP of 40 per cent. RCEP, which is being 
negotiated between the 10 ASEAN member 
States and their 6 FTA partners, accounted for 24 
per cent of global FDI flows in recent years, nearly 
twice as much as before the crisis.
b. FDI outflows
Global FDI outflows rose by 5 per cent to $1.41 
trillion, up from $1.35 trillion in 2012. Investors from 
developing and transition economies continued 
their expansion abroad, in response to faster 
economic growth and investment liberalization 
(chapter III) as well as rising income streams from 
high commodity prices. In 2013 these economies 
accounted for 39 per cent of world outflows; 15 
years earlier their share was only 7 per cent (figure 
I.4). In contrast, TNCs from developed economies 
continued their “wait and see” approach, and their 
investments remained at a low level, similar to that 
of 2012.
FDI flows from developed countries continued 
to stagnate. FDI outflows from developed 
countries were unchanged from 2012 – at $857 
billion – and still 55 per cent off their peak in 2007. 
Developed-country TNCs continued to hold large 
amounts of cash reserves in their foreign affiliates in 
the form of retained earnings, which constitute part 
of reinvested earnings, one of the components of 
FDI flows. This component reached a record level 
of 67 per cent (figure I.5).
Investments from the largest investor – the United 
States – dropped by 8 per cent to $338 billion, led by 
the decline in cross-border merger and acquisition 
table I.1. FDI inflows to selected regional and interregional groups, 
average 2005–2007, 2008–2013
 (Billions of dollars)
Regional/inter-regional 
groups
2005–2007 pre-
crisis average
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
G-20 878 992 631 753 892 694 791
APEC 560 809 485 658 765 694 789
TPP 363 524 275 382 457 402 458
TTIP 838 858 507 582 714 377 434
RCEP 195 293 225 286 337 332 343
BRICS 157 285 201 237 286 266 304
NAFTA 279 396 184 250 287 221 288
ASEAN  65 50 47 99 100 118 125
MERCOSUR 31 59 30 65 85 85 85
Memorandum: percentage share in world FDI flows
G-20 59 55 52 53 52 52 54
APEC 37 44 40 46 45 52 54
TPP 24 29 23 27 27 30 32
TTIP 56 47 41 41 42 28 30
RCEP 13 16 18 20 20 25 24
BRICS 11 16 16 17 17 20 21
NAFTA 19 22 15 18 17 17 20
ASEAN  4 3 4 7 6 9 9
MERCOSUR 2 3 2 5 5 6 6
Source:  UNCTAD FDI-TNC-GVC Information System, FDI/TNC database (www.unctad.org/fdistatistics).  
Note:      G-20 = 19 individual members economies of the G20, excluding the European Union, which is the 20th member, APEC 
= Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, TTIP = Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership, TPP = Trans-Pacific 
Partnership, RCEP = Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership, BRICS = Brazil, Russian Federation, India, China 
and South Africa,  NAFTA =  North American Free Trade Agreement, ASEAN = Association of Southeast Asian Nations, 
MERCOSUR = Common Market of the South. Ranked in descending order of the 2013 FDI flows.
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(M&A) purchases and negative intracompany loans. 
United States TNCs continued to accumulate 
reinvested earnings abroad, attaining a record level 
of $332 billion. FDI outflows from the EU rose by 5 
per cent to $250 billion, while those from Europe as 
a whole increased by 10 per cent to $329 billion. 
With $60 billion, Switzerland became the largest 
outward investor in Europe, propelled by a doubling 
of reinvested earnings abroad and an increase in 
intracompany loans. Countries that had recorded a 
large decline in 2012, including Italy, the Netherlands 
and Spain, saw their outflows rebound sharply. 
In contrast, investments by TNCs from France, 
Germany and the United Kingdom saw a 
substantial decline. TNCs from France and the 
United Kingdom undertook significant equity 
divestment abroad. Despite the substantial 
depreciation of the currency, investments from 
Japanese TNCs continued to expand, rising 
by over 10 per cent to a record $136 billion. 
Flows from developing economies 
remained resilient, rising by 3 per cent. 
FDI from these economies reached a 
record level of $454 billion in 2013. Among 
developing regions, flows from developing 
Asia and Africa increased while those from 
Latin America and the Caribbean declined 
(figure I.6). Developing Asia remained a large 
source of FDI, accounting for more than one 
fifth of the world’s total.
Flows from developing Asia rose by 8 per cent to 
$326 billion with diverging trends among subregions: 
East and South-East Asia TNCs experienced growth 
of 7 per cent and 5 per cent, respectively; FDI flows 
from West Asia surged by almost two thirds; and 
TNC activities from South Asia slid by nearly three 
quarters. In East Asia, investment from Chinese 
TNCs climbed by 15 per cent to $101 billion owing 
to a surge of cross-border M&As (examples include 
the $19 billion CNOOC-Nexen deal in Canada and 
the $5 billion Shuanghui-Smithfield Foods deal in 
the United States). In the meantime, investments 
from Hong Kong (China) grew by 4 per cent 
to $92 billion. The two East Asian economies 
have consolidated their positions among the 
leading sources of FDI in the world (figure I.7). 
Investment flows from the two other important 
sources in East Asia – the Republic of Korea 
and Taiwan Province of China – showed 
contrasting trends: investments by TNCs 
from the former declined by 5 per cent to $29 
billion, while those by TNCs from the latter 
rose by 9 per cent to $14 billion.
FDI flows from Latin America and the 
Caribbean decreased by 8 per cent to $115 
billion in 2013. Excluding flows to offshore 
financial centres (box I.1), they declined by 31 
per cent to $33 billion. This drop was largely 
attributable to two developments: a decline 
in cross-border M&As and a strong increase 
in loan repayments to parent companies by 
Figure I.4. Share of FDI outflows by group of economies, 
1999–2013
(Per cent)
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Figure I.5. Share of FDI outflow components for selected 
developed countries,a 2007–2013
(Per cent)
Source: UNCTAD FDI-TNC-GVC Information System, FDI/TNC database 
(www.unctad.org/fdistatistics).
a Economies included are Belgium, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, 
Denmark, Estonia, Germany, Hungary, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Sweden, 
Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States.
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Brazilian and Chilean foreign affiliates abroad. 
Colombian TNCs, by contrast, bucked the regional 
trend and more than doubled their cross-border 
M&As. Investments from TNCs registered in 
Caribbean countries increased by 4 per cent 
in 2013, constituting about three quarters of 
the region’s total investments abroad.
FDI flows from transition economies 
increased significantly, by 84 per cent, 
reaching a new high of $99 billion. As in past 
years, Russian TNCs were involved in the 
most of the FDI projects, followed by TNCs 
from Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan. The value 
of cross-border M&A purchases by TNCs 
from the region rose significantly in 2013 – 
mainly as a result of the acquisition of TNK-
BP Ltd (British Virgin Islands) by Rosneft; 
however, the number of such deals dropped. 
2. FDI by mode of entry
The downward trend observed in 2012 both 
in FDI greenfield projects1 and in cross-border 
M&As reversed in 2013, confirming that the 
general investment outlook improved (figure 
I.8). The value of announced greenfield 
projects increased by 9 per cent – remaining, 
however, considerably below historical levels 
– while the value of cross-border M&As 
increased by 5 per cent. 
In 2013, both FDI greenfield projects and 
cross-border M&As displayed differentiated 
patterns among groups of economies. 
Developing and transition economies 
largely outperformed developed countries, 
with an increase of 17 per cent in the 
values of announced greenfield projects 
(from $389 billion to $457 billion), and a 
sharp rise of 73 per cent for cross-border 
M&As (from $63 billion to $109 billion). By 
contrast, in developed economies both 
greenfield investment projects and cross-
border M&As declined (by 4 per cent and 
11 per cent, respectively). As a result, 
developing and transition economies 
accounted for historically high shares of 
the total values of greenfield investment 
and M&A projects (68 per cent and 31 per 
cent respectively).
The importance of developing and 
transition economies stands out clearly in 
Figure I.6. FDI outflows, by region, 2008–2013
(Billions of dollars)
Source: UNCTAD FDI-TNC-GVC Information System, FDI/TNC database 
(www.unctad.org/fdistatistics).
Figure I.7. FDI outflows: top 20 home economies, 
2012 and 2013
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their roles as acquirers. Their cross-border M&As 
rose by 36 per cent to $186 billion, accounting for 
53 per cent of global cross-border M&As. Chinese 
firms invested a record $50 billion. A variety of 
firms, including those in emerging industries such 
as information technology (IT) and biotechnology, 
started to engage in M&As. As to outward greenfield 
investments, developing and transition economies 
accounted for one third of the global total. Hong 
Kong (China) stands out with an announced value 
of projects of $49 billion, representing 7 per cent 
of the global total. Greenfield projects from the 
BRICS registered a 16 per cent increase, driven by 
TNCs based in South Africa, Brazil and the Russian 
Federation. 
Southern TNCs acquired 
significant assets of developed-
country foreign affiliates in 
the developing world. In 2013, 
the value of cross-border M&A 
purchases increased marginally 
– by 5 per cent, to $349 billion – 
largely on the back of increased 
investment flows from developing 
and transition economies, whose 
TNCs captured a 53 per cent share 
of global acquisitions. The global 
rankings of the largest investor 
countries in terms of cross-border 
M&As reflect this pattern. For 
example, among the top 20 cross-
border M&A investors, 12 were 
from developing and transition 
economies – 7 more than in the case 
of FDI outflows. More than two thirds of 
gross cross-border M&As by Southern 
TNCs were directed to developing and 
transition economies. Half of these 
investments involved foreign affiliates 
of developed-country TNCs (figure I.9), 
transferring their ownership into the 
hands of developing-country TNCs. 
This trend was particularly marked 
in the extractive industry, where the 
value of transactions involving sales by 
developed-country TNCs to developing-
country-based counterparts represented 
over 80 per cent of gross acquisitions 
by South-based TNCs in the industry. 
In Africa as a whole, these purchases accounted 
for 74 per cent of all purchases on the continent. 
In the extractive sector, in particular, Asian TNCs 
have been making an effort to secure upstream 
reserves in order to satisfy growing domestic 
demand. At the same time, developed-country 
TNCs have been divesting assets in some areas, 
which eventually opens up opportunities for local or 
other developing-country firms to invest. 
The leading acquirer in South-South deals was 
China, followed by Thailand, Hong Kong (China), 
Mexico and India. Examples of this trend include 
several megadeals such as the Italian oil and gas 
group Eni’s sale of its subsidiary in Mozambique to 
PetroChina for over $4 billion; the oil and gas group 
Figure I.8. Historic trend of FDI projects, 2004–2013
(Billions of dollars)
Source: UNCTAD FDI-TNC-GVC Information System, cross-border M&A 
database for M&As and information from the Financial Times Ltd, 
fDi Markets (www.fDimarkets.com) for greenfield projects.
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Apache’s (United States) sale of its subsidiary in 
Egypt to Sinopec (China) for almost $3 billion; and 
ConocoPhillips’s sale of its affiliates in Algeria to an 
Indonesian State-owned company, Pertamina, for 
$1.8 billion.
The banking industry followed the same pattern: 
for example, in Colombia, Bancolombia acquired 
the entire share capital of HSBC Bank (Panama) 
from HSBC (United Kingdom) for $2.1 billion; and 
in Egypt, Qatar National Bank, a majority-owned 
unit of the State-owned Qatar Investment Authority, 
acquired a 77 per cent stake of Cairo-based 
National Société Générale Bank from Société 
Générale (France) for $1.97 billion.
This trend – developing countries conducting 
a high share of the acquisitions of developed-
country foreign affiliates – seems set to continue. 
Whereas in 2007 only 23 per cent of acquisitions 
from Southern TNCs from developing and transition 
economies targeted foreign affiliates of developed-
country corporations, after the crisis this percentage 
increased quickly, jumping to 30 per cent in 2010 
and 41 per cent in 2011 to half of all acquisitions 
in 2013.
3. FDI by sector and industry
At the sector level, the types of investment – 
greenfield activity and cross-border M&As – varied 
(figure I.10).
Primary sector. Globally, values of greenfield 
and M&A projects in the primary sector regained 
momentum in 2013 (increasing by 14 per cent and 
32 per cent, respectively), with marked differences 
between groups of countries. Greenfield activity in 
the extractive industry by developed and transition 
economies plummeted to levels near zero, leaving 
almost all the business to take place in developing 
countries. 
In developing countries the value of announced 
greenfield projects doubled, from $14 billion in 2012 
to $27 billion in 2013; the value of cross-border 
M&As also increased, from a negative level of 
-$2.5 billion in 2012 to $25 billion in 2013. Although 
the value of greenfield projects in developing 
economies still remains below historic levels, cross-
border M&As are back to recent historic highs 
(2010–2011). 
Manufacturing. Investment in manufacturing was 
relatively stable in 2013, with a limited decrease in the 
value of greenfield projects (-4 per cent) and a more 
pronounced increase in the value of cross-border 
M&As (+11 per cent). In terms of greenfield projects, 
a sharp rise in investment activity was observed in 
the textile and clothing industry, with the value of 
announced investment projects totalling more than 
$24 billion, a historical high and more than twice 
the 2012 level. Conversely, the automotive industry 
registered a significant decline for the third year in a 
Figure I.10. FDI projects, by sector, 2012–2013
(Billions of dollars)
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row. As for cross-border M&As, the regional trends 
display a clear divergence between developed and 
developing economies. While the value of cross-
border M&As in developed economies decreased 
by more than 20 per cent, developing economies 
enjoyed a fast pace of growth, seeing the value of 
such deals double. The growth in momentum was 
mainly driven by a boom in the value of cross-border 
M&As in the food, beverages and tobacco industry, 
which jumped from $12 billion in 2012 to almost 
$40 billion in 2013. 
Services. Services continued to account for the 
largest shares of announced greenfield projects 
and M&A deals. In 2013, it was the fastest-
growing sector in terms of total value of announced 
greenfield projects, with a significant increase of 20 
per cent, while the value of M&A deals decreased 
moderately. As observed in the primary sector, 
the increase in greenfield projects took place in 
developing economies (+40 per cent compared 
with -5 per cent in developed economies and -7 per 
cent in transition economies). The growth engines 
of the greenfield investment activity in developing 
economies were business services (for which 
the value of announced greenfield project tripled 
compared with 2012) and electricity, gas and water 
(for which the value of greenfield projects doubled). 
The analysis of the past sectoral distribution 
of new investment projects shows some 
important emerging trends in regional 
investment patterns. In particular, although 
foreign investments in many poor developing 
countries historically have concentrated heavily on 
the extractive industry, analysis of FDI greenfield 
data in the last 10 years depicts a more nuanced 
picture: the share of FDI in the extractive industry 
is still substantial but not overwhelming and, most 
important, it is rapidly decreasing. 
The analysis of the cumulative value of announced 
greenfield projects in developing countries for the 
last 10 years shows that investment in the primary 
sector (almost all of it in extractive industries) is 
more significant for Africa and least developed 
countries (LDCs) than for the average developed 
and developing economies (figure I.11). It also 
shows that in both Africa and LDCs, investment 
is relatively balanced among the three sectors. 
However, looking at greenfield investment in terms 
of the number of projects reveals a different picture, 
in which the primary sector accounts for only a 
marginal share in Africa and LDCs. 
Over the past 10 years the share of the 
primary sector in greenfield projects has been 
gradually declining in both Africa and LDCs, 
while that of the services sector has increased 
significantly (figure I.12). The value share of 
announced greenfield projects in the primary sector 
has decreased from 53 per cent in 2004 to 11 per 
Figure I.11. Sectoral distribution of announced greenfield FDI projects, by group of economies, 
cumulative 2004–2013
(Per cent)
Source: UNCTAD, based on information from the Financial Times Ltd, fDi Markets (www.fDimarkets.com).
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cent in 2013 for Africa, and from 74 per cent to 9 
per cent for LDCs. By comparison, the share for 
the services sector has risen from 13 per cent to 
63 per cent for Africa, and from 10 to 70 per cent 
for LDCs. 
At the global level some industries have experienced 
dramatic changes in FDI patterns in the face of the 
uneven global recovery. 
•	 Oil	 and	 gas. The shale gas revolution in the 
United States is a major game changer in the 
energy sector. Although questions concerning 
its environmental and economic sustainability 
remain, it is expected to shape the global FDI 
environment in the oil and gas industry and in 
other industries, such as petrochemicals, that 
rely heavily on gas supply.
•	 Pharmaceuticals. Although FDI in this industry 
remains concentrated in the United States, 
investments targeting developing economies 
are edging up. In terms of value, cross-
border M&As have been the dominant mode, 
enabling TNCs to improve their efficiency and 
profitability and to strengthen their competitive 
advantages in the shortest possible time.
•	 Retail	 industry. With the rise of middle classes 
in developing countries, consumer markets are 
flourishing. In particular, the retail industry is 
attracting significant levels of FDI.
a. Oil and gas
The rapid development of shale gas is changing the 
North American natural gas industry. Since 2007 the 
production of natural gas in the region has doubled, 
driven by the boom in shale gas production, which 
is growing at an average annual rate of 50 per 
cent.2 The shale gas revolution is also a key factor 
in the resurgence of United States manufacturing. 
The competitive gain produced by falling natural 
gas prices3 represents a growth opportunity for 
the manufacturing sector, especially for industries, 
such as petrochemicals, that rely heavily on natural 
gas as a fuel. 
The shale gas revolution may change the game 
in the global energy sector over the next decade 
and also beyond the United States. However, the 
realization of its potential depends crucially on a 
number of factors. Above all, the environmental 
impact of horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracturing 
is still a controversial issue, and opposition to the 
technique is strengthening. An additional element 
of uncertainty concerns the possibility of replicating 
the United States success story in other shale-rich 
countries, such as China or Argentina. Success will 
require the ability to put in place in the near future the 
necessary enablers, both “under the ground” (the 
technical capability to extract shale gas effectively 
and efficiently) and “above the ground” (a favourable 
business and investment climate to attract foreign 
Figure I.12. Historic evolution of the sectoral distribution of annouced greenfield FDI projects in Africa and LDcs, 
2004–2013
(Per cent of total value)
Source: UNCTAD, based on information from the Financial Times Ltd, fDi Markets (www.fDimarkets.com).
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players to share technical and technological know-
how). In addition, new evidence suggests that 
recoverable resources may be less than expected 
(see chapter II.2.c). 
From an FDI perspective, some interesting trends 
are emerging: 
•	 In	 the	 United	 States	 oil	 and	 gas	 industry,	 the	
role of foreign capital supplied by major TNCs 
is growing as the shale market consolidates 
and smaller domestic players need to share 
development and production costs. 
•	 Cheap	 natural	 gas	 is	 attracting	 new	 capacity	
investments, including foreign investments, 
to United States manufacturing industries 
that are characterized by heavy use of natural 
gas, such as petrochemicals and plastics. 
Reshoring of United States manufacturing 
TNCs is also an expected effect of the lowering 
of prices in the United States gas market.
•	 TNCs	 and	 State-owned	 enterprises	 (SOEs)	
from countries rich in shale resources, such 
as China, are strongly motivated to establish 
partnerships (typically in the form of joint 
ventures) with United States players to acquire 
the technical expertise needed to lead the 
shale gas revolution in their countries.
The FDI impact on the United States oil and 
gas industry: a market consolidation story. 
From an FDI perspective, the impact of the shale 
revolution on the United States oil and gas industry 
is an M&A story. In the start-up (greenfield) stage, 
the shale revolution was led by North American 
independents rather than oil and gas majors. 
Greenfield data confirm that, despite the shale gas 
revolution, FDI greenfield activity in the United States 
oil and gas industry has collapsed in the last five 
years, from almost $3 billion in 2008 (corresponding 
to some 5 per cent of all United States greenfield 
activity) to $0.5 billion in 2013 (or 1 per cent of all 
greenfield activity).4 Only in a second stage will the 
oil and gas majors enter the game, either engaging 
in M&A operations or establishing partnerships, 
typically joint ventures, with local players who are 
increasingly eager to share the development costs 
and ease the financial pressure.5 
Analysis of cross-border M&A deals in the recent 
years (figure I.13) shows that deals related to shale 
gas have been a major driver of cross-border M&A 
activity in the United States oil and gas industry, 
accounting for more than 70 per cent of the total 
value of such activity in the industry. The peak of 
the consolidation wave occurred in 2011, when 
the value of shale-related M&As exceeded $30 
billion, corresponding to some 90 per cent of the 
total value of cross-border M&As in the oil and gas 
industry in the United States. 
The FDI impact on the United States chemical 
industries: a growth story. The collapse of North 
American gas prices, down by one third to one 
fourth since 2008, is boosting new investments in 
United States chemical industries. 
Unlike in the oil and gas industry, a significant 
part of the foreign investment in the United States 
chemical industry goes to greenfield investment 
projects. A recent report by the American Chemical 
Council6 confirms the trend toward new capacity 
investments. On the basis of investment projects 
that had been announced by March 2013, the 
report estimates the cumulative capital expenditure 
in the period 2010–2020 attributable to the shale 
gas revolution at $71.7 billion. United States TNCs 
such as ExxonMobil, Chevron and Dow Chemicals 
will play a significant role in this expenditure, with 
investments already planned for several billion 
dollars. 
These operations may also entail a reshoring of 
current foreign business, with a potential negative 
Figure I.13. estimated value and share of shale gas 
cross-border M&A deals in all such dealsa in the 
united States oil and gas industry, 2008–2013
(Billions of dollars and per cent)
Source: UNCTAD FDI-TNC-GVC Information System, cross-
border M&A database for M&As; other various sources.
a Includes changes of ownership.
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impact (through divestments) on inward FDI to 
traditionally cheap production locations such as 
West Asia or China (see chapter II.2.c). TNCs from 
other countries are also actively seeking investment 
opportunities in the United States. According to 
the Council’s report, nearly half of the cumulative 
$71.7 billion in investments is coming from foreign 
companies, often through the relocation of plants 
to the United States. The investment wave involves 
not only TNCs from the developed world; those 
from developing and transition economies are also 
increasingly active, aiming to capture the United 
States shale opportunity.7
As a consequence, the most recent data show 
a significant shift in global greenfield activity in 
chemicals towards the United States: in 2013 the 
country’s share in chemical greenfield projects 
(excluding pharmaceutical products) reached a 
record high of 25 per cent, from historical levels 
between 5 and 10 per cent – well above the 
average United States share for all other industries 
(figure I.14). 
The FDI impact on other shale-rich countries 
(e.g. China): a knowledge-sharing story. 
TNCs, including SOEs from countries rich in shale 
resources, are strongly motivated to establish 
partnerships with the United States and other 
international players to acquire the technical know-
how to replicate the success of the United States 
shale revolution in their home countries. In terms of 
FDI, this is likely to have a twofold effect:
•	 Outward	 FDI	 flows	 to	 the	 United	 States	
are expected to increase as these players 
proactively look for opportunities to acquire 
know-how in the field through co-management 
(with domestic companies) of United States 
shale projects. Chinese companies have been 
among the most active players. In 2013, for 
example, Sinochem entered into a $1.7 billion 
joint venture with Pioneer Natural Resources to 
acquire a stake in the Wolcamp Shale in Texas. 
•	 Foreign	 capital	 in	 shale	 projects	 outside	
the United States is expected to grow as 
companies from shale-rich countries are 
seeking partnerships with foreign companies to 
develop their domestic shale projects. In China 
the two giant State oil and gas companies, 
PetroChina and CNOOC, have signed a 
number of agreements with major western 
TNCs, including Shell. In some cases these 
agreements involve only technical assistance 
and support; in others they also involve 
actual foreign capital investment. This is the 
case with the Shell-PetroChina partnership in 
the Sichuan basin, which entails a $1 billion 
investment from Shell. In other shale-rich 
countries such as Argentina and Australia 
the pattern is similar, with a number of joint 
ventures between domestic companies and 
international players.
b. Pharmaceuticals
A number of factors caused a wave of 
restructuring and new market-seeking 
investments in the pharmaceuticals industry. 
They include the “patent cliff” faced by some large 
TNCs,8 increasing demand for generic drugs, 
and growth opportunities in emerging markets. A 
number of developed-country TNCs are divesting 
non-core business segments and outsourcing 
research and development (R&D) activities,9 while 
acquiring or merging with firms in both developed 
and developing economies to secure new streams 
of revenues and to optimize costs. Global players 
Figure I.14. united States share of global annouced
greenfield FDI projects, chemicalsa vs all industries,
2009–2013
(Per cent of total value)
Source: UNCTAD FDI-TNC-GVC Information System, information 
from the Financial Times Ltd, fDi Markets (www.
fDimarkets.com).
a Excluding the pharmaceutical industry.
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in this industry are keen to gain access to high-
quality, low-cost generic drug manufacturers.10 To 
save time and resources, instead of developing 
new products from scratch, TNCs are looking for 
acquisition opportunities in successful research 
start-ups and generics firms (UNCTAD 2011b). 
Some focus on smaller biotechnology firms that 
are open to in-licensing activities and collaboration. 
Others look for deals to develop generic versions of 
medicines.11 Two other factors – the need to deploy 
vast reserves of retained earnings held overseas 
and the desire for tax savings – are also driving 
developed-country TNCs to acquire assets abroad. 
A series of megadeals over the last two decades 
has reshaped the industry.12
FDI in pharmaceuticals13 has been 
concentrated in developed economies, 
especially in the United States – the largest 
pharmaceuticals market for FDI.14 Although the 
number of greenfield FDI projects announced was 
similar to the number of cross-border M&As,15 the 
transaction values of the M&As (figure I.15) were 
notably greater than the announced values of the 
greenfield projects for the entire period (figure I.16). 
The impact of M&A deals in biological products on the 
overall transaction volume became more prominent 
since 2009. After a rise in 2011, these cross-border 
M&A activities – both in value and in the number 
of deals – dropped in 2012–2013. The slowdown 
also reflects a smaller number of 
megadeals involving large TNCs in 
developed economies. 
Announced greenfield investments 
in developing economies have been 
relatively more important than devel-
oped-country projects since 2009, 
when they hit a record $5.5 billion 
(figure I.16). In 2013, while greenfield 
FDI in developed economies stagnat-
ed ($3.8 billion), announced greenfield 
investments in developing economies 
($4.3 billion) represented 51 per cent 
of global greenfield FDI in pharmaceu-
ticals (compared with an average of 
40 per cent for the period 2003–2012). 
Pharmaceutical TNCs are likely to 
continue to seek growth opportuni-
ties through acquisitions, pursuing growth in emerg-
ing markets and opportunities for new product de-
velopment and marketing.16 Restructuring efforts by 
developed-country TNCs are gaining momentum, 
and further consolidation of the global generic mar-
ket is highly likely.17 During the first quarter of 2014, 
the transaction value of cross-border M&As ($22.8 
billion in 55 deals) already surpassed the value re-
corded for all of 2013.18 Announcements of poten-
tial deals strongly suggest a return of megadeals,19 
led by cash-rich TNCs holding record amounts of 
cash reserves in their foreign affiliates.20
The increasing interest of pharmaceuticals 
TNCs in emerging markets can also be witnessed 
in the trends in cross-border M&As. In developing 
economies, the transaction value of cross-border 
M&A deals in pharmaceuticals, including biological 
products, soared in 2008 (from $2.2 billion in 2007 
to $7.9 billion),21 driven by the $5.0 billion acquisition 
of Ranbaxy Laboratories (India) by Daiichi Sankyo 
(Japan).22 It hit another peak ($7.5 billion) in 2010, 
again led by a $3.7 billion deal that targeted India.23 
As shown in figure I.15, transaction volumes in 
developing and transition economies remain a 
fraction of global cross-border M&A activities in this 
industry, but their shares are expanding. In 2013, at 
$6.6 billion,24 their share in global pharmaceutical 
deals reached the highest on record (figure I.17).25 
Figure I.15. cross-border M&A deals in pharmaceuticals,a 2003–2013
(Billions of dollars)
Source: UNCTAD FDI-TNC-GVC Information System, cross-border M&A database.
a Includes biological products.
b A substantial part of  pharmaceuticals in developed countries is accounted for 
by biological products.
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Pharmaceutical TNCs’ growing interest in emerging 
markets as a new platform for growth will expand 
opportunities for developing and transition 
economies to attract investment. In Africa, for 
example, where the growing middle class 
is making the market more attractive to the 
industry, the scale and scope of manufacturing 
and R&D investments are likely to expand to 
meet increasing demands for drugs to treat 
non-communicable diseases.26 At the same 
time, TNCs may become more cautious about 
their operations and prospects in emerging 
markets as they face shrinking margins for 
generics27 as well as bribery investigations,28 
concerns about patent protection of branded 
drugs,29 and failures of acquired developing-
country firms to meet quality and regulatory 
compliance requirements.30
For some developing and transition 
economies, the changing global environment 
in this industry poses new challenges. For 
example, as India and other generic-drug-
manufacturing countries start to export more 
drugs to developed economies, one possible 
scenario is a supply shortage in poor countries, 
leading to upward pressures on price, 
which will adversely affect access to 
inexpensive, high-quality generic drugs 
by people in need (UNCTAD 2013a). 
In Bangladesh, where the domestic 
manufacturing base for generics has 
been developed by restricting FDI and 
benefitting from TRIPS exemptions, 
the Government will have to make 
substantial changes in its policies and 
in development strategies pertaining to 
its pharmaceutical industry in order to 
achieve sustainable growth.31 
c. Retail
Changing industrial context. The 
global retail industry is in the midst of an 
industrial restructuring, driven by three 
important changes. First, the rise of 
e-commerce is changing consumers’ 
purchasing behaviour and exerts 
strong pressures on the traditional 
retail sector, particularly in developed 
countries and high-income developing countries. 
Second, strong economic growth and the rapid 
expansion of the middle class have created 
important retail markets in not only large emerging 
Figure I.16. Value of greenfield FDI projects announced in
 pharmaceuticals, by group of economies, 2003–2013
(Billions of dollars)
Source: UNCTAD, based on information from the Financial Times Ltd, fDi 
Markets (www.fDimarkets.com).
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Developing economies Transition economies Developed economies
Figure I.17. cross-border M&A deals in pharmaceuticalsa 
targeted at developing and transition economies, 2004–2013
Source: UNCTAD FDI-TNC-GVC Information System, cross-border 
M&A database.
a Includes biological products.
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markets but also other relatively small developing 
countries. Third, competition has intensified, and 
margins narrowed, as market growth has slowed. 
In some large emerging markets, foreign retailers 
now face difficulties because of the rising number 
of domestic retailers and e-commerce companies 
alike, as well as rising operational costs due to 
higher real estate prices, for example. 
These changes have significantly affected the 
internationalization strategies and practices of 
global retailers. Some large retail chains based 
in developed countries have started to optimize 
the scale of their businesses to fewer stores and 
smaller formats. They do this first in their home 
countries and other developed-country markets, 
but now the reconfiguration has started to affect 
their operations in emerging markets. In addition, 
their internationalization strategies have become 
more selective: a number of the world’s largest 
retailers have slowed their expansion in some large 
markets (e.g. Brazil, China) and are giving more 
attention to other markets with greater growth 
potential (e.g. sub-Saharan Africa).
Global retailers slow their expansion in large 
emerging markets. Highly internationalized, the 
top five retail TNCs (table I.2) account for nearly 
20 per cent of the total sales of the world’s 
250 largest retailers, and their share in total 
foreign sales is more than 30 per cent.32 The latest 
trends in their overseas investments showcase 
the effects of an overall industry restructuring 
on firms’ international operations. For instance, 
the expansion of Wal-Mart (United States) in 
Brazil and China has slowed. After years of rapid 
expansion, Wal-Mart has nearly 400 stores in 
China, accounting for about 11 per cent of Chinese 
hypermarket sales. In October 2013, the company 
announced that it would close 25 underperfor-
ming stores, some of which were gained through 
the acquisition of Trust-Mart (China) in 2007.33
A number of companies undertake divestments 
abroad in order to raise cash and shore up balance 
sheets,34 and it seems that regional and national 
retailers have accordingly taken the opportunity 
to expand their market shares, including 
through the acquisition of assets sold by TNCs. 
Carrefour (France) sold $3.6 billion in assets in 
2012, withdrawing from Greece, Colombia and 
Indonesia. In 2013, the French retailer continued to 
downsize and divest internationally. In April, it sold 
a 12 per cent stake in a joint venture in Turkey to 
its local partner, Sabanci Holding, for $79 million. 
In May, it sold a 25 per cent stake in another joint 
venture in the Middle East to local partner MAF for 
$680 million. Carrefour has also closed a number 
of stores in China. 
New growth markets stand out as a focus of 
international investment. Some relatively low-
income countries in South America, sub-Saharan 
Africa and South-East Asia have become increasingly 
attractive to FDI by the world’s top retailers. After the 
outbreak of the global financial crisis, the international 
expansion of large United States and European 
retailers slowed owing to economic recession and 
its effects on consumer spending in many parts of 
the world. Retailers’ expansion into large emerging 
markets also slowed, as noted above. However, 
Western retailers continued to establish and expand 
their presence in the new growth markets, because 
of their strong economic growth, burgeoning middle 
table I.2. top 5 tncs in the retail industry, ranked by foreign assets, 2012
(Billions of dollars and number ef employees)
Corporation Home economy
Sales Assets Employment Countries of 
operation
Transnationality 
IndexaForeign Total Foreign Total Foreign Total
Wal-Mart Stores Inc United States  127  447  84  193 800 000 2 200 000 28 0.76
Tesco PLC United Kingdom  35  103  39  76 219 298 519 671 33 0.84
Carrefour SA France  53  98  34  61 267 718 364 969 13 0.57
Metro AG Germany  53  86  27  46 159 344 248 637 33 0.62
Schwarz Groupb Germany  49  88 .. .. .. .. 26 0.56
Source:  UNCTAD, based on data from Thomson ONE.
a  The Transnationality Index is calculated as the average of the following three ratios: foreign to total assets, foreign to total 
sales and foreign to total employment, except for Schwarz Group which is based on the foreign to total sales ratio.
b  Data of 2011.
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class, increasing purchasing power and youthful 
populations.
Africa has the fastest-growing middle class in 
the world: according to the African Development 
Bank, the continent’s middle class numbers about 
120 million now and will grow to 1.1 billion by 2060. 
Wal-Mart plans to open 90 new stores across 
sub-Saharan Africa over the next three years, as it 
targets growth markets such as Nigeria and Angola. 
As Carrefour retreats from other foreign markets, 
it aims to open its first store in Africa in 2015, in 
Côte d’Ivoire, followed by seven other countries 
(Cameroon, Congo, the Democratic Republic of 
the Congo, Gabon, Ghana, Nigeria and Senegal). 
In the luxury goods segment as well, some of the 
world’s leading companies are investing in stores 
and distribution networks in Africa (chapter II.1). 
More and more cross-border M&As, including in 
e-commerce. Global retailers invest internationally 
through both greenfield investments and cross-
border M&As, and sometimes they operate in 
foreign markets through non-equity modes, most 
notably franchising. Available data show that, since 
2009, international greenfield investment in retail 
dropped for three years before a recent pickup; 
by contrast, the value of cross-border M&As in the 
sector has increased continuously. In 2012, driven 
by the proactive international expansion of some 
large TNCs, total global sales of cross-border M&As 
surpassed the pre-crisis level, and that amount 
continued to rise in 2013. 
A number of megadeals have been undertaken in 
industrialized economies over the past few years.35 
At the same time, the world’s leading retailers 
have expanded into emerging markets more and 
more through cross-border M&As. For instance, 
in 2009, Wal-Mart (United States) acquired a 58 
per cent stake in DYS, Chile’s largest food retailer, 
with an investment of $1.5 billion; and in 2012, it 
acquired South Africa’s Massmart for $2.4 billion. 
International M&As have also targeted e-commerce 
companies in key markets, particularly China, where 
online retail sales have reached almost the same 
level as in the United States. Apart from foreign 
e-commerce companies, international private 
equity investors such as Bain Capital and IDG 
Capital Partners (both from the United States) and 
sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) such as Temasek 
(Singapore) have invested in leading Chinese 
e-commerce companies, including in Alibaba and 
JD.com before their planned initial public offering 
(IPO) in the United States (table I.3). 
4. FDI by selected types of investors
This subsection discusses recent trends in FDI by 
private equity funds, SWFs and SOEs.
a. Private equity firms
In 2013, the unspent outstanding funds of 
private equity firms (so-called dry powder) 
grew further to a record level of $1.07 trillion, 
an increase of 14 per cent over the previous 
year. Firms thus did not use funds for investment 
despite the fact that they could raise more money 
for leverage owing to quantitative easing and low 
interest rates. This is reflected also in lower levels of 
FDI by such firms. In 2013, their new cross-border 
investment (usually through M&As due to the nature 
of the business) was only $171 billion ($83 billion 
net of divestments), accounting for 21 per cent of 
gross cross-border M&As. This was 10 percentage 
points lower than in the peak year of 2007 (table I.4). 
Private equity markets remain muted. In addition, 
private equity firms are facing increasing scrutiny 
from regulatory and tax authorities, as well as rising 
pressure to find cost savings in their operations and 
portfolio firms. 
Private equity firms are becoming relatively more 
active in emerging markets (figure I.18). In particular, 
in Asia they acquired more companies, pushing up 
the value of M&As. Examples include the acquisitions 
table I.3. Five largest cross-border 
international private equity investments in               
e-commerce in china, 2010–2012
Company Foreign investors
Investment 
($ million)
Year
Alibaba
Sequoia Capital, Silver Lake, 
Temasek
3 600 2011, 2012
JD.com
Tiger Fund, HilhouseCapitalMa-
nagement
1 500 2011
Yougou Belly International 443 2011
Gome Bain Capital 432 2010
VANCL Temasek, IDG Capital 230 2011
Source:  UNCTAD, based on ChinaVenture (www.chinaventure.
com.cn).
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of Ping An Insurance of China by a group of investors 
from Thailand for $9.4 billion and Focus Media 
Holding (China) by Giovanna Acquisition (Cayman 
Islands) for $3.6 billion. Outside Asia, some emerging 
economies, such as Brazil, offer opportunities for the 
growth of private equity activity. For example, in Latin 
America, where Latin America-based private equity 
firms invested $8.9 billion in 2013, with $3.5 billion 
going to infrastructure, oil and energy.36 In addition, 
FDI by foreign private equity firms for the same year 
was $6 billion. In contrast, slow M&A growth in 
regions such as Europe meant fewer opportunities 
for private equity firms to pick up assets that might 
ordinarily be sold off during or after an acquisition. 
Furthermore, the abundance of cheap credit and 
better asset performance in areas such as real estate 
made private equity less attractive. 
In 2013, private equity funds attracted attention 
with their involvement in delisting major public 
companies such as H. J. Heinz and Dell (both 
United States), and with large cross-border M&As 
such as the acquisition of Focus Media Holding, 
as mentioned above. Furthermore, increases in 
both club deals – deals involving several private 
equity funds – and secondary buyouts, in which 
investments change hands from one private equity 
fund to another, may signal a diversification of 
strategies in order to increase corporate value in the 
context of the generally low investment activity by 
private equity firms.
Secondary buyouts have been increasingly popular 
also as an exit route in 2013, particularly in Western 
Europe. Some of the largest private equity deals 
of the year were sales to other buyout firms. For 
example, Springer Science+Business Media 
(Germany), owned by EQT Partners (United States) 
and the Government of Singapore Investment 
Corporation (GIC), was sold to BC Partners (United 
Kingdom) for $4.4 billion. Nevertheless, there is still 
an overhang of assets that were bought before the 
financial crisis that have yet to realize their expected 
value and have not been sold.
Although emerging market economies appear to 
provide the greater potential for growth, developed 
countries still offer investment targets, in particular 
table I.4. cross-border M&As by private equity firms, 1996–2013
(Number of deals and value)
Number of deals Gross M&As Net M&As
Year Number Share in total (%) Value ($ billion) Share in total (%) Value ($ billion) Share in total (%)
1996  989 16   44 16 18 12 
1997 1 074 15   58 15 18 10 
1998 1 237 15   63 9 29 8 
1999 1 466 15   81 9 27 5 
2000 1 478 14   83 6 30 3 
2001 1 467 17   85 11 36 8 
2002 1 329 19   72 14 14 6 
2003 1 589 23   91 23 31 19 
2004 1 720 22   134 25 62 31 
2005 1 892 20   209 23 110 20 
2006 1 898 18   263 23 118 19 
2007 2 108 17   541 31 292 28 
2008 2 015 18   444 31 109 17 
2009 2 186 24   115 18 70 25 
2010 2 280 22   147 19 68 20 
2011 2 026 19   161 15 69 12 
2012 2 300 23   192 23 67 20 
2013 2 043 24   171 21 83 24 
Source:  UNCTAD FDI-TNC-GVC Information System, cross-border M&A database (www.unctad.org/fdistatistics).
Note:  Value on a net basis takes into account divestments by private equity funds. Thus it is calculated as follows: Purchases 
of companies abroad by private equity funds (-) Sales of foreign affiliates owned by private equity funds. The table 
includes M&As by hedge and other funds (but not sovereign wealth funds). Private equity firms and hedge funds refer to 
acquirers as “investors not elsewhere classified”. This classification is based on the Thomson ONE database on M&As.
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in small and medium-size enterprises (SMEs), 
which are crucial to economic recovery and to the 
absorption of unemployment. In the EU, where one 
of the dominant concerns for SMEs is access to 
finance – a concern that was further aggravated 
during the crisis37 – private equity funds are an 
important alternative source of finance. 
b. SWFs
SWFs continue to grow, spread geographically, 
but their FDI is still small. Assets under manage-
ment of more than 70 major SWFs approached 
$6.4 trillion based in countries around the world, 
including in sub-Saharan Africa. In ad dition to the 
$150 billion Public Investment Corporation of South 
Africa, SWFs were established recently in Angola, 
Nigeria and Ghana, with oil proceeds of $5 billion, 
$1 billion and $500 million, respectively. Since 2010, 
SWF assets have grown faster than the assets of 
any other institutional investor group, including pri-
vate equity and hedge funds. In the EU, for example, 
between 15 and 25 per cent of listed companies 
have SWF shareholders. In 2013, FDI flows of SWFs, 
which had remained subdued after the crisis, reached 
$6.7 billion, with cumulative flows of $130 billion 
(figure I.19).
FDI by SWFs is still small, corresponding to less 
than 2 per cent of total assets under management 
and represented mostly by a few major SWFs. 
Nevertheless, the geographical scope of their 
investment has recently been expanding to markets 
such as sub-Saharan Africa. In 2011, China 
Investment Corporation (CIC) bought a 25 per cent 
stake in Shanduka Groupe (South Africa) for $250 
million, and in late 2013 Temasek (Singapore’s 
SWF) paid $1.3 billion to buy a 20 per cent stake in 
gas fields in the United Republic of Tanzania. 
SWFs’ investment portfolios are expanding 
across numerous sectors, including the retail and 
consumer sectors, where Temasek’s acquisition 
of a 25 per cent stake in AS Watson (Hong Kong, 
China) for $5.7 billion in early 2014 is an example. 
SWFs are also expanding their investment in 
real estate markets in developed countries. For 
example, in early 2014, the Abu Dhabi Investment 
Authority and Singapore’s GIC purchased an office 
building in New York for $1.3 billion, and China’s 
CIC spent £800 million for an office area in London. 
In December 2013, GIC and Kuwait’s government 
real estate company bought office buildings in 
London for £1.7 billion. Norway’s Government 
Pension Fund Global, the largest SWF, also started 
Figure I.18. FDI by private equity funds, by major host region, 1995–2013
(Billions of dollars and per cent)
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to invest in real estate outside Europe in 2013, 
with up to 5 per cent of its total funds. Global real 
estate investment by SWFs is expected to run to 
more than $1 trillion in 2014, a level similar to the 
pre-crisis position seven years ago.38 
SWF motives and types of investment targets differ. 
The share of investment by SWFs in the Gulf region, 
for example, has been increasing in part due to 
external factors, such as the euro crisis, but also 
in support of boosting public investment at home. 
Gulf-based SWFs are increasingly investing in their 
domestic public services (health, education and 
infrastructure), which may lower their level of FDI 
further. For countries with SWFs, public investment 
is increasingly seen as having better returns 
(financial and social) than portfolio investment 
abroad. Chapter IV looks at ways that countries 
without SWFs may be able to tap into this public-
services investment expertise.
By contrast, Malaysia’s SWF, Khazanah, like many 
other SWFs,39 views itself more as a strategic 
development fund. Although 35 per cent of its assets 
are invested abroad, it targets the bulk of its investment 
at home to strategic development sectors, such 
as utilities, telecommunications and other infra-
structure, which are relevant for sustainable 
development, as well as trying to crowd in private-
sector investment.40
In an effort to source funds widely and attract private 
investment for public investment, some SWFs are 
engaged in public offerings. For example, in 2013, 
Doha Global Investment Company (backed by the 
Qatari SWF) decided to launch an IPO. The IPO 
will offer shares only to Qatari nationals and private 
Qatari companies, thereby sharing some of the 
benefits of Qatari sovereign investments directly with 
the country’s citizens and companies. 
SWFs are undertaking more joint activity with 
private equity fund managers and management 
companies, in part as a function of the decline of 
private equity activity since the crisis. SWFs are 
also taking larger stakes in private equity firms 
as the funds look for greater returns following 
declining yields on their traditional investments (e.g. 
government bonds). SWFs may also be favouring 
partnerships with private equity firms as a way of 
securing managerial expertise in order to support 
more direct involvement in their acquisitions; for 
example, Norway’s Government Pension Fund 
Global, which is a shareholder of Eurazeo (France), 
Ratos (Sweden), Ackermans en Van Haaren 
(Belgium) and other companies; and the United Arab 
Emirates’ Mubadala, which is a shareholder in The 
Carlyle Group (United States). These approaches 
by SWFs to using and securing funds for further 
investment provide useful lessons for other financial 
firms in financing for development. 
c. SOEs
State-owned TNCs (SO-TNCs) represent a 
small part of the global TNC universe,41 but the 
number of their foreign affiliates and the scale 
of their foreign assets are significant. According 
to UNCTAD’s estimates, there are at least 550 SO-
TNCs; their foreign assets are estimated at more 
than $2 trillion.42 Both developed and developing 
countries have SO-TNCs, some of them among the 
largest TNCs in the world (table I.5). A number of 
European countries, such as Denmark, France and 
Germany, as well as the BRICS, are home to the 
most important SO-TNCs. 
Figure I.19. Annual and cumulative value of FDI 
by SWFs, 2000–2013
(Billions of dollars)
Source: UNCTAD FDI-TNC-GVC Information System, cross-
border M&A database for M&As and information from 
the Financial Times Ltd, fDi Markets (www.fDimarkets.
com) for greenfield projects.
Note: Data include value of flows for both cross-border M&As 
and greenfield FDI projects and only investments by 
SWFs which are the sole and immediate investors. Data 
do not include investments made by entities established 
by SWFs or those made jointly with other investors. In 
2003–2013, cross-border M&As accounted for about 
80 per cent of total. 
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
0
5
10
15
20
25
20
00
20
01
20
02
20
03
20
04
20
05
20
06
20
07
20
08
20
09
20
10
20
11
20
12
20
13
Annual ows (left scale)
Cumulative ows 
(right scale)
CHAPTER I  Global Investment Trends 21
In line with the industrial characteristics of SOEs in 
general, SO-TNCs tend to be active in industries that 
are capital-intensive, require monopolistic positions 
to gain the necessary economies of scale or are 
deemed to be of strategic importance to the country. 
Therefore, their global presence is considerable in 
the extractive industries (oil and gas exploration and 
metal mining), infrastructure industries and public 
utilities (electricity, telecommunication, transport 
and water), and financial services. The oil and gas 
industry offers a typical example of the prominence 
of SOEs, particularly in the developing world: SOEs 
control more than three fourths of global crude oil 
reserves. In addition, some of the world’s largest 
TNCs in the oil and gas industry are owned and 
controlled by developing-country governments, 
including CNPC, Sinopec and CNOOC in China, 
Gazprom in the Russian Federation, Petronas in 
Malaysia, Petrobras in Brazil and Saudi Aramco in 
Saudi Arabia.
Owing to the general lack of data on FDI by 
companies with different ownership features, it is 
difficult to assess the global scale of FDI flows related 
to SO-TNCs. However, the value of FDI projects, 
including both cross-border M&A purchases and 
announced greenfield investments, can provide a 
rough picture of such FDI flows and their fluctuation 
over the years (figure I.20). Overall, FDI by SO-TNCs 
had declined in every year after the global financial 
table I.5. the top 15 non-financial State-owned tncs,a ranked by foreign assets, 2012
(Billions of dollars and number of employees)
SO-TNCs Home country Industry
State 
share
Assets Sales Employment Transnationality 
Index bForeign Total Foreign Total Foreign Total
GDF Suez France Utilities   36   175   272   79   125  110 308  219 330 0.59
Volkswagen Group Germany Motor vehicles   20   158   409   199   248  296 000  533 469 0.58
Eni SpA Italy Oil and gas   26   133   185   86   164  51 034  77 838 0.63
Enel SpA Italy Utilities   31   132   227   66   109  37 588  73 702 0.57
EDF SA France Utilities   84   103   331   39   93  30 412  154 730 0.31
Deutsche Telekom AG Germany Telecommunications   32   96   143   42   75  113 502  232 342 0.58
CITIC Group China Diversified   100   72   515   10   52  30 806  140 028 0.18
Statoil ASA Norway Oil and gas   67   71   141   28   121  2 842  23 028 0.29
General Motors Co United States Motor vehicles   16   70   149   65   152  108 000  213 000 0.47
Vattenfall AB Sweden Utilities   100   54   81   19   25  23 864  32 794 0.72
Orange S.A. France Telecommunications   27   54   119   24   56  65 492  170 531 0.42
Airbus Group France Aircraft   12   46   122   67   73  88 258  140 405 0.64
Vale SA Brazil Metal mining   3c   46   131   38   48  15 680  85 305 0.45
COSCO China Transport and storage   100   40   52   19   30  7 355  130 000 0.50
Petronas Malaysia Oil and gas   100   39   150   43   73  8 653  43 266 0.35
Source: UNCTAD.
a  These TNCs are at least 10 per cent owned by the State or public entities, or the State/public entity is the largest shareholder.
b  The Transnationality Index is calculated as the average of the following three ratios: foreign to total assets, foreign to total 
sales and foreign to total employment.
c  State owns 12 golden shares that give it veto power over certain decisions.
Figure I.20. Value of estimated FDI by SO-tncs,
2007–2013
(Billions of dollars and per cent)
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Source: UNCTAD FDI-TNC-GVC Information System, cross-
border M&A database for M&As and information from 
the Financial Times Ltd, fDi Markets (www.fDimarkets.
com) for greenfield projects.
Note: Estimated FDI is the sum of greenfield investments and 
M&As. The combined value here is only an indication 
of the size of total investment by SO-TNCs.
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crisis, but in 2013 such investment started to pick 
up, and the upward trend is likely to be sustained 
in 2014, driven partly by rising investments in 
extractive industries.
Rising FDI by SO-TNCs from emerging economies, 
especially the BRICS, contributed to the growth in 
FDI flows in 2013. The internationalization of Chinese 
SOEs accelerated, driving up FDI outflows from 
China. In extractive industries, Chinese SO-TNCs 
have been very active in cross-border acquisitions: 
for instance, CNOOC spent $15 billion to acquire 
Nexen in Canada, the largest overseas deal ever 
undertaken by a Chinese oil and gas company; and 
Minmetal bought the Las Bambas copper mine 
in Peru for $6 billion. Furthermore, Chinese SOEs 
in manufacturing and services, especially finance 
and real estate, have increasingly invested abroad. 
Indian SO-TNCs in the extractive industries have 
become more proactive in overseas investment 
as well. For example, ONGC Videsh Limited, the 
overseas arm of the State-owned Oil and Natural 
Gas Corporation, is to invest heavily in Rovuma 
Area I Block, a project in Mozambique. 
In the Russian Federation, State ownership has 
increased as Rosneft, Russia’s largest oil and 
gas company, acquired BP’s 50 per cent interest 
in TNK-BP for $28 billion (part in cash and part in 
Rosneft shares) in March 2013. This deal made 
Rosneft the world’s largest listed oil company by 
output. In the meantime, Rosneft has expanded 
its global presence by actively investing abroad: its 
subsidiary Neftegaz America Shelf LP acquired a 
30 per cent interest in 20 deep-water exploration 
blocks in the Gulf of Mexico held by ExxonMobil 
(United States). In December, Rosneft established 
a joint venture in cooperation with ExxonMobil to 
develop shale oil reserves in western Siberia. 
Compared with their counterparts from the BRICS, 
SO-TNCs from developed countries have been less 
active in investing abroad and their international 
investment remains sluggish. This is partly because 
of the weak economic performance of their home 
countries in the Eurozone. However, a number of 
large M&A projects undertaken by these firms, such 
as those of EDF (France) and Vattenfall (Sweden), 
were recorded in infrastructure industries. In 
addition, emerging investment opportunities in 
utilities and transport industries in Europe may 
increase FDI by SO-TNCs in these industries. 
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The gradual improvement of macroeconomic 
conditions, as well as recovering corporate profits 
and the strong performance of stock markets, will 
boost TNCs’ business confidence, which may lead 
to a rise in FDI flows over the next three years. On the 
basis of UNCTAD’s survey on investment prospects 
of TNCs and investment promotion agencies (IPAs), 
results of UNCTAD’s FDI forecasting model and 
preliminary 2014 data for cross-border M&As and 
greenfield activity, UNCTAD projects that FDI flows 
could rise to $1.62 trillion in 2014, $1.75 trillion in 
2015 and $1.85 trillion in 2016 (see figure I.1). 
The world economy is expected to grow by 
3.6 per cent in 2014 and 3.9 per cent in 2015 
(table I.6). Gross fixed capital formation and trade 
are projected to rise faster in 2014–2015 than in 
2013. Those improvements could prompt TNCs 
to gradually transform their record levels of cash 
holdings into new investments. The slight rise in 
TNC profits in 2013 (figure I.21) will also have a 
positive impact on their capacity to invest. 
B. PrOSPectS
FDI flows to developing countries will remain 
high in the next three years. Concerns about 
economic growth and the ending of quantitative 
easing raise the risk of slow growth in FDI inflows in 
emerging markets. Following the recent slowdown 
in growth of FDI inflows in developing countries (a 6 
per cent increase in 2013 compared with an aver-
age of 17 per cent in the last 10 years), FDI in these 
countries is expected to remain flat in 2014 and 
then increase slightly in 2015 and 2016 (table I.7).
In light of this projection, the pattern of FDI by 
economic grouping may tilt in favour of developed 
countries. The share of developing and transition 
economies would decline over the next three years 
(figure I.22). 
However, the results of the model are based mainly 
on economic fundamentals – projections which are 
subject to fluctuation. Furthermore, the model does 
not take into account risks such as policy uncertainty 
and regional conflict, which are difficult to quantify. 
It also does not take into account megadeals such 
as the $130 billion buy-back of shares by Verizon 
(United States) from Vodafone (United Kingdom 
in 2014), which will reduce the equity component 
of FDI inflows to the United States and affect the 
global level of FDI inflows. 
Although the introduction of quantitative 
easing appears to have had little impact 
on FDI flows in developing countries, this 
might not be the case for the ending of those 
measures. Although there seems to be a strong 
relationship between the easing of monetary policy 
table I.6. Annual growth rates of global GDP, 
trade, GFcF and employment, 2008–2015
(Per cent)
Variable 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013a 2014b 2015b
GDP 2.8 -0.4 5.2 3.9 3.2 3.0 3.6 3.9
Trade 3.1 -10.6 12.5 6.0 2.5 3.6 5.3 6.2
GFCF 2.0 -4.6 5.6 4.6 4.3 3.1 4.4 5.1
Employment 1.1 0.5 1.3 1.5 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3
Source:  UNCTAD based on IMF for GDP, trade and GFCF, and 
ILO for employment.
a  Estimation. 
b  Projections.
Note: GFCF = gross fixed capital formation.
Figure I.21. Profitabilitya and profit levels of tncs,
2003–2013
(Billions of dollars and per cent)
Source: UNCTAD, based on data from Thomson ONE.
a  Profitability is calculated as the ratio of net income to 
total sales.
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UNCTAD’s econometric model (WIR11) 
projects that FDI flows will pick up in 2014, 
rising 12.5 per cent to reach $1.62 trillion 
(table I.7), mainly owing to the strengthening of 
global economic activity. Much of the impetus will 
come from developed countries, where FDI flows 
are expected to rise by 35 per cent. 
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table I.7.  Summary of econometric medium-term baseline scenarios of FDI flows, by groupings
(Billions of dollars and per cent)
Averages Projections
2005–2007 2009–2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Global FDI flows  1 493      1 448      1 330    1 452    1 618    1 748    1 851   
Developed economies   978       734       517     566     763     887     970   
Developing economies   455       635       729     778     764     776     799   
Transition economies   60       79       84     108     92     85     82   
Memorandum
Average growth rates Growth rates Growth rate projections
2005–2007 2009–2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
Global FDI flows   39.6   1.0 - 21.8   9.1   11.5   8.0   5.9
Developed economies   46.5 - 0.4 - 41.3   9.5   34.8   16.3   9.5
Developing economies   27.8   4.4   0.6   6.7 - 1.8   1.6   2.9
Transition economies   47.8 - 1.9 - 11.3   28.3 - 15.0 - 7.6 - 3.9
Source: UNCTAD.
in developed countries and portfolio capital flows 
to emerging economies, quantitative easing had no 
visible impacts on FDI flows (figure I.23). FDI projects 
have longer gestation periods and are thus less 
susceptible to short-term fluctuations in exchange 
rates and interest rates. FDI generally involves a 
long-term commitment to a host economy. Portfolio 
and other investors, by contrast, may liquidate their 
investments when there is a drop in confidence in 
the currency, economy or government.
Although quantitative easing had little impact on FDI 
flows in the period 2009–2013, this might change 
with the ending of unconventional measures, 
judging by developments when the tapering was 
announced and when it began to be implemented. 
During the first half of 2013 and the beginning of 
2014, there is evidence of a sharp decrease in 
private external capital flows and a depreciation of 
the currencies of emerging economies. 
FDI inflows to the countries affected by the 
tapering could see the effect of more company 
assets offered for sale, given the heavy 
indebtedness of domestic firms and their reduced 
access to liquidity. Increases in cross-border 
Figure I.22. FDI inflows: share by major economic groups, 
2000–2013 and prospects, 2014–2016
(Per cent)
Source: UNCTAD FDI-TNC-GVC Information System, FDI database (www.unctad.org/
fdistatistics); and UNCTAD estimates.
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M&As in emerging markets in late 2013 and the 
beginning of 2014 may reflect this phenomenon. 
Foreign investors may also see the crisis as an 
opportunity to pick up assets at relatively low 
cost. Furthermore, some affected developing 
countries (e.g. Indonesia) have intensified their 
efforts to attract long-term capital flows or FDI to 
compensate for the loss in short-term flows. Their 
efforts essentially concentrate on further promoting 
and facilitating inward FDI (chapter III). The impact 
of tapering on FDI flows may evolve differently by 
type of FDI.
•	 Export-oriented	 FDI: Currency depreciation, 
if continued, can increase the attractiveness 
of affected emerging economies to foreign 
investors by lowering the costs of production 
and increasing export competitiveness.
•	 Domestic	 market-oriented	 FDI: Reduced 
demand and slower growth could lead to some 
downscaling or delay of FDI in the countries 
most affected. The impact on domestic-
market-oriented affiliates varies by sector and 
industry. Foreign affiliates in the services sector 
are particularly susceptible to local demand 
conditions.
Reviving M&A activity in the beginning of 2014. 
An overall increase of FDI inflows and the rise of 
developed countries as FDI hosts are apparent 
in the value of cross-border M&As announced in 
the beginning of 2014. For the first four months of 
2014, the global market for cross-border M&As was 
worth about $500 billion (including divestments), the 
highest level since 2007 and more than twice the 
value during the same period in 2013 (figure I.24). 
The deals in this period were financed either by 
stocks or by cash held in the form of retained 
earnings abroad. The 10 largest deals announced 
in the first quarter of 2014 all targeted companies in 
developed countries (table I.8); in 2013 only 5 of the 
top 10 deals were invested in developed countries.
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Figure I.23. Portfolio investment and FDI inflows to emerging markets, quarterly Index, 2005 Q1–2013 Q4
(Base 100: quarterly average of 2005)
Source: UNCTAD FDI-TNC-GVC Information System, FDI/TNC database (www.unctad.org/fdistatistics); IMF for portfolio investment.
Note: 2013 Q4 is estimated.
 Countries included are Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Hong Kong (China), Hungary, India, 
Indonesia, Kazakhstan, the Republic of Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, the Philippines, Poland, the Russian Federation, 
South Africa, Thailand, Turkey, Ukraine and the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela.
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Responses to this year’s World Investment 
Prospects Survey (WIPS) support an opti-
mistic scenario. This year’s survey generated 
responses from 164 TNCs, collected between 
February and April 2014, and from 80 IPAs in 74 
countries. Respondents revealed that they are still 
uncertain about the investment outlook for 2014 
but had a bright forecast for the following 
two years (figure I.25). For 2016, half of the 
respondents had positive expectations and 
almost none felt pessimistic about the invest-
ment climate. When asked about their intend-
ed FDI expenditures, half of the respondents 
forecasted an increase over the 2013 level 
in each of the next three years (2014–2016). 
Among the factors positively affecting FDI 
over the next three years, respondents most 
frequently cited the state of the economies 
of the United States, the BRIC (Brazil, Rus-
sian Federation, India and China),  and the 
EU-28. Negative factors remain the pending 
sovereign debt issues and fear of rising pro-
tectionism in trade and investment.
In the medium term, FDI expenditures are 
set to increase in all sectors. However, low-
tech manufacturing industries are expected 
to see FDI decreases in 2014. According to 
the WIPS responses, TNCs across all sectors will 
either maintain or increase FDI in 2015 and 2016. 
In contrast, for 2014 investors expressed some 
uncertainties about their plans, with respondents 
from some low-tech industries in the manufacturing 
sector forecasting decreases of expenditures. 
Figure I.24. Global markets for cross-border M&As on 
announcement basis January–April of each year 
of 2007–2014, by group of economies
(Billions of dollars)
Source: UNCTAD FDI-TNC-GVC Information System, cross-border 
M&A database.
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table I.8. top 10 largest cross-border M&A announcements by value of transaction, 
January–April 2014
  Date 
announced
Target company Target industry Target nation Acquiror name
Value of 
transaction 
($ million)
Acquiror ultimate 
parent firm
Acquiror ultimate 
parent nation 
04/28/2014 AstraZeneca PLC Pharmaceutical preparations United Kingdom Pfizer Inc 106 863 Pfizer Inc United States
04/04/2014 Lafarge SA Cement, hydraulic France Holcim Ltd 25 909 Holcim Ltd Switzerland
02/18/2014
Forest Laboratories 
Inc
Pharmaceutical preparations United States Actavis PLC 25 110 Actavis PLC Ireland
04/30/2014
Alstom SA-Energy 
Businesses
Turbines and turbine gene-
rator sets
France GE 17 124 GE United States
04/22/2014
GlaxoSmithKline 
PLC-Oncology
Pharmaceutical preparations United Kingdom Novartis AG 16 000 Novartis AG Switzerland
01/13/2014 Beam Inc
Wines, brandy, and brandy 
spirits
United States Suntory Holdings Ltd 13 933
Kotobuki Realty 
Co Ltd
Japan
03/17/2014
Grupo Corporativo 
ONO SA
Telephone communications, 
except radiotelephone
Spain
Vodafone Holdings 
Europe SLU
10 025 Vodafone Group PLC United Kingdom
02/21/2014 Scania AB
Motor vehicles and passenger 
car bodies
Sweden Volkswagen AG 9 162
Porsche Automobil 
Holding SE
Germany
04/22/2014
Novartis AG-Vac-
cines Business
Biological products, except 
diagnostic substances
Switzerland GlaxoSmithKline PLC 7 102 GlaxoSmithKline PLC United Kingdom
03/16/2014 RWE Dea AG
Crude petroleum and natural 
gas
Germany L1 Energy 7 099
LetterOne Holdings 
SA
Luxembourg
Source:  UNCTAD FDI-TNC-GVC Information System, cross-border M&A database.
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Figure I.26. IPAs’ selection of most promising industries 
for attracting FDI in their own country
(Percentage of IPA respondents)
Source: UNCTAD survey.
Note: Based on responses from 80 IPAs. Aggregated by region or economic grouping to 
which responding IPAs belong.
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Respondents from manufacturing industries such 
as textiles, wood and wood products, construction 
products, metals and machinery indicated a fall in 
investments in 2014. By 2016, almost half of TNCs 
in all sectors expect to see an increase in their FDI 
expenditures, in line with their rising optimism about 
the global investment environment. 
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Figure I.25. tncs’ perception of the global 
investment climate, 2014–2016
(Percentage of respondents)
Source: UNCTAD survey.
Note: Based on responses from 164 companies.
Echoing the prospects perceived by TNCs, IPAs 
also see more investment opportunities in services 
than in manufacturing. Indeed, few IPAs selected 
a manufacturing industry as one of the top three 
promising industries. However, the view from 
IPAs differs for inward FDI by region (figure I.26). 
IPAs in developed economies anticipate good 
prospects for FDI in machinery, business services, 
such as computer programming and consultancy, 
and transport and communication, especially 
telecommunications. African IPAs expect further 
investments in the extractive and utilities industries, 
while Latin American IPAs emphasize finance 
and tourism services. Asian IPAs refer to positive 
prospects in construction, agriculture and machinery. 
IPAs in transition economies have high expectations 
in construction, utilities and textiles.
FDI expenditures are set to grow, especially 
from developing countries, and to be directed 
more to other developing countries. This 
year’s survey results show diverging trends across 
groups of economies with regard to investment 
expenditures. More than half of the respondents 
from the developing and transition economies 
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Figure I.27. IPAs’ selection of most promising investor 
home economies for FDI in 2014–2016
(Percentage of IPA respondents selecting economy 
as a top source of FDI)
Source: UNCTAD survey.
Note: Based on responses from 80 IPAs. 
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foresaw an increase in FDI expenditures 
in 2014 (57 per cent) and in the medium 
term (63 per cent). In contrast, TNCs from 
developed countries expected to increase 
their investment budgets in only 47 per cent 
of cases, in both the short and medium 
terms.
Developed economies remain important 
sources of FDI but are now accompanied 
by major developing countries such as 
the BRIC, the United Arab Emirates, the 
Republic of Korea and Turkey. Indeed, China 
is consistently ranked the most promising 
source of FDI, together with the United 
States (figure I.27). Among the developed 
economies, the United States, Japan, the 
United Kingdom, Germany and France are 
ranked as the most promising developed-
economy investors, underscoring their 
continuing role in global FDI flows. As 
to host economies, this year’s ranking is 
largely consistent with past ones, with only 
minor changes. South-East Asian countries 
such as Viet Nam, Malaysia and Singapore, 
and some developed economies, such as 
the United Kingdom, Australia, France and 
Poland, gained some positions, while Japan 
and Mexico lost some (figure I.28).
Figure I.28. tncs’ top prospective host economies 
for 2014–2016
(Percentage of respondents selecting economy 
as a top destination, (x)=2013 ranking)
Source: UNCTAD survey.
Note: Based on responses from 164 companies. 
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International production continued to gain 
strength in 2013, with all indicators of foreign 
affiliate activity rising, albeit at different 
growth rates (table I.9). Sales rose the most, 
by 9.4 per cent, mainly driven by relatively high 
economic growth and consumption in developing 
and transition economies. The growth rate of 
7.9 per cent in foreign assets reflects the strong 
performance of stock markets and, indeed, is in 
line with the growth rate of FDI outward stock. 
Employment and value added of foreign affiliates 
grew at about the same rate as FDI outflows – 5 per 
cent – while exports of foreign affiliates registered 
only a small increase of 2.5 per cent. For foreign 
employment, the 5 per cent growth rate represents 
a positive trend, consolidating the increase in 2012 
following some years of stagnation in the growth 
of the workforce, both foreign and national. By 
contrast, a 5.8 per cent growth rate for value added 
represents a slower trend since 2011, when value 
added rebounded after the financial crisis. These 
patterns suggest that international production is 
growing more slowly than before the crisis. 
Cash holdings for the top 5,000 TNCs remained 
high in 2013, accounting for more than 11 per 
cent of their total assets (figure I.29), a level 
similar to 2010, in the immediate aftermath of 
the crisis. At the end of 2013, the top TNCs from 
developed economies had cash holdings, including 
short-term investments, estimated at $3.5 trillion, 
compared with roughly $1.0 trillion for firms from 
developing and transition economies. However, 
while developing-country TNCs have held their 
cash-to-assets ratios relatively constant over time 
at about 12 per cent, developed-country TNCs 
have increased their ratios since the crisis, from 
an average of 9 per cent in 2006–2008 to more 
than 11 per cent in 2010, and they maintained that 
ratio through 2013. This shift may reflect the greater 
risk aversion of developed-economy corporations, 
which are adopting cash holding ratios similar to 
the ones prevalent in the developing world. Taking 
the average cash-to-assets ratio in 2006–2008 as a 
benchmark, developed-country TNCs in 2013 had 
an estimated additional amount of cash holdings of 
$670 billion.
Given the easy access to finance enjoyed by large 
firms, partly thanks to the intervention of central 
banks in the aftermath of the crisis, financial 
constraints might not be the only reason for the 
slow recovery of investments. However, easy 
money measures did not lead to a full recovery 
of debt financing to its pre-crisis level (figure I.30); 
in 2013, net debt issuance amounted to just 
under $500 billion, almost a third less than the 
level in 2008. At the same time, corporations did 
increase share buy-backs and dividend payments, 
producing total cash outflows of about $1 trillion 
in 2013. Two factors underlie this behaviour: on 
the one hand, corporations are repaying debt and 
rewarding their shareholders to achieve greater 
stability in an economic environment still perceived 
as uncertain, and on the other hand, depending in 
which industry they operate, they are adopting a 
very cautious attitude toward investment because 
of weak demand.
Figure I.30 shows sources and uses of cash at 
an aggregate level for the biggest public TNCs, 
which hides important industry-specific dynamics. 
In fact, overall capital expenditures (for both 
domestic and foreign activities) have increased 
in absolute terms over the last three years; at 
the same time, expenditures for acquisition of 
business have decreased. However, there are wide 
differences across industries. TNCs in the oil and 
gas, telecommunications and utilities industries all 
significantly increased their expenditures (capital 
expenditures plus acquisitions), especially in 
2013. In contrast, investments in industries such 
as consumer goods, and industrials (defined as 
transport, aerospace and defence, and electronic 
and electrical equipment) fell after the crisis and 
have remained low. This is largely consistent with 
the level of cash holdings observed by industry. 
These industries accumulated cash holdings of 
$440 billion and $511 billion between the pre-
crisis period and 2013 (figure I.31). This represents 
a jump of more than three and two percentage 
points, respectively, to 12.8 and 11.5 per cent. This 
suggests that the companies operating in these 
industries are the ones most affected by the slow 
c. trenDS In InternAtIOnAL PrODuctIOn
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economic recovery and related persistent demand 
slack in developed countries.
The other industries with bulging cash holdings are 
computer services and software (here represented 
by technology), which in 2013 saw an increase in 
cash holdings of $319 billion over the pre-crisis level 
(figure I.31). On the one hand, firms with more growth 
opportunities and with high R&D expenditures have 
higher cash holdings than the average because 
returns on research activities are highly risky 
and unpredictable; hence firms prefer to rely on 
cash generated in-house rather than on external 
resources. On the other hand, these technology 
industries – as well as health care industries – often 
move intellectual property and drug patents to low-
tax jurisdictions, letting earnings from those assets 
pile up offshore to avoid paying high home taxes. 
This adds significantly to corporate cash stockpiles. 
table I.9. Selected indicators of FDI and international production, 
2013 and selected years
Item
Value at current prices 
(Billions of dollars)
1990
2005–2007 
(pre-crisis average)
2011 2012 2013
FDI inflows  208 1 493 1 700 1 330 1 452
FDI outflows  241 1 532 1 712 1 347 1 411
FDI inward stock 2 078 14 790 21 117 23 304 25 464
FDI outward stock 2 088 15 884 21 913 23 916 26 313
Income on inward FDI a  79 1 072 1 603 1 581 1 748
Rate	of	return	on	inward	FDI	b 3.8 7.3 6.9 7.6 6.8
Income on outward FDI a  126 1 135 1 550 1 509 1 622
Rate	of	return	on	outward	FDI b 6.0 7.2 6.5 7.1 6.3
Cross-border M&As  111  780  556  332  349
Sales of foreign affiliates 4 723 21 469 28 516 31 532c 34 508c
Value-added (product) of foreign affiliates  881 4 878 6 262 7 089c 7 492c
Total assets of foreign affiliates 3 893 42 179 83 754 89 568c 96 625c
Exports of foreign affiliates 1 498 5 012d 7 463d 7 532d 7 721d
Employment by foreign affiliates (thousands) 20 625 53 306 63 416 67 155c 70 726c
Memorandum:
GDP 22 327 51 288 71 314 72 807 74 284
Gross fixed capital formation 5 072 11 801 16 498 17 171 17 673
Royalties and licence fee receipts  29  161  250  253  259
Exports of goods and services 4 107 15 034 22 386 22 593e 23 160e
Source: UNCTAD.
a Based on data from 179 countries for income on inward FDI and 145 countries for income on outward FDI in 2013, in both 
cases representing more than 90 per cent of global inward and outward stocks.
b Calculated only for countries with both FDI income and stock data.
c Data for 2012 and 2013 are estimated using a fixed effects panel regression of each variable against outward stock and a 
lagged dependent variable for the period 1980–2010.
d Data for 1995–1997 are based on a linear regression of exports of foreign affiliates against inward FDI stock for the period 
1982–1994. For 1998–2013, the share of exports of foreign affiliates in world exports in 1998 (33.3 per cent) was applied to 
obtain values.
e Data from IMF, World	Economic	Outlook, April 2014.
Note:  Not included in this table are the values of worldwide sales by foreign affiliates associated with their parent firms through 
non-equity relationships and of the sales of the parent firms themselves. Worldwide sales, gross product, total assets, 
exports and employment of foreign affiliates are estimated by extrapolating the worldwide data of foreign affiliates of 
TNCs from Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, the Czech Republic, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Israel, Italy, 
Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Portugal, Slovenia, Sweden, and the United States for sales; those from the 
Czech Republic, France, Israel, Japan, Portugal, Slovenia, Sweden, and the United States for value added (product); 
those from Austria, Germany, Japan and the United States for assets; those from the Czech Republic, Japan, Portugal, 
Slovenia, Sweden, and the United States for exports; and those from Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Czech Republic, 
Finland, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Macao (China), Portugal, Slovenia, Sweden, 
Switzerland, and the United States for employment, on the basis of three-year average shares of those countries in 
worldwide outward FDI stock.
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For example, Apple (United States) has added 
$103 billion to its cash holdings since 2009. Other 
United States corporations in these industries such 
as Microsoft, Google, Cisco Systems and Pfizer, 
are all holding record-high cash reserves. 
The cash-to-assets ratios in these 
industries are thus normally much higher 
and have also increased the most over 
the years, from 22 to 26 per cent for 
technology and from 15 to 16 per cent 
for health care. By contrast, oil and gas 
production, basic materials, utilities and 
telecommunications are the industries 
in which cash holdings have been low 
during the period considered (with an 
average cash-to-assets ratio of 6–8 per 
cent). In the oil and gas industry, not 
only have large investments been made 
in past years, but United States oil and 
gas production and capital spending on 
that production have continued to rise, 
boosted by the shale gas revolution. 
Similarly, big investments have been 
required in telecommunications (e.g. 4G 
wireless networks, advanced television 
and internet services). 
The degree of internationalization 
of the world’s largest TNCs 
remained flat. Data for the top 100 
TNCs, most of them from developed 
economies, show that their 
domestic production – as measured 
by domestic assets, sales and 
employment – grew faster than their 
foreign production. In particular, their 
ratio of foreign to total employment 
fell for the second consecutive year 
(table I.10). Lower internationalization 
may be partly explained by onshoring 
and relocation of production to home 
countries by these TNCs (WIR13).
Similarly, the internationalization level 
of the largest 100 TNCs domiciled in 
developing and transition economies 
remained stable. However, this was 
not due to divestments or relocation 
of international businesses, but to larger domestic 
investment. Thus, while the foreign assets of TNCs 
from these economies rose 14 per cent in 2012 – 
faster than the rate of the world’s largest 100 TNCs 
– the rise was similar to the increase in domestic 
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Figure I.29. cash holdings of top 5,000 tncs and their share
in total assets, 2006–2013
Source:  UNCTAD, based on data from Thomson ONE.
Note: Data based on records of 5,309 companies of which 3,472 were in 
developed countries. These do not include non-listed companies such 
as many developing country SO-TNCs.
Figure I.30. top 5,000 tncs: major cash sources and uses,
 2006–2013
(Billions of dollars)
Source:  UNCTAD, based on data from Thomson ONE.
Note: Based on records of 5,108 companies, of which 3,365 were  in 
developed countries. Both domestic and foreign activities are 
covered. These companies do not include non-listed companies 
such as SOEs.
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Figure I.31. cash holdings and their ratio to total assets, top 5,000 tncs, 
by industry, 2006–2008 and 2013
(Billions of dollars and per cent)
Source:  UNCTAD, based on data from Thomson ONE.
Note: Data based on records of 5,309 companies, of which 3,472 were in developed 
countries.
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table I.10.  Internationalization statistics of the 100 largest non-financial tncs worldwide and from 
developing and transition economies 
(Billions of dollars, thousands of employees and per cent)
Variable
100 largest TNCs worldwide
100 largest TNCs from developing 
and transition economies
2011 2012 a
2011–2012 
% Change
2013 b
2012–2013 
% Change
2011 2012 % Change
Assets
Foreign  7 634  7 888 3  8 035 2  1 321  1 506 14
Domestic  4 897  5 435 11  5 620 3  3 561  4 025 13
Total  12 531  13 323 6  13 656 2  4 882  5 531 13
Foreign as % of total   61   59 -2c   59 0c   27   27 0c
Sales
Foreign  5 783  5 900 2  6 057 3  1 650  1 690 2
Domestic  3 045  3 055 0  3 264 7  1 831  2 172 19
Total  8 827  8 955 1  9 321 4  3 481  3 863 11
Foreign as % of total   66   66 0c   65 -1c   47   44 -4c
Employment
Foreign  9 911  9 821 -1  9 810 0  3 979  4 103 3
Domestic  6 585  7 125 8  7 482 5  6 218  6 493 4
Total  16 496  16 946 3  17 292 2  10 197  10 596 4
Foreign as % of total   60   58 -2c   57 -1c   39   39 0c
Source: UNCTAD.
a Revised results.
b Preliminary results.
c In percentage points.
Note:  From 2009 onwards, data refer to fiscal year results reported between 1 April of the base year to 31 March of the 
following year. Complete 2013 data for the 100 largest TNCs from developing and transition economies are not yet 
available.
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assets (13 per cent) (table I.10). The growth of 
sales and foreign employment at home outpaced 
foreign sales. In particular, the 19 per cent growth 
in domestic sales demonstrates the strength of 
developing and transition economies.
notes
1 Greenfield investment projects data refer to announced ones. 
The value of a greenfield investment project indicates the 
capital expenditure planned by the investor at the time of the 
announcement. Data can be substantially different from the 
official FDI data as companies can raise capital locally and 
phase their investments over time, and the project may be 
cancelled or may not start in the year when it is announced.
2 United States Energy Information Administration.
3 United States natural gas prices dropped from nearly $13 per 
MMBtu (million British thermal units) in 2008 to $4 per MMBtu 
in 2013 (two to three times lower than European gas prices 
and four times lower than Japanese prices for liquefied natural 
gas). 
4 According to UNCTAD database, based on information from 
the Financial Times Ltd, fDi Markets (www.fDimarkets.com).
5 Both United States and foreign companies benefit from these 
deals. United States operators get financial support, while 
foreign companies gain experience in horizontal drilling and 
hydraulic fracturing that may be transferable to other regions. 
Most of the foreign investment in these joint ventures involves 
buying a percentage of the host company’s shale acreages 
through an upfront cash payment with a commitment to cover 
a portion of the drilling cost. Foreign investors in joint ventures 
pay upfront cash and commit to cover the cost of drilling extra 
wells within an agreed-upon time frame, usually between 2 and 
10 years.
6 American Chemical Council, “Shale Gas Competitiveness, and 
new US chemical industry investment: an analysis based on 
announced projects”, May 2013.
7 As examples, South African Sasol is investing some $20 billion 
in Louisiana plants that turn gas into plastic, in the largest-
ever manufacturing project by a foreign direct investor in the 
United States; Formosa Plastics from Taiwan Province of 
China plans two new factories in Texas to make ethylene and 
propylene, key components in the manufacture of plastics and 
carpets; EuroChem, a Russian company that makes fertilizers, 
is building an ammonia plant in Louisiana, where proximity to 
the Mississippi River provides easy access to Midwest farms. 
Recently the CEO of Saudi Basic Industries Corporation 
(SABIC), the world’s biggest petrochemicals maker by market 
value, disclosed company plans to enter the United States 
shale market.
8 The potential sharp decline in revenues as a firm’s patents 
on one or more leading products expire from the consequent 
opening up of the market to generic alternatives.
9 Innovation used to drive this industry, but outsourcing of R&D 
activities has become one of the key industry trends in the past 
decade as a result of big TNCs shifting their R&D efforts in the 
face of patent cliffs and cost pressures (IMAP, Global	Pharma	
&	Biotech	M&A	Report	2014, www.imap.com, accessed on 2 
April 2014). 
10 “India approves $1.6bn acquisition of Agila Specialties by 
Mylan”, 4 September 2014, www.ft.com.
11 “Pharma & biotech stock outlook – Dec 2013 – industry 
outlook”, 3 December 2013, www.nasdaq.com.
12 “Big pharma deals are back on the agenda”, Financial	Times, 
22 April 2014.
13 In the absence of global FDI data specific to the 
pharmaceutical industry, trends in cross-border M&A deals 
and greenfield FDI projects are used to represent the global 
FDI trends in this industry. Subindustries included in M&A deals 
are the manufacture of pharmaceuticals, medicinal chemical 
products, botanical products and biological products. In 
greenfield FDI projects, pharmaceuticals and biotechnology.
14 In the United States, FDI inflows to this industry represented 
about one quarter of manufacturing FDI in 2010–2012 
(“Foreign direct investment in the United States”, 23 October 
2013, www.whitehouse.gov).
15 For the period 2003–2013, the number of greenfield FDI 
projects was between 200 and 290, with an annual average 
of 244, while that of cross-border M&As was between 170 and 
280, with an annual average of 234. 
16 PwC (2014), Pharmaceutical	 and	 Life	 Science	 Deals	 Insights	
Quarterly, quoted in “Strong Q4 pharmaceutical & life sciences 
M&A momentum expected to continue into 2014, according to 
PwC” (PwCUS, press release, 10 February 2014).
17 “Why did one of the world’s largest generic drug makers exit 
China?”, Forbes, 3 February 2014, www.forbes.com.
18 The largest deals reported in the first quarter of 2014 were a 
$4.3 billion acquisition of Bristol-Myers Squibb (United States) 
by AstraZeneca (United Kingdom) through its Swedish affiliate, 
followed by a $4.2 billion merger between Shire (Ireland) and 
ViroPharma (United States).
19 Among them, the largest so far was a bid made by Pfizer 
(United States) for AstraZeneca (United Kingdom) (table I.8). 
Even though Pfizer walked away, AstraZeneca may look for 
another merger option with a smaller United States company 
(“Big pharma deals are back on the agenda”, Financial	Times, 
22 April 2014). 
20 “Corporate takeovers: Return of the big deal”, The Economist, 
3 May 2014.
21 In 2008, no information on transaction value was available for 
transition economies.
22 Daiichi Sankyo plans to divest in 2014.
23 Abbott Laboratories (United States) acquired the Healthcare 
Solutions business of Piramal Healthcare (India). In transition 
economies, only $7 million was recorded in 2010. 
24 The largest deal was a $1.9 billion acquisition of 
Agila Specialties, a Bangalore-based manufacturer of 
pharmaceuticals, from Strides Arcolab (United States) by Mylan 
(United States). 
25 When deals in biological products are excluded, the share of 
developing and transition economies in 2013 exceeded 30 per 
cent. 
26 GlaxoSmithKline (United Kingdom) has announced plans to 
invest over $200 million in sub-Saharan Africa in the next five 
years to expand its existing manufacturing capacities in Kenya, 
Nigeria and South Africa and to build new factories in Ethiopia, 
Ghana and/or Rwanda, as well as the world’s first open-
access R&D laboratory for non-communicable diseases in 
Africa, creating 500 new jobs (“Drugmaker GSK to invest $200 
mln in African factories, R&D”, 31 March 2014, www.reuters.
com). 
27 “The world of pharma in 2014 – serialization, regulations, and 
rising API costs”, 23 January 2014, www.thesmartcube.com. 
28 IMAP, Global	Pharma	&	Biotech	M&A	Report	2014,	www.imap.
com, accessed on 2 April 2014.
29 For example, “Low-Cost Drugs in Poor Nations Get a Lift in 
Indian Court”, The	New	York	Times, 1 April 2013.
World Investment Report 2014: Investing in the SDGs: An Action Plan34
30 See, for example, “What does Mylan get for $1.6 billion? A 
vaccine maker with a troubled factory”, 24 September 2013, 
www.forbes.com; “US drug regulator slams poor maintenance 
of Ranbaxy plant”, 27 January 2014, http://indiatoday.intoday.
in.
31 See UNCTAD (2013a) for details.
32 Data on the world’s top 250 retailers show that these 
companies receive about one quarter of their revenues from 
abroad (Deloitte, 2013).
33 Laurie Burkitt and Shelly Banjo, “Wal-Mart Takes a Pause in 
China “, Wall Street Journal, 16 October 2013.
34 Reuters, “Carrefour sells stake in Middle East venture for 
$683m”, Al Arabiya News, 22 May 2013.
35 In 2011, for example, Aldi (Germany) took over Walgreen’s and 
Home Depot in the United States.
36 Latin American Private Equity & Venture Capital Association, 
as quoted in “LatAm investment hit six-year high”, Private 
Equity International, 20 February 2014, and “PE drives LatAM 
infrastructure”, 16 December 2013, Financial Times.
37 European Central Bank, 2013	 SMEs’	 Access	 to	 Finance	
Survey, http://ec.europa.eu.
38 Forecast by Cushman & Wakefield.
39 As reported in an interview with the managing director of 
Kazanah: “We have a mandate to ‘crowd-in’ and catalyze 
some parts of the economy, hence we tend to find our natural 
home in those areas where there is a strategic benefit, perhaps 
in providing an essential service or key infrastructure, and 
where there are high barriers to entry for the private sector, 
inter alia very long investment horizons or large balance sheet 
requirements.”
40 Available at http://blogs.cfainstitute.org/investor/2013/07/30/
malaysias-khazanah-not-just-a-swf-but-a-nation-building-
institution/.
41 In UNCTAD’s definition, SO-TNCs are TNCs that are at least 
10 per cent owned by the State or public entities, or in which 
the State or public entity is the largest shareholder or has a 
“golden share”.
42 UNCTAD has revamped the SO-TNC database by strictly 
applying its definition, thereby shortening the list of SO-TNCs. 
In addition, some majority privately owned TNCs, in which 
the State has acquired a considerable share through financial 
investment, are no longer considered State-owned. See, 
e.g., Karl P. Sauvant and Jonathan Strauss, “State-controlled 
entities control nearly US$ 2 trillion in foreign assets”, Columbia 
FDI	Perspectives, No. 64 April 2, 2012.
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IntroDuctIon
In 2013, foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows 
increased in all three major economic groups – 
developed, developing and transition economies 
(table II.1) – although at different growth rates. 
FDI flows to developing economies reached a new 
high of $778 billion, accounting for 54 per cent of 
global inflows in 2013. Flows to most developing 
subregions were up. Developing Asia remained 
the largest host region in the world. FDI flows to 
transition economies recorded a 28 per cent 
increase, to $108 billion. FDI flows to developed 
countries increased by 9 per cent to $566 billion 
– still only 60 per cent of their pre-crisis average 
during 2005–2007. FDI flows to the structurally 
weak, vulnerable and small economies fell by 3 per 
cent in 2013, from $58 billion in 2012 to $57 billion, 
as the growth of FDI to least developed countries 
(LDCs) was not enough to offset the decrease 
of FDI to small island developing States (SIDS) 
and landlocked developing countries (LLDCs) 
(table II.1). Their share in the world total also fell, 
from 4.4 per cent in 2012 to 3.9 per cent.
Outward FDI from developed economies stagnated 
at $857 billion in 2013, accounting for a record low 
share of 61 per cent in global outflows. In contrast, 
flows from developing economies remained resilient, 
rising by 3 per cent to reach a new high of $454 
billion. Flows from developing Asia and Africa rose 
while those from Latin America and the Caribbean 
declined. Developing Asia remained a large source 
of FDI, accounting for more than one fifth of the 
global total. And flows from transition economies 
rose significantly – by 84 per cent – reaching a new 
high of $99 billion.
table II.1. FDI flows, by region, 2011–2013
(Billions of dollars and per cent)
Region FDI inflows FDI outflows
2011 2012 2013 2011 2012 2013
World  1 700  1 330  1 452  1 712  1 347  1 411
Developed economies  880  517  566  1 216  853  857
European Union  490  216  246  585  238  250
North America  263  204  250  439  422  381
Developing economies  725  729  778  423  440  454
Africa  48  55  57  7  12  12
Asia  431  415  426  304  302  326
East and South-East Asia  333  334  347  270  274  293
South Asia  44  32  36  13  9  2
West Asia  53  48  44  22  19  31
Latin America and the Caribbean  244  256  292  111  124  115
Oceania  2  3  3  1  2  1
Transition economies  95  84  108  73  54  99
Structurally weak, vulnerable and small economiesa  58  58  57  12  10  9
LDCs  22  24  28  4  4  5
LLDCs  36  34  30  6  3  4
SIDS  6  7  6  2  2  1
Memorandum: percentage share in world FDI flows
Developed economies  51.8  38.8  39.0  71.0  63.3  60.8
European Union  28.8  16.2  17.0  34.2  17.7  17.8
North America  15.5  15.3  17.2  25.6  31.4  27.0
Developing economies  42.6  54.8  53.6  24.7  32.7  32.2
Africa  2.8  4.1 3.9  0.4  0.9  0.9
Asia  25.3  31.2  29.4  17.8  22.4  23.1
East and South-East Asia  19.6  25.1  23.9  15.8  20.3  20.7
South Asia  2.6  2.4  2.4  0.8  0.7  0.2
West Asia  3.1  3.6  3.0  1.3  1.4  2.2
Latin America and the Caribbean  14.3  19.2  20.1  6.5  9.2  8.1
Oceania  0.1  0.2  0.2  0.1  0.1  0.1
Transition economies  5.6  6.3  7.4  4.3  4.0  7.0
Structurally weak, vulnerable and small economiesa  3.4  4.4  3.9  0.7  0.7  0.7
LDCs  1.3  1.8  1.9  0.3  0.3  0.3
LLDCs  2.1  2.5  2.0  0.4  0.2  0.3
SIDS  0.4  0.5  0.4  0.1  0.2  0.1
Source: UNCTAD, FDI-TNC-GVC Information System, FDI/TNC database (www.unctad.org/fdistatistics).  
aWithout double counting.
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1. Africa
A. rEGIonAL trEnDS
Figure c. FDI outflows, 2007–2013
(Billions of dollars)
Figure B. FDI inflows, 2007–2013
(Billions of dollars)
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Figure A. FDI flows, top 5 host and home economies, 2012–2013 
(Billions of dollars)
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table A. Distribution of FDI flows among economies, 
by range,a 2013 
range Inflows outflows
Above 
$3.0 billion
South Africa, Mozambique, 
Nigeria, Egypt, Morocco, Ghana 
and Sudan
South Africa
$2.0 to 
$2.9 billion
Democratic Republic of the Congo 
and the Congo Angola
$1.0 to 
$1.9 billion
Equatorial Guinea, United 
Republic of Tanzania, Zambia, 
Algeria, Mauritania, Uganda, 
Tunisia and Liberia
Nigeria
$0.5 to 
$0.9 billion
Ethiopia, Gabon, Madagascar, 
Libya, Namibia, Niger, Sierra 
Leone, Cameroon, Chad and Kenya
Sudan and Liberia
$0.1 to 
$0.4 billion
Mali, Zimbabwe, Burkina Faso, 
Côte d’Ivoire, Benin, Senegal, 
Djibouti, Mauritius, Botswana, 
Seychelles, Malawi, Rwanda and 
Somalia
Democratic Republic of the Congo, Morocco, 
Egypt, Zambia, Libya, Cameroon and 
Mauritius
Below 
$0.1 billion
Togo, Swaziland, Lesotho, Eritrea, 
São Tomé and Principe, Gambia, 
Guinea, Cabo Verde, Guinea-
Bissau, Comoros, Burundi, Central 
African Republic and Angola
Gabon, Burkina Faso, Malawi, Benin, Togo, 
Côte d’Ivoire, Senegal, Zimbabwe, Tunisia, 
Lesotho, Rwanda, Mali, Ghana, Seychelles, 
Kenya, Mauritania, Cabo Verde, Guinea, 
Swaziland, Guinea-Bissau, São Tomé and 
Principe, Botswana, Mozambique, Uganda, 
Niger, Namibia and Algeria
a Economies are listed according to the magnitude of their FDI flows.
table c. cross-border M&As by region/country, 2012–2013
(Millions of dollars)
region/country Sales Purchases2012 2013 2012 2013
World  -1 254 3 848 629 3 019
Developed economies  -3 500 -8 953  635 2 288
European Union  841 -4 831  1 261  1 641
North America  -1 622 -5 196  19  -17
Australia  -1 753 141 -645 664
Developing economies  2 172  12 788  -7  731
Africa 126  130 126  130
Asia 2 050  13 341  145 596
China 1 580 7 271 - 78
India  22 419 410 233
Indonesia -  1 753 212 -
Singapore 271 543 -615 167
Transition economies  - -  - -
table B. cross-border M&As by industry, 2012–2013
(Millions of dollars)
Sector/industry Sales Purchases
2012 2013 2012 2013
Total -1 254 3 848 629  3 019 
Primary -1 125 135 308  289 
Mining, quarrying and petroleum -1 148 135 286  289 
Manufacturing 231  3 326 1 518 1 632 
Food, beverages and tobacco  634  1 023  185  244 
Chemicals and chemical products 17 16 -162 - 
Pharmaceuticals, medicinal chemical & botanical prod.  42  567  502 1 310 
Non-metallic mineral products -25 1 706 81 - 
Services -360 387 -1 197 1 098 
Transportation and storage 2 27 2 27 
Information and communication  -750 -207 -11 105 
Financial and insurance activities 335  240  -1 688 653 
Business services  24  104  374  135 
table D. Greenfield FDI projects by industry, 2012–2013
(Millions of dollars)
Sector/industry Africa as destination Africa as investors2012 2013 2012 2013
Total  47 455  53 596  7 764  15 807
Primary  7 479 5 735 455  7
Mining, quarrying and petroleum  7 479 3 795 455 7
Manufacturing  21 129 13 851 4 013 7 624
Food, beverages and tobacco 2 227 1 234 438 373
Textiles, clothing and leather 206 1 750 34 128
Non-metallic mineral products 1 067 3 616 674 2 896
Motor vehicles and other transport equipment 2 316 1 593 - 108
Services  18 847 34 010 3 296 8 177
Electricity, gas and water 6 401 11 788 60 -
Construction 3 421 3 514 - 1 005
Transport, storage and communications  3 147 7 652 1 221 2 558
Business services  1 892 7 096 889 2 662
table E. Greenfield FDI projects by region/country, 2012–2013
(Millions of dollars)
Partner region/economy Africa as destination Africa as investors2012 2013 2012 2013
World  47 455 53 596 7 764 15 807
Developed economies 17 541 27 254 1 802 2 080
European Union  8 114 16 308 370 960
United States 4 844 2 590 1 362 1 076
Japan 708 1 753 39 -
Developing economies 29 847 26 234 5 962 13 652
Africa 4 019 12 231 4 019 12 231
Nigeria 711 2 261 161 2 729
South Africa 1 397 4 905 396 344
Asia 25 586 13 807 1 474 1 337
China 1 771 303 102 140
India 7 747 5 628 149 68
Transition economies 67 108 - 76
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FDI inflows to Africa rose by 4 per cent to $57 billion, 
driven by international and regional market-seeking 
flows, and infrastructure investments. Expectations 
for sustained economic and population growth 
continue to attract market-seeking FDI into 
consumer-oriented industries. Intraregional 
investments are increasing, led by South African, 
Kenyan and Nigerian corporations. Most of the 
outflows were directed to other countries in the 
continent, paving the way for investment-driven 
regional integration.
Consumer-oriented sectors are beginning 
to drive FDI growth. Expectations for further 
sustained economic and population growth 
underlie investors’ continued interest not only in 
extractive industries but also in consumer-market-
oriented sectors that target the rising middle-class 
population (WIR13).1 This group is estimated to 
have expanded 30 per cent over the past decade, 
reaching 120 million people. Reflecting this change, 
FDI is starting to diversify into consumer-market-
oriented industries, including consumer products 
such as foods, information technology (IT), tourism, 
finance and retail. Similarly, driven by the growing 
trade and consumer markets, infrastructure FDI 
showed strong increases in transport and in 
information and communication technology (ICT).
Data on announced greenfield investment 
projects (table D) show that the services sector 
is driving inflows (see also chapter I). In particular, 
investments are targeting construction, utilities, 
business services and telecommunications. The 
fall in the value of greenfield investment projects 
targeting the manufacturing sector was caused 
by sharply decreasing flows in resource-based 
industries such as coke and petroleum products, 
and metal and metal products, both of which fell 
by about 70 per cent. By contrast, announced 
greenfield projects show rising inflows in the textile 
industry and high interest by international investors 
in motor vehicle industries. Data on cross-border 
merger and acquisition (M&A) sales show a sharp 
increase in the manufacturing sector, targeting the 
food processing industry, construction materials 
(non-metallic mineral products) and pharmaceutical 
industries (table B).
Some foreign TNCs are starting to invest in 
research and development (R&D) in agriculture 
in the continent, motivated by declining yields, 
global warming, concerns about supply shortages 
and the sectoral need for a higher level of 
technological development. For example, in 2013, 
Dupont (United States) gained a majority stake in the 
seed company Pannar by promising to invest $6.2 
million by 2017 to establish an R&D hub in South 
Africa to develop new seed technology for the region. 
Similarly, Barry Callebaut (Switzerland) inaugurated 
its Cocoa Centre of Excellence to promote advanced 
agricultural techniques in Côte d’Ivoire, the world’s 
largest cocoa-producing country. That investment is 
estimated at $1.1 million. 
Technology firms have also started to invest 
in innovation in Africa. In November 2013, IBM 
opened its first African research laboratory, on the 
outskirts of Nairobi, with an investment of more than 
$10 million for the first two years. The facility reflects 
IBM’s interest in a continent where smartphones 
are becoming commonplace. Kenya has become 
a world leader in payment by mobile phone, stirring 
hope that Africa can use technology to leapfrog 
more established economies. In October, Microsoft 
announced a partnership with three African 
technology incubation hubs to develop businesses 
based on cloud-computing systems. In the last few 
years, Google has funded start-up hubs in Nigeria, 
Kenya and South Africa, as part of a push to invest 
in innovation in Africa. 
Trends in FDI flows vary by subregion. Flows 
to North Africa decreased by 7 per cent to $15.5 
billion (figure B). However, with this relatively high 
level of FDI, investors appear to be ready to return 
to the region. FDI to Egypt fell by 19 per cent but 
remained the highest in the subregion at $5.6 
billion. In fact, many foreign investors, especially 
producers of consumer products, remain attracted 
by Egypt’s large population (the largest in the 
subregion) and cheap labour costs. Most of the 
neighbouring countries saw increasing flows. 
Morocco attracted increased investment of $3.4 
billion – especially in the manufacturing sector, with 
Nissan alone planning to invest about $0.5 billion in 
a new production site – as well as in the real estate, 
food processing and utility sectors. In Algeria, the 
Government is intensifying efforts to reform the 
market and attract more foreign investors. As an 
example, State-owned Société de Gestion des 
Participations Industries Manufacturières concluded 
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an agreement with Taypa Tekstil Giyim (Turkey), 
to construct a multimillion-dollar centre in the 
textile-clothing industry. Among other objectives, 
the partnership aims to promote public-private 
joint ventures in Algeria and to create employment 
opportunities for more than 10,000 people, 
according to the Algerian Ministry of Industry.
FDI flows to West Africa declined by 14 per cent, to 
$14.2 billion, much of that due to decreasing flows 
to Nigeria. Uncertainties over the long-awaited 
petroleum industry bill and security issues triggered 
a series of asset disposals from foreign TNCs. 
National champions and other developing-country 
TNCs are taking over the assets of the retreating 
TNCs. Examples are two pending megadeals 
that will see Total (France) and ConocoPhillips 
(United States) sell their Nigerian assets to 
Sinopec Group (China) and local Oando PLC for 
$2.5 billion and $1.8 billion, respectively. By 
contrast, in 2013 Ghana and Côte d’Ivoire 
started to produce oil, attracting considerable 
investment from companies such as Royal Dutch 
Shell (United Kingdom), ExxonMobil (United 
States), China National Offshore Oil Company 
(CNOOC) and China National Petroleum 
Corporation (CNPC), as well as from State-owned 
petroleum companies in Thailand and India.
Central Africa attracted $8.2 billion of FDI in 2013, a 
fall of 18 per cent from the previous year. Increasing 
political turmoil in the Central African Republic and 
the persisting armed conflict in the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo could have negatively 
influenced foreign investors. In East Africa, flows 
surged by 15 per cent to $6.2 billion, driven 
by rising flows to Kenya and Ethiopia. Kenya is 
developing as the favoured business hub, not only 
for oil and gas exploration in the subregion but also 
for industrial production and transport. The country 
is set to develop further as a regional hub for 
energy, services and manufacturing over the next 
decade. Ethiopia’s industrial strategy is attracting 
Asian capital to develop its manufacturing base. In 
2013, Huanjin Group (China) opened its first factory 
for shoe production, with a view to establishing a 
$2 billion hub for light manufacturing. Early in the 
year, Julphar (United Arab Emirates), in conjunction 
with its local partner, Medtech, officially inaugurated 
its first pharmaceutical manufacturing facility in 
Africa in Addis Ababa. Julphar’s investment in the 
construction of the plant is estimated at around 
$8.5 million. Uganda, the United Republic of 
Tanzania and Madagascar maintained relatively 
high inward flows, thanks to the development of 
their gas and mineral sectors.
FDI flows to Southern Africa almost doubled in 2013, 
jumping to $13.2 billion from $6.7 billion in 2012, 
mainly owing to record-high flows to South Africa 
and Mozambique. In both countries, infrastructure 
was the main attraction. In Mozambique, 
investments in the gas sector also played a role. 
Angola continued to register net divestments, albeit 
at a lower rate than in past years. Because foreign 
investors in that country are asked to team with 
local partners, projects are failing to materialize for 
lack of those partners, despite strong demand.2 
Outward FDI flows from Africa rose marginally 
to $12 billion. The main investors were South Africa, 
Angola and Nigeria, with flows mostly directed to 
neighbouring countries. South African outward 
FDI almost doubled, to $5.6 billion, powered 
by investments in telecommunications, mining 
and retail. Nigeria outflows were concentrated 
in building materials and financial services. A few 
emerging TNCs expanded their reach over the 
continent. In addition to well-known South African 
investors (such as Bidvest, Anglo Gold Ashanti, 
MTN, Shoprite, Pick’n’Pay, Aspen Pharmacare and 
Naspers), some other countries’ conglomerates 
are upgrading their cross-border operations first 
in neighbouring countries and then across the 
whole continent. For example, Sonatrach (Algeria) 
is present in many African countries in the oil and 
gas sector. Other examples include the Dangote 
and Simba Groups (Nigeria), which are active in 
the cement, agriculture and oil-refining industries. 
Orascom (Egypt), active in the building materials 
and chemicals industries, is investing in North 
African countries. Sameer Group (Kenya) is involved 
in industries that include agriculture, manufacturing, 
distribution, high-tech, construction, transport and 
finance. The Comcraft Group (Kenya), active in the 
services sector, is extending its presence beyond 
the continent into Asian markets. 
Regional integration efforts intensified. 
African leaders are seeking to accelerate regional 
integration, which was first agreed to in the 1991 
Abuja Treaty. The treaty provided for the African 
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Economic Community to be set up through a 
gradual process, which would be achieved by 
coordinating, harmonizing and progressively 
integrating the activities of regional economic 
communities (RECs).3 Recent efforts in this direction 
include a summit of African Union leaders in January 
2012 that endorsed a new action plan to establish 
a Continental Free Trade Area. In addition, several 
RECs plan to establish monetary unions as part of a 
broader effort to promote regional integration.
Another example of these integration efforts was the 
launch of negotiations on the COMESA-EAC-SADC 
Free Trade Area in 2011, between the Common 
Market for East and Southern Africa (COMESA), the 
East African Community (EAC) and the Southern 
African Development Community (SADC). The 
Tripartite Free Trade Agreement (FTA) involves 
26 African countries in the strategic objective of 
consolidating RECs to achieve a common market 
as well as a single investment area. In the Tripartite 
Roadmap, Phase I covers the implementation 
of the FTA for trade in goods.4 Phase II will 
discuss infrastructure and industrial development, 
addressing investment issues as well as services, 
intellectual property rights, competition policy, and 
trade development and competitiveness.
Although Phase II plans to address investment 
issues, the primary impact on FDI will most likely 
occur through tariff and non-tariff measures, 
especially non-tariff barriers, the main remaining 
impediment to the free and competitive flow of 
goods and services on the continent. 
Raising intraregional FDI supports African 
leaders’ efforts to achieve deeper regional 
integration. The rapid economic growth of the 
last decade underlies the rising dynamism of 
African firms on the continent, in terms of both 
trade and foreign investment.5 Led by the cross-
border operations of TNCs based in the major 
economies of the continent, this trend is sustaining 
African leaders’ efforts. Intra-African investments 
are trending up, driven by a continuous rise in 
South African FDI into the continent, as well as by 
increases of flows since 2008 from Kenya, Nigeria, 
and Northern African countries.6 
Between 2009 and 2013, the share of cross-border 
greenfield projects – the major investment type in 
Africa – originating from other African countries 
has increased to 18 per cent, from about 10 per 
cent in the period 2003–2008 (figure II.1). All major 
investors – South Africa (7 per cent), Kenya (3 per 
cent) and Nigeria (2 per cent) – more than doubled 
their shares. Over the same five years, the gross 
value of cross-border intra-African acquisitions 
grew from less than 3 per cent of total investments 
in 2003–2008 to more than 9 per cent in the next 
five years. Growing consumer markets are a key 
force enabling these trends, given that an increasing 
amount of FDI into Africa – from abroad and by 
region – goes to consumer-facing industries, led by 
banking and telecommunications. 
Compared with other foreign investment, 
intra-African projects are concentrated in 
manufacturing and services; the extractive 
industries play a very marginal role (figure 
II.2). Comparing the sectoral distribution across 
sources shows that 97 per cent of intra-African 
investments target non-primary sectors compared 
with 76 per cent of investments from the rest of 
the world, with a particularly high difference in the 
share that targets the manufacturing sector. Intra-
African investments in the manufacturing sector 
concentrate in agri-processing, building materials, 
electric and electronic equipment, and textiles, 
while in the services sector African TNCs have 
been attracted to telecommunications and retail 
industries, especially in rapidly growing economies 
like those in Nigeria, Ghana, Uganda and Zambia. 
Other very active industries for intraregional 
investments are finance, especially banking, and 
business services, where investors from South 
Africa, Kenya, Togo and Nigeria are expanding 
in the neighbouring countries. In finance, low-
technology consumer products and wood furniture, 
intra-African investments accounted for roughly 40 
per cent of all greenfield investments by number of 
projects. In residential construction and in hotels 
and restaurants services, TNCs from South Africa, 
Kenya and Egypt were the leading investors in Africa 
by number of cross-border acquisitions deals. The 
high shares of intra-African investment targeting 
the manufacturing sector accord with evidence 
from trade statistics showing that the industry 
products that are most traded intraregionally are 
manufactured goods – especially those entailing low 
and medium levels of processing (UNCTAD, 2013b). 
These industries could thus benefit the most from 
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regional integration measures; an enlarged market 
could provide companies enough scope to grow 
and create incentives for new investments. 
The share of intra-African FDI in the manufacturing 
and services sectors varies widely across RECs. 
In some RECs, such as ECOWAS and EAC, 
intraregional FDI in these sectors represents about 
36 per cent of all investments; in others, such 
as UMA, it is marginal (figure II.3). Furthermore, 
excluding SADC, investments from all of Africa 
usually represents a much higher share of FDI than 
intra-REC investments do. 
The gap between intra-African and intra-REC 
FDI indicates that cross-REC investment 
flows are relatively common and suggests 
the importance of viewing RECs as building 
blocks of a continental FTA. Because RECs’ 
market size is limited and not all RECs have 
advanced TNC members that can drive FDI, the 
integration of RECs into a single Africa-wide market 
will benefit most the economies of the smallest 
and less industrially diversified groups such as the 
Economic Community of Central African States 
(ECCAS). 
Intraregional FDI is a means to integrate 
smaller African countries into global 
production processes. Smaller African economies 
rely more heavily on regional FDI (figure II.4). For 
many smaller countries, often landlocked or non-oil-
exporting ones, intraregional FDI is a critical source 
of foreign capital. 
For smaller countries such as Benin, Burkina 
Faso, Guinea-Bissau, Lesotho, Rwanda and 
Togo, investments from other African countries 
represented at least 30 per cent of their FDI stocks. 
Similarly, Southern African countries such as 
Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, Uganda and the 
United Republic of Tanzania received a sizeable 
Figure II.1. Geographical distribution of sources of greenfield investment in Africa 
by number of projects, 2003–2008 and 2009–2013
(Per cent)
Source: UNCTAD, based on information from the Financial Times Ltd., fDi Markets (www.fDimarkets.com).
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Figure II.2. Sectoral distribution of announced value
of FDI greenfield projects by source, 
cumulative 2009–2013
(Per cent)
Source: UNCTAD, based on information from the Financial 
Times Ltd., fDi Markets (www.fDimarkets.com).
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Figure II.3. Announced value of FDI greenfield projects in manufacturing and services,
cumulative 2009–2013
(Billions of dollars and per cent)
Source: UNCTAD, based on information from the Financial Times Ltd., fDi Markets (www.fDimarkets.com).
(Per cent)
Intra-REC
ECOWAS  58
Africa  281
Host 
region
Total value
($ billlion)
Share of investment from Africa 
17
1
15
17
18
36
37
EAC  31
ECCAS  23
SADC  83
COMESA  106
UMA  43
Figure II.4. Intraregional FDI stock in Africa (various years)
(Per cent)
Source: UNCTAD, Bilateral FDI Statistics (http://unctad.org/en/Pages/DIAE/FDI%20Statistics/FDI-Statistics-Bilateral.aspx). 
a  Mauritius was excluded from the calculation of the African share as it acts as an investment platform for many extraregional 
investors.        
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amount of their FDI stock from the region (excluding 
stock from Mauritius), most of that from South 
Africa. By contrast, African investments in North 
African countries such as Morocco are minimal; the 
bulk of investments there come from neighbouring 
countries in Europe and the Middle East. 
Intraregional FDI is one of the most important 
mechanisms through which Africa’s increasing 
demand can be met by a better utilization of its own 
resources. Furthermore, intra-African investment 
helps African firms enhance their competitiveness 
by increasing their scale, developing their 
production know-how and providing access to 
better and cheaper inputs. Several of the most 
prominent African TNCs that have gone global, such 
as Anglo American and South African Breweries 
(now SABMiller), were assisted in developing 
their international competitiveness through first 
expanding regionally.
The rising intra-African investments have not 
yet triggered the consolidation of regional 
value chains. In terms of participation in global 
value chains (GVCs), Africa ranks quite high in 
international comparisons: its GVC participation 
rate in 2011 was 56 per cent compared with the 
developing-country average of 52 per cent and the 
global average of 59 per cent (figure II.5). However, 
the analysis of the components of the GVC 
participation rate shows that the African down-
stream component (exports that are incorporated in 
other products and re-exported) represents a much 
higher share than the upstream component (foreign 
value added in exports). This high share reflects the 
important contribution of African natural resources to 
other countries’ exports.
Natural resources are mainly traded with 
extraregional countries, do not require much 
transformation (nor foreign inputs), and thus 
contribute little to African industrial development 
and its capacity to supply the growing internal 
demand. The high share of commodities in the 
region’s exports together with inadequate transport, 
energy and telecommunications infrastructure is 
also a key factor hampering the development of 
regional value chains. Among the world’s regions, 
Africa relies the least on regional interactions in 
the development of GVCs. On both the upstream 
side (the foreign value added) and the downstream 
side (the domestic value added included in other 
countries’ exports), the share of intra-African 
value chain links is very limited compared with 
all other regions (figure II.6). In terms of sectors, 
manufacturing and services appear to be more 
regionally integrated than the primary sector. One 
of the industries most integrated regionally is agri-
processing, where Africa benefits from economies 
of scale – deriving from regional integration 
measures – in processing raw materials. However, 
further development and upscaling of the regional 
value chains in this industry remains difficult as 
long as intra-African investments are local market-
oriented FDI.
Across RECs, regional value chains seem to 
be most developed in the three RECs that are 
Figure II.5. GVc participation rate for Africa and other selected regions, 2011
(Per cent)
Source: UNCTAD-EORA GVC Database.
Note:  GVC participation rate indicates the share of a country’s exports that is part of a multi-stage trade process; it is the 
foreign value added (FVA) used in a country’s exports (the upstream component) plus the value added supplied to other 
countries’ exports (the downstream component, or DVX), divided by total exports.
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planning to create the Tripartite FTA (COMESA, 
EAC and SADC). This suggests that the economies 
in this subregion are a step ahead in the regional 
integration process. Northern African countries 
that belong to UMA are the least involved in 
regional value chains, while the participation of 
ECCAS and ECOWAS in regional value chains is 
relatively in the average of the continent.
Future prospects for regional integration 
and industrial development. The Tripartite FTA 
that COMESA, EAC and SADC members aim to 
establish could be a useful model for other regional 
communities to use in boosting their efforts to bring 
Africa’s small and fragmented economies together 
into a single market. By deepening regional 
integration, resources will be pooled and local 
markets enlarged, thus stimulating production 
and investment and improving prospects for 
growth and development in the continent. One 
of the main obstacles to integration as well as 
to the development of regional value chains is 
inadequate and poor infrastructure. Insufficient 
and nonexistent transport and energy services are 
common problems that affect all firms operating 
in Africa.7 To tackle some infrastructure gaps and 
make further economic development possible, 
international support is needed. In particular, the 
sustainable development goals (SDGs) (chapter IV) 
offer an opportunity to increase FDI that targets 
the continent’s major needs. 
The sharp increase in the number of Asian 
businesses engaging in Africa (through both trade 
and FDI), as well as the new investments from 
North America and Europe in R&D and consumer 
industries, could provide an extraregional impetus 
to the development of regional value chains and 
GVCs. With declining wage competitiveness, China, 
for example, may relocate its labour-intensive 
industries to low-income countries while upgrading 
its industry towards more sophisticated products 
with higher value added (Lin 2011, Brautigam 
2010).8 The relocation of even a small part of China’s 
labour-intensive industries could support industrial 
development in Africa, providing a much-needed 
source of employment for the burgeoning working-
age population.9 
Figure II.6. regional value chain participation, 2011
Source: UNCTAD-EORA GVC Database.
Note:  The upstream component is defined as the foreign value added used in a country’s exports; the downstream component 
is defined as the domestic value added supplied to other countries’ exports.
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Asia continues to be the world’s top FDI spot, 
accounting for nearly 30 per cent of global FDI 
inflows. Thanks to a significant increase in cross-
border M&As, total inflows to the region as a whole 
amounted to $426 billion in 2013, 3 per cent higher 
than in 2012. The growth rates of FDI inflows to 
the East, South-East and South Asia subregions 
ranged between 2 and 10 per cent, while inflows 
to West Asia declined by 9 per cent (figure II.7). 
FDI outflows from subregions showed more 
diverging trends: outflows from East and South-
East Asia experienced growth of 7 and 5 per cent, 
respectively; outflows from West Asia increased 
by about two thirds; and those from South Asia 
plummeted to a negligible level (figure II.7). 
For some low-income countries in the region, weak 
infrastructure has long been a major challenge in 
attracting FDI and promoting industrial development. 
Today, rising intraregional FDI in infrastructure 
industries, driven by regional integration efforts 
(section a) and enhanced connectivity through the 
establishment of corridors between subregions 
(section b), is likely to accelerate infrastructure 
build-up, improve the investment climate and 
promote economic development.
Figure II.7. FDI in and out of developing Asia, by subregion, 2012–2013
(Billions of dollars)
Source:  UNCTAD FDI-TNC-GVC Information System, FDI/TNC database 
(www.unctad.org/fdistatistics).
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a. East and South-East Asia
Figure A. FDI flows, top 5 host and home economies, 2012–2013 
(Billions of dollars)
Figure c. FDI outflows, 2007–2013
(Billions of dollars)
Figure B. FDI inflows, 2007–2013
(Billions of dollars)
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table A. Distribution of FDI flows among economies, 
by range,a 2013 
range Inflows outflows
Above 
$50 billion
China, Hong Kong (China) and 
Singapore
China and Hong Kong (China) 
$10 to 
$49 billion
Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia and 
Republic of Korea
Republic of Korea, Singapore, Taiwan 
Province of China and Malaysia
$1.0 to 
$9.9 billion
Viet Nam, Philippines, Taiwan 
Province of China, Myanmar, Macao 
(China), Mongolia and Cambodia
Thailand, Indonesia, Philippines and 
Viet Nam
$0.1 to 
$0.9 billion
Brunei Darussalam, Lao People's 
Democratic Republic and Democratic 
People's Republic of Korea
..
Below 
$0.1 billion
Timor-Leste
Mongolia, Macao (China), Cambodia, 
Timor-Leste, Lao People's 
Democratic Republic and Brunei 
Darussalam
a Economies are listed according to the magnitude of their FDI flows.
table B. cross-border M&As by industry, 2012–2013
(Millions of dollars)
Sector/industry Sales Purchases2012 2013 2012 2013
Total 22 377 40 655 78 736 98 217
Primary 831 -3 489 10 578 10 902
Mining, quarrying and petroleum 421 -3 492 11 982 10 845
Manufacturing 12 702 19 017 12 956 6 376
Food, beverages and tobacco 7 197 13 411 4 820 5 701
Basic metal and metal products 281 919 2 822 -2 339
Computer, electronic optical prod. & elect. equipment  712 1 239 2 878 1 635
Machinery and equipment 1 830 196 1 525 1 897
Services 8 844 25 128 55 203 80 939
Electricity, gas, water and waste management 858 1 216 2 761 4 873
Information and communications 4 379 104 4 827 2 827
Financial and insurance activities 709 14 977 46 321 66 826
Business services 1 056 10 149 452 3 704
table c. cross-border M&As by region/country, 2012–2013
(Millions of dollars)
region/country Sales Purchases2012 2013 2012 2013
World  22 377  40 655  78 736 98 217
Developed economies  5 357  6 065  54 514  50 844
European Union 2 686 -5 814 24 286 8 927
United Kingdom -2 958 721 15 364 3 033
Canada -290 -32 7 778 20 805
United States - 1 149 5 038 7 608 11 289
Australia 580 -270 11 050 6 861
Japan 3 821 9 005 2 969 1 676
Developing economies 16 040  32 148 23 966 45 213
Africa -386 334 1 861 9 728
Asia and Oceania 16 339 30 619 16 614 32 610
Latin America and the Caribbean 87 1 194 5 491 2 875
Transition economies - 597 256 2 160
table D. Greenfield FDI projects by industry, 2012–2013
(Millions of dollars)
Sector/industry
East and South-East 
Asia as destination
East and South-East 
Asia as investors
2012 2013 2012 2013
Total 147 303 146 465 110 393 106 067
Primary 363 593 3 022 2 195
Mining, quarrying and petroleum 363 372 3 022 2 195
Manufacturing 70 298 76 193 43 738 22 285
Food, beverages and tobacco 6 260 5 012 4 028 2 181
Chemicals and chemical products 9 946 13 209 10 770 3 301
Electrical and electronic equipment 9 361 7 571 11 562 5 492
Motor vehicles and other transport equipment 17 212 16 855 4 844 3 293
Services 76 641 69 679 63 632 81 588
Electricity, gas and water 4 507 17 925 14 392 7 979
Construction 19 652 11 179 29 147 13 388
Finance 13 658 9 080 6 109 4 951
Business services 9 611 9 553 2 184 42 666
table E. Greenfield FDI projects by region/country, 2012–2013
(Millions of dollars)
Partner region/economy
East and South-East 
Asia as destination
East and South-East 
Asia as investors
2012 2013 2012 2013
World 147 303 146 465 110 393 106 067
Developed economies 98 785 100 261 35 998 15 789
European Union 38 453 41 127 19 012 8 230
Germany 12 036 13 189 468 401
United Kingdom 8 443 7 632 15 003 4 079
United States 27 637 23 173 13 417 3 943
Japan 24 252 27 191 677 1 728
Developing economies 47 849 45 721 69 027 88 723
Asia 47 327 44 652 59 632 36 904
East Asia 23 966 17 753 25 144 21 185
South-East Asia 19 728 14 094 18 549 10 662
South Asia 2 386 2 627 8 211 3 016
Transition economies 1 247 10 178 7 728 2 041
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Against the backdrop of a sluggish world economy 
and a regional slowdown in growth, total FDI 
inflows to East and South-East Asia reached 
$347 billion in 2013, 4 per cent higher than in 
2012. Inflows to East Asia rose by 2 per cent to 
$221 billion, while those to South-East Asia 
increased by 7 per cent to $125 billion. FDI outflows 
from the overall region rose by 7 per cent to 
$293 billion. In late 2012, the 10 member States of 
the Association for Southeast Asian Development 
(ASEAN) and their 6 FTA partners (Australia, China, 
India, Japan, the Republic of Korea and New 
Zealand) launched negotiations for the Regional 
Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP). In 
2013, combined FDI inflows to the 16 negotiating 
members amounted to $343 billion, accounting for 
24 per cent of global FDI flows. The expansion of 
free trade areas in and beyond the region is likely to 
further increase the dynamism of FDI growth and 
deliver associated development benefits.
China’s outflows grew faster than inflows. FDI 
inflows to China have resumed their growth since 
late 2012. With inflows at $124 billion in 2013, the 
country again ranked second in the world (figure I.3) 
and narrowed the gap with the largest host country, 
the United States. China’s 2 per cent growth in 
2013 was driven by rising inflows in services, 
particularly trade and real estate. As TNCs invest in 
the country increasingly through M&As, the value of 
cross-border M&A sales surged, from $10 billion in 
2012 to $27 billion in 2013.
In the meantime, China has strengthened its position 
as one of the leading sources of FDI, and its outflows 
are expected to surpass its inflows within two years. 
During 2013, FDI outflows swelled by 15 per cent, 
to an estimated $101 billion, the third highest in 
the world. Chinese companies made a number of 
megadeals in developed countries, such as the $15 
billion CNOOC-Nexen deal in Canada and the $5 
billion Shuanghui-Smithfield deal in the United States 
– the largest overseas deals undertaken by Chinese 
firms in the oil and gas and the food industries, 
respectively. As China continues to deregulate 
outward FDI,10 outflows to both developed and 
developing countries are expected to grow further. 
For instance, Sinopec, the second largest Chinese 
oil company, plans to invest $20 billion in Africa in the 
next five years,11 while Lenovo’s recent acquisitions 
of IBM’s X86 server business ($2.3 billion) and 
Motorola Mobile ($2.9 billion) will boost Chinese FDI 
in the United States.
High-income economies in the region 
performed well in attracting FDI. Inflows to 
the Republic of Korea reached $12 billion, the 
highest level since the mid-2000s, thanks to rising 
foreign investments in shipbuilding and electronics 
– industries in which the country enjoys strong 
international competitiveness – as well as in the 
utility industries. In 2013, FDI inflows to Taiwan 
Province of China grew by 15 per cent, to $4 billion, 
as economic cooperation with Mainland China 
helped improve business opportunities in the island 
economy.12 In 2013, FDI outflows from the Republic 
of Korea declined by 5 per cent to $29 billion, while 
those from Taiwan Province of China rose by 9 per 
cent to $14 billion.
Hong Kong (China) and Singapore – the other two 
high-income economies in the region – experienced 
relatively slow growth in FDI inflows. Inflows to 
Hong Kong (China) increased by 2 per cent to 
$77 billion. Although this amount is still below the 
record level of $96 billion in 2011, it is higher than 
the three-year averages before the crisis ($49 billion) 
and after the crisis ($68 billion). In 2012, annual FDI 
inflows to Singapore rose above $60 billion for the 
first time. A number of megadeals in 2013, such as 
the acquisition of Fraser & Neave by TCC Assets 
for about $7 billion, drove FDI inflows to a record 
$64 billion. As the recipients of the second and third 
largest FDI in developing Asia, Hong Kong (China) 
and Singapore have competed for the regional 
headquarters of TNCs with each other, as well as 
with some large Chinese cities, in recent years 
(box II.1).
FDI growth in ASEAN slowed, particularly 
in some lower-income countries. FDI inflows 
to ASEAN rose by 7 per cent in 2013, to $125 
billion. It seems that the rapid growth of FDI inflows 
to ASEAN during the past three years – from 
$47 billion in 2009 to $118 billion in 2012 – has 
slowed, but the balance between East Asia and 
South-East Asia continued to shift in favour of the 
latter (figure B).
Among the ASEAN member States, Indonesia 
was most affected by the financial turmoil in 
emerging economies in mid-2013. However, 
FDI inflows remained stable, at about $18 billion. 
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Box II.1. Attracting regional headquarters of TNCs: 
competition among Asian economies
Hong Kong (China) and Singapore are very attractive locations for the regional headquarters of TNCs. The two 
economies are similar in terms of specific criteria that are key for attracting regional headquarters (European Chamber, 
2011). As highly open economies, strong financial centres and regional hubs of commerce, both are very successful 
in attracting such headquarters. The number of TNC headquarters based in Hong Kong (China), for example, had 
reached about 1,380 by the end of 2013. Its proximity to Mainland China may partly explain its competitive edge. 
The significant presence of such headquarters has helped make the two economies the major recipients of FDI in 
their subregions: Hong Kong (China) is second only to Mainland China in East Asia, while Singapore is the largest 
host in South-East Asia.
The two economies now face increasing competition from large cities in Mainland China, such as Beijing and 
Shanghai. By the end of October 2013, for example, more than 430 TNCs had established regional headquarters in 
Shanghai, as well as 360 R&D centres.13 However, the TNCs establishing these headquarters have targeted mainly 
the Chinese market, while Hong Kong (China) and Singapore remain major destinations for the headquarters of 
TNCs targeting the markets of Asia and the Pacific at large. 
In March 2014, the Chinese Government decided to move the headquarters of CIFIT Group, China’s largest TNC in 
terms of foreign assets, from Beijing to Hong Kong (China). This decision shows the Government’s support for the 
economy of Hong Kong (China) and is likely to enhance the city’s competitive advantages for attracting investment 
from leading TNCs, including those from Mainland China. 
Source: UNCTAD.
In Malaysia, another large FDI recipient in ASEAN, 
inflows increased by 22 per cent to $12 billion 
as a result of rising FDI in services. In Thailand, 
inflows grew to $13 billion; however, about 400 FDI 
projects were shelved in reaction to the continued 
political instability, and the prospects for inflows 
to the country remain uncertain.14 Nevertheless, 
Japanese investment in manufacturing in Thailand 
has risen significantly during the past few years and 
is likely to continue to drive up FDI to the country. 
FDI inflows to the Philippines were not affected 
by 2013’s typhoon Haiyan; on the contrary, total 
inflows rose by one fifth, to $4 billion – the highest 
level in its history. The performance of ASEAN’s 
low-income economies varied: while inflows to 
Myanmar increased by 17 per cent to $2.6 billion, 
those to Cambodia, the Lao People’s Democratic 
Republic and Viet Nam remained at almost the 
same levels. 
FDI outflows from ASEAN increased by 5 per cent. 
Singapore, the regional group’s leading investor, 
saw its outward FDI double, rising from $13 billion in 
2012 to $27 billion in 2013. This significant increase 
was powered by large overseas acquisitions by 
Singaporean firms and the resultant surge in the 
amount of transactions. Outflows from Malaysia 
and Thailand, the other two important investing 
countries in South-East Asia, dropped by 21 per 
cent and 49 per cent, to $14 billion and $7 billion, 
respectively.
Prospects remain positive. Economic growth has 
remained robust and new liberalization measures 
have been introduced, such as the launch of the 
China (Shanghai) Pilot Free Trade Zone. Thus, East 
Asia is likely to enjoy an increase of FDI inflows in the 
near future. The performance of South-East Asia is 
expected to improve as well, partly as a result of 
the accelerated regional integration process (see 
below). However, rising geopolitical tensions have 
become an important concern in the region and 
may add uncertainties to the investment outlook.
As part of a renewed effort to bring about economic 
reform and openness, new policy measures are 
being introduced in trade, investment and finance 
in the newly established China (Shanghai) Pilot Free 
Trade Zone. In terms of inward FDI administration, 
a new approach based on pre-establishment 
national treatment has been adopted in the zone, 
and a negative list announced. Specific segments 
in six service industries – finance, transport, 
commerce and trade, professional services, 
cultural services and public services – have been 
opened to foreign investors (chapter III). FDI 
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inflows to the zone and to Shanghai in general are 
expected to grow as a result.15 
Accelerated regional integration 
contributes to rising FDI flows
Regional economic integration in East and South-
East Asia has accelerated in recent years. This 
has contributed to enhanced competitiveness in 
attracting FDI and TNC activities across different 
industries. In particular, investment cooperation 
among major economies has facilitated inter-
national investment and operation by regional 
TNCs in their neighbouring countries, contributing 
to greater intraregional FDI flows and stronger 
regional production networks. Low-income 
countries in the region have benefited significantly 
from such flows in building up their infrastructure 
and productive capacities. The geographical 
expansion of free trade areas in and beyond the 
region is likely to further extend the dynamism of 
FDI growth and deliver associated development 
benefits. 
A comprehensive regional partnership in the 
making. ASEAN was the starting point of regional 
economic integration in East and South-East Asia, 
and has always been at the centre of the integration 
process. Established in 1967, ASEAN initially 
involved Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, 
Singapore and Thailand. Subsequently, Brunei 
Darussalam, Viet Nam, the Lao People’s Democratic 
Republic, Myanmar and Cambodia joined. Since its 
establishment, ASEAN has made efforts to widen 
as well as deepen the regional integration process, 
contributing to improved regional connectivity 
and interaction. Its economic links with the rest 
of the world have increasingly intensified and its 
intraregional links have strengthened. 
Over time, ASEAN has broadened the scope of 
regional economic integration alongside its major 
partners – China, the Republic of Korea and Japan 
– through the ASEAN+3 Cooperation.16 The East 
Asia Summit involves these three countries as well, 
in addition to Australia, India and New Zealand.17 
ASEAN has signed FTAs with all six countries. 
In November 2012, the 10 ASEAN member 
States and the six ASEAN FTA partners launched 
negotiations for RCEP, which aims to establish the 
largest free trade area in the world by population. In 
2013, combined FDI inflows to the 16 negotiating 
members amounted to $343 billion, or 24 per cent 
of global FDI inflows.
Proactive investment cooperation. Investment 
cooperation is an important facet of these regional 
economic integration efforts. In 1998, ASEAN 
members signed the Framework Agreement on 
the ASEAN Investment Area (AIA). In 2009, the 
ASEAN Comprehensive Investment Agreement 
(ACIA) consolidated the 1998 AIA Agreement 
and the 1987 Agreement for the Promotion and 
Protection of Investments (also known as the 
ASEAN Investment Guarantee Agreement). At the 
ASEAN Economic Ministers Meeting in August 
2011, member States agreed to accelerate the 
implementation of programmes towards the 
ASEAN Economic Community in 2015, focusing on 
initiatives that would enhance investment promotion 
and facilitation.
In addition, various investment agreements have 
been signed under general FTA frameworks in East 
and South-East Asia. In recent years significant 
progress has been made, involving leading 
economies in Asia, including China, India, Japan 
and the Republic of Korea. For instance, ASEAN 
and China signed their investment agreement in 
August 2009. In May 2012, China, Japan and the 
Republic of Korea signed a tripartite investment 
agreement, which represented a crucial step in 
establishing a free trade bloc among the three East 
Asian countries.
Within the overall framework of regional integration, 
these investment agreements aim to facilitate 
international investment in general but may also 
promote cross-border investment by regional TNCs 
in particular. In addition, ASEAN has established 
effective institutional mechanisms of investment 
facilitation and promotion, aiming to coordinate 
national efforts within the bloc and compete 
effectively with other countries in attracting FDI. 
Rising intraregional FDI flows. Proactive regional 
investment cooperation efforts in East and South-
East Asia have contributed to a rise in FDI inflows to 
the region in general and intraregional FDI flows in 
particular. ASEAN has seen intraregional flows rise 
over the past decade, and for some of its member 
States, inflows from neighbouring countries 
have increased significantly. During 2010–2012, 
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the RCEP-negotiating countries (or ASEAN+6 
countries) provided on average 43 per cent of FDI 
flows to ASEAN, compared with an average of 17 
per cent during 1998–2000 (figure II.8). 
Emerging industrial patterns and development 
implications. Rising intraregional FDI flows 
have focused increasingly on infrastructure and 
manufacturing. Low-income countries in the region 
have gained in particular.
•  Manufacturing. Rising intraregional FDI in 
manufacturing has helped South-East Asian 
countries build their productive capacities in both 
capital- and labour-intensive industries. TNCs 
from Japan have invested in capital-intensive 
manufacturing industries such as automotive and 
electronics. For instance, Toyota has invested 
heavily in Thailand in recent years, making the 
country its third largest production base. Attracted 
by low labour costs and good growth prospects, 
Japanese companies invested about $1.8 billion 
in Viet Nam in 2011, and $4.4 billion of Japanese 
investment was approved in 2012. FDI from 
Japan is expected to increase in other ASEAN 
member States as well, particularly Myanmar. 
China’s investment in manufacturing in ASEAN 
covers a broad range of industries but is especially 
significant in labour-intensive manufacturing.
•  Infrastructure. TNCs from Singapore have been 
important investors in infrastructure industries in 
the region, accounting for about 20 per cent of 
greenfield investments. In recent years, Chinese 
companies have invested in Indonesia and 
Viet Nam.19 In transport, Chinese investment is 
expected to increase in railways, including in the 
Lao People’s Democratic Republic and Myanmar. 
In November 2013, China and Thailand signed a 
memorandum of understanding on a large project 
that is part of a planned regional network of high-
speed railways linking China and Singapore. In 
the meantime, other ASEAN member States 
have begun to open some transport industries 
to foreign participation, which may lead to 
more intraregional FDI (including from Chinese 
companies). For example, Indonesia has recently 
allowed foreign investment in service industries 
such as port management.20 As more countries 
in South-East Asia announce ambitious long-term 
plans, total investment in infrastructure in this 
subregion between 2011 and 2020 is expected to 
exceed $1.5 trillion.21 Fulfilling this huge amount 
of investment will require mobilizing various 
sources of funding, in which TNCs and financial 
institutions within East and South-East Asia can 
Figure II.8. Major sources of FDI inflows to ASEAn,
1998–2000 and 2010–2012
(Billions of dollars)
Source: UNCTAD, Bilateral FDI Statistics (http://unctad.org/
en/Pages/DIAE/FDI%20Statistics/FDI-Statistics-
Bilateral.aspx).
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China, India, Japan and the Republic of Korea, 
as well as Singapore, Malaysia and Thailand have 
made considerable advances as sources of FDI to 
ASEAN. It seems that this has taken place mainly 
at the cost of the United States and the European 
Union (EU). Singapore is an important source of 
FDI for other countries in ASEAN, as well as for 
other major Asian economies, such as China and 
India.18 Japan has been one of the leading investors 
in South-East Asia, and ASEAN as a whole 
accounted for more than one tenth of all Japanese 
outward FDI stock in 2012. In 2013, Japanese 
investors spent nearly $8 billion in ASEAN, which 
is replacing China as the most important target 
of Japanese FDI. In recent years, FDI flows from 
China to ASEAN countries have rapidly increased, 
and the country’s outward FDI stock in ASEAN as a 
whole had exceeded $25 billion by the end of 2012 
(figure II.9). The establishment of the China-ASEAN 
Free Trade Area in early 2010 has strengthened 
regional economic cooperation and contributed to 
the promotion of two-way FDI flows, particularly 
from China to ASEAN. Accordingly, the share of 
ASEAN in China’s total outward FDI stock rose to 
5.3 per cent in 2012. 
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Source: UNCTAD, Bilateral FDI Statistics (http://unctad.org/en/Pages/DIAE/FDI%20Statistics/FDI-Statistics-Bilateral.aspx).
Figure II.9. china: outward FDI stock in ASEAn member States and share of ASEAn in total, 2005–2012
(Billions of dollars and per cent)
Others
Lao People's Democratic
Republic
Viet Nam
Thailand
Indonesia
Cambodia
Myanmar
Singapore
Share of ASEAN in total
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
%
$ 
b
ill
io
n
play an important role, through both equity- and 
non-equity modes.
For most of the low-income countries in the 
region, intraregional flows account for a major 
share of FDI inflows, contributing to a rapid build-
up of infrastructure and productive capacities. For 
instance, Indonesia and the Philippines have seen 
higher capital inflows to infrastructure industries, 
such as electricity generation and transmission, 
through various contractual arrangements. 
Cambodia and Myanmar, the two LDCs in South-
East Asia, have recently emerged as attractive 
locations for investment in labour-intensive 
industries, including textiles, garments and footwear. 
Low-income South-East Asian countries have 
benefited from rising production costs in China and 
the subsequent relocation of production facilities. 
Outlook. The negotiation of RCEP started in May 
2013 and is expected to be completed in 2015. 
It is likely to promote FDI inflows and associated 
development benefits for economies at different 
levels of development in East and South-East Asia, 
through improved investment climates, enlarged 
markets, and the build-up of infrastructure and 
productive capacities. RCEP is not the only 
integration mechanism that covers a large range 
of economies across Asia and the Pacific. As the 
Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation and the Trans-
Pacific Partnership (chapter I) extend beyond the 
geographical scope of the region, so may the 
development benefits related to increased flows of 
both trade and investment.
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b. South Asia
Figure A. FDI flows, top 5 host and home economies, 2012–2013
(Billions of dollars)
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Figure B. FDI inflows, 2007–2013
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table A. Distribution of FDI flows among economies, 
by range,a 2013
range Inflows outflows
Above 
$10 billion
India ..
$1.0 to 
$9.9 billion
Islamic Republic of Iran, 
Bangladesh and Pakistan
India
$0.1 to 
$0.9 billion
Sri Lanka and Maldives Islamic Republic of Iran and Pakistan
Below 
$0.1 billion
Nepal, Afghanistan and Bhutan Sri Lanka and Bangladesh
a Economies are listed according to the magnitude of their FDI flows.
table B. cross-border M&As by industry, 2012–2013
(Millions of dollars)
Sector/industry Sales Purchases2012 2013 2012 2013
Total 2 821 4 784 3 104 1 621
Primary 130 28 -70 1 482
Mining, quarrying and petroleum 130 2 -70 1 482
Manufacturing 1 232 4 608 718 920
Food, beverages and tobacco 355 1 173 -2 -34
Chemicals and chemical products -207 3 620 12 246
Pharmaceuticals, medicinal chemical & botanical prod. 138 3 148 502 551
Basic metal and metal products 124 -4 068 116 65
Services 1 459 148 2 456 -781
Electricity, gas, water and waste management 40 -677 - -
Information and communications -430 -209 414 85
Financial and insurance activities 1 597 -298 675 -691
Business services -59 621 56 350
table c. cross-border M&As by region/country, 2012–2013
(Millions of dollars)
region/country Sales Purchases2012 2013 2012 2013
World 2 821 4 784 3 104 1 621
Developed economies 1 350 3 367 2 421 1 883
European Union 467 1 518 669 1 734
France 1 051 144 - 108
United Kingdom -791 1 110 62 510
United States 627 1 368 1 759 387
Japan 1 077 382 7 -
Switzerland -1 011 -62 357 -
Developing economies 1 456 1 212 683 -262
Africa 431 233 22 419
Asia and Oceania 1 026 979 542 -1 240
Latin America and the Caribbean - - 119 559
Transition economies - - - -
table E. Greenfield FDI projects by region/country, 2012–2013
(Millions of dollars)
Partner region/economy
South Asia 
as destination
South Asia 
as investors
2012 2013 2012 2013
World 39 525 24 499 27 714 15 789
Developed economies 23 579 17 495 8 598 4 115
European Union 12 962 6 543 2 895 2 593
Germany 4 291 1 137 847 500
United Kingdom 2 748 2 386 1 765 1 733
United States 5 559 4 718 829 1 308
Japan 3 147 2 801 84 45
Developing economies 15 694 6 928 18 736 10 802
Africa 149 871 9 315 5 799
Asia and Oceania 15 511 6 031 8 815 4 717
East and South-East Asia 8 211 3 016 2 386 2 627
West Asia 4 972 2 293 4 100 1 367
Transition economies 252 76 380 872
table D. Greenfield FDI projects by industry, 2012–2013
(Millions of dollars)
Sector/industry
South Asia 
as destination
South Asia 
as investors
2012 2013 2012 2013
Total 39 525 24 499 27 714 15 789
Primary 165 23 4 602 47
Mining, quarrying and petroleum 165 23 4 602 47
Manufacturing 16 333 11 220 11 365 6 842
Chemicals and chemical products 1 786 1 161 1 668 900
Metals and metal products 3 317 896 2 178 886
Motor vehicles and other transport equipment 4 248 1 969 2 941 2 386
Other manufacturing 1 089 1 008 103 509
Services 23 027 13 256 11 747 8 900
Electricity, gas and water 6 199 2 044 4 236 3 069
Transport, storage and communications 7 210 3 265 1 442 2 121
Finance 3 264 1 906 726 722
Business services 2 805 2 389 2 048 2 021
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FDI inflows to South Asia rose by 10 per cent 
to $36 billion in 2013. Outflows from the region 
slid by nearly three fourths, to $2 billion. Facing 
old challenges and new opportunities, South 
Asian countries registered varied performance in 
attracting FDI. At the regional level, renewed efforts 
to enhance connectivity with other parts of Asia are 
likely to help build up infrastructure and improve the 
investment climate. India has taken various steps 
to open its services sector to foreign investors, 
most notably in the retail industry. It seems that the 
opening up of single-brand retail in 2006 has led to 
increased FDI inflows; that of multi-brand retail in 
2012 has so far not generated the expected results. 
Trends in M&As and announced greenfield 
projects diverged. In 2013, the total amount of 
announced greenfield investments in South Asia 
dropped by 38 per cent, to $24 billion (table D). 
In manufacturing, greenfield projects in metals 
and metal products and in the automotive industry 
experienced considerable drops; in services, a 
large decline took place in infrastructure industries 
and financial services. Most major recipients of 
FDI in the region experienced a significant decline 
in greenfield projects, except for Sri Lanka, where 
they remained at a high level of about $1.3 billion.
In contrast, the total amount of cross-border M&A 
sales rose by 70 per cent, to $5 billion. The value 
of M&As boomed in manufacturing, particularly 
in food and beverage, chemical products and 
pharmaceuticals (table B). A number of large deals 
took place in these industries. For instance, in food 
and beverage, Relay (Netherlands) acquired a 27 per 
cent stake in United Sprits (India) for $1 billion, and, 
in pharmaceuticals, Mylan (United States) took over 
Agila (India) for $1.9 billion. Some smaller deals also 
took place in other South Asian countries, including 
Bangladesh, Pakistan and Sri Lanka.
FDI inflows rose in India, but macroeconomic 
uncertainties remain a major concern. The 
dominant recipient of FDI in South Asia, India, expe-
rienced a 17 per cent increase in inflows in 2013, to 
$28 billion (table A). The value of greenfield projects 
by TNCs declined sharply in both manufacturing 
and services. Flows in the form of M&As from the 
United Kingdom and the United States increased, 
while those from Japan declined considerably. In 
the meantime, the value of greenfield projects from 
these countries all dropped, but only slightly. The 
main manufacturing industries targeted by foreign 
investors were food and beverage, chemical prod-
ucts, and pharmaceuticals.
Macroeconomic uncertainties in India continue to 
be a concern for foreign investors. The annual rate 
of GDP growth in that country has slowed to about 
4 per cent, and the current account deficit has 
reached an unprecedented level – nearly 5 per 
cent of GDP. The Indian rupee depreciated 
significantly in mid-2013. High inflation and the 
other macroeconomic problems have cast doubts 
on prospects for FDI, despite the Government’s 
ambitious goal to boost foreign investment. Policy 
responses to macroeconomic problems will play an 
important role in determining FDI prospects in the 
short to medium run.22
For Indian companies, domestic economic problems 
seemed to have deterred international expansion, 
and India saw its outward FDI drop to merely $1.7 
billion in 2013. The slide occurred mainly as a result 
of reversed equity investment – from $2.2 billion to 
-2.6 billion – and large divestments by Indian TNCs 
accounted for much of the reverse. Facing a weak 
economy and high interest rates at home, some 
Indian companies with high financial leverage sold 
equity or assets in order to improve cash flows.23 
Facing old challenges as well as new oppor-
tunities, other countries reported varied 
performance. Bangladesh experienced significant 
growth in FDI inflows: from $1.3 billion in 2012 
to about $1.6 billion in 2013. Manufacturing 
accounted for a major part of inflows and 
contributed significantly to employment creation 
(UNCTAD, 2013a). The country has emerged as an 
important player in the manufacturing and export 
of ready-made garments (RMG) and has become 
a sourcing hotspot with its advantages of low cost 
and capacity (WIR13). However, the industry in 
Bangladesh has faced serious challenges, including 
in labour standards and skill development (box II.2).
FDI inflows to Pakistan increased to $1.3 billion, 
thanks to rising inflows to services in 2013. The 
country recently held its first auction for 3G and 
4G networks of mobile telecommunications. China 
Mobile was the winning bidder and now plans to 
invest $1.5 billion in Pakistan in the next four years. 
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Box II.2. Challenges facing the garment industry of Bangladesh: 
roles of domestic and foreign companies
Bangladesh has been recognized as one of the “Next 11” emerging countries to watch, following the BRICS countries 
(Brazil, Russian Federation, India, China, and South Africa) and listed among the “Frontier Five” emerging economies, 
along with Kazakhstan, Kenya, Nigeria and Viet Nam. The RMG industry has been the major driver of the country’s 
economic development in recent decades and is still fundamental to the prospects of the Bangladesh economy. This 
industry is considered the “next stop” for developed-country TNCs that are moving sourcing away from China. Such 
opportunity is essential for development, as Bangladesh needs to create jobs for its growing labour force (ILO, 2010).
With the prediction of further growth in the industry and the willingness of developed-country firms to source from 
Bangladesh, the picture on the demand side seems promising. However, realizing that promise requires the country 
to address constraints on the supply side. At the national level, poor infrastructure continues to deter investment in 
general and FDI in particular (UNCTAD, 2013a). At the firm level, one issue concerns the need for better compliance 
with labour legislation, as illustrated by several tragedies in the country’s garment industry. Besides strengthening 
such compliance, the industry needs to develop its capabilities, not only by consolidating strengths in basic garment 
production but also by diversifying into higher-value activities along the RMG value chain. 
Currently, Bangladesh’s garment firms compete predominantly on price and capacity. The lack of sufficient skills 
remains a major constraint, and both domestic and foreign-invested firms need to boost their efforts in this regard. A 
recent UNCTAD study shows the dominance of basic and on-the-job training, which links directly to established career 
trajectories within firms. However, high labour turnover hampers skill development at the firm level. On-the-job training 
is complemented by various initiatives supported by employer organizations, which have training centres but often 
cooperate with governmental and non-governmental organizations.  
FDI has accounted for a relatively small share of projects in the Bangladesh RMG industry in recent years. During 
2003–2011, only 11 per cent of investment projects registered in the industry were foreign-originated. Nevertheless, 
owing to the larger scale of such projects, they account for a significantly high share of employment and capital 
formation, and they can be an important catalyst for skills development in the labour force.
Source: UNCTAD (2014a).
FDI to the Islamic Republic of Iran focuses heavily 
on oil exploration and production, and economic 
sanctions have had negative effects on those 
inflows, which declined by about one third in 2013, 
to $3 billion. 
Services have attracted increasing attention from 
TNCs, as countries open new sectors to foreign 
investment. However, as demonstrated in India’s 
retail industry (see next subsection), some of the 
new liberalization efforts have not yet been able to 
boost FDI inflows as governments expected. One 
reason is the uncertain policy environment. For 
instance, responses from foreign investors to the 
Indian Government’s liberalization efforts have been 
mixed. 
Enhanced regional connectivity improves FDI 
prospects in South Asia. Poor infrastructure has 
long been a major challenge in attracting FDI and 
promoting industrial development in the region. 
Policy developments associated with enhanced 
connectivity with East Asia, especially the potential 
establishment of the Bangladesh-China-India-
Myanmar Economic Corridor and the China-
Pakistan Economic Corridor (box II.3), are likely to 
accelerate infrastructure investment in South Asia, 
and to improve the overall investment climate. As a 
result of interregional initiatives, China has shown 
its potential to become an important source of 
FDI in South Asia, particularly in infrastructure and 
manufacturing industries. The Chinese Government 
has started negotiating with the Indian Government 
on setting up an industrial zone in India to host 
investments from Chinese companies. China is 
the third country to consider such country-specific 
industrial zones in India, following Japan and the 
Republic of Korea (WIR13). 
New round of retail liberalization 
has not yet brought expected FDI 
inflows to India
Organized retailing, such as supermarkets and 
retail chains, has expanded rapidly in emerging 
markets.25 In India, organized retail has become 
a $28 billion sector and is expected to grow to 
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Box II.3. International economic corridors and FDI prospects in South Asia
Two international economic corridors linking South Asia and East and South-East Asia are to be established: the 
Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar (BCIM) Economic Corridor and the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor. Countries 
involved in the two initiatives have drawn up specific timetables for implementation. For the BCIM Economic Corridor, 
for example, the four countries have agreed to build transport, energy and telecommunication networks connecting 
each other.24 
The two initiatives will help enhance connectivity between Asian subregions and foster regional economic cooperation. 
In particular, these initiatives will facilitate international investment, enhancing FDI flows between participating 
countries and benefiting low-income countries in South Asia. Significant investment in infrastructure, particularly 
for land transportation, is expected to take place along these corridors, strengthening the connectedness of the 
three subregions. In addition, industrial zones will be built along these corridors, leading to rising investment in 
manufacturing in the countries involved. This is likely to help South Asian countries benefit from the production 
relocation that is under way in China.
Source: UNCTAD.
Source: UNCTAD.
Box figure II.3.1. The Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar Economic Corridor 
and the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor: the geographical scope 
a market worth $260 billion by 2020, according 
to forecasts of the Boston Consulting Group. As 
part of an overall reform programme and in order 
to boost investment and improve efficiency in 
the industry, the Indian Government opened up 
single-brand and multi-brand retail in 2006 and 
2012, respectively. However, the two rounds of 
liberalization have had different effects on TNCs’ 
investment decisions, and the recent round has not 
yet generated the expected results. 
Two rounds of retail liberalization. The 
liberalization of the Indian retail sector has 
encountered significant political resistance from 
domestic interest groups, such as local retailers and 
small suppliers (Bhattacharyya, 2012). In response, 
the Government adopted a gradual approach 
to opening up the sector – first the single-brand 
segment and then the multi-brand one. When the 
Government opened single-brand retail to foreign 
investment in 2006, it allowed 51 per cent foreign 
ownership; five years later, it allowed 100 per cent. 
In September 2012, the Government started to 
allow 51 per cent foreign ownership in multi-brand 
retail. 
However, to protect relevant domestic stakeholders 
and to enhance the potential development benefits 
of FDI, the Government has simultaneously 
introduced specific regulations. These regulations 
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cover important issues, such as the minimum 
amount of investment, the location of operation, 
the mode of entry and the share of local sourcing. 
For instance, single-brand retailers must source 
30 per cent of their goods from local small and 
medium-size enterprises. Multi-brand retailers may 
open stores only in cities with populations greater 
than 1 million and must invest at least $100 million. 
In addition, the Government recently clarified 
that foreign multi-brand retailers may not acquire 
existing Indian retailers. 
The opening up of single-brand retail in 2006 
led to increased FDI inflows. Since the initial 
opening up of the retail sector, a number of the 
world’s leading retailers, such as Wal-Mart (United 
States) and Tesco (United Kingdom), have taken 
serious steps to enter the Indian market. These 
TNCs have started doing businesses of wholesale 
and single-brand retailing, sometimes through joint 
ventures with local conglomerates. For instance, 
jointly with Bharti Group, Wal-Mart opened about 
20 stores in more than a dozen major cities. Tesco’s 
operations include sourcing and service centres, as 
well as a franchise arrangement with Tata Group. It 
has also signed an agreement to supply Star Bazaar 
with exclusive access to Tesco’s retail expertise and 
80 per cent of the stock of the local chain. 
Thanks to policy changes in 2006, annual FDI 
inflows to the trade sector in general jumped from 
an average of $60 million during 2003–2005 to 
about $600 million during 2007–2009. Inflows have 
fluctuated between $390 million and $570 million in 
recent years (figure II.10). The share of the sector 
in total FDI inflows rose from less than 1 per cent 
in 2005 to about 3 per cent during 2008–2009. 
However, that share has declined as investment 
encouraged by the first round of investment 
liberalization lost momentum.
The opening up of multi-brand retail in 2012 
has not generated the expected results. 
Policy-related uncertainties continue to hamper the 
expansion plans of foreign chains. Although foreign 
investment continues to flow into single-brand retail, 
no new investment projects have been recorded 
in multi-brand retail and in fact divestments have 
taken place. Major TNCs that entered the Indian 
market after the first round of liberalization have 
taken steps to get out of the market. For instance, 
Wal-Mart (United States) recently abandoned its 
plan to open full-scale retail outlets in India and 
dissolved its partnership with Bharti. 
TNCs’ passive and even negative reactions to the 
second round of retail liberalization in India were 
due partly to the strict operational requirements 
and continued policy uncertainties. As the two 
rounds of policy changes encountered significant 
political resistance, compromises have been made 
at both national and local levels to safeguard local 
interests by regulating issues related to the location 
of operations, the mode of entry and the share of 
local sourcing required. 
The way forward. A different policy approach 
could be considered for better leveraging foreign 
investment for the development of Indian retail 
industry. For example, in terms of mode of entry, 
franchising and other non-equity forms of TNC 
participation can be options. Through such 
arrangements, the host country can benefit from 
foreign capital and know-how while minimizing 
potential tensions between foreign and local 
stakeholders.
Source: UNCTAD FDI-TNC-GVC Information System, FDI/TNC 
database (www.unctad.org/fdistatistics).
Figure II.10. India: wholesale and retail trade inflows,
2005–2012
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c. West Asia
Figure A. FDI flows, top 5 host and home economies, 2012–2013
(Billions of dollars)
Figure c. FDI outflows, 2007–2013
(Billions of dollars)
Figure B. FDI inflows, 2007–2013
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table A. Distribution of FDI flows among economies, 
by range,a 2013
range Inflows outflows
Above 
$10 billion 
Turkey and United Arab Emirates ..
$5.0 to 
$9.9 billion 
Saudi Arabia Kuwait and Qatar
$1.0 to 
$4.9 billion 
Iraq, Lebanon, Kuwait, 
Jordan and Oman
Saudi Arabia, Turkey, United Arab 
Emirates, Oman and Bahrain
Below 
$1.0 billion
Bahrain, State of Palestine, 
Yemen and Qatar
Lebanon, Iraq, Yemen, 
Jordan and State of Palestine
a Economies are listed according to the magnitude of their FDI flows.
table B. cross-border M&As by industry, 2012–2013
(Millions of dollars)
Sector/industry Sales Purchases2012 2013 2012 2013
Total 8 219 2 065 11 390 8 077
Primary 233 357 21 476
Mining, quarrying and petroleum 233 344 21 466
Manufacturing 2 568 451 1 668 61
Food, beverages and tobacco 1 019 186 1 605 -
Pharmaceuticals, medicinal chem. & botanical prod. 700 40 27 -
Services 5 419 1 257 9 700 7 540
Electricity, gas and water 284 140 - 1 908
Construction 125 14 1 126 -47
Transportation and storage 874 55 -132 483
Information and communications 3 357 21 2 803 1 137
Financial and insurance activities - 298 465 6 543 3 972
Business services 1 039 371 73 184
table c. cross-border M&As by region/country, 2012–2013
(Millions of dollars)
region/country Sales Purchases2012 2013 2012 2013
World 8 219 2 065 11 390 8 077
Developed economies -1 083 406 5 223 2 739
European Union -3 007 714 5 319 1 312
Germany 72 3 456 -584 -654
United Kingdom -214 390 1 318 1 527
United States 1 700 -573 -244 67
Developing economies 4 228 1 160 4 585 4 913
Egypt - - 9 3 150
West Asia 3 855 1 039 3 855 1 039
Iraq -14 - 1 503 630
Qatar 3 357 449 - -
Transition economies 4 023 3 1 582 425
   Russian Federation 3 873 3 1 582 425
table D. Greenfield FDI projects by industry, 2012–2013
(Millions of dollars)
Sector/industry
West Asia as destination West Asia as investors
2012 2013 2012 2013
Total 44 668 56 527 35 069 39 240
Primary 2 5 990 37 1 701
Mining, quarrying and petroleum 2 5 990 37 1 701
Manufacturing 20 249 18 692 12 401 17 880
Coke, petroleum products and nuclear fuel 5 002 3 769 5 768 9 666
Chemicals and chemical products 6 181 4 178 103 202
Motor vehicles and other transport equipment 1 019 5 750 130 111
Services 24 417 31 845 22 630 19 659
Electricity, gas and water 2 608 13 761 601 1 777
Construction 6 693 3 253 5 105 4 313
Hotels and restaurants 3 809 3 555 3 302 3 142
Finance 2 226 1 641 3 993 2 305
Business services 2 038 6 155 588 3 953
table E. Greenfield FDI projects by region/country, 2012–2013
(Millions of dollars)
Partner region/economy West Asia as destination West Asia as investors2012 2013 2012 2013
World 44 668 56 527 35 069 39 240
Developed economies 15 652 27 253 2 054 4 572
Europe 9 883 15 801 1 640 2 509
North America 5 102 10 009 342 1 976
Developing economies 25 860 16 496 30 874 31 016
North Africa 1 047 109 10 511 3 906
Egypt 1 047 86 7 403 1 552
East Asia 4 901 1 058 820 500
South-East Asia 2 827 984 427 9 678
South Asia 4 100 1 367 4 972 2 293
West Asia 12 746 12 729 12 746 12 729
Transition economies 3 156 12 779 2 140 3 653
   Russian Federation 122 12 710 313 1 345
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FDI flows to West Asia decreased in 2013 by 9 per 
cent, to $44 billion, the fifth consecutive decline 
since 2009 and a return to the level they had in 
2005. Persistent tensions in the region continued 
to hold off foreign direct investors in 2013. Since 
2009, FDI flows to Saudi Arabia and Qatar have 
maintained a downward trend. During this period, 
flows to a number of other countries have started 
to recover, although that recovery has been bumpy 
in some cases. Flows have remained well below the 
levels reached some years ago, except in Kuwait 
and Iraq, where they reached record levels in 2012 
and 2013, respectively.
Turkey remained West Asia’s main FDI 
recipient in 2013, although flows decreased 
slightly, remaining at almost the same level as in 
the previous year – close to $13 billion (figure A). 
This occurred against a background of low cross-
border M&A sales, which dropped by 68 per cent to 
$867 million, their lowest level since 2004. While 
inflows to the manufacturing sector more than 
halved, dropping to $2 billion and accounting for 
only 16 per cent of the total, they increased in 
electricity, gas and water supply (176 per cent to 
$2.6 billion), finance (79 per cent to $3.7 billion), 
and real estate (16 per cent to $3 billion). Together 
these three industries represented almost three 
quarters of total FDI to the country.
FDI flows to the United Arab Emirates 
continued their recovery after the sharp decline 
registered in 2009, increasing in 2013 for the fourth 
consecutive year and positioning this country as the 
second largest recipient of FDI after Turkey. Flows 
increased by 9 per cent to $10.5 billion, remaining 
however well below their level in 2007 ($14.2 billion). 
This FDI recovery coincided with the economy 
rebounding from the 2009 debt crisis, driven by 
both oil and non-oil activities. Among the latter, 
the manufacturing sector expanded, led by heavy 
industries such as aluminium and petrochemicals; 
tourism and transport benefited from the addition 
of more routes and capacity by two local airlines; 
and the property market recovered, thanks to the 
willingness of banks to resume loans to real estate 
projects, which brought new life to the construction 
business, the industry that suffered most from the 
financial crisis and has taken the longest to recover. 
That industry got further impetus in November 
2013, when Dubai gained the right to host the 
World Expo 2020.
Flows to Saudi Arabia registered their fifth 
consecutive year of decline, decreasing by 
24 per cent to $9.3 billion, and moving the country 
from the second to the third largest host economy 
in the region. This decline has taken place despite 
the large capital projects under way in infrastructure 
and in downstream oil and gas, mainly refineries and 
petrochemicals. However, the Government remains 
the largest investor in strategically important 
sectors, and the activities of many private firms 
(including foreign ones) depend on government 
contracts (non-equity mode) or on joint ventures 
with State-owned companies. The departure in 
2013 of over 1 million expatriate workers has 
exacerbated the mismatch of demand and supply 
in the private job market that has challenged private 
businesses since the 2011 launch of the policy of 
“Saudization” (WIR13).
Flows to Iraq reached new highs. Despite high 
levels of instability in Iraq, affecting mainly the central 
area around Baghdad, FDI flows are estimated to 
have increased by about 20 per cent in 2013, to 
$2.9 billion. The country’s economic resurgence has 
been underpinned by its vast hydrocarbon wealth. 
Economic growth has been aided by substantial 
increases in government spending to compensate 
for decades of war, sanctions and underinvestment 
in infrastructure and basic services. In addition, 
work on several large oilfields has gathered speed 
since the award of the largest fields to foreign oil 
TNCs. A significant development for the industry in 
2013 was the start of operations of the first stage 
of a long-delayed gas-capture project run by Basra 
Gas Company (State-owned South Gas Company 
(51 per cent), Shell (44 per cent) and Mitsubishi 
(5 per cent)). The project captures associated gas 
that was being flared from three oil fields in southern 
Iraq and processes it for liquefied petroleum gas 
(LPG), natural gas liquids and condensate for 
domestic markets.
FDI flows to Kuwait are estimated to have decreased 
by 41 per cent in 2013, after having reached record 
highs in 2012 owing to a one-off acquisition deal 
worth $1.8 billion (see WIR13). FDI to Jordan 
increased by 20 per cent to $1.8 billion, despite 
regional unrest and sluggish economic growth. 
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Because of the country’s geostrategic position, 
countries and foreign entities have been extending 
considerable new funding in the form of aid, grants, 
guarantees, easy credit and investment.26 FDI 
to Lebanon is estimated to have fallen by 23 per 
cent, with most of the flows still focused on the 
real estate market, which registered a significant 
decrease in investments from the Gulf Cooperation 
Council (GCC) countries.
Prospects for the region’s inward FDI remain 
bleak, as rising political uncertainties are a strong 
deterrent to FDI, even in countries not directly 
affected by unrest and in those registering robust 
economic growth. The modest recovery in FDI 
flows recorded recently in some countries would 
have been much more substantial in the absence of 
political turmoil, given the region’s vast hydrocarbon 
wealth. 
FDI outflows from West Asia soared by 64 per 
cent to $31 billion in 2013, boosted by rising flows 
from the GCC countries, which enjoy a high level 
of foreign exchange reserves derived from their 
accumulation of surpluses from export earnings. 
Although each of these countries augmented its 
investment abroad, the quadrupling of outflows 
from Qatar and the 159 per cent growth in flows 
from Kuwait explain most of the increase. Given the 
high levels of their foreign exchange reserves and 
the relatively small sizes of their economies, GCC 
countries are likely to continue to increase their 
direct investment abroad.
New challenges faced by the GCC petro-
chemicals industry. With the goal of diversifying 
their economies by leveraging their abundant oil and 
gas and their capital to develop industrial capabilities 
and create jobs where they enjoy competitive 
advantages, GCC Governments have embarked 
since the mid-2000s on the development of large-
scale petrochemicals projects in joint ventures with 
international oil companies (see WIR12). These 
efforts have significantly expanded the region’s 
petrochemicals capacities.27 And they continue to 
do so, with a long list of plants under development, 
including seven megaprojects distributed between 
Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Qatar and 
Oman (table II.2). The industry has been facing new 
challenges, deriving among others from the shale 
gas production under way in North America (see 
chapter I), which has affected the global strategy of 
petrochemicals TNCs.
TNC focus on the United States. The shale 
gas revolution in North America, combined with 
gas shortages in the GCC region,28 has reduced 
the cost advantage of the GCC petrochemicals 
players and introduced new competition. By driving 
down gas prices in the United States,29 the shale 
revolution is reviving that country’s petrochemicals 
sector.30 Some companies have been looking 
again to the United States, which offers a huge 
consumer base and the opportunity to spread 
companies’ business risks. Global petrochemicals 
players that have engaged in several multibillion-
table II.2. Selected mega-petrochemicals projects under development in the Gcc countries
Project/Company name Partners Location Start Up
Capital 
expenditure     
($ million)
Sadara Aramco (65%) and Dow Chemical (35%) Jubail, Saudi Arabia 2016 20 000
Chemaweyaat Abu Dhabi Investment Council (40%); International 
Petroleum Investment Company (IPIC) (40%) and Abu 
Dhabi National Oil Company (ADNOC) (20%)
Al-Gharbia UAE 2018 11 000–20 000
Petro Rabigh 2 Aramco (37.5%) and Sumitomo (37.5%) Rabigh, Saudi Arabia 2016 7 000
Al Karaana Qatar Petroleum (80%) and Shell (20%) Ras, Laffan, Qatar 2017 6 400
Al-Sejeel Qatar Petroleum (80%) and Qatar Petrochemical (Qapco) 
(20%)
Ras Laffan, Qatar 2018 5 500
Liwa Plastics Oman Oil Refineries and Petroleum Industries (Orpic) Sohar, Oman 2018 3 600
Kemya SABIC (50%) and Exxon Mobil (50%) Jubail, Saudi Arabia 2015 3 400
Source:  UNCTAD, based on various newspaper accounts.
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dollar megaprojects in GCC countries in the last 
10 years – including Chevron Phillips Chemical, 
Dow Chemical and ExxonMobil Chemical – have 
been considering major projects in the United 
States. For example, Chevron Phillips is planning 
to build a large-scale ethane cracker and two 
polyethylene units in Texas.31 Dow Chemical has 
restarted its idled Saint Charles plant in Louisiana 
and is undertaking a major polyethylene and 
ethylene expansion in its plant in Texas.32 As of 
March 2014, the United States chemical industry 
had announced investment projects valued at about 
$70 billion and linked to the plentiful and affordable 
natural gas from domestic shale formations. About 
half of the announced investment is by firms based 
outside the United States (see chapter III).
Shale technology is being transferred through 
cross-border M&As to Asian TNCs.  United 
States technology has been transferred to Asian 
countries rich in shale gas through M&A deals, 
which should eventually help make these regions 
more competitive producers and exporters for 
chemicals. Government-backed Chinese and 
Indian companies have been aggressively luring or 
acquiring partners in the United States and Canada 
to gather the required production techniques, with a 
view to developing their own domestic resources.33
GCC petrochemicals and energy enterprises 
have also invested in North America. The 
North American shale gas boom has also attracted 
investment from West Asian petrochemicals 
companies: NOVA Chemicals (fully owned by 
Abu Dhabi’s State-owned International Petroleum 
Investment Company) is among the first to build a 
plant to exploit low-cost North American ethylene.34 
SABIC (Saudi Arabia) is also moving to harness the 
shale boom in the United States. The company – 
which already has a presence in the United States 
through SABIC Americas, a chemicals and fertilizer 
producer and a petrochemicals research centre – is 
looking to seal a deal to invest in a petrochemicals 
project as well.35 The boom has also pushed State-
owned Qatar Petroleum (QP) to establish small 
footholds in North America’s upstream sector. 
Because QP is heavily dependent on Qatar’s North 
Field, it has invested to diversify risk geographi-
cally. In April 2013, its affiliate, Qatar Petroleum 
International (QPI), signed a memorandum of 
understanding with ExxonMobil for future joint 
investment in unconventional gas and natural gas 
liquids in the United States, which suggests a 
strategy of strengthening ties with TNCs that invest 
in projects in Qatar36 and reflects joint interest in 
expanding the partnership both domestically and 
internationally. QPI also announced a $1 billion 
deal with Centrica (United Kingdom) to purchase oil 
and gas assets and exploration acreage in Alberta 
from oil sands producer Suncor Energy (Canada). 
However, new evidence suggests that the outlook 
for the shale gas industry may be less bright than 
was thought.37
Petrochemicals producers in the Middle East 
should nonetheless build on this experience 
to develop a strategy of gaining access to key 
growth markets beyond their diminishing feedstock 
advantage. Rather than focusing on expanding 
capacity, they need to leverage their partnership with 
petrochemicals TNCs to strengthen their knowledge 
and skills base in terms of technology, research and 
efficient operations, and to establish linkages with the 
global manufacturing TNCs that use their products. 
Efforts towards that end have been undertaken, for 
example, by SABIC, which has opened R&D centres 
in Saudi Arabia, China and India, and is developing 
a strategy to market its chemicals to international 
manufacturing giants. 
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3. Latin America and the caribbean
Figure A. FDI flows, top 5 host and home economies, 2012–2013
(Billions of dollars)
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Figure B. FDI inflows, 2007–2013
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table A. Distribution of FDI flows among economies, 
by range,a 2013
range Inflows outflows
Above 
$10 billion 
British Virgin Islands, Brazil, Mexico, 
Chile, Colombia, Cayman Islands 
and Peru
British Virgin Islands, Mexico, 
Cayman Islands and Chile
$5.0 to 
$9.9 billion 
Argentina and Venezuela (Bolivarian 
Republic of)
Colombia
$1.0 to 
$4.9 billion 
Panama, Uruguay, Costa Rica, 
Dominican Republic, Bolivia 
(Plurinational State of), Trinidad and 
Tobago, Guatemala, Bahamas and 
Honduras
Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) 
and Argentina
$0.1 to 
$0.9 billion 
Nicaragua, Ecuador, Jamaica, 
Paraguay, Barbados, Guyana, Haiti, 
Aruba, El Salvador, Antigua and 
Barbuda, Saint Vincent and the 
Grenadines, Suriname and Saint Kitts 
and Nevis
Trinidad and Tobago, Panama, 
Bahamas, Costa Rica and Peru
Less than 
$0.1 billion 
Belize, Saint Lucia, Grenada, Sint 
Maarten, Anguilla, Curaçao, Dominica 
and Montserrat
Nicaragua, Ecuador, Guatemala, 
Honduras, Saint Lucia, Aruba, Antigua 
and Barbuda, Barbados, El Salvador, 
Grenada, Sint Maarten, Saint Kitts and 
Nevis, Belize, Montserrat, Dominica, 
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, 
Suriname, Jamaica, Uruguay, Curaçao, 
Dominican Republic and Brazil
a Economies are listed according to the magnitude of their FDI flows.
Note: Not including offshore financial centres. 
table B. cross-border M&As by industry, 2012–2013
(Millions of dollars)
Sector/industry Sales Purchases2012 2013 2012 2013
Total 24 050 61 613 33 673 18 479
Primary -2 550 28 245 823 309
Mining, quarrying and petroleum -2 844 28 238 868 309
Manufacturing 9 573 25 138 4 849 7 153
Food, beverages and tobacco 3 029 23 848 235 4 644
Basic metal and metal products 4 367 -34 1 326 39
Non-metallic mineral products - - 66 1 936
Services 17 027 8 230 28 001 11 017
Electricity, gas, water and waste management -73 3 720 398 85
Transportation and storage 4 550 1 520 3 443 628
Information and communications 1 146 252 -10 345
Financial and insurance activities 5 121 2 189 19 586 9 931
Business services 3 043 -488 960 -23
table c. cross-border M&As by region/country, 2012–2013
(Millions of dollars)
region/country Sales Purchases2012 2013 2012 2013
World 24 050 61 613 33 673 18 479
Developed economies 1 699 -7 188 17 146 7 274
Belgium 1 237 15 096 - -60
Spain -1 996 -7 083 1 109 422
United Kingdom -4 592 -30 530 932 -213
United States 8 717 6 299 4 642 2 250
Developing economies 22 011 14 168 16 705 10 818
Brazil 1 138 21 8 555 2 909
Chile 9 445 2 769 608 617
Colombia 2 277 4 815 4 260 1 500
Mexico -134 2 700 448 214
Transition economies - 53 916 -178 387
  Russian Federation - 53 916 -178 370
table D. Greenfield FDI projects by industry, 2012–2013
(Millions of dollars)
Sector/industry
LAc as destination LAc as investors
2012 2013 2012 2013
Total 69 731 145 066 9 508 18 257
Primary 5 557 12 485 159 4 000
Mining, quarrying and petroleum 5 557 12 485 159 4 000
Manufacturing 32 236 34 630 3 745 4 292
Food, beverages and tobacco 3 605 3 844 692 1 493
Chemicals and chemical products 1 790 3 038 157 362
Metals and metal products 5 226 3 913 823 89
Motor vehicles and other transport equipment 12 409 11 794 523 114
Services 31 939 97 952 5 605 9 966
Electricity, gas and water 11 802 17 454 1 040 809
Transport, storage and communications 4 150 14 205 560 4 703
Finance 2 138 5 770 413 923
Business services 9 553 49 961 1 993 1 501
table E. Greenfield FDI projects by region/country, 2012–2013
(Millions of dollars)
Partner region/economy LAc as destination LAc as investors2012 2013 2012 2013
World 69 731 145 066 9 508 18 257
Developed economies 56 709 80 421 2 172 1 249
Europe 27 786 37 739 385 653
   Italy 8 106 6 013 - -
   Spain 6 799 11 875 62 121
North America 22 852 30 687 1 780 585
Japan 3 250 6 420 - -
Developing economies 12 684 63 790 7 336 16 912
East Asia 4 582 45 538 99 693
Latin America and the Caribbean 6 576 15 730 6 576 15 730
   Brazil 2 706 5 926 1 895 3 022
   Mexico 1 260 4 144 790 1 113
Transition economies 337 855 - 96
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FDI flows to Latin America and the Caribbean 
reached $292 billion in 2013 (figure B). Excluding 
the offshore financial centres, they increased by 
6 per cent to $182 billion. Flows to Central America 
and the Caribbean increased by 64 per cent to 
$49 billion, boosted by a mega-acquisition in 
Mexico. Whereas in previous years FDI growth 
was driven largely by South America, in 2013 
flows to this subregion declined by 6 per cent to 
$133 billion, as the decline in metal prices 
dampened FDI growth in the metal mining 
industry of some countries. FDI outflows reached 
$115 billion in 2013. Excluding financial centres, 
they declined by 31 per cent to $33 billion. 
Central America and the Caribbean drove 
FDI growth to the region. The purchase by 
the Belgian brewer AB InBev of the remaining 
shares in Grupo Modelo for $18 billion more than 
doubled inflows to Mexico to $38 billion (figure 
A), and is largely behind the strong increase 
of FDI to Central America and the Caribbean. 
Flows also increased in Panama (61 per cent to 
$4.7 billion) − Central America’s second largest 
recipient after Mexico − on the back of large 
infrastructure investment projects, including the 
expansion of the Panama Canal and of the capital 
city’s metro rail system, both part of ambitions to 
develop the country into a regional logistical hub 
and expand its capacity for assembly operations. 
Flows to Costa Rica rose by 14 per cent to 
$2.7 billion, boosted by a near tripling of real estate 
acquisitions by non-residents, accounting for 
43 per cent of total FDI to the country. The growth 
of FDI to Guatemala and to Nicaragua slowed 
in 2013, with flows growing by only 5 per cent 
after registering substantial increases in the last 
few years. The growth was powered primarily by 
surges in FDI in the mining and banking industries 
in Guatemala, and in free trade zones and offshore 
assembly manufacturing in Nicaragua. 
In the Caribbean, flows to the Dominican Republic 
fell by 37 per cent to $2 billion, after two years of 
strong recovery which had driven them to $3.1 
billion in 2012. This fall is due to both the predictable 
decline of cross-border M&As in 2013 − after the 
one-off acquisition of the country’s largest brewer 
for $1.2 billion in 2012 − and the completion of 
the Barrick Gold mining investment project, which 
started production in 2012. FDI in Trinidad and 
Tobago − highly concentrated in the oil and gas ex-
tractive industry, which attracted more than 70 per 
cent of total inflows to the country in 2001–2011 
(see section B.3) − decreased by 30 per cent to 
$1.7 billion, owing to the halving of reinvested 
earnings as natural gas prices remained weak. 
After three consecutive years of strong 
growth, FDI to South America declined (figure 
B). Among the main recipient countries, Brazil saw 
only a slight decline from 2012 − 2 per cent to 
$64 billion (figure A) − but with highly uneven growth 
by sector. Flows to the primary sector soared by 
86 per cent to $17 billion, powered primarily by the 
oil and gas extractive industry (up 144 per cent to 
$11 billion), while flows to the manufacturing and 
services sectors decreased by 17 and 14 per cent, 
respectively. FDI to the automobile and electronics 
industries bucked the trend of the manufacturing 
sector, rising by 85 and 120 per cent, respectively. 
FDI to Chile declined by 29 per cent to $20 billion, 
driven mainly by decreasing flows to the mining 
industry, which accounted for more than half of 
total FDI flows to this country in 2006–2012. The 
decrease in this sector is due to the completion 
of a number of investment projects that started 
production in 2013 and to the indefinite suspension 
of Barrick Gold’s (Canada) $8.5 billion Pascua-Lama 
gold-mining mega-project, located on the Chilean-
Argentinian border.38 The suspension, prompted 
mainly by lower gold prices and Barrick’s financial 
strains, has also affected FDI to Argentina, which 
declined by 25 per cent. Flows to Peru decreased 
by 17 per cent to $10 billion, following a strong 
decline of reinvested earnings (by 41 per cent to 
$4.9 billion) and of equity capital (by 48 per cent 
to $2.4 billion), partly compensated by the increase 
in intracompany loans. The Bolivarian Republic of 
Venezuela saw its FDI inflows more than double, to 
$7 billion. Inflows to Colombia increased by 8 per 
cent to $17 billion (figure A), largely on the back 
of cross-border M&A sales in the electricity and 
banking industries.  
Decreasing cross-border purchases and 
increasing loan repayments caused a slide 
of outward FDI from the region. FDI outflows 
reached $115 billion in 2013 (figure C). Excluding 
offshore financial centres, they declined by 31 per 
cent to $33 billion. The decline is the result of both 
a 47 per cent decrease in cross-border acquisitions 
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from the high value reached during 2012 ($31 billion) 
and a strong increase in loan repayments to parent 
companies by foreign affiliates of Brazilian and 
Chilean TNCs.39 Colombian TNCs clearly bucked 
the region’s declining trend in cross-border M&As, 
more than doubling the value of their net purchases 
abroad to over $6 billion, mainly in the banking, oil 
and gas, and food industries.
FDI prospects in the region are likely to be led 
by developments in the primary sector. New 
opportunities are opening for foreign TNCs in the 
region’s oil and gas industry, namely in Argentina 
and in Mexico. 
Argentina’s vast shale oil and gas resources40 and 
the technical and financial needs of Yacimientos 
Petrolíferos Fiscales (YPF), the majority State-owned 
energy company, to exploit them open new horizons 
for FDI in this industry. The agreement reached in 
2014 with Repsol (Spain) regarding compensation 
for the nationalization of its majority stake in YPF41 
removed a major hurdle to the establishment of joint 
ventures between YPF and other foreign companies 
for the exploitation of shale resources. YPF has 
already secured some investment, including a 
$1.2 billion joint venture with Chevron (United States) 
for the exploitation of the Vaca Muerta shale oil 
and gas field. Total (France) will also participate in a 
$1.2 billion upstream joint venture. 
In Mexico, FDI in the oil and gas industry is likely 
to receive a powerful boost after the approval of 
the long-disputed energy reform bill that ended 
a 75-year State oil monopoly and opened the 
Mexican energy industry to greater participation 
by international energy players in the upstream, 
midstream and downstream oil and gas sectors 
(see chapter III).
The sectoral composition of FDI stock in Latin 
America and the Caribbean shows similarities 
and differences by countries and subregions. 
The services sector is the main target of FDI both 
in South America and in Central America and 
the Caribbean (figure II.11), albeit relatively more 
important in the latter. The prominence of this sector 
is the result of the privatizations and the removal of 
restrictions on FDI that took place in both subregions 
in the last two decades. The manufacturing sector 
is the second most important target in both 
subregions, but more important in Central America 
and the Caribbean. The primary sector is relatively 
more important in South America but marginal in 
the other subregion. In Brazil and Mexico – the two 
biggest economies, where the region’s FDI to the 
manufacturing sector is concentrated − FDI is driven 
by two different strategies; export-oriented in Mexico 
(efficiency-seeking) and domestic-market-oriented in 
Brazil (market-seeking). 
Source: UNCTAD FDI-TNC-GVC Information System, FDI/TNC database.
Figure II.11. Latin America and the caribbean: share of FDI stock by main sectors, subregions and countries, 2012
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These different patterns of FDI flows and the 
different strategies of TNCs have shaped the 
different export structures of the two subregions, 
with primary products and commodity-based 
manufactures predominating in South America’s 
exports and manufactured products predominating 
in Central America and the Caribbean’s exports, 
resulting in two distinct GVC participation patterns. 
A closer look at the industry level also shows 
significant differences in GVC patterns within 
the same manufacturing activities, resulting from 
different industrialization strategies.
Different patterns of GVC integration. In 2011, 
the share of Latin American exports dependent 
on GVCs was 45 per cent, but the subregional 
figures differ strongly. In Central America and the 
Caribbean, GVC participation derives primarily 
from the relatively high imported foreign value 
added in exports (upstream component), while 
the downstream component is low. This occurs 
because most exports are made up of medium- 
and high-skill technology-intensive products (e.g. 
automobiles, electronics) as well as low-technology 
products (e.g. textiles) near the end of the value 
chain. In South America, by contrast, there is low 
upstream but high downstream participation in 
GVCs (figure II.12). This is due to the predominance 
of primary products and commodity-based 
manufactures in exports, which use few foreign 
inputs and, because they are at the beginning of the 
value chain, are themselves used as intermediate 
goods in third countries’ exports.
The same phenomenon can be observed in the 
value added exports of the manufacturing sector. 
While GVC participation in this sector in South 
America was 34 per cent in 2010 – shared equally 
between imported value added and downstream 
use of exports (at 17 per cent each) – participation 
was much higher in Central America and the 
Caribbean (50 per cent) and highly imbalanced 
in favour of imported value added in exports 
(44 per cent), while downstream use represented 
only 6 per cent (figure II.13). Differences between the 
two subregions are more accentuated in industries 
such as electronics, motor vehicles, machinery and 
equipment, and textiles and clothing (table II.3). 
This different degree and pattern of participation in 
GVCs between the two subregions − in the same 
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Note:  GVC participation rate indicates the share of a country’s exports that is part of a multi-stage trade process; it is the 
foreign value added (FVA) used in a country’s exports (the upstream component) plus the value added supplied to other 
countries’ exports (the downstream component, or DVX), divided by total exports.
 The share of foreign value added in Central America and the Caribbean’s exports is under-estimated because the 
UNCTAD-EORA data do not take into account the high import content of production in the maquiladora industry.
Figure II.12. GVc participation rate in Latin America and the caribbean, 2011 
(Per cent)
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manufacturing activities − derives from their position 
in the value chain, the nature of end markets, the 
linkages between export activities and the local 
economy, the nature of industrial policy, and the 
degree of intraregional integration. Central American 
and Caribbean countries rely heavily on the United 
States as both an export market for manufacturing 
products (76 per cent of all such exports) (figure II.14) 
and a GVC partner, especially in the upstream part of 
the chain, contributing 55 per cent of the imported 
value added in those exports (table II.4). However, 
their intraregional trade links and GVC interaction 
are weak: the subregion absorbs only 5 per cent of 
its own manufacturing exports (see figure II.4) and 
accounts for a small part of its upstream and down-
stream GVC links in the manufacturing sector (2 per 
cent and 6 per cent respectively) (see table II.4). 
By contrast, intraregional trade links in South 
America are much stronger, accounting for 49 per 
cent of the subregion’s manufacturing exports, 
24 per cent of its upstream GVC manufacturing 
links, and 13 per cent of its downstream links 
(table II.4). Finally, South America’s manufacturing 
exports integrate a much lower share of imported 
value added (17 per cent) than do those of Central 
America (44 per cent) (table II.4).
In the manufacturing sector in particular, the 
differences between South America and Central 
America in patterns of GVC participation derive 
mostly from two sources: different industrialization 
strategies and different modes of integration in 
international trade of Latin America’s biggest 
economies, Brazil and Mexico.42 This is illustrated 
by the example of the automobile industry, which, 
in both countries, is dominated by almost the same 
foreign vehicle-assembly TNCs but shows very 
different patterns of GVC participation.
Two ways to participate in GVCs: the 
automobile industry in Brazil and Mexico. 
Brazil and Mexico are respectively the seventh and 
eighth largest automobile producers and the fourth 
and sixteenth largest car markets, globally.43 Almost 
all of their motor vehicle production is undertaken 
Source: UNCTAD-Eora GVC Database.
Note:   GVC participation rate indicates the share of a country’s exports that is part of a multi-stage trade process; it is the 
foreign value added (FVA) used in a country’s exports (the upstream component) plus the value added supplied to other 
countries’ exports (the downstream component, or DVX), divided by total exports. 
 Total exports as calculated in GVCs (sum of the three components) are not necessarily the same as reported in the 
national account of exports of goods and services.
Figure II.13. Latin America and the caribbean: value added exports by main components, 
sectors and subregions, 2010 
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Source: UNCTAD GlobStat.
Figure II.14. Latin America and the caribbean: geographical distribution of export of manufactured 
goods by destination, 2010 
(Per cent)
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table II.3. Latin America and the caribbean manufacturing sector: GVc participation, components 
and share in total value added manufacturing exports by main industry, 2010
(Per cent)
Industry
South America Central America and the Caribbean
GVC 
participation
rate
FVA 
share
DVX 
share
Share in 
total manu-
facturing 
exports
GVC 
participation
rate
FVA 
share
DVX 
share
Share in 
total manu-
facturing 
exports
Manufacturing sector 34 17 17 100 50 44 6 100 
Electrical and electronic equipment 40 24 16 4 63 59 4 33 
Motor vehicles and other transport equipment 34 25 9 12 50 47 4 25 
Food, beverages and tobacco 20 13 8 17 25 21 4 6 
Chemicals and chemical products 42 22 20 16 38 20 18 5 
Textiles, clothing and leather 27 16 11 8 41 38 2 10 
Metal and metal products 43 16 27 12 55 29 26 4 
Machinery and equipment 27 16 12 7 41 38 4 5 
Wood and wood products 35 13 22 8 45 31 14 2 
Coke, petroleum products and nuclear fuel 40 9 31 5 42 31 11 3 
Rubber and plastic products 42 21 21 3 56 42 14 1 
Non-metallic mineral products 29 11 18 3 27 12 15 2 
Source:  UNCTAD-Eora GVC Database.
Note:  GVC participation rate indicates the share of a country’s exports that is part of a multi-stage trade process; it is the 
foreign value added (FVA) used in a country’s exports (the upstream component) plus the value added supplied to other 
countries’ exports (the downstream component, or DVX), divided by total exports.
by global vehicle assemblers, most of which − 
including Ford, General Motors, Honda, Nissan, 
Renault, Toyota and Volkswagen − have assembly 
plants in both countries. This shared characteristic 
notwithstanding, clear differences exist between the 
industries in the two countries. The most significant 
one is that the Brazilian automobile value chain 
has the domestic market as its main end market, 
whereas the Mexican one is largely export-oriented 
and directed mainly to the United States as its end 
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market. In 2012, the Mexican automobile industry 
exported, for example, 82 per cent of its vehicle 
production44 – 64 per cent of it to the United States. 
By contrast, only 13 per cent of vehicle production 
in Brazil was exported, with MERCOSUR absorbing 
67 per cent of exports by value.45 
The inward/outward orientation of the motor vehicle 
industries in the two countries is also reflected by 
the much lower GVC participation of Brazil’s motor 
vehicle exports − 26 per cent, compared with 58 
per cent for Mexico’s exports. This difference is 
explained mainly by the much lower imported 
content in Brazil’s exports (21 per cent versus 47 
per cent in Mexico) and also − but to a lesser extent 
− by the lower participation of Brazil’s motor vehicle 
exports in other countries’ exports (5 per cent, 
compared with 11 per cent) (table II.5).
Another difference is the major interaction of Brazil’s 
automotive industry with other Latin American 
countries – mainly Argentina, with which Brazil has 
an agreement on common automotive policy.46 
Mexico’s industry relies strongly on developed 
countries, mainly the United States; its few linkages 
with other Latin American countries are with 
neighbours that do not have significant activity in 
the automotive industry. Indeed, whereas Latin 
America and the Caribbean accounts for only 
4 per cent of GVC participation in Mexico’s motor 
vehicle exports, in Brazil its share is 12 per cent. 
More tellingly, Brazil represents an important step in 
Argentina’s motor vehicle value chain: it accounts 
for 34 per cent of GVC participation in Argentina’s 
motor vehicle exports (table II.5) and absorbs 
77 per cent of the value of those exports.47 
Different TNC strategies and different 
government industrial policies have resulted 
in distinct GVC integration patterns with 
different implications in each country for 
business linkages, innovation and technology. 
Mexico opted for an export-oriented strategy that 
allows companies operating under the IMMEX 
programme48 to temporarily import goods and 
services that will be manufactured, transformed or 
repaired, and then re-exported, with no payment 
of taxes, no compensatory quotas and other 
specific benefits.49 This strategy relies mainly on 
table II.4. Latin America and the caribbean: GVc upstream and downstream links in the manufacturing 
sector by subregion and by geographical origin and destination, 2010
(Per cent)
Partner region
FVA share 
(by origin)
DVX share 
(by destination)
GVC participation           
rate (by origin 
and destination) 
South 
America
Central 
America and 
the Caribbean
South 
America
Central 
America and 
the Caribbean
South 
America
Central 
America and 
the Caribbean
Developed countries 55 76 64 76 59 76 
North America 23 54 14 35 19 52 
Europe 27 16 46 38 36 19 
Other developed 5 6 4 3 5 6 
Developing and transition economies 45 24 36 24 41 24 
Latin America and the Caribbean 26 7 18 10 22 7 
  South America 24 5 13 4 19 5 
  Central America and the Caribbean 2 2 5 6 3 2 
Asia and Oceania 15 15 15 11 15 15 
Other developing and transition economies 4 2 3 3 4 2 
World 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Amount ($ billion) 50 130 48 19 98 149 
Share in total value added manufacturing exports 17 44 17 6 34 50 
Source:  UNCTAD-Eora GVC Database.
Note:  GVC participation rate indicates the share of a country’s exports that is part of a multi-stage trade process; it is the 
foreign value added (FVA) used in a country’s exports (the upstream component) plus the value added supplied to other 
countries’ exports (the downstream component, or DVX), divided by total exports.
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the low cost of labour as a fundamental factor of 
competitiveness and GVC integration. It has resulted 
in the development of an extensive network of 
maquiladora-type producers, including carmakers 
and automobile suppliers, mostly foreign owned, 
that has transformed Mexico into a significant 
export hub. However, it has not necessarily forged 
strong linkages with local suppliers (Sturgeon et al., 
2010).50 The weak linkages with local suppliers in 
the automobile value chain may also be attested 
to by the high level of foreign value added in the 
industry’s exports (table II.5).
In contrast, the automotive value chain in Brazil 
has benefited from the advantages offered by a 
large internal and regional market, and thus has 
expanded into more complex and diverse activities, 
generating local innovation. Brazilian affiliates of 
TNC carmakers have increased their technological 
capabilities through the search for solutions to meet 
local demand, related to technical differences in 
materials, fuels and road conditions or to distinct 
consumer preferences. Thus, the capabilities of 
Brazilian automotive engineering have been formed 
through a learning process of adapting and, more 
table II.5. Latin America: GVc upstream and downstream links in the motor vehicle industry, 
selected countries,by geographical origin and destination, 2010
(Per cent)
FVA share 
(by origin)
DVX share  
(by destination)
GVC participation           
rate (by origin  
and destination)
Partner region/country Brazil Mexico Argentina Brazil Mexico Argentina Brazil Mexico Argentina
Developed countries 79 89 43 70 81 50 72 83 48 
United States 36 72 18 24 56 17 27 59 17 
Europe 33 10 20 37 16 27 36 15 26 
Other developed 9 7 5 9 9 6 9 8 6 
Developing and transition economies 21 11 57 30 19 50 28 17 52 
Latin America and the Caribbean 12 4 49 12 4 37 12 4 40 
South America 11 4 49 11 4 36 11 4 39 
Argentina 9 0 0 6 0 0 7 0 0 
Brazil 0 3 42 0 2 31 0 2 34 
Central America and the Caribbean 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 
Mexico 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 
Asia and Oceania 9 7 7 14 13 12 13 12 11 
China 4 3 4 6 5 6 6 5 5 
Other developing and transitional economies 1 0 0 3 2 2 3 1 1 
World 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Amount ($ billion) 5.7 33.2 2.2 1.4 8.1 0.7 7.0 41.2 2.9
Share in total value added motor vehicle 
exports (%)
21 47 50 5 11 15 26 58 65
Source: UNCTAD-Eora GVC Database.
Note:  GVC participation rate indicates the share of a country’s exports that is part of a multi-stage trade process; it is the 
foreign value added (FVA) used in a country’s exports (the upstream component) plus the value added supplied to other 
countries’ exports (the downstream component, or DVX), divided by total exports.
  UNCTAD-Eora’s estimates of foreign and domestic value added in Mexico’s gross exports do not take into account 
the high import content of production in the Maquiladora and PITEX programmes, likely leading to a significant under-
estimation of the share of foreign value added in its exports. UNCTAD-Eora’s data, based on a country’s input-output 
table, relies on the assumption that the intensity in the use of imported inputs is the same between production for 
exports and production for domestic sales. This assumption does not hold for countries, like Mexico, hosting significant 
processing exports characterized by favourable tax treatment for temporary imports to produce export goods. This 
implies a significant difference in the intensity of imported intermediate inputs between the production of processing 
exports on the one hand and the production for normal exports and domestic sales on the other hand. Estimates using 
an input-output table for the maquiladora industry for 2003, found a foreign value added share of about 74 per cent 
for the transportation equipment industry (NICS 336) in 2003 (De la Cruz et al. (2011), while UNCTAD-Eora’s estimates 
for the same year are 41 per cent for the manufacture of motor vehicles trailers and semi-trailers and other transport 
equipment (ISIC D34 and D35).
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recently, designing and developing vehicles suitable 
for local conditions. This process has generated 
opportunities to involve locally owned component 
producers, local research and engineering services 
institutions, and other smaller suppliers of parts 
and components, which may have specific local 
knowledge not available in multinational engineering 
firms (Quadros, 2009; Quadros et al., 2009).51
Although the size of the Brazilian car market was one 
of the main factors behind the wave of investment 
in the 1990s and the progressive delegation of 
innovation activities to Brazilian affiliates and their 
local suppliers, Government policies have been a 
strong determinant in the attraction of new vehicle 
assemblers and in the expansion of innovation and 
R&D activities. In contrast to Mexico, where since 
the 1990s, Government policy has moved towards 
free trade and investment rules, automotive policy 
in Brazil maintains high tariffs on automotive 
products imported from outside MERCOSUR. 
Brazil also introduced a series of incentives for 
exports and for investment in new plants. In 2011, 
faced with an increase in imported models favoured 
by the expanding internal market, an overvalued 
local currency and depressed export markets in 
developed countries, the Government introduced 
an internal tax on car purchases. However, it 
exempted carmakers that sourced at least 65 per 
cent of their parts from MERCOSUR partners or 
from Mexico (with which Brazil has an automotive 
deal). This reduced vehicle imports from a peak of 
27 per cent in December 2011 to 19 per cent 
in October 2013. In 2012, the Government 
renegotiated the bilateral deal with Mexico, 
imposing import quotas. A new automotive 
regime for 2013–2017 (Inovar Autos), introduced 
in 2012, set new rules that are intended to boost 
local content, energy efficiency, innovation and 
R&D. Companies that achieve specific targets in 
production steps located in Brazil and in investment 
in product development and R&D will benefit from 
additional tax incentives.52 
Both Brazil and Mexico continue to attract signifi-
cant foreign investment in their automobile sector. 
In Brazil, the new automobile regime, combined 
with the continued expansion of the car market 
in Brazil and Argentina, has encouraged foreign 
investors to step up investment plans and increase 
local content.53 In Mexico, low labour costs, an 
increasingly dense and capable foreign-owned 
supply chain, and a global web of FTAs are driving a 
production surge in the automotive industry, much 
of it from Japanese and German manufacturers.54 
The growth potential of the automotive industry 
appears promising in both countries, despite clear 
differences between the two in government policies 
and TNC strategies. Mexico has successfully 
leveraged its strategic proximity to the United 
States market and its trade agreements with more 
than 40 countries to attract important amounts 
of FDI to its automobile industry, which has 
transformed the country into a major export base, 
creating significant job opportunities. However, the 
country’s competitiveness is still based primarily 
on low wages, and the industry – strongly export-
oriented – has developed only weak linkages with 
local suppliers. In Brazil, the exports are lower 
but the advantages represented by the large 
internal and regional markets have attracted FDI 
to the automobile industry. The need to adapt 
to the specificities of this market, coupled with a 
government policy introduced in the 2000s to 
provide greater incentives for innovation, R&D and 
development of domestic productive capacity, have 
led to more integration of local suppliers into the 
automobile value chain, and the development of 
local innovation and R&D capabilities. 
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4. transition economies
Figure c. FDI outflows, 2007–2013
(Billions of dollars)
Figure B. FDI inflows, 2007–2013
(Billions of dollars)
Figure A. FDI flows, top 5 host and home economies, 2012–2013
(Billions of dollars)
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table A. Distribution of FDI flows among economies, 
by range,a 2013
range Inflows outflows
Above 
$5.0 billion 
Russian Federation and Kazakhstan Russian Federation 
$1.0 to 
$4.9 billion 
Ukraine, Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, 
Belarus, Albania, Uzbekistan, Serbia 
and Georgia
Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan
$0.5 to 
$0.9 billion
Kyrgyzstan ..
Below 
$0.5 billion
Montenegro, Armenia, the former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Republic of 
Moldova and Tajikistan
Ukraine, Belarus, Georgia, Albania, 
Republic of Moldova, Montenegro, 
Armenia, Serbia, Kyrgyzstan,  
the former Yugoslav Republic 
of Macedonia, and Bosnia and 
Herzegovina
a Economies are listed according to the magnitude of their FDI flows.
table c. cross-border M&As by region/country, 2012–2013
(Millions of dollars)
region/country Sales Purchases2012 2013 2012 2013
World 6 852 -3 820 9 296 56 970
Developed economies 4 746 -7 591 4 848 1 682
European Union 3 709 -3 987 5 164 243
Cyprus 7 988 -234 - -
Sweden -1 747 - 3 384 - 15
United States -212 -3 580 -283 30
Developing economies 1 661 2 972 4 023 54 516
Africa - - - -
Latin America and the Caribbean -178 387 - 53 916
West Asia 1 582 425 4 023 3
South, East and South-East Asia 256 2 160 - 597
China 200 2 000 - -
Transition economies 424 771 424 771
table D. Greenfield FDI projects by industry, 2012–2013
(Millions of dollars)
Sector/industry
transition economies 
as destination
transition economies 
as investors
2012 2013 2012 2013
Total 39 389 27 868 9 950 18 611
Primary 2 604 560 145 3 146
Mining, quarrying and petroleum 2 604 560 145 3 146
Manufacturing 18 134 10 041 6 496 2 462
Food, beverages and tobacco 2 348 725 201 248
Coke, petroleum products and nuclear fuel 424 501 3 747 714
Chemicals and chemical products 5 316 995 186 396
Motor vehicles and other transport equipment 4 229 2 027 1 682 673
Services 18 651 17 267 3 310 13 003
Electricity, gas and water 3 984 5 076 594 10 389
Construction 2 908 3 069 31 -
Transport, storage and communications 4 051 2 698 893 676
Finance 2 056 2 359 1 134 1 330
table E. Greenfield FDI projects by region/country, 2012–2013
(Millions of dollars)
Partner region/economy
transition economies  
as destination
transition economies  
as investors
2012 2013 2012 2013
World 39 389 27 868 9 950 18 611
Developed economies 29 092 19 633 3 060 2 327
European Union 20 338 14 719 2 337 2 186
Germany 4 329 2 767 29 157
United Kingdom 2 538 563 540 80
United States 4 610 2 570 279 41
Developing economies 7 888 6 253 4 481 14 302
Africa - 76 67 108
East and South-East Asia 5 368 1 556 668 483
South Asia 380 872 252 76
West Asia 2 140 3 653 3 156 12 779
Latin America and the Caribbean - 96 337 855
Transition economies 2 409 1 982 2 409 1 982
table B. cross-border M&As by industry, 2012–2013
(Millions of dollars)
Sector/industry Sales Purchases2012 2013 2012 2013
Total 6 852 -3 820 9 296 56 970
Primary -1 193 -3 726 2 173 55 687
Mining, quarrying and petroleum -1 212 -3 726 2 173 55 687
Manufacturing 340 2 813 -547 -24
Food, beverages and tobacco 6 189 -40 4
Chemicals and chemical products 281 2 000 - 30
Basic metal and metal products 5 425 -182 -59
Motor vehicles and other transport equipment -390 60 - - 
Services 7 705 -2 907 7 669 1 307
Electricity, gas, water and waste management -451 857 - 597
Transport and storage 2 148 348 1 291 652
Information and communications 6 714 -4 106 23 -
Financial and insurance activities -168 -164 6 314 -17
CHAPTER II  Regional Investment Trends 71
FDI flows to and from transition economies reached 
record levels in 2013. The Russian Federation was 
the world’s third largest recipient of FDI and the 
world’s fourth largest investor, mostly due to a 
single large deal. In South-East Europe, most of the 
increase in inflows was driven by the privatization of 
remaining State-owned enterprises in the services 
sector. FDI in the transition economies is likely to be 
affected by uncertainties related to regional conflict; 
FDI linkages between the transition economies and 
the EU may be particularly impacted.
FDI inflows to the transition economies 
increased by 28 per cent in 2013, to $108 
billion (figure B). The FDI performance of both 
transition subgroups was significant: in South-East 
Europe, flows increased by 43 per cent, from $2.6 
billion in 2012 to $3.7 billion in 2013, reflecting a 
rise of investments in the services sector; in the 
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), the 
28 per cent rise in flows was due to the significant 
growth of FDI to the Russian Federation, which 
made it the world’s third largest recipient of 
inflows for the first time. Large countries in the 
region continued to account for the lion’s share of 
inward FDI, with the top two destinations (Russian 
Federation and Kazakhstan) accounting for 82 per 
cent of the flows (figure A). 
The Russian Federation saw FDI flows grow by 
57 per cent, reaching $79 billion. Foreign investors 
were motivated by continued strong growth in the 
domestic market coupled with productivity gains. 
They primarily used intracompany loans from parent 
companies to finance these investments. Investors 
also continued to be attracted by high returns in 
energy and other natural-resource-related projects, 
as illustrated by partnership deals in “hard to 
access” oil projects, for which tax relief is offered. 
The FDI surge was also due to the acquisition by 
BP (United Kingdom) of an 18.5 per cent equity 
stake in Rosneft (Russia Federation) as part of a 
bigger deal between those two companies (box 
II.4). As a result, in 2013 the United Kingdom was 
the largest investor in the Russian Federation for 
the first time, accounting for an estimated 23 per 
cent of FDI to the country. 
FDI inflows to Kazakhstan declined by 29 per 
cent, to $10 billion, as investments in financial 
services slowed, with some foreign banks divesting 
their assets. For example, Unicredit (Italy) sold its 
affiliate ATF bank to a domestic investor. Political 
uncertainties since 2013 have halved FDI flows to 
Ukraine to $3.8 billion, partly due to a number of 
divestments – in particular, in the banking sector. 
In South-East Europe, most of the FDI 
inflows were driven by privatizations in the 
services sector. In Albania, FDI inflows reached 
$1.2 billion, owing mainly to the privatization of 
four hydropower plants and to the acquisition of a 
70 per cent share of the main oil-refining company 
ARMO by Heaney Assets Corporation (Azerbaijan). 
In Serbia, the jump in FDI can be ascribed to 
some major acquisitions. The private equity 
group KKR (United States) acquired pay-TV and 
broadband group SBB/Telemach, for $1 billion. 
Abu Dhabi’s Etihad Airways acquired a 49 per 
cent stake in Jat Airways, the Serbian national flag 
Box II.4. The Rosneft-BP transactions
In March 2013, Rosneft, the Russian Federation’s State-owned and largest oil company, completed the acquisition 
of TNK-BP. Rosneft paid $55 billion to the two owners: BP (United Kingdom) and A.A.R. Consortium, an investment 
vehicle based in the British Virgin Islands that represented the Russian co-owners of TNK-BP. A.A.R. was paid 
all in cash, while BP received $12.5 billion in cash and an 18.5 per cent stake in Rosneft, valued at $15 billion. 
The payment by Rosneft was reflected as direct equity investment abroad in the balance-of-payment statistics of 
the Russian Federation, while the acquisition by BP of the stake in Rosneft was reflected as direct equity inflow. 
The remainder of the acquisition was funded by borrowing from foreign banks (reported at $29.5 billion) and from 
domestic banks. The Rosneft-BP transactions raised FDI inflows in the first quarter of 2013 by $15 billion in the 
Russian Federation. It raised foreign borrowing by about $29.5 billion, while boosting FDI outflows by $55 billion in 
the British Virgin Islands. 
Source:  UNCTAD, based on conversation with the Central Bank of Russia; Institute of International Finance, “Private capital 
flows to emerging market economies”, June 2013.
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carrier, as part of the offloading of loss-making 
State-owned enterprises.
Although developed countries were the main 
investors in the region, developing-economy 
FDI has been on the rise. Chinese investors, 
for example, have expanded their presence in the 
CIS by acquiring either domestic or foreign assets. 
Chengdong Investment Corporation acquired a 
12 per cent share of Uralkali (Russian Federation), 
the world’s largest potash producer. CNPC acquired 
ConocoPhillips’ shares in the Kashagan oil-field 
development project in Kazakhstan for $5 billion.
In 2013, outward FDI from the region jumped 
by 84 per cent, reaching $99 billion. As in 
past years, Russian TNCs accounted for most 
FDI projects, followed by TNCs from Kazakhstan 
and Azerbaijan. The value of cross-border M&A 
purchases by TNCs from the region rose more than 
six-fold, mainly owing to the acquisition of TNK-
BP Ltd (British Virgin Islands) by Rosneft (box II.4). 
Greenfield investments also rose by 87 per cent to 
$19 billion.
Prospects. FDI in the transition economies is 
expected to decline in 2014 as uncertainties 
related to regional conflict deter investors – mainly 
those from developed countries. However, regional 
instability has not yet affected investors from 
developing countries. For example, in the Russian 
Federation, the government’s Direct Investment 
Fund – a $10 billion fund to promote FDI in the 
country – has been actively deployed in collaboration 
with foreign partners, for example, to fund a deal 
with Abu Dhabi’s Finance Department to invest 
up to $5 billion in Russian infrastructure. In South-
East Europe, FDI is expected to rise – especially in 
pipeline projects in the energy sector. In Serbia, the 
South Stream project, valued at about €2 billion, is 
designed to transport natural gas from the Russian 
Federation to Europe. In Albania, the Trans-Adriatic 
pipeline will generate one of that country’s largest 
FDI projects, with important benefits for a number 
of industries, including manufacturing, utilities 
and transport. The pipeline will enhance Europe’s 
energy security and diversity by providing a new 
source of gas.55
(i) Interregional FDI with the EU
FDI linkages between the East (transition 
economies) and the West (EU) were strong until 
2013, but the deepening stand-off between the 
EU and the Russian Federation over Ukraine might 
affect their FDI relationship.
Over the past 10 years, transition economies have 
been the fastest-growing hosts for FDI worldwide, 
overtaking both developed and all developing 
groups (figure II.15). During 2000–2013, total FDI 
in these economies – in terms of stocks as well 
as flows – rose at roughly 10 times the rate of 
growth of total global FDI. Similarly, outflows from 
transition economies rose by more than 17 times 
between 2000 and 2013, an increase unrivalled 
by any other regional grouping. EU countries have 
been important partners, both as investors and 
recipients, in this evolution.
Source: UNCTAD FDI-TNC-GVC Information System, FDI/TNC 
database (www.unctad.org/fdistatistics).
Figure II.15. FDI inflow index of selected regions,
2000–2013
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In transition economies, the EU has the 
largest share of inward FDI stock, accounting 
for more than two thirds of the total. North 
America has consistently accounted for a lower 
share of inward FDI to transition economies (3 per 
cent), while the share of developing economies 
has been on the rise to 17 per cent. In the CIS, EU 
investors are motivated by a desire to gain access 
to natural resources and growing local consumer 
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markets, and to benefit from business opportunities 
arising from the liberalization of selected industries. 
In South-East Europe, most of the EU investments 
are driven by the privatization of State-owned 
enterprises and by large projects benefiting from a 
combination of low production costs in the region 
and the prospect of association with or membership 
in the EU. Among the EU countries, Germany has 
the largest stock of FDI, followed by France, Austria, 
Italy and the United Kingdom (figure II.16).
Data on individual FDI projects show a similar 
pattern: In terms of cross-border M&As, TNCs from 
the Netherlands are the largest acquirers (31 per 
cent), followed by those from Germany and Italy. 
In greenfield projects, German investors have the 
largest share (19 per cent), followed by those from 
the United Kingdom and Italy. With regard to target 
countries, about 60 per cent of the region’s M&As 
and announced greenfield projects took place in 
the Russian Federation, followed by Ukraine.
Data on cross-border M&As indicate that EU 
investments in transition economies are more 
concentrated in finance; electricity, gas and water, 
information and communication; and mining and 
quarrying (figure II.17). Construction; transport, 
storage and communication; motor vehicles and 
other transport equipment; coke and petroleum 
products; and electricity, gas and water are the 
main recipient industries of announced greenfield 
Source:  Source: UNCTAD FDI-TNC-GVC Information System, cross-border M&A database for M&As (www.unctad.org/fdistatistics) 
and information from the Financial Times Ltd, fDi Markets (www.fDimarkets.com) for greenfield projects.
Note:  M&A data cover only those deals that involved an acquisition of an equity stake of more than 10 per cent. Greenfield 
data refer to estimated amounts of capital investment.
Figure II.17. Distribution of cross-border M&As and greenfield investment in transition economies concluded 
by Eu tncs, by industry, cumulative 2003–2013 
(Per cent of total value)
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projects by EU investors. Salient FDI trends in some 
of these industries are as follows: 
•  The relaxation of foreign ownership restrictions 
in the financial services industry and accession 
to the WTO of some transition economies 
facilitated the entry of EU investors. It also 
reflected European banks’ increasing interest 
in growth opportunities outside their traditional 
markets. For example, UniCredit (Italy) acquired 
Ukrsotsbank (Ukraine) for $2.1 billion and 
Société Générale Group (France) bought a 
20 per cent equity stake in Rosbank, one of the 
largest Russian banks, for $1.7 billion. In South-
East Europe, the share of banking assets owned 
by foreign entities, mainly from the EU, has risen 
to more than 90 per cent. Foreign banks (mainly 
Austrian, Italian and Greek banking groups) have 
either acquired local banks or established local 
affiliates or regional branches. 
•  The need for structural reform to enable the 
electricity industry to meet the growing demand 
for electric power in the Russian Federation 
prompted the unbundling and reorganization 
of State-owned Unified Energy Systems. This 
restructuring and sales of assets have provided 
opportunities for foreign investors to enter the 
industry. A number of the stakes have been 
acquired by European TNCs, such as Fortum 
(Finland), Enel (Italy), E.ON (Germany), CEZ Group 
(Czech Republic), RWE Group (Germany) and 
EDF (France). 
•  Driven by high expected returns, EU TNCs 
increased their investments in energy and natural-
resource-related projects, mainly through two 
channels. First, the European companies entered 
transition economies’ oil and gas markets through 
asset-swap deals by which those companies 
obtained minority participation in exploration and 
extraction projects in exchange for allowing firms 
from transition economies to enter downstream 
markets in the EU. For example, Wintershall 
(Germany) acquired a stake in the Yuzhno-
Russkoye gas field in Siberia; in return, Gazprom 
(Russian Federation) could acquire parts of 
Wintershall’s European assets in hydrocarbons 
transportation, storage and distribution. Second, 
in some “hard to access” oil and gas projects 
requiring cutting-edge technology, such as the 
development of the Yamal and Shtokman fields, 
EU TNCs were invited to invest. 
•  Among announced greenfield projects, the 
increased activity in the automotive industry 
in transition economies was fuelled by EU 
manufacturers’ search for low-cost, highly 
skilled labour and access to a growing market. 
Many EU car manufacturers – among them, 
Fiat, Volkswagen, Opel, Peugeot and Renault – 
have opened production facilities in transition 
economies, mainly in the Russian Federation. Car 
assembly plants have already created a sufficient 
critical mass to encourage the entry of many 
types of component suppliers.
The bulk of outward FDI stock from transition 
economies is in EU countries. Virtually all (95 per 
cent) of the outward stock from South-East Europe 
and CIS countries is due to the expansion abroad 
of Russian TNCs. These investors increasingly 
look for strategic assets in EU markets, including 
downstream activities in the energy industry and 
value added production activities in metallurgy, 
to build global and regional value chains through 
vertical integration. Much of the outward FDI has 
been undertaken by relatively few major TNCs with 
significant exports, aiming to reinforce their overseas 
business activities through investment. Russian 
oil and gas TNCs made some market-seeking 
acquisitions of processing activities, distribution 
networks, and storage and transportation facilities 
across Europe. For example, Gazprom concluded 
an agreement with OMV (Austria) for the purchase 
of 50 per cent of its largest Central European 
gas distribution terminal and storage facility, and 
Lukoil acquired a 49 per cent stake in the Priolo 
oil refinery of ISAB (Italy) for $2.1 billion (table II.6). 
Russian TNCs in iron and steel also continued to 
increase their investments in developed countries. 
For M&As, the United Kingdom was the main target 
with almost one third of all investment; for greenfield 
projects, Germany accounted for 36 per cent of 
investments from transition economies (figure II.18).
Prospects for the FDI relationship between the 
EU and transition economies. Since the global 
economic crisis, several Russian TNCs have had to 
sell foreign companies they acquired through M&As 
as the values of their assets declined (an example is 
Basic Element, which lost some of its foreign assets 
in machinery and construction in Europe). 
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The regional conflict might affect FDI flows to 
and from transition economies. The outlook for 
developed-country TNCs investing in the region 
appears gloomier. For Russian TNCs investing 
abroad, an important concern is the risk of losing 
access to foreign loans. Banks in developed 
countries may be reluctant to provide fresh finance. 
Although some Russian State banks might fill the 
gap left by foreign lenders, some Russian TNCs 
depend on loans from developed countries. 
table II.6. the 20 largest cross-border M&A deals in Eu countries by transition economy tncs, 
2005–2013
Year 
Value       
($ million)
Acquired company Host economy
Industry of the 
acquired company
Ultimate acquiring 
company
Ultimate home 
economy
Industry of the 
ultimate acquiring 
company
2008  2 098 ISAB Srl Italy
Crude petroleum 
and natural gas
NK LUKOIL Russian Federation
Crude petroleum and 
natural gas
2005  2 000 Nelson Resources Ltd United Kingdom Gold ores NK LUKOIL Russian Federation
Crude petroleum and 
natural gas
2009  1 852
MOL Magyar Olaj es 
Gazipari Nyrt
Hungary
Crude petroleum 
and natural gas
Surgutneftegaz Russian Federation
Crude petroleum and 
natural gas
2007  1 637 Strabag SE Austria
Industrial buildings 
and warehouses
KBE Russian Federation Investors, nec
2011  1 600 Ruhr Oel GmbH Germany Petroleum refining Rosneftegaz Russian Federation
Crude petroleum and 
natural gas
2009  1 599 Lukarco BV Netherlands Pipelines, nec NK LUKOIL Russian Federation
Crude petroleum and 
natural gas
2008  1 524 Oriel Resources PLC United Kingdom
Ferroalloy ores, 
except vanadium
Mechel Russian Federation Iron and steel forgings
2007  1 427 Strabag SE Austria
Industrial buildings 
and warehouses
KBE Russian Federation Investors, nec
2006  1 400 PetroKazakhstan Inc United Kingdom
Crude petroleum 
and natural gas
NK KazMunaiGaz Kazakhstan
Crude petroleum and 
natural gas
2010  1 343 Kazakhmys PLC United Kingdom Copper ores Kazakhstan Kazakhstan National government
2009  1 200 Rompetrol Group NV Netherlands
Crude petroleum 
and natural gas
NK KazMunaiGaz Kazakhstan
Crude petroleum and 
natural gas
2012  1 128
BASF Antwerpen NV-
Fertilizer Production 
Plant
Belgium
Nitrogenous 
fertilizers
MKHK YevroKhim Russian Federation
Chemical and fertilizer 
mineral mining, nec
2012  1 024 Gefco SA France
Trucking, except 
local
RZhD Russian Federation
Railroads, line-haul 
operating
2009  1 001 Sibir Energy PLC United Kingdom
Crude petroleum 
and natural gas
Gazprom Russian Federation
Crude petroleum and 
natural gas
2008  940 Formata Holding BV Netherlands Grocery stores
Pyaterochka 
Holding NV
Russian Federation Grocery stores
2012  926
Bulgarian 
Telecommunications 
Co AD
Bulgaria
Telephone 
communications, 
except 
radiotelephone
Investor Group Russian Federation Investors, nec
2011  744 Sibir Energy PLC United Kingdom
Crude petroleum 
and natural gas
Gazprom Russian Federation
Crude petroleum and 
natural gas
2012  738
Volksbank 
International AG {VBI}
Austria Banks Sberbank Rossii Russian Federation Banks
2009  725
Total Raffinaderij 
Nederland NV
Netherlands
Crude petroleum 
and natural gas
NK LUKOIL Russian Federation
Crude petroleum and 
natural gas
2006  700 Lucchini SpA Italy
Steel works, blast 
furnaces, and rolling 
mills
Kapital Russian Federation Steel foundries, nec
Source:  UNCTAD FDI-TNC-GVC Information System, cross-border M&A database (www.unctad.org/fdistatistics).
Note:  The data cover only deals that involved acquisition of an equity stake greater than 10 per cent.
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Source:  UNCTAD FDI-TNC-GVC Information System, cross-border M&A database (www.unctad.org/fdistatistics) for M&As and 
information from the Financial Times Ltd, fDi Markets (www.fDimarkets.com) for greenfield projects.
Note:   The data cover only those deals that involved an acquisition of an equity stake of more than 10 per cent.
Figure II.18. Distribution of cross-border M&As and greenfield investment in Eu countries concluded
 by transition-economy tncs, by host country, cumulative 1990–2013 (M&As) and 2003–2013 
(greenfield investments) 
(Per cent of total value) 
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Furthermore, additional scrutiny of Russian 
investments in Europe, including an asset swap 
between Gazprom and BASF (Germany), may slow 
down the vertical integration process that Russian 
TNCs have been trying to establish.56
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5. Developed countries
Figure A. FDI flows, top 5 host and home economies, 2012–2013
(Billions of dollars)
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Figure c. FDI outflows, 2007–2013
(Billions of dollars)
Figure B. FDI inflows, 2007–2013
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table A. Distribution of FDI flows among economies, 
by range,a 2013
range Inflows outflows
Above 
$100 billion 
United States United States and Japan
$50 to 
$99 billion 
Canada Switzerland and Germany
$10 to 
$49 billion 
Australia, Spain, United Kingdom, 
Ireland, Luxembourg, Germany, 
Netherlands, Italy, Israel and Austria
Canada, Netherlands, Sweden, Italy, 
Spain, Ireland, Luxembourg, United 
Kingdom, Norway and Austria
$1 to 
$9 billion 
Norway, Sweden, Czech Republic, 
France, Romania, Portugal, Hungary, 
Greece, Japan, Denmark and 
Bulgaria
Denmark, Australia, Israel, Finland, 
Czech Republic, Hungary and 
Portugal
Below 
$1 billion 
New Zealand, Estonia, Latvia, 
Slovakia, Croatia, Cyprus, Lithuania, 
Iceland, Gibraltar, Bermuda, Slovenia, 
Finland, Malta, Belgium, Switzerland 
and Poland
New Zealand, Iceland, Estonia, 
Latvia, Cyprus, Bulgaria, Romania, 
Lithuania, Slovenia, Bermuda, Malta, 
Croatia, Slovakia, Greece, France, 
Poland and Belgium
a Economies are listed according to the magnitude of their FDI flows.
table B. cross-border M&As by industry, 2012–2013
(Millions of dollars)
Sector/industry Sales Purchases2012 2013 2012 2013
Total 268 652 239 606 183 914 151 752
Primary 50 161 39 346 -10 406 -41 903
Mining, quarrying and petroleum 43 032 37 906 -10 411 -42 154
Manufacturing 109 481 86 617 117 068 79 993
Food, beverages and tobacco 20 616 19 708 24 945 25 231
Chemicals and chemical products 16 411 21 132 19 705 4 822
Pharmaceuticals, medicinal chem. & botanical prod. 11 638 742 17 951 20 443
Computer, electronic optical prod. & electrical equipt. 22 061 10 776 23 909 11 808
Services 109 010 113 643 77 252 113 662
Trade 12 581 7 406 19 537 -2 067
Information and communications 22 395 29 374 9 372 22 476
Financial and insurance activities 9 905 9 081 27 461 64 741
Business services 31 406 35 965 16 865 22 220
table c. cross-border M&As by region/country, 2012–2013
(Millions of dollars)
region/country Sales Purchases2012 2013 2012 2013
World 268 652 239 606 183 914 151 752
Developed economies 175 408 165 650 175 408 165 650
Europe 45 246 34 225 93 865 112 545
North America 103 729 85 138 67 732 40 618
Other developed countries 26 432 45 287 13 811 12 487
Japan 32 276 44 872 -1 548 2 576
Developing economies 79 982 65 035 3 760 -6 307
Africa 635 2 288 -3 500 -8 953
Latin America and the Caribbean 17 146 7 274 1 699 -7 188
Asia and Oceania 62 201 55 473 5 561 9 833
China 27 009 37 405 3 251 6 201
Singapore -1 039 2 745 6 004 4 386
Transition economies 4 848 1 682 4 746 -7 591
table D. Greenfield FDI projects by industry, 2012–2013
(Millions of dollars)
Sector/industry
Developed countries 
as destination
Developed countries 
as investors
2012 2013 2012 2013
Total 224 604 215 018 413 541 458 336
Primary 9 222 1 687 16 979 17 878
Mining, quarrying and petroleum 9 220 1 683 16 977 15 712
Manufacturing 88 712 92 748 186 278 197 086
Textiles, clothing and leather 6 579 13 711 10 080 18 269
Chemicals and chemical products 13 165 15 615 26 090 32 542
Electrical and electronic equipment 10 604 13 853 15 108 20 716
Motor vehicles and other transport equipment 21 423 15 944 52 736 49 247
Services 126 670 120 584 210 285 243 372
Electricity, gas and water 27 023 25 463 41 758 69 487
Transport, storage & communications 17 070 19 436 40 067 41 630
Finance 11 120 10 260 23 106 21 309
Business services 31 316 33 689 50 188 56 767
table E. Greenfield FDI projects by region/country, 2012–2013
(Millions of dollars)
Partner region/economy
Developed countries 
as destination
Developed countries 
as investors
2012 2013 2012 2013
World 224 604 215 018 413 541 458 336
Developed economies 170 919 184 887 170 919 184 887
Europe 107 093 112 784 109 572 107 921
North America 47 082 54 615 45 010 57 582
Other developed countries 16 744 17 488 16 337 19 383
Japan 9 818 11 212 4 317 7 920
Developing economies 50 625 27 804 213 530 253 816
Africa 1 802 2 080 17 541 27 254
Asia and Oceania 46 650 24 475 139 280 146 140
China 6 232 9 171 50 451 48 894
India 8 553 3 530 21 249 13 571
Latin America and the Caribbean 2 172 1 249 56 709 80 421
Transition economies 3 060 2 327 29 092 19 633
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After the sharp fall in 2012, overall FDI of the 
39 developed economies57 resumed its recovery 
in 2013, albeit marginally in the case of outflows. 
Inflows were $566 billion, rising 9 per cent over 
2012 (figure B). Outflows were $857 billion in 
2013, virtually unchanged from $852 billion a year 
earlier (figure C). Both inflows and outflows were 
still barely half of the peak level in 2007. In terms 
of global share, developed countries accounted for 
39 per cent of total inflows and 61 per cent of total 
outflows – both historically low levels.
Despite the overall increase in inflows, recovery was 
concentrated in a smaller set of economies; only 15 
of 39 economies registered a rise. Inflows to Europe 
were $251 billion (up 3 per cent over 2012), with EU 
countries accounting for the bulk, at $246 billion. 
Inflows to Italy and Spain made a robust recovery, 
with the latter receiving the largest flows in Europe in 
2013 (figure A). Inflows to North America rebounded 
to $250 billion with a 23 per cent increase, making 
the United States and Canada the recipients of the 
largest flows to developed countries in 2013 (figure 
A). The increase was primarily due to large inflows 
from Japan in the United States and a doubling of 
United States FDI in Canada. Inflows to Australia 
and New Zealand together declined by 12 per cent, 
to $51 billion.
The recovery of outflows from developed countries 
was more widely shared, with an increase in 
22 economies. Outflows from Europe rose by 
10 per cent to $328 billion, of which $250 billion 
was from the EU countries. Switzerland became 
Europe’s largest direct investor (figure A). In 
contrast, outflows from North America shed another 
10 per cent, slipping to $381 billion. The effect of 
greater cash hoarding abroad by United States 
TNCs (i.e. an increase in reinvested earnings) was 
countered by the increasing transfer of funds raised 
in Europe back to the home country (i.e. a decline in 
intracompany loans). Outflows from Japan grew for 
the third successive year, rising to $136 billion. In 
addition to investment in the United States, market-
seeking FDI in South-East Asia helped Japan 
consolidate its position as the second largest direct 
investor (figure A).
Diverging trends among major European 
countries. European FDI flows have fluctuated 
considerably from year to year. Among the major 
economies, Germany saw inflows more than 
double from $13 billion in 2012 to $27 billion in 
2013. In contrast, inflows to France declined by 
80 per cent to $5 billion and those to the United 
Kingdom declined by 19 per cent to $37 billion. In 
all cases, large swings in intracompany loans were 
a significant contributing factor. Intracompany loans 
to Germany, which had fallen by $39 billion in 2012, 
bounced back by $20 billion in 2013. Intracompany 
loans to France fell from $5 billion in 2012 to -$14 
billion in 2013, implying that foreign TNCs pulled 
funds out of their affiliates in France. Similarly, 
intracompany loans to the United Kingdom fell from 
-$2 billion to -$10 billion. Other European countries 
that saw a large change in inflows of intracompany 
loans in 2012 were Luxembourg (up $22 billion) and 
the Netherlands (up $16 billion). 
Negative intracompany loans weigh down 
outflows from the United States. In 2013, two 
types of transactions had opposite effects on FDI 
outflows from the Unites States. On the one hand, 
the largest United States TNCs are estimated to 
have added more than $200 billion to their overseas 
cash holdings in 2013, raising the accumulated total 
to just under $2 trillion, up 12 per cent from 2012. On 
the other hand, non-European issuers (mostly United 
States but also Asian TNCs) reportedly sold euro-
denominated corporate bonds worth $132 billion (a 
three-fold increase from 2011) and transferred some 
of the proceeds to the United States to meet funding 
needs there.58 Rather than repatriating retained 
earnings, United States TNCs often prefer to meet 
funding needs through additional borrowing so as 
to defer corporate income tax liabilities.59 Favourable 
interest rates led them to raise those funds in Europe. 
As a consequence, the United States registered 
negative outflows of intracompany loans (-$6.1 
billion) in 2013, compared with $21 billion in 2012.
TTIP under negotiation. The Transatlantic Trade 
and Investment Partnership (TTIP) is a proposed 
FTA between the EU and the United States. Talks 
started in July 2013 and are expected to finish in 
2015 or early 2016. If successfully concluded, TTIP 
would create the world’s largest free trade area. Its 
key objective is to harmonize regulatory regimes 
and reduce non-tariff “behind the border” barriers to 
trade and investment.60 Aspects of TTIP could have 
implications for FDI. 
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The EU and the United States together constitute 
more than 45 per cent of global GDP. FDI flows 
within the TTIP bloc accounted for, on average, 
half of global FDI flows over the period 2004–2012 
(figure II.19). Intra-EU FDI has tended to be volatile, 
but FDI flows between the EU and the United States 
have remained relatively stable in recent years.
Viewed from the United States, the EU economies 
make up about 30 per cent of the outside world 
in terms of GDP. The EU’s importance as a 
destination for United States FDI has been much 
more significant, with its share in flows ranging from 
41 per cent to 59 per cent over 2004–2012, and 
its share in outward stocks at over 50 per cent by 
the end of that period.61 In contrast, the EU’s share 
in United States exports averaged only 25 per 
cent over the same period. Major host countries of 
United States FDI are listed in table II.7.
The industry breakdown shows that about four fifths 
of United States FDI stock in the EU is in services, 
in which “Holding Companies (nonbank)” account 
for 60 per cent and “Finance (except depository 
institutions) and insurance” for another 20 per cent. 
Manufacturing takes up 12 per cent. 
From the EU’s perspective, much of the inflows to 
EU countries arrive from other EU countries. Over 
the period 2004–2012, on average, 63 per cent 
of FDI flows to the region came from other EU 
Source: UNCTAD, based on data from Eurostat.
Figure II.19. FDI inflows between the Eu and 
the united States and intra-Eu against global flows,
2004–2012
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table II.7. united States FDI stock abroad, 
by major recipient economies, 2012
Destination
FDI stock
($ million)
Share
(%)
Netherlands  645 098 14.5 
United Kingdom  597 813 13.4 
Luxembourg  383 603 8.6 
Canada  351 460 7.9 
Ireland  203 779 4.6 
Singapore  138 603 3.1 
Japan  133 967 3.0 
Australia  132 825 3.0 
Switzerland  130 315 2.9 
Germany  121 184 2.7 
European Union 2 239 580 50.3 
All countries total 4 453 307 100.0 
Source:  UNCTAD, Bilateral FDI Statistics (http://unctad.org/en/
Pages/DIAE/FDI%20Statistics/FDI-Statistics-Bilateral.
aspx). 
Note:  Excludes Bermuda and United Kingdom Caribbean 
islands (British Antilles, British Virgin Islands, Cayman 
Islands, Montserrat).
countries and 15 per cent from the United States. 
The combined share of the EU and the United 
States in FDI stock in the EU at the end of 2012 
was 76 per cent. Considering the EU as a single 
block, the United States was the largest investment 
partner, accounting for one third of all investment 
flows from outside the EU.
For the United States, the share of the EU in its 
inflows ranged from 45 per cent to 75 per cent 
over the period 2004–2012. In terms of FDI stock, 
the EU’s share was 62 per cent at the end of 2012 
(table II.8). The top investors include the larger 
economies in the EU, such as France and Germany, 
along with the United Kingdom. Luxembourg and 
the Netherlands rank high as source countries of 
FDI in the United States, too. One explanation for 
the high share of these economies is that they 
have become preferred locations for incorporating 
global companies. The merger between two of 
the largest suppliers of chip-making equipment, 
Applied Materials (United States) and Tokyo 
Electron (Japan), in 2013 illustrates the case. To 
implement the merger, the two companies set up 
a holding company in the Netherlands. The existing 
companies became United States and Japanese 
affiliates of the Dutch holding company through 
share swaps. 
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Booming inflows to Israel. One beneficiary of 
the growing cash holdings among TNCs seems 
to be Israel, which hosts a vibrant pool of venture-
capital-backed start-up companies, especially in 
knowledge-intensive industries. These companies 
have become acquisition targets of global TNCs. 
In 2013, foreign TNCs are estimated to have spent 
$6.5 billion on Israeli companies,62 raising inflows 
to Israel to the record high of $12 billion. High-
profile examples include the acquisitions of Waze 
by Google for $966 million, Retalix by NCR for 
$735 million and Intucell by Cisco for $475 million. 
Berkshire Hathaway paid $2.05 billion to take full 
control of its Israeli affiliate IMC. A Moody’s report 
noted that, at 39 per cent at the end of 2013, 
the technology industry had the largest hoard 
(domestic and offshore) of total corporate cash of 
non-financial United States companies; the health-
care and pharmaceuticals industries followed.63 
This concentration of cash in knowledge-intensive 
industries may signal further deals in the making 
for Israel.
A shift towards consumer-oriented industries. 
As the weight of developing countries in the global 
economy increases, their effects on both the inward 
and outward FDI patterns of developed countries 
are becoming more apparent. The growth of more 
affluent, urbanized populations in developing 
economies presents significant market potential 
that TNCs around the world are keen to capture. 
For example, the shift in emphasis in the Chinese 
economy from investment-led to consumption-led 
growth is beginning to shape investment flows in 
consumer-oriented industries such as food (tables 
B and D). 
On the one hand, TNCs from developed countries 
are entering the growing food market in China. 
The Japanese trading house Marubeni, the largest 
exporter of soya beans to China, finalized a $2.7 
billion deal to acquire the grain merchant Gavilon 
(United States) after the deal was approved by 
China’s competition authority. On the other hand, 
the trend is also shaping investment flows in 
the other direction: in the largest takeover of a 
United States company by a Chinese company, 
Shuanghui acquired pork producer Smithfield for 
$4.7 billion. Shuanghui’s strategy is to export meat 
products from the United States to China and other 
markets. Another example of Chinese investment 
in agri-processing occurred in New Zealand, where 
Shanghai Pengxin proposed to acquire Synlait 
Farms, which owns 4,000 hectares of farmland, for 
$73 million.64 The company had already acquired 
the 8,000-hectare Crafar farms for $163 million in 
2012. 
A slowdown in investment in extractive 
industries. Earlier optimism in the mining industry, 
fuelled by surging demand from China, has been 
replaced by a more cautious approach. Rio Tinto 
(United Kingdom/Australia) announced that its 
capital expenditure would fall gradually from over 
$17 billion in 2012 to $8 billion in 2015. BHP Billiton 
(Australia) also announced its intent to reduce its 
capital and exploration budget. Glencore Xstrata 
(Switzerland) announced it would reduce its total 
capital expenditures over 2013–2015 by $3.5 
billion. The investment slowdown in mining has 
affected developed countries that are rich in natural 
resources, an effect that was particularly apparent 
in cross-border M&As (table B). Net M&A sales 
(analogous to inward FDI) of developed countries 
in mining and quarrying were worth $110 billion 
at the peak of the commodity boom in 2011 but 
declined to $38 billion in 2013. For example, in the 
United States they fell from $46 billion in 2011 to 
$2 billion in 2013 and in Australia from $24 billion 
table II.8. FDI stock in the united States, by 
major source economy, 2012
Source
FDI stock
($ million)
Share
(%)
United Kingdom  486 833 18.4 
Japan  308 253 11.6 
Netherlands  274 904 10.4 
Canada  225 331 8.5 
France  209 121 7.9 
Switzerland  203 954 7.7 
Luxembourg  202 338 7.6 
Germany  199 006 7.5 
Belgium  88 697 3.3 
Spain  47 352 1.8 
Australia  42 685 1.6
European Union 1 647 567 62.2
All countries total 2 650 832 100.0
Source:  UNCTAD, Bilateral FDI Statistics (http://unctad.org/en/
Pages/DIAE/FDI%20Statistics/FDI-Statistics-Bilaleral.
aspx). 
Note:  Excludes Bermuda and United Kingdom Caribbean 
islands (British Antilles, British Virgin Islands, Cayman 
Islands, Montserrat).
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in 2011 to $5 billion in 2013. Similarly, net cross-
border purchases (analogous to outward FDI) by 
developed-country TNCs in this industry declined 
from $58 billion in 2011 to a net divestment of 
-$42 billion in 2013. 
TNCs eyeing growth markets. Growing consumer 
markets in emerging economies remain a prime 
target for developed-country TNCs. The Japanese 
beverages group Kirin Holdings, which bought 
control of Brazil’s Schincariol in 2011, announced 
its plan to invest $1.5 billion during 2014 to expand 
its beer-brewing capacity in the country. Japanese 
food and beverage group Suntory acquired the 
United States spirits company Beam Inc. for 
$13.6 billion and the drinks brands Lucozade and 
Ribena of GlaxoSmithKline for $2.1 billion. These 
deals give the Japanese group not only a significant 
presence in the United States and the United 
Kingdom, but also access to distribution networks 
in India, the Russian Federation and Brazil in the 
case of Beam, and Nigeria and Malaysia in the case 
of Lucozade and Ribena. 
Growing urban populations are driving a rapid 
expansion of power generation capacity in 
emerging economies, which is drawing investment 
from developed-country TNCs. In October 2013, 
an international consortium comprising Turkish 
Electricity Generation Corporation, Itochu (Japan), 
GDF Suez (France) and the Government of Turkey 
signed a framework agreement to study the 
feasibility of constructing a nuclear power plant in 
Sinop, Turkey.65 GDF Suez (France) also teamed up 
with Japanese trading house Mitsui and Moroccan 
energy company Nareva Holdings to form the joint 
venture Safi Energy Company, which was awarded 
a contract to operate a coal-fired power plant in 
Morocco in September 2013.66 Another European 
power company, Eon (Germany), acquired a 50 per 
cent stake in the Turkish power company Enerjisa 
and increased its stake in the Brazilian power 
generation company MPX in 2013, in an effort to 
build a presence in emerging markets. 
The pursuit of “next emerging markets” has led 
TNCs to target lower-income countries, too. For 
instance, the Japanese manufacturer Nissin Food 
invested in a joint venture with the Jomo Kenyatta 
University of Agriculture and Technology in Kenya, 
initially to market imported packaged noodles, but 
also to start local production in 2014. The joint 
venture aims to source agricultural input from local 
producers and to export packaged noodles to 
neighbouring countries, taking advantage of free 
trade within EAC. 
Facilitating investment in Africa. In June 2013, 
the Government of the United States announced 
Power Africa – an initiative to double the number of 
people in sub-Saharan Africa with access to power. 
For the first phase over 2013–2018, the Government 
has committed more than $7 billion in financial 
support and loan guarantees, which has resulted 
in the leveraging of commitments by private sector 
partners, many of them TNCs, to invest over $14.7 
billion in the power sectors of the target countries. 
In a different sector, the Government of Japan 
announced a $2 billion support mechanism for its 
TNCs to invest in natural resource development 
projects in Africa.67 One of the projects earmarked 
for support is Mitsui’s investment – expected to be 
worth $3 billion – in natural gas in Mozambique. 
General optimism might not be reflected in 
FDI statistics in 2014. UNCTAD’s forecast based 
on economic fundamentals suggests that FDI flows 
to developed economies could rise by 35 per cent 
in 2014 (chapter I). As an early indication, M&A 
activities picked up significantly in the first quarter 
of 2014. Furthermore, shareholder activism is likely 
to intensify in North America, adding extra impetus 
to spend the accumulated earnings. However, 
reasons to expect declines in FDI flows are also 
present. The divestment by Vodafone (United 
Kingdom) of its 45 per cent stake in Verizon 
Wireless (United States) was worth $130 billion, 
appearing in statistics as negative FDI inflows to 
the United States. 
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1. Least developed countries
Figure A. FDI flows, top 5 host and home economies, 2012–2013
(Billions of dollars)
Figure c. FDI outflows, 2007–2013
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Figure B. FDI inflows, 2007–2013
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table A. Distribution of FDI flows among economies, 
by range,a 2013
range Inflows outflows
Above 
$2.0 billion 
Mozambique, Sudan Myanmar and 
Democratic Republic of the Congo Angola
$1.0 to 
$1.9 billion 
Equatorial Guinea, United Republic 
of Tanzania, Zambia, Bangladesh, 
Cambodia, Mauritania, Uganda 
and Liberia
..
$0.5 to 
$0.9 billion 
Ethiopia, Madagascar, Niger, Sierra 
Leone and Chad Sudan and Liberia
$0.1 to 
$0.4 billion 
Mali, Burkina Faso, Benin, Senegal, 
Lao People's Democratic Republic, 
Djibouti, Haiti, Malawi, Rwanda, 
Somalia and Solomon Islands
Democratic Republic of the Congo 
and Zambia
Below 
$0.1 billion 
Togo, Nepal, Afghanistan, Lesotho, 
Eritrea, Vanuatu, São Tomé and 
Principe, Samoa, Gambia, Guinea, 
Bhutan, Timor-Leste, Guinea-Bissau, 
Comoros, Kiribati, Burundi, Central 
African Republic, Yemen and Angola
Burkina Faso, Yemen, Malawi, Benin, 
Cambodia, Togo, Bangladesh, Senegal, 
Lesotho, Rwanda, Timor-Leste, Mali, 
Mauritania, Solomon Islands, Guinea, 
Vanuatu, Guinea-Bissau, São Tomé and 
Principe, Samoa, Kiribati, Mozambique, 
Uganda, Niger and Lao People's 
Democratic Republic
a Economies are listed according to the magnitude of their FDI flows.
B. trEnDS In StructurALLY WEAK, VuLnErABLE
AnD SMALL EconoMIES
table B. cross-border M&As by industry, 2012–2013
(Millions of dollars)
Sector/industry Sales Purchases2012 2013 2012 2013
Total 374 26 -102 -12
Primary 11 16 - -12
Mining, quarrying and petroleum 11 16 - -12
Manufacturing 342 37 -185 -
Food, beverages and tobacco 351 20 - -
Textiles, clothing and leather - 2 - - 
Chemicals and chemical products - - -185 -
Pharmaceuticals, medicinal chem. & botanical prod. - 15 - -
Non-metallic mineral products 90 - - -
Services 22 -27 83 -
Information and communications 18 3 - -
Financial and insurance activities 1 -42 83 -
Business services - 12 - -
table c. cross-border M&As by region/country, 2012–2013 
(Millions of dollars)
region/country Sales Purchases2012 2013 2012 2013
World 374 26 -102 -12
Developed economies -1 217 -4 020 88 2
Cyprus - -155 - -
Italy - -4 210 - -
Switzerland - 761 - -
Canada -1 258 -353 - -
Australia -115 -36 - -
Developing economies 1 591 4 046 -190 -14
Nigeria - - -185 -
Panama - -430 - -
China 1 580 4 222 - -14
Malaysia - 176 - -
Transition economies - - - -
table D. Greenfield FDI projects by industry, 2012–2013
(Millions of dollars)
Sector/industry LDcs as destination LDcs as investors
2012 2013 2012 2013
Total 21 923 39 943 1 005 1 528
Primary 4 390 3 461 - 7
Agriculture, hunting, forestry and fisheries - 1 940 - -
Mining, quarrying and petroleum 4 390 1 520 - 7
Manufacturing 6 727 8 100 91 395
Coke, petroleum products and nuclear fuel 1 970 1 764 - -
Non-metallic mineral products 1 265 3 379 - 262
Motor vehicles and other transport equipment 397 812 - -
Services 10 806 27 482 914 1 126
Electricity, gas and water 3 905 17 902 - -
Transport, storage and communications 2 234 4 819 168 92
Finance 1 920 1 523 327 593
Business services 725 1 224 418 37
table E. Greenfield FDI projects by region/country, 2012–2013
(Millions of dollars)
Partner region/economy LDcs as destination LDcs as investors
2012 2013 2012 2013
World 21 923 39 043 1 005 1 528
Developed economies 8 822 24 806 32 122
Finland 18 1 942 - -
United Kingdom 1 289 2 152 - -
Iceland - 4 000 - -
United States 3 251 1 194 - -
Japan 1 371 11 322 - -
Developing economies 13 072 14 237 973 1 366
Nigeria 691 1 833 - 17
South Africa 786 2 360 8 -
Malaysia 342 1 059 1 2
India 4 383 3 479 - 41
Transition economies 30 - - 39
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FDI flows to LDCs rose to $28 billion in 2013. 
Greenfield investments in LDCs rebounded to a 
three-year high, driven by announced projects in 
the services sector. External finance constitutes an 
important part of the financing of infrastructure projects 
in LDCs, but a substantial portion of announced 
investments has not generated FDI inflows. Growing 
official development finance to support infrastructure 
projects in LDCs is encouraging, but LDCs’ estimated 
investment needs are much greater. Mobilization of 
resources for infrastructure development in LDCs 
remains a challenge. 
FDI inflows to LDCs increased by 14 per cent to 
$28 billion. While inflows to some larger LDCs fell 
or stagnated (figure A), rising inflows were recorded 
elsewhere. A $2.6 billion reduction in divestment 
(negative inflows) in Angola contributed most to this 
trend, followed by gains in Ethiopia ($0.7 billion or 
242 per cent), Myanmar ($0.4 billion or 17 per cent), 
the Sudan ($0.6 billion or 24 per cent) and Yemen 
(a $0.4 billion or 75 per cent fall in divestment). The 
share of inflows to LDCs in global inflows continued 
to be small (figure B). Among the developing 
economies, the share of inflows to LDCs increased 
to 3.6 per cent of FDI inflows to all developing 
economies compared with 3.4 per cent in 2012. 
As in 2012, developed-economy TNCs contin-
ued selling their assets in LDCs to other foreign 
investors. The net sales value of cross-border M&As 
in LDCs (table B) masks the fact that more than 60 
such deals took place in 2013. While the value of net 
sales to developed-economy investors continued 
to decline in 2013 (table C) – indicating the highest-
ever divestments in LDCs by those economies – net 
sales to developing-economy investors rose to a re-
cord level, mainly through the acquisition of assets 
divested by developed economies. Examples include 
the $4.2 billion divestment of a partial stake in the 
Italian company Eni’s oil and gas exploration and 
production affiliate in Mozambique, which was ac-
quired by the China National Petroleum Corporation. 
Other such deals include a series of acquisitions by 
Glencore (Switzerland) in Chad and the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo, which were recorded as a 
$0.4 billion divestment by Canada and a $0.4 billion 
divestment by Panama (table C).68
Announced greenfield FDI rebounded, driven 
by large-scale energy projects. The number of 
announced new projects reached a record high,69 
and the value of announced investments reached 
their highest level in three years. The driving force 
was robust gains in the services sector (table D), 
contributing 70 per cent of total greenfield invest-
ments. Greenfield investments in energy (in 11 
projects) and in transport, storage and communi-
cations (in 59 projects) both hit their highest levels 
in 2013 (table D). Announced greenfield FDI from 
developed economies was at a 10-year high, led by 
record-high investments from Iceland and Japan to 
LDCs (table E). A single large electricity project from 
each of these home countries boosted greenfield 
investments in LDCs.
The largest fossil fuel electric power project from 
Japan (table II.9) was linked with the development 
of a newly established special economic zone (SEZ) 
in Myanmar (box II.2). Iceland’s $4 billion geothermal 
power project in Ethiopia (see also table II.9) received 
support from the Government of the United States 
as part of its six-nation Power Africa initiative, a $7 
billion commitment to double the number of people 
with access to electricity in Africa.70 In this, the largest 
alternative energy project ever recorded in LDCs, 
Rejkavik Geothermal (Iceland) will build and operate 
up to 1,000 megawatts of geothermal power in the 
next 8–10 years.
India continued to lead greenfield FDI from 
developing economies to LDCs, with South 
Africa and Nigeria running second and third. 
Among investors from developing economies, India 
remained the largest, despite a 21 per cent fall in the 
value of announced investments in LDCs (table E). 
Announced greenfield investments from India were 
mostly in energy – led by Jindal Steel & Power – 
and telecommunications projects – led by the Bharti 
Group – in African LDCs. In Asia, Bangladesh was the 
only LDC in which Indian greenfield FDI projects were 
reported in 2013.71 Announced greenfield investments 
from South Africa and Nigeria to LDCs showed a 
strong increase (table E). The fourth largest project in 
Mozambique (table II.9) accounted for two thirds of 
announced greenfield FDI from South Africa to LDCs. 
Announced greenfield FDI projects from Nigeria to 
LDCs hit a record high, led by the Dangote Group’s 
cement and concrete projects in five African LDCs 
and Nepal ($1.8 billion in total). Greenfield projects 
from Nigeria also boosted greenfield investments in 
non-metallic mineral products in LDCs (table D).
World Investment Report 2014: Investing in the SDGs: An Action Plan84
External finance constitutes an important 
part of the financing of a growing number of 
infrastructure projects announced in LDCs. 
The surge in announced greenfield investments in 
energy, transport, storage and communications 
(table D) indicates increasing foreign engagement 
in infrastructure projects in LDCs. From 2003 
to 2013, nearly 290 infrastructure projects72 
– including domestic and non-equity modes 
of investment – were announced in LDCs.73 
The cumulative costs amounted to $332 billion 
(about $30 billion a year),74 of which 43 per cent 
($144 billion) was attributed to 142 projects that 
were announced to be financed partly or fully by 
foreign sponsors (including public entities, such as 
bilateral and multilateral development agencies) 
and almost half ($164 billion) was attributed to 
110 projects whose sponsors were unspecified.75 
Energy projects have been the driver, accounting 
for 61 per cent of the estimated cost of all foreign 
participating projects (and 71 per cent of the total 
project costs with unspecified sponsors). 
Over the past decade, the number of announced 
infrastructure projects in LDCs rose from an annual 
average of 15 in 2003–2005 to 34 in 2011–2013. 
Growth in total announced project costs nearly 
quadrupled (from an annual average of $11 billion 
in 2003–2005 to $43 billion in 2011–2013). The 
total value of announced infrastructure projects hit 
an exceptionally high level twice: first in 2008 and 
then in 2012 (figure II.20). In both cases, the driver 
was the announcement of a single megaproject – in 
the Democratic Republic of the Congo ($80 billion 
in energy)76 in 2008 and in Myanmar ($50 billion in 
transportation) in 2012. Not only did the number of 
projects increase to their highest level in 2013, but 
the total value of announced projects also made 
significant gains, in 2012–2013 (figure II.20). This 
was due to a sharp increase in transport projects in 
Africa, led by a $10 billion project for an oil and gas 
free port zone in the United Republic of Tanzania, 
as well as a $4 billion rail line project and a $3 billion 
rail and port project in Mozambique.77 
A substantial portion of announced 
infrastructure investments has not generated 
FDI inflows. Judging from the level of current FDI 
stock in LDCs (annex table II.2) and the average 
annual FDI inflows to all LDCs ($16.7 billion in 
2003–2013), a substantial portion of foreign 
and unspecified contributions to announced 
infrastructure projects (about $29 billion annually, 
of which $15 billion was attributed to unspecified 
sponsors) did not generate FDI inflows. Project 
costs could be shared among different types 
of sponsors, so that not all were funded by 
foreign investors alone. Also, the FDI statistics 
do not capture a large part of foreign sponsors’ 
investment commitments, which were financed 
with non-equity modes of investments by TNCs 
(WIR08 and WIR11), debts, structured finance, or 
bilateral or multilateral donor funding.78 It is also 
possible that some announced projects may have 
been cancelled or never realized. Another possible 
explanation is that the year when a project is 
announced does not correspond to the year 
when the host LDC receives FDI.79 The status of 
two megaprojects announced in 2008 and 2012 
(boxes II.5 and II.6) reflects these gaps between 
announced project costs and their impacts 
on FDI flows. Neither project has yet triggered 
the announced levels of foreign or domestic 
investment.
table II.9. the five largest greenfield projects announced in LDcs, 2013
Host economy 
(destination) 
Industry segment Investing company Home economy
Estimated investment 
($ million)
Myanmar
Fossil fuel 
electric power
Mitsubishi Japan 9 850
Ethiopia Geothermal electric power Reykjavik Geothermal Iceland 4 000
Mozambique Forestry and logging Forestal Oriental Finland 1 940
Mozambique Petroleum and coal products Beacon Hill Resources South Africa 1 641
Cambodia Biomass power Wah Seong Malaysia 1 000
Source: UNCTAD, based on information from the Financial Times Ltd, fDi Markets (www.fDimarkets.com).
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Source: UNCTAD, based on data from Thomson ONE.
Figure II.20. Estimated value and number of announced infrastructure projects in LDcs, 
by type of sponsor, 2003–2013
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Box II.5. The Grand Inga Hydroelectric Power Station Project: no foreign investment 
secured to start first phase
When the $80 billion Grand Inga hydroelectric project was recorded in 2008, the Democratic Republic of the Congo 
was one of five African countries (with Angola, Botswana, Namibia and South Africa) that agreed to develop this 
project under the management of the Western Power Corridor, a consortium of five national utility companies repre-
senting each of the five States sharing 20 per cent of the equity. The host country had already secured an agreement 
with BHP Billiton (Australia) to jointly develop a $3 billion aluminium smelter to use 2,000 megawatts of electricity to 
be generated by the first phase of the project, “Inga III”.80 In 2009, however, seeking a greater controlling share in 
the project, the Democratic Republic of the Congo withdrew from the agreement and went alone to develop Inga 
III.81 BHP Billiton was then selected to build a $5 billion smelter, along with a 2,500-megawatt plant for $3.5 billion. 
In early 2012, citing economic difficulties, the company abandoned both plans and withdrew from Inga III.
In May 2013, the stalled project was revived as a 4,800-megawatt project at an estimated cost of $12 billion, to 
be managed by Eskom (South Africa) and Société Nationale d’Electricité (Democratic Republic of the Congo). 
By the end of 2013, a cooperation treaty had been sealed between the Democratic Republic of the Congo and 
South Africa, in which South Africa committed to buy more than half of the electricity generated. With financial and 
technical assistance from the African Development Bank ($33 million) and the World Bank ($73 million),82 feasibility 
studies were conducted for the base chute development. Other bilateral development agencies and regional banks 
expressed interest in funding the project, but no firm commitments have been made. 
Three consortiums, including TNCs from Canada, China, the Republic of Korea and Spain, have been prequalified 
to bid for this $12 billion project, and a winning bidder will be selected in the summer of 2014.83 This will result in an 
expansion in both FDI and non-equity modes of activity by TNCs, though the exact amounts will depend on which 
consortium wins and the configuration of the project. Construction is scheduled to start in early 2016, to make the 
facility operational by 2020.
Source:  UNCTAD based on “Grand Inga Hydroelectric Project: An Overview”, www.internationalrivers.org, and “The Inga  
3 Hydropower Project”, 27 January 2014, www.icafrica.org. 
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The growth in development finance to support 
infrastructure projects in LDCs is encouraging, 
but the estimated investment needs in these 
countries are much greater. Along with FDI and 
non-equity modes, official development assistance 
(ODA) from the OECD Development Assistance 
Committee (DAC) has been the important external 
source of finance for infrastructure projects in 
LDCs. Because ODA can act as a catalyst for 
boosting FDI in infrastructure development in LDCs 
(WIR10), synergies between ODA disbursements 
and FDI inflows to LDCs should be encouraged to 
strengthen productive capacities in LDCs.88 
Led by transport and storage, gross disbursements 
of official development finance (ODF) to selected 
infrastructure sectors89 in LDCs are growing 
steadily (figure II.21). ODF includes both ODA 
and non-concessional financing90 from multilateral 
development banks. In cumulative terms, however, 
gross ODF disbursements to infrastructure projects 
in LDCs amounted to $41 billion,91 or an annual 
average of $4 billion, representing 0.9 per cent of 
average GDP in 2003–2012.
Relatively small infrastructure financing by DAC 
donors is not unique to LDCs.92 Yet, considering 
that low-income countries had to spend 12.5 per 
cent of GDP (or about $60 billion for LDCs) annually 
to develop infrastructure to meet the Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs),93 ODF of $4 billion 
a year (7 per cent of the estimated $60 billion) for 
all LDCs appears to fall short of their investment 
requirements. Given the structural challenges such 
countries face, where the domestic private sector 
is underdeveloped, it is a daunting task to bridge 
the gap between ODF and investment needs for 
achieving the SDGs (see chapter IV). 
For instance, in water supply and sanitation, where 
hardly any foreign investments in announced 
projects have been recorded in the last decade, the 
highest level of gross ODF disbursements to LDCs 
($1.8 billion in 2012) would cover no more than 10 
per cent of the estimated annual capital that LDCs 
need ($20 billion a year for 2011–2015) to meet the 
MDG water supply and sanitation target ($8 billion) 
and universal coverage target (an additional $12 
billion).94 With the current level of external finance, 
therefore, the remaining $18 billion must be secured 
in limited domestic sources in LDCs.
Prospects. Announced projects suggest that 
FDI inflows to infrastructure projects in LDCs 
Box II.6. Dawei Special Economic Zone: $10 billion secured, search continues for 
new investors to finance remaining $40 billion
Although the announced $50 billion build-operate-own project in Dawei, Myanmar – the Dawei SEZ – was registered 
as a transportation project, it is a multisectoral infrastructure project: a two-way road between Myanmar and Thailand, 
a seaport, steel mills, oil refineries, petrochemical factories, power plants, telecommunication lines, water supply, a 
wastewater treatment system, and housing and commercial facilities. 
When this project was announced in late 2012, Thailand’s largest construction group, Italian-Thailand Development 
(ITD), was in charge under a 75-year concession. ITD was responsible for implementing the first phase, estimated at 
$8 billion, and construction was scheduled to start in April 2014.84 However, due to ITD’s failure to secure sufficient 
investments and reach an agreement on the development of energy infrastructure, the Governments of Myanmar and 
of Thailand took over the project in 2013, establishing a joint special purpose vehicle (SPV).85 
Stressing the potential for Dawei to grow into a new production hub in the ASEAN region, the Thai-Myanmar SPV 
approached the Government of Japan, which had been engaged in the development of another SEZ in Thilawa.86 In 
November 2013, the Thai-Myanmar SPV involved a leading Japanese TNC in a 7-megawatt power station project 
in Dawei at an estimated cost of $9.9 billion (table II.9). To manage this project, a Thai-Japan joint venture has been 
established by Mitsubishi Corporation (Japan) (30 per cent) and two Thai firms – Electricity Generating Authority of 
Thailand (50 per cent) and ITD (20 per cent).87 
To implement the remaining six segments of infrastructure development in the SEZ, the Thai-Myanmar SPV continues 
to look for new investors. The viability of the SEZ depends on successful implementation of the planned infrastructure 
developments. Until the remaining $40 billion is secured, therefore, its fate is on hold.
Source: UNCTAD. 
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are growing, which is imperative for sustainable 
economic growth. FDI inflows to LDCs in the ASEAN 
region are likely to grow further by attracting not only 
large-scale infrastructure investments but also FDI 
in a range of industries in the manufacturing and 
services sectors (section A.2.a). As infrastructure 
investments tend to flow more into larger resource-
rich LDCs than into smaller resource-scarce ones, 
there is a risk that uneven distributions of FDI 
among LDCs may intensify. 
Mobilization of available resources for improving 
infrastructure in LDCs remains a great challenge. 
Along with the international aid target for LDCs, 
donor-led initiatives for leveraging private finance 
in infrastructure development in developing 
economies – such as some DAC donors’ explicit 
support for public-private partnerships (PPPs),95 EU 
blending facilities,96 and the G-20’s intent to identify 
appropriate actions to increase infrastructure 
investment in low-income countries (OECD, 2014, 
p. 27) – can generate more development finance for 
LDCs. The promotion of impact investments and 
private-sector investments in economic and social 
infrastructure for achieving the SDGs (chapter IV) will 
lead to opportunities for some LDCs. The increasing 
importance of FDI and development finance from 
the South to LDCs97 is also encouraging. 
The extent of FDI growth and sustainable economic 
development in LDCs largely depends on the 
successful execution and operation of infrastructure 
projects in the pipeline. In this respect, domestic 
and foreign resources should be mobilized more 
efficiently and effectively. Although international 
development partners are stepping up their 
efforts to deliver on their commitments for better 
development outcomes, LDCs are also expected to 
increase domestic investments in infrastructure.98 
Source:  UNCTAD, based on selected sectoral data available from the OECD Creditor Reporting System.
Note:     Excludes disbursements to finance–related training, policy, administration and management projects in these four sectors.
Figure II.21. Gross oDF disbursements to LDcs, selected sectors, 2003–2012
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2. Landlocked developing countries
Figure A. FDI flows, top 5 host and home economies, 2012–2013
(Billions of dollars)
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table A. Distribution of FDI flows among economies, 
by range,a 2013
range Inflows outflows
Above 
$1 billion 
Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, 
Azerbaijan, Mongolia, Zambia, Bolivia 
(Plurinational State of), Uganda and 
Uzbekistan
Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan
$500 to 
$999 million 
Ethiopia, Kyrgyzstan, Niger and Chad ..
$100 to 
$499 million 
Mali, Zimbabwe, Paraguay, Burkina 
Faso, Armenia, the Former Yugoslav 
Republic of Macedonia, Lao People's 
Democratic Republic, Republic of 
Moldova, Botswana, Malawi, Rwanda 
and Tajikistan
Zambia
$10 to 
$99 million 
Nepal, Afghanistan, Swaziland, 
Lesotho and Bhutan
Burkina Faso, Mongolia, Malawi, 
Republic of Moldova, Zimbabwe, 
Lesotho, Armenia and Rwanda
Below 
$10 million 
Burundi and Central African Republic
Mali, Swaziland, Kyrgyzstan, 
Botswana, Uganda, the Former 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, 
Niger and Lao People's Democratic 
Republic
a Economies are listed according to the magnitude of their FDI flows.
Figure c. FDI outflows, 2007–2013
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table B. cross-border M&As by industry, 2012–2013
(Millions of dollars)
Sector/industry Sales Purchases2012 2013 2012 2013
Total -574 258 544 6
Primary -2 612 -22 160 2
Mining, quarrying and petroleum -2 614 -22 160 2
Manufacturing 468 257 -183 -
Food, beverages and tobacco 377 177 - -
Chemicals and chemical products - 5 -185 -
Motor vehicles and other transport equipment - 60 - -
Non-metallic mineral products 90 - - -
Services 1 570  23 566 3
Trade - - 20 -
Information and communications 1 542 20 - -
Financial and insurance activities 17 3 598 3
Public administration and defence, compulsory social sec. - - -52 -
table c. cross-border M&As by region/country, 2012–2013
(Millions of dollars)
region/country Sales Purchases2012 2013 2012 2013
World -574 258 544 6
Developed economies -804 99 445 2
European Union -823 72 435 2
Other developed Europe -5 331 - -
Canada 2 -298 10 -
United States -22 - - -
Other developed countries 44 -6 - -
Developing economies 191 160 -35  3
Africa 106 - -185 3
Latin America and the Caribbean -150 - - -
West Asia - 6 150 -
South, East and South-East Asia 235 154 - -
Transition economies 23 - 133 -
table D. Greenfield FDI projects by industry, 2012–2013
(Millions of dollars)
Sector/industry LLDcs as destination LLDcs as investors2012 2013 2012 2013
Total 17 931 17 211 4 005 1 033
Primary 1 443 1 207 - -
Mining, quarrying and petroleum 1 443 1 207 - -
Manufacturing 8 931 5 273 3 276 407
Chemicals and chemical products 4 781 128 - 92
Non-metallic mineral products 66 1 624 18 75
Metals and metal products 1 784 279 - 70
Electrical and electronic equipment 246 587 - -
Services 7 558 10 730 729 626
Electricity, gas and water 2 300 5 213 - -
Trade 400 467 197 133
Transport, storage and communications 1 823 2 349 168 139
Finance 1 306 1 301 240 332
table E. Greenfield FDI projects by region/country, 2012–2013
(Millions of dollars)
Partner region/economy LLDcs as destination LLDcs as investors2012 2013 2012 2013
World 17 931 17 211 4 005 1 033
Developed economies 5 279 9 879 178 188
European Union 3 109 3 618 128 150
Other developed Europe 12 4 346 - -
United States 1 131 502 50 3
Other developed countries 431 1 060 - 35
Developing economies 11 853 6 163 3 587 507
Africa 679 2 872 308 174
East and South-East Asia 5 561 1 249 244 36
South Asia 3 643 776 - 116
West Asia 1 962 582 3 034 114
Latin America and the Caribbean 10 684 - 66
Transition economies 799 1 168 240 338
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FDI flows to the landlocked developing countries 
(LLDCs) fell by 11 per cent to $29.7 billion in 2013 
after the 2012 figure was revised slightly downward 
to $33.5 billion. Investment to the group was still 
concentrated in the transition-economy LLDCs, 
which accounted for 62 per cent of FDI inflows. In 
African LLDCs, FDI flows increased by 10 per cent 
but the picture was mixed: 7 of the 15 countries 
experienced falls and 8 countries, predominantly 
mineral-exporting economies, saw increases. 
In contrast to 2012, when the Republic of Korea 
and the West Asian economies led investments, in 
2013 developed-economy investors took the lead 
(in particular Europe), which increased their share 
in the group from 29 per cent in 2012 to 57 per 
cent. Services continued to attract strong investor 
interest, especially in the electricity, water and gas 
sectors and the transport sector. 
FDI inflows to LLDCs as a group registered a 
decline of 11 per cent in 2013, to $29.7 billion. 
This follows revised figures for 2012 that show 
a slight fall, making 2013 the first year in which 
FDI has fallen two years in a row for this group of 
economies. The Asian group of LLDCs experienced 
the largest fall, nearly 50 per cent, mainly due to a 
precipitous decline in investment in Mongolia. As 
reported in UNCTAD’s Investment Policy Review of 
Mongolia (UNCTAD, 2014), this fall was linked to 
an investment law introduced in early 2012 which 
was thought to have concerned many investors, 
especially those who were already cautious.99 The 
law was amended in November 2013. The more 
than 12 per cent drop in FDI to the transition LLDCs 
is accounted for mainly by a tailing off of investment 
to Kazakhstan in 2013, despite strong performance 
in Azerbaijan, where inflows rose by 31 per cent. 
In other subregions, FDI performance was positive 
in 2013. Inflows to the Latin American LLDCs 
increased by 38 per cent, as a result of the steadily 
increasing attractiveness of the Plurinational State 
of Bolivia to foreign investors. African LLDCs saw 
their share of total LLDC inflows increase from 18 
to 23 per cent, with strong performance in Zambia, 
where flows topped $1.8 billion. Nevertheless, 
inflows to LLDCs in 2013 remained comparatively 
small, representing just 2 per cent of global flows – 
a figure which has shrunk since 2012 and illustrates 
the continuing economic marginalization of many of 
these countries. 
LLDC outflows, which had surged to $6.1 billion in 
2011, declined in 2012 but recovered to $3.9 billion 
last year, up 44 per cent. Historically, Kazakhstan 
has accounted for the bulk of LLDC outflows and, 
together with Azerbaijan, it accounted for almost all 
outward investment last year. 
Greenfield and M&A figures reveal a changed 
pattern of investment in 2013 in terms of sectors 
and source countries. In 2012, the major investors 
in LLDCs were developing economies, primarily 
the Republic of Korea and India. However, in 
2013, developing-economy flows to LLDCs fell by 
almost 50 per cent from $11.9 billion in 2012 to 
$6.2 billion – albeit with some notable exceptions 
such as Nigeria, which was the second largest 
investor in LLDCs in 2013. Europe was the major 
investor, accounting for 46 per cent of FDI in 
terms of source; as investors in LLDCs, developed 
economies as a whole increased their share from 
29 per cent in 2012 to 57 per cent in 2013. 
In terms of investors’ sectoral interests, services 
remain strong: in 2013, announced greenfield 
investments in this sector increased 42 per cent 
from the previous year. Investment in infrastructure 
doubled, in particular to the electricity, water and 
gas sectors, primarily on the back of an announced 
greenfield project in the geothermal sector in 
Ethiopia by Reykjavik Geothermal, valued at 
$4 billion (see previous section on LDCs); FDI to 
the transport sector rose 29 per cent. With regard 
to M&As, the pattern of divestment in the primary 
sector – especially by European firms – that was 
seen in 2012 continued, albeit more slowly, and 
European firms registered a positive number for 
total M&As in 2013. 
a. FDI in the LLDCs – a stock-
taking since Almaty I (2003)
The Almaty Programme of Action for the LLDCs, 
adopted in 2003, addressed transport and transit 
cooperation to facilitate the integration of LLDCs into 
the global economy. The follow-up Second United 
Nations Conference on Landlocked Developing 
Countries, to be held in November 2014, will 
examine LLDC performance in this respect and 
assess their infrastructure needs, in particular those 
that can improve trade links, reduce transport costs 
and generate economic development. Recognizing 
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the critical role that the private sector can play, it will 
be essential for LLDCs to adopt measures to boost 
investment, in particular investment in infrastructure 
for transport, telecommunications and utilities. 
An analysis of FDI indicators (table II.10) over the past 
10 years reveals a mixed performance in LLDCs. 
In terms of FDI growth, they fared better than the 
global average but worse than other developing 
countries as a group. Among LLDCs, FDI growth 
in the Latin American and African subregions was 
stronger than in the transition economies and 
Asian subregion. Looking at the importance of FDI 
for LLDC economies, in terms of the share of FDI 
stock in GDP, it has averaged 5 percentage points 
higher than in developing countries, revealing the 
importance of foreign investment for growth in 
the LLDCs. In terms of the ratio of FDI to gross 
fixed capital formation (GFCF) – one of the building 
blocks of development – FDI’s role was again more 
important for LLDCs than for developing economies 
over the previous 10 years. And LLDCs registered a 
much stronger growth rate in GVC participation than 
either the developing-country or the global average. 
b. FDI inflows over the past decade
Since 2004, FDI inflows to LLDCs have generally 
followed a rising trajectory, with the exception of 
declines in 2005 and following the global economic 
crisis in 2009 and 2010. Figures for 2012 and 2013 
also show a decline in inward investment to the 
group, but FDI has nevertheless stabilized around 
the previous three-year average (figure II.22). 
At 10 per cent, the compound annual growth 
rate (CAGR) for FDI inflows to LLDCs was higher 
than the world rate of 8 per cent but lower than 
for developing countries as a whole, at 12 per 
cent (table II.10). Although the transition LLDCs 
accounted for the bulk of the increase in FDI in value 
terms, the subregion’s CAGR was in fact the lowest 
of all LLDC regions over the period (table II.11). The 
Asian and Latin American economies experienced 
the strongest FDI growth in terms of their CAGR, 
which dampens the effects of volatility in flows. 
However, the picture in Latin America is distorted 
by the presence of only two landlocked economies, 
and in Asia by the impact of Mongolia’s natural 
resources boom, which attracted significantly 
increased FDI over the past decade. 
Another distortion therefore concerns the weight of 
the mineral-exporting economies that mainly form 
part of the transition-economy subregion, and in 
particular, Kazakhstan. As a group, the transition-
economy LLDCs accounted for the bulk of FDI 
inflows over the period 2004–2013, with an average 
share of almost 70 per cent. Indeed, just six mineral-
exporting countries – Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan 
table II.10. Selected FDI and GVc indicators, 2004–2013
(Per cent)
Indicator LLDCs
Developing 
countries
World
FDI inflows, annual growth 10   12    8   
Inward FDI stock as % of GDP, 10-year average 34   29    30   
FDI inflows as % of GFCF, 10-year average 21   11    11   
GVC participation, annual growtha 18   12    10   
Source: UNCTAD FDI-TNC-GVC Information System, FDI/TNC/database (www.unctad.org/fdistatistics) and UNCTAD-Eora GVC 
Database.
Note:    Annual growth computed as compound annual growth rate over the period considered.
GVC participation indicates the part of a country’s exports that is part of a multi-stage trade process; it is the foreign value 
added (FVA) used in a country’s exports (the upstream component) plus the value added supplied to other countries’ 
exports (the downstream component, or DVX).
a 2004–2011.
table II.11. FDI inflows to LLDcs, 2004–2013
(Millions of dollars and per cent)
Subregion 2004 2013 Growth 
LLDCs Subregion 12 290 29 748  10 
LLDCs-Africa 2 464 6 800  12 
LLDCs-Latin America and the Caribbean  113 2 132  39 
LLDCs-Asia and Oceania  305 2 507  26 
LLDCs-Transition economies 9 408 18 309  8 
Source: UNCTAD FDI-TNC-GVC Information System, FDI-
TNC-GVC Information System, FDI/TNC database 
(www.unctad.org/fdistatistics).   
Note:    Growth computed as compound annual growth rate 
over the period.
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and Azerbaijan, plus the non-transition - economies 
of Mongolia, Uganda and Zambia – accounted for 
almost three quarters of all LLDC inflows. Although 
trends have remained broadly similar over the past 
decade, several countries have attracted increasing 
flows, largely as a result of the development of their 
natural resource sectors, among them Mongolia, 
Turkmenistan and Uganda. All three countries 
started to attract large increases in FDI in the past 
five years. Kazakhstan, which accounted for over 
60 per cent of LLDC FDI during the boom years 
of 2006–2008, has since seen its share of inflows 
decline to about 41 per cent and to just under a 
third in 2013. 
However, as a share of global flows, FDI inflows to 
LLDCs remain small, having grown from 1.7 per 
cent of global flows in 2004 to a high of 2.5 per cent 
in 2012, and retreated to just 2 per cent this year.
c. FDI’s contribution to economic 
growth and capital formation
With the caveat that FDI trends in LLDCs remain 
skewed by the dominance of the mineral-exporting 
economies of Central Asia, it is clear that FDI 
has made a significant contribution to economic 
development in LLDCs. As a percentage of GDP, 
inflows have been relatively more important for this 
group of countries than for the global average or for 
developing countries as a group. FDI flows peaked 
at over 6 per cent of GDP in 2004 and remained 
an important source of investment at 5 per cent 
of GDP in 2012. Even ignoring Kazakhstan, and 
latterly Mongolia, FDI as a percentage of GDP 
has remained above the world and developing-
country averages (1.04 percentage points higher 
than developing countries without Kazakhstan, and 
0.53 percentage point higher without Kazakhstan 
and Mongolia, averaged over the past decade.)
The story repeats itself when FDI stocks are used 
instead of flows (figure II.23). Despite having fallen 
Source: UNCTAD FDI-TNC-GVC Information System, FDI/TNC database (www.unctad.org/fdistatistics).
Figure II.22. FDI inflows to LLDcs, average, various years and 2013
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Source: UNCTAD FDI-TNC-GVC Information System, FDI/TNC 
database (www.unctad.org/fdistatistics).
Figure II.23. FDI stock as a percentage of GDP,
2004–2013
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Figure II.24 FDI inflows as a share of gross fixed
capital formation, 2004–2013
(Per cent)
Source: UNCTAD FDI-TNC-GVC Information System, FDI/TNC 
database (www.unctad.org/fdistatistics) and IMF for 
gross fixed capital formation data.
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below the world and developing-country averages 
in 2007, FDI stocks as a percentage of GDP have 
since risen steeply and now represent a value 
equivalent to 38 per cent of GDP, compared with 
31 per cent for developing countries as a whole. 
This picture is reinforced by the role of FDI in 
gross fixed capital formation (GFCF) – one of the 
essential building blocks of long-term investment 
and development. In LLDCs, FDI can potentially 
contribute to GFCF: it plays a far more important 
role in GFCF than in the global average or in 
developing countries generally (figure II.24). The 
average ratio of FDI to GFCF peaked at over 
27 per cent in 2004; after a dramatic fall in 2005, 
it climbed steadily to more than 20 per cent in 
2012. What is significant, however, is the difference 
between the relative importance of FDI for GFCF for 
LLDCs: the average ratio of FDI to GFCF is almost 
twice that for other developing countries and for 
all economies, both of which have hovered around 
10 per cent in the past five years.
process – not far below the developing-country 
average of 52 per cent (figure II.25). 
LLDCs have a much smaller share in the upstream 
component of GVC participation, reflecting the role 
that natural resources play in several countries’ 
exports. Consequently, the average LLDC upstream 
component – 18 per cent in 2011 – is lower than 
the average developing-country share – 25 per 
cent. However, the growth of LLDC participation in 
GVCs in all subregions in the past decade looks 
very different: the compound annual growth rate 
has averaged more than 18 per cent from 2004 to 
2011. This compares with a global growth rate in 
GVC participation of 10 per cent and a developing-
country growth rate of 12 per cent. In view of the 
rising rates of foreign investment in this group of 
countries over the past decade, a relationship can 
be inferred between increasing FDI flows, principally 
from TNCs, and rapid growth in GVC participation.
e. M&As and greenfield 
investments in the LLDCs  
– a more nuanced picture
Like FDI as a whole, M&As in the LLDC group 
are dominated by Kazakhstan. Of the 73 M&A 
deals worth over $100 million completed in the 
LLDCs over the last 10 years, almost half were in 
Kazakhstan, including 8 of the top $10 billion-plus 
deals. Of these, all but two were in the mineral and 
gas sectors. However, the telecommunications 
sector also produced a number of large deals, not 
only in Kazakhstan but also in Zambia, Uganda and 
Uzbekistan. 
From 2004 through 2013, the average value of 
announced greenfield investments has been greater 
than that of M&As and more diversified across the 
group. Of the 115 largest greenfield investments 
worth more than $500 million, just over a quarter were 
in Kazakhstan, a significantly smaller proportion than 
the country’s share of M&As. Kazakhstan also took a 
similar proportion of the $42 billion-plus investments. 
However, in terms of sectoral distribution, greenfield 
projects were even more concentrated in the mineral 
and gas sectors than were M&As. 
Focusing specifically on investment in infra-
structure (in this case in electricity generation, 
telecommunications and transportation), where 
LLDCs have particular needs, shows that greenfield 
d. The role of investment in LLDC 
GVC patterns
WIR13 drew attention to the links between 
investment and trade, particularly through the 
GVCs of TNCs. It is striking that, despite their 
structural constraints, LLDCs do not differ markedly 
from other developing countries in terms of their 
participation in GVCs: as a group, almost 50 per 
cent of their exports form part of a multistage trade 
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investment has been relatively more distributed 
geographically over the past decade. Although 
Kazakhstan still accounts for 9 per cent of greenfield 
projects in infrastructure worth over $100 million, this 
share is lower than its shares in M&As in infrastructure 
and in large greenfield FDI projects (figure II.26). Of 
the 133 greenfield projects in infrastructure worth 
over $100 million in the past decade, 99 were in the 
Asian and transition economy LLDCs, 29 were in 
Africa and 5 were in South America. 
M&A and greenfield data portray a more nuanced 
picture of the geographical spread of foreign 
investment deals and projects in LLDCs. For 
example, they do not all take place in Kazakhstan 
and a small number of Central Asian economies. The 
data also reveal the concentration of investment in 
two sectors: minerals and gas, where investment is 
primarily resource seeking, and telecommunications, 
where it is primarily market seeking. 
The indicators of FDI performance in LLDCs since 
2004 (table II.10) show that LLDCs performed 
relatively well compared with developing countries 
and with the global economy on all indicators, even 
when Kazakhstan and Mongolia are excluded from 
the analysis. However, it is clear that to speak of 
LLDCs as a homogenous group is misleading and 
disguises regional and country differences. As 
LLDCs prepare for the follow-up Global Review 
Conference in 2014, policymakers and the 
international community must reflect on how to 
spread the benefits of FDI to other members of 
the grouping and beyond a relatively narrow set of 
sectors, as well as how to promote FDI attraction 
in those LLDCs, while minimizing any negative 
impacts.100 
Source: UNCTAD-EORA GVC Database.
Note:   GVC participation rate indicates the share of a country’s exports that is part of a multi-stage trade process; it is the foreign 
value added (FVA) used in a country’s exports (the upstream component) plus the value added supplied to other countries’ 
exports (the downstream component, or DVX), divided by total exports.
Figure II.25. GVc participation rate, 2011, and GVc participation growth, 2004–2011
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Figure II.26. Kazakhstan: share of LLDc M&As, 
greenfield investment projects and greenfield 
infrastructure projects, 2004–2013
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3. Small island developing States
Figure A. FDI flows, top 5 host and home economies, 2012–2013
(Billions of dollars)
Figure c. FDI outflows, 2007–2013
(Billions of dollars)
Figure B. FDI inflows, 2007–2013
(Billions of dollars)
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table A. Distribution of FDI flows among economies, 
by range,a 2013
range Inflows outflows
Above 
$1 billion 
Trinidad and Tobago and Bahamas ..
$500 to 
$999 million 
Jamaica Trinidad and Tobago
$100 to 
$499 million 
Barbados, Maldives, Fiji, Mauritius, 
Seychelles, Antigua and Barbuda, 
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, 
Saint Kitts and Nevis and Solomon 
Islands
Bahamas and Mauritius 
$50 to 
$99 million 
Saint Lucia and Grenada ..
$1 to 
$49 million 
Vanuatu, São Tomé and Principe, 
Samoa, Marshall Islands, Timor-
Leste, Cabo Verde, Papua New 
Guinea, Dominica, Comoros, Tonga, 
Kiribati and Palau
Marshall Islands, Timor-Leste, 
Seychelles, Fiji, Saint Lucia, Antigua 
and Barbuda, Barbados, Grenada, 
Cabo Verde, Solomon Islands, Saint 
Kitts and Nevis and Tonga
Below 
$1 million 
 Federated States of Micronesia
Vanuatu, São Tomé and Principe, 
Samoa, Dominica, Saint Vincent and 
the Grenadines, Kiribati and Jamaica
a Economies are listed according to the magnitude of their FDI flows.
table B. cross-border M&As by industry, 2012–2013
(Millions of dollars)
Sector/industry Sales Purchases2012 2013 2012 2013
Total 97 -596 -2 -266
Primary 110 -600 25 -14
Agriculture, forestry and fishing - - 20 -
Mining, quarrying and petroleum 110 -600 5 -14
Manufacturing -47 -5 - 10
Food, beverages and tobacco -47 - - -
Basic metal and metal products - - - 10
Services 33 9 -27 -262
Electricity, gas, water and waste management - - 228 -
Transportation and storage 20 - - -
Information and communications - 4 - 108
Financial and insurance activities 13 - -254 -369
Business services - 5 - -
table c. cross-border M&As by region/country, 2012–2013
(Millions of dollars)
region/country Sales Purchases2012 2013 2012 2013
World 97 -596 -2 -266
Developed economies -42 -604 5 -219
Germany - 285 - -
Switzerland - -285 - -
United States -37 -600 - 103
Developing economies 119 3 -7 -47
Latin America and the Caribbean - -272 330 -86
Guatemala - - 228 -
Cayman Islands - -272 -  -86
India 115 - 66 38
Indonesia - - 189 -
Singapore 7 331 -655 9
Transition economies - - - -
table D. Greenfield FDI projects by industry, 2012–2013
(Millions of dollars)
Sector/industry SIDS as destination SIDS as investors2012 2013 2012 2013
Total 2 298 6 506 205 3 809
Primary 8 2 532 - -
Mining, quarrying and petroleum 8 2 532 - -
Manufacturing 1 169 1 986 130 -
Coke, petroleum products and nuclear fuel 929 1 048 - -
Chemical and chemical products - 850 - -
Services 1 121 1 988 75 3 809
Electricity, gas and water 156 - - -
Construction - 1 350 - -
Hotels and restaurants 505 65 30 -
Transport, storage and communications 116 477 - 1 871
Finance 201 22 12 190
Business services 77 46 33 1 749
table E. Greenfield FDI projects by region/country, 2012–2013
(Millions of dollars)
Partner region/economy SIDS as destination SIDS as investors2012 2013 2012 2013
World 2 298 6 506 205 3 809
Developed economies 1 493 2 814 26 3
Europe 307 255 26 3
United States 181 1 379 - -
Australia 1 005 316 - -
Japan - 863 - -
Developing economies 805 3 691 179 3 806
Kenya - - - 450
Nigeria - - - 2 296
China - 3 250 - 164
Latin America and the Caribbean 30 13 30 457
Small island developing states (SIDS) 30 - 30 -
Transition economies - - - -
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a. FDI in small island developing 
States – a decade in review
FDI inflows to the SIDS declined by 16 per cent 
to $5.7 billion in 2013, putting an end to a two-
year recovery. Flows decreased in all subregions, 
but unevenly. African SIDS registered the highest 
decline (41 per cent to $499 million), followed by 
Latin American SIDS (14 per cent to $4.3 billion). 
SIDS in Asia and Oceania registered a slight 3 per 
cent decline to $853 million. This trend is examined 
in a long-term context.
SIDS face unique development challenges that are 
formally recognized by the international community. 
For this reason, their financing needs to achieve 
economic, social and environmentally sustainable 
development are disproportionally large, both 
as a share of their GDP and as compared with 
other developing countries’ needs. Mobilization 
of financing through various channels – private or 
public, and domestic or international – is no doubt 
required for sustainable development in SIDS. 
External finance includes ODA and private capital 
flows (both FDI and portfolio and other investment, 
such as bank loan flows) as well as remittances and 
other flows.
A third United Nations Conference on SIDS is to 
be held in September 2014 in Samoa. It seeks a 
renewed political commitment to SIDS’ development 
through identifying new and emerging challenges 
and opportunities for their sustainable development 
and establishing priorities to be considered in the 
elaboration of the post-2015 UN development 
agenda. This section reviews a decade of FDI to the 
29 SIDS countries – as listed by UNCTAD (box II.7) 
– in terms of their trends, patterns, determinants 
and impacts. 
The global economic crisis halted strong FDI 
growth. FDI inflows into SIDS increased significant-
ly over 2005–2008, reaching an annual average of 
$6.3 billion, more than twice the level over 2001–
2004. However, the global financial crisis led to a 
severe reversal of this trend, with FDI plummeting 
by 47 per cent, from $8.7 billion in 2008 to 
$4.6 billion in 2009. Flows recovered in 2011 and 
2012, before declining again in 2013, remaining 
below the annual average they had reached in 
2005–2008 (figure II.27). 
Although FDI flows to the SIDS are very small in 
relative terms, accounting for only 0.4 per cent of 
global FDI flows over 2001–2013, they are very high 
compared with the size of the SIDS’ economies. 
The ratio of inflows to current GDP during 2001–
2013 was almost three times the world average 
and more than twice the average of developing and 
transition economies. These relatively high inflows 
to the group are the result of fiscal advantages 
offered to foreign investors in a number of SIDS, 
and of a limited number of very large investments in 
extractive industries. 
Caribbean SIDS have traditionally attracted 
the bulk of FDI into SIDS, accounting for 78 per 
cent of flows over the period 2001–2013. Their 
proximity to and economic dependence on the 
large North American market are the main factors 
Box II.7. UNCTAD’s list of SIDS
The United Nations has recognized the particular problems of SIDS without, however, establishing criteria for 
determining an official list of them. Fifty-two countries and territories are presently classified as SIDS by the United 
Nations Office of the High Representative for the Least Developed Countries, Landlocked Developing Countries and 
Small Island Developing States (UN-OHRLLS); 29 have been defined by UNCTAD and used for analytical purposes. 
This review regroups the 29 countries in three geographical regions: 
•  Africa SIDS: Cape Verde, São Tomé and Príncipe, the Comoros, Mauritius and Seychelles.
•  Asia and Oceania SIDS: Maldives, Timor-Leste, Fiji, Kiribati, the Marshall Islands, the Federated States of 
Micronesia, Nauru, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu and Vanuatu.
•  Caribbean SIDS: Antigua and Barbuda, the Bahamas, Barbados, Dominica, Grenada, Jamaica, Saint Kitts and 
Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, and Trinidad and Tobago.
Source:  UNCTAD; UN OHRLLS, “Small Islands Developing States - Small Islands Big(ger) Stakes”, United Nations, New 
York, 2011. 
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explaining their higher attractiveness compared 
with other SIDS regions. 
However, SIDS located in Africa and in Asia and 
Oceania experienced relatively stronger FDI growth 
during the 2000 (figure II.28). Their share in total 
FDI flows increased from 11 per cent in 2001–2004 
to 20 per cent in 2005–2008, to 29 per cent in 
2009–2013. The actual importance of Asia and 
Oceania as a SIDS recipient subregion is probably 
underestimated, because of the undervaluation of 
FDI flows to Papua New Guinea and Timor-Leste, 
two countries rich in natural resources that host 
significant FDI projects in the extractive industry 
(box II.8) but do not include those projects in official 
FDI statistics (Timor-Leste) or do not reflect them 
fully (Papua New Guinea). 
Mineral extraction and downstream-related 
activities, tourism, business and finance are 
the main target industries for FDI. Sectoral 
FDI data are available for very few SIDS countries. 
Only Jamaica, Mauritius, Trinidad and Tobago, and 
Papua New Guinea make available official sectoral 
data on FDI. These data show a high concentration 
of FDI in the extractive industries in Papua New 
Guinea and in Trinidad and Tobago.101 FDI flows to 
Mauritius are directed almost totally to the services 
sector, with soaring investments in activities such 
as finance, hotels and restaurants, construction 
and business in the period 2007–2012. FDI to 
Jamaica, which used to be more diversified among 
the primary, manufacturing and services sectors, 
has increasingly targeted service industries during 
the period 2007–2012 (table II.12). 
In the absence of FDI sectoral data for most SIDS 
countries, information on greenfield FDI projects 
announced by foreign investors in the SIDS 
Source: UNCTAD FDI-TNC-GVC Information System, FDI/TNC database (www.unctad.org/fdistatistics).
Figure II.27. FDI flows into SIDS by main subregion, 2001–2013
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between 2003 and 2013 is used as an alternative 
way to assess which countries and industries 
have attracted foreign investors’ interest, if not 
actual investments. (M&As – another mode of 
FDI – are almost nonexistent in SIDS.) Upstream 
and downstream activities in the oil, gas and 
metal minerals industries103 have been the focus 
of most capital expenditures in greenfield projects 
announced by foreign investors (57 per cent 
of the total), with Papua New Guinea, Trinidad 
and Tobago, Timor-Leste and Fiji hosting these 
projects. Hotels and restaurants are the next 
largest focus of foreign investors’ pledges to invest 
(12 per cent of total announced investments), with 
Maldives being their favourite destination. Other 
services industries, such as construction, transport 
Box II.8. TNCs in the extractive industry in Papua New Guinea and Timor-Leste
Papua New Guinea has high prospects for oil and gas, with deposits of both found across its territory. The most 
developed of its projects is the liquefied natural gas (LNG) project led by ExxonMobil,102 which is expected to begin 
production in 2014. It will produce 6.6 million tonnes of LNG per year for end users in Taiwan Province of China, 
Japan and China. The project cost is now estimated at $19 billion, significantly more than the initial cost ceiling of $15 
billion. A potential second project is the Gulf LNG project initially driven by InterOil (United States) and now operated 
by Total (France), which took a majority share in 2013. Oil and gas drilling by foreign companies is continuing apace, 
with plenty of untapped potential and more gas and oil being discovered each year. 
Papua New Guinea is also rich in metal mining, with copper and gold being the major mineral commodities produced. 
The country is estimated to be the 11th largest producer of gold, accounting for about 2.6 per cent of global 
production. It also has deposits of chromite, cobalt, nickel and molybdenum. Several international mining companies 
are majority owners or shareholders in metal-producing operations, including Newcrest Mining (Australia), Harmony 
Gold Mining (South Africa), Barrick Gold (Canada), New Guinea Gold (Canada) and MCC (China).
Timor-Leste has many oil and gas deposits both onshore and offshore, although most petroleum development 
has been far offshore. It also has significant untapped mineral potential in copper, gold, silver and chromite, but 
the mountainous terrain and poor infrastructure have impeded widespread exploration and development. Major 
oil and gas discoveries in the Timor Sea in 1994 have led to the development of a large-scale offshore oil industry. 
ConocoPhillips, Eni, Santos, INPEX Woodside, Shell and Osaka Gas are among the international oil companies 
operating there. 
Source:  United States Department of the Interior, 2011 Minerals Yearbook Papua New Guinea, December 2012; Revenue 
Watch Institute, “Timor-Leste; Extractive Industries”, www.revenuewatch.org.
table II.12. SIDS: FDI flows and stock by sector, selected countries, various years 
(Millions of dollars)
FDI flows (average per year) FDI stock
Sector/industry
Jamaica Mauritius Trinidad and Tobago Papua New Guinea
2001–2006 2007–2012 2001–2006 2007–2012 2001–2006 2007–2011 2006 2012
Primary  141  71  3  4  768  796  1 115  4 189
Mining, quarrying 
and petroleum
 141  71 - -  768  796  991  4 000
Manufacturing  68  36  6  8  10  26  126  184
Services  169  238  78  363  43  487  61  149
Business activities  67  133  18  146 .. .. .. ..
Finance .. ..  37  114 .. ..  43  64
Hotels and 
restaurants
 99  106  10  46 .. ..  3  5
Construction .. ..  2  31 .. .. .. ..
Other services  3 -  11  26 .. ..  14  80
Total  663  587  87  375  876  1 344  1 350  4 576
Unspecified  285  242 - -  54  35  48  54
Source: UNCTAD FDI-TNC-GVC Information System, FDI/TNC database (www.unctad.org/fdistatistics).
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and communications, finance, public utilities and 
business activities, are among the other typical 
activities for which greenfield FDI projects have 
been announced in SIDS countries (table II.13). 
Developed-country TNCs have announced the 
most capital spending in greenfield projects 
in SIDS countries (almost two thirds of total 
capital expenditures). Resource-rich countries 
such as Papua New Guinea, Trinidad and Tobago, 
and Timor-Leste represented 63 per cent of 
such TNCs’ announced capital spending. TNCs 
from developing and transition economies have 
focused their interest mainly in four SIDS countries, 
namely Papua New Guinea, Maldives, Mauritius 
and Jamaica, which together represented the 
destinations of 89 per cent of those TNCs’ total 
announced capital spending (table II.14).
Main location advantages of SIDS, and the 
opportunities and risks they represent for 
sustainable development. The endowments of 
SIDS, principally in natural resources and human 
capital, confer a number of location advantages. In 
addition, all of these countries qualify for at least 
one trade preference regime104 that gives them, in 
principle, preferential access to developed-country 
markets. A number of industries have flourished 
based on these advantages: 
•  Tourism and fishing industries have been favoured 
because of the valuable natural resources, 
including oceans, sizeable exclusive economic 
zones, coastal environments and biodiversity. 
Tourism is often identified as a promising growth 
sector in SIDS, offering one of the few opportunities 
for economic diversification through the many 
linkages it can build with other economic sectors. 
If adequately integrated into national development 
plans, it can contribute to the growth of sectors 
such as agriculture, fishing and services. But if 
not properly planned and managed, tourism can 
have negative social and environmental impacts, 
table II.13. SIDS: announced value of greenfield FDI projects by sector, total and top 10 destination 
countries, 2003–2013
(Millions of dollars)
Sector/industry
Papua 
New 
Guinea
Trinidad 
and 
Tobago
Maldives
Timor-
Leste
Mauritius Jamaica Fiji Bahamas Seychelles
São Tomé 
and 
Principe
Others Total
Primary  8 070  3 091 -  1 000 - -  792 - - -  228  13 181
Mining, quarrying 
and petroleum
 8 070  3 091 -  1 000 - -  792 - - -  228  13 181
Manufacturing  7 155  3 865  78  4 010  203  687  59  142  102  351  248  16 900
Coke, petroleum pro-
ducts and nuclear fuel
 6 650  791 -  4 000  1 - - - - - -  11 442
Metal and metal 
products
 228  404 - -  2  384 - - - - -  1 019
Chemicals and 
chemical products
-  2 435 - -  3  10 - - - -  80  2 527
Food, beverages 
and tobacco
 214  92 -  10 -  258  46 -  59 -  129  808
Other manufacturing  63  143  78 -  197  35  13  142  43  351  39  1 104
Services  1 113  301  5 683  116  4 344  3 147  551  1 079  695  161  2 337  19 527
Hotels and restaurants - -  3 153 -  362  504  206  128  476 -  1 171  5 999
Construction - -  1 997 -  2 445  1 350 - - - - -  5 792
Transport, storage 
and communications
 70  23  326  116  362  1 027  70  837  186  150  446  3 613
Finance  162  111  208 -  164  96  248  34  19  11  241  1 295
Electric, gas and 
water distribution
 775 - - - - - - - - -  340  1 115
Business activities  48  55 - -  774  43  27  55  14 -  77  1 094
Other services  59  111 - -  237  126 -  24 - -  63  619
Total  16 338  7 256  5 762  5 126  4 547  3 834  1 403  1 220  797  512  2 813  49 608
Source:  UNCTAD, based on information from the Financial Times Ltd., fDi Markets (www.fdimarkets.com).
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table II.14. SIDS: announced value of greenfield FDI projects by top 10 home countries to top 10 
destination countries, 2003–2013
(Millions of dollars)
Home country
Papua 
New 
Guinea
Trinidad 
and 
Tobago
Maldives
Timor-
Leste
Mauritius Jamaica Fiji Bahamas Seychelles
São Tomé 
and 
Principe
Other 
SIDS
Total 
SIDS
United States  3 005  3 094  206 -  569  1 207  554  252 - -  1 161  10 046
Australia  3 535  316 -  4 000  5 -  456 - - -  290  8 601
China  3 528 - - - -  1 350  8 - - -  98  4 983
South Africa  3 000 - - -  1 320 - - - - - -  4 320
India  923  171  1 565 -  419  3  3 -  224 - -  3 307
Canada  970  1 205  617 -  121  38 - -  241 -  63  3 254
United Kingdom  139  1 412  42 -  119  367  13  328  7  351  367  3 145
France - -  13 -  1 732  103  41  550 - - -  2 439
Thailand - -  1 620  10  3 - - - - -  65  1 698
United Arab Emirates -  23  715 -  72 -  42 -  265 -  64  1 180
Italy  8 - -  1 000 - - - - - - -  1 008
Korea, Republic of  959  4 - -  11 - - - - - -  975
Others  272  1 032  985  116  178  766  288  90  60  161  707  4 653
World  16 338  7 256  5 762  5 126  4 547  3 834  1 403  1 220  797  512  2 813  49 608
Developed economies  7 705  6 967  1 302  5 108  2 686  2 441  1 115  1 131  298  501  2 072  31 325
Developing and 
transition economies
 8 634  289  4 460  19  1 861  1 393  288  89  498  11  741  18 283
Source: UNCTAD, based on information from the Financial Times Ltd., fDi Markets (www.fdimarkets.com).
significantly degrade the environment on which it 
is so dependent and lead to irreversible damage 
to ecosystems and to traditional activities such as 
agriculture and fishing (UN OHRLLS, 2011).
•  Mining and related activities have been developed 
in some SIDS that have sizeable nonrenewable 
natural resources. If properly managed, mineral 
endowments can provide opportunities for 
economic development and poverty alleviation. 
However, exploitation of non-renewable 
resources poses serious challenges – economic, 
social and environmental – to prospects for long-
term sustainable development. The economic 
challenges consist in defining how to create value 
from mineral resources, how to capture that 
value locally and how to make the best use of the 
revenues created. The social and environmental 
challenges derive from the strong environmental 
footprint and the profound social impacts that the 
extractive industry tends to have (see WIR07).
•  Business and offshore financial services have 
prospered in a number of SIDS countries against 
the backdrop of strong incentives for non-
resident companies and individuals to establish 
headquarters and financial and trading operations 
in their jurisdictions. These include favourable 
tax regimes, efficient business registrations, 
secrecy rules and lax regulatory frameworks. 
Host countries see these services as a source 
of growth and economic diversification, with 
positive spillover effects on other activities, 
including tourism, hotels and restaurants, 
telecommunications and transport. However, they 
could bring some disadvantages, such as making 
small, open economies vulnerable to sharp 
changes in global financial flows and putting them 
under the scrutiny of the very countries affected 
by the activities facilitated by favourable tax 
regimes.105
•  Exports such as textiles, apparel, garment 
assembly and processed fish have been 
developed in some SIDS – for example, Cabo 
Verde, Fiji, Jamaica and Mauritius – under the 
cover of preference trade regimes. However, trade 
liberalization on a most-favoured-nation basis 
and the dismantling of textile and clothing quotas 
under the Agreement on Textiles and Clothing 
of the World Trade Organization have resulted 
in preference erosion that has been particularly 
acute among garment-exporting SIDS. 
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These sectors have been the primary target of FDI 
and will continue to offer the greatest development 
opportunities. These activities also constitute the 
main sources of the foreign exchange earnings 
that are necessary to finance the energy and 
food imports on which these island countries are 
often highly dependent. Although FDI represents 
an important additional source of investment 
capital in industries that are critical to growth and 
development, very little is known about FDI impacts 
on SIDS – in particular, how these impacts interact 
with their structural vulnerabilities.
The small size of SIDS countries means that 
development and the environment are closely 
interrelated and interdependent. There is usually 
great competition for land and water resources 
among tourism, agriculture and other land uses 
(such as mining, in resource-rich countries), and 
the overdevelopment of any of these sectors could 
be detrimental to the others. The environmental 
consequences of ill-conceived development can 
threaten not only the livelihood of people but 
also the islands themselves and the cultures they 
nurture. The challenge for SIDS is to ensure that 
FDI and its use for economic development do not 
cause any permanent harm to sustainable use of 
land, water and marine resources. 
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notes
1  Estimates for Africa’s middle class vary considerably among 
sources. The figure quoted is consistent with those of the African 
Development Bank (AfDB) and the Standard Chartered Bank 
regional head of research for Africa. It is based on a definition 
of middle class that includes people spending between $4 and 
$20 per day. This class of consumers represented in 2010 
more than 13 per cent of the continent’s population.
2  “The MPLA sticks to its course”, Africa Confidential, Vol. 55, 
No. 1, 10 January 2014.
3  The African Union recognizes eight RECs as the building 
blocks of an eventual African Economic Community: the Arab 
Maghreb Union (UMA), the Common Market for East and 
Southern Africa (COMESA), the Community of Sahel-Saharan 
States (CENSAD), the Economic Community of Central 
African States (ECCAS), the East African Community (EAC), 
the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), 
the Inter-Governmental Authority for Development (IGAD) and 
the Southern African Development Community (SADC). Other 
regional groups exist, but are not among these building blocks. 
Moreover, some of the RECs recognized by the African Union 
are not active. Thus, in this section, the analysis is limited to 
the major RECs: COMESA, SADC, ECOWAS, ECCAS, UMA 
and EAC. 
4  This involves the negotiation of seven main technical issues: 
(1) rules of origin; (2) non-tariff barriers; (3) standardization, 
metrology, conformity, assessment and accreditation (i.e. 
technical barriers to trade), and sanitary and phytosanitary 
measures; (4) customs cooperation, documentation, 
procedures and transit instruments; (5) trade remedies; (6) 
dispute settlement; and (7) tariff liberalization.
5  Intra-African trade has increased fourfold since 2000, though 
its share in global trade has remained constant over the last 
decade at 11–14 per cent.
6  Conclusive analysis of the impact of regional integration on FDI 
would require data on bilateral FDI flows and detailed sectoral 
data, which are not available for most African countries. There 
is also some degree of imprecision in FDI data for Africa 
related to the large scale of the informal economy. The analysis 
presented here relies on announced greenfield data.
7  For example, 60 per cent of Japanese companies in Africa cite 
transport and energy service gaps as their biggest problems, 
according to a survey by the Japan External Trade Organization.
8  Investment patterns as well as the establishment of special 
Chinese trade and investment zones in Africa lend some 
support to this hypothesis (Brautigam and Tang, 2011).
9  By the middle of the century, Africa’s working-age population will 
number 1.2 billion, from about 500 million today, meaning it will 
provide one in four of the world’s workers, compared with one 
in eight from China.
10  For instance, according to a policy document released in 
December 2013, overseas investment projects below $1 
billion are not subject to government approval.
11  “Sinopec will invest $20 billion in Africa in five years”, China 
News Service, 17 December 2013.
12  However, controversy and political turmoil related to the 
Cross-Strait Service Trade Agreement have cast doubt on the 
prospects for FDI in services. The agreement, signed in June 
2013, aimed to substantially liberalize trade in services between 
mainland China and Taiwan Province of China. Under the 
terms of the treaty, service industries such as banking, health 
care, tourism, film, telecommunications and publishing will be 
opened to bilateral investment. 
13  Data released by the Shanghai Municipality.
14  Board of Investment, Thailand (see: Michael Peel, “Thailand 
political turmoil imperils foreign and domestic investment”, 
Financial Times, 9 March 2014).
15  In the first three quarters of 2013, for example, 33 TNCs 
established headquarters in Shanghai, including 10 for the 
Asia Pacific region. In addition, some large storage and logistic 
projects are under construction in the zone. About 600 foreign 
affiliates have been established there.
16  Each of the three East Asian economies has its own economic 
arrangement and relationship with ASEAN, and all three are 
currently negotiating their agreement on a free trade area.
17  The East Asia Summit is an annual forum, initially held by 
leaders of the ASEAN+6 countries (ASEAN+3 and Australia, 
India and New Zealand). Membership has expanded to 
include the United States and the Russian Federation. The 
Summit has gradually moved towards a focus on economic 
cooperation and integration.
18  Asia as a whole accounted for 58 per cent of Singapore’s total 
outward FDI stock of $350 billion by the end of 2011, including 
ASEAN (which accounted for 22 percent of the total FDI stock 
of Singapore), China (18 per cent), Hong Kong (China) (9 per 
cent), Japan (4 per cent) and India (3 per cent). The largest 
recipients of Singaporean FDI within ASEAN are Malaysia (8 per 
cent), Indonesia (7 per cent) and Thailand (4 per cent). For many 
of these economies, Singapore ranks among the top investing 
countries. Detailed data on the breakdown of FDI stock of 
South-East Asian countries show that Singapore is among the 
leading investors for countries such as Malaysia and Thailand. 
19  In Viet Nam, for instance, a joint venture between China 
Southern Power Grid and a local firm is investing $2 billion in 
a power plant.
20  According to the latest policy change approved in April 2014, 
harbour management may be 49 per cent foreign owned.
21  China International Capital Corporation estimates.
22  See, for instance, Saurabh Mukherjea, “Removing inflation 
distortions will bring back FDI”, The Economic Times, 26 May 
2014.
23  See, for example, “Standard and Poor: Indian corporates 
divesting stake to improve cash flows”, Singapore: Commodity 
Online, 19 March 2014.
24  Saibal Dasgupta, “Plan for economic corridor linking India to 
China approved”, The Times of India, 20 December 2013.
25  In India, organized retailing refers to trading activities undertaken 
by licensed retailers, such as supermarkets and retail chains, 
while unorganized retailing refers to the traditional formats of 
low-cost retailing, such as local corner shops, convenience 
stores and pavement vendors. Currently supermarkets and 
similar organized retailing account for about 2–4 per cent of 
the whole retail market.
26  In 2013, GCC countries began disbursing a $5 billion grant 
agreed in 2011, and the United States provided a 100 per 
cent guarantee for a seven-year, $1.25 billion Eurobond 
with interest set at 2.503 per cent. The International Finance 
Corporation (IFC) announced that it was heading a consortium 
of lenders that would provide $221 million for construction 
of a 117-megawatt wind farm in Jordan’s southwest. The 
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) 
opened a permanent office in Amman and officially conferred 
“Recipient Nation” status on Jordan, which henceforth can 
benefit from more of EBRD’s regular products and services, 
including financing tools, soft loans and technical assistance 
(EBRD has already provided a $100 million soft loan to finance 
a power plant near the capital). The United States Agency for 
International Development (USAID) launched two initiatives: the 
Jordan Competitiveness Program, a $45 million scheme aimed 
at attracting $700 million in FDI and creating 40,000 jobs over 
the next five years, and an agreement to provide $235 million for 
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education development over five years. And the EU announced 
about $54 million in new assistance to help Jordan cope with 
the costs of hosting Syrian refugees (Oxford Business Group, 
“Jordan attracts flurry of foreign funds”, Economic Update, 19 
December 2013).
27  In 2012, GCC countries hosted 13 per cent of the world’s 
primary petrochemicals production. Their production capacity 
grew by 5.6 per cent to 127.8 million tonnes in 2012, in 
contrast to that of the global industry, which grew by a mere 
2.6 per cent. Among GCC countries, Saudi Arabia leads the 
industry with a production capacity of 86.4 million tonnes 
in 2012, or 68 per cent of total capacity in GCC countries. 
Forecasts are that the region’s petrochemicals capacity will 
reach 191.2 million tonnes by 2020, with Saudi Arabia leading 
the expansion and adding 40.6 million tonnes, and Qatar and 
the United Arab Emirates adding 10 million tonnes and 8.3 
million tonnes, respectively.
28  Cheap natural gas has fed the industry’s growth, but that 
advantage is slowly eroding as the opportunity cost of 
natural gas goes up. Despite huge reserves, natural gas is 
fast becoming a scarce commodity in the region owing to 
rising power consumption. The unrelenting drive towards 
industrialization and diversification in energy-intensive industries 
since the 2000s has placed significant demand pressure on gas 
production. Low regulated gas prices have resulted in physical 
shortages of gas in every GCC country except Qatar, as 
demand has outstripped local supply capacity. Consequently, 
the supply of ethane – a key by-product of natural gas used 
as a petrochemicals feedstock – is not expected to grow 
significantly, and most of the anticipated supply is already 
committed (Booz & Co., 2012).
29  The price of natural gas in the United States was about $3.75 
per million British thermal units at the end of 2012, down from 
more than $13 per million in 2008. United States ethane has 
fallen from about $0.90 a gallon in 2011 to about $0.30 a gallon 
at the end of 2012. (“Sabic looks to tap into US shale gas”, 
Financial Times, 28 November 2012.)
30  The United States produced nearly a third of the world’s 
petrochemicals products in the 1980s, but that market share 
had shrunk to 10 per cent by 2010. (“GCC Petrochemicals 
Sector Under Threat From US”, Gulf Business, 14 October 
2013.)
31  “Global shale revolution threatens Gulf petrochemicals 
expansion”, Financial Times, 13 May 2013, www.ft.com.
32  “Dow Chemical moving ahead with polyethylene investments”, 
Plastic News, 19 March 2014; “Global Economic Weakness 
Pares Saudi Petchem Profits”, MEES, 15 February 2013.
33  To acquire upstream assets in North America, China’s national 
oil companies have spent more than $34 billion since 2010, 
most of that on unconventional projects. The latest deal was 
the $15.1 billion acquisition by CNOOC of Nexen (Canada) 
in 2013, which gives CNOOC control over significant oil and 
shale gas operations in Canada. In the same vein, in 2010 
Reliance Industries Limited (India) acquired shale gas assets 
in the United States for $3.45 billion, while State-owned GAIL 
India Limited acquired a 20 per cent stake in the Eagle Ford 
shale acreage from Carrizo Oil & Gas Inc. (United States) for 
$64 million.
34  It is building a 454,000 tonne/year linear low-density 
polyethylene plant at its site in Alberta (Canada). (“NOVA 
weighs US Gulf, Canada ethylene to supply possible PE 
plant”, Icis.com, 7 May 2013, www.icis.com.)
35  The United States Energy Information authority is expected to 
publish new estimates that considerably downplay the country’s 
recoverable shale reserves. (“U.S. officials cut estimate of 
recoverable Monterey Shale oil by 96%”, Los Angeles Times, 
20 May 2014; “Write-down of two-thirds of US shale oil 
explodes fracking myth”, The Guardian, 22 May 2014.)
36  “Sabic eyes investing in US petrochemicals”, Financial Times, 
8 October 2013.
37  QP (70 per cent) and ExxonMobil (30 per cent) are partners 
in RasGas, an LNG-producing company in Qatar. In addition, 
ExxonMobil has a 7 per cent stake in QP’s Barzan gas project, 
which is set to come online in 2014.
38  Sectoral data for Brazil and Chile are from the Central Bank of 
Brazil and the Central Bank of Chile, respectively.
39  Intracompany loans in both Brazil and Chile registered 
negative values in 2013, indicating that loan repayments to 
parent companies by foreign affiliates were higher than loans 
from the former to the latter. Net intracompany loans reached 
-$18 billion in Brazil (compared with -$10 billion in 2012), and 
-$2 billion in Chile (compared with $8 billion in 2012). 
40  The United States Energy Information Administration 
estimated Argentina’s shale gas resources as the second 
largest in the world and its shale oil resources as the fourth 
largest (The Economist Intelligence Unit, “Industry Report, 
Energy, Argentina”, April 2014).
41  Under the agreement, Repsol will receive $5 billion in bonds. The 
dollar bond payment − which will mature between 2017 and 
2033 − guarantees a minimum market value of $4.67 billion. If 
the market value of the bonds does not amount to the minimum, 
the Argentine government must pay Repsol an additional 
$1 billion in bonds. The agreement also stipulates the termination 
of all judicial and arbitration proceedings and the reciprocal 
waiver of future claims. (Repsol, “Argentina and Repsol reach a 
compensation agreement over the expropriation of YPF”, press 
release, 25 February 2014, www.repsol.com).
42  Brazil accounts for 57 per cent of South America’s total 
manufactured exports, and Mexico accounts for 88 per cent of 
manufactured exports of Central America and the Caribbean 
(UNCTAD GlobalStat).
43  The difference in market size between Brazil and Mexico 
has increased considerably in recent years. Vehicle sales 
amounted to 1.7 million and 1.2 million units, respectively, 
in Brazil and Mexico in 2005, and 3.8 million and 1.1 million 
units in 2013. This translated to a more than doubling of 
vehicle sales per capita in Brazil from 9.2 to 18.8 units per 
1,000 inhabitants, and a decrease in Mexico from 10.6 to 
9 per 1,000 inhabitants (Organisation Internationale des 
Constructeurs d’Automobiles, www.oica.net for vehicle sales 
data, and UNCTAD Globstat for population data). 
44  Including cars, light commercial vehicles, buses, trucks and 
agricultural machinery.
45  Instituto Nacional de Estadística y Geografía (INEGI), 2013, 
“La industria automotriz en México”, Serie Estadísticas 
Sectoriales; Associação Nacional dos Fabricantes de Veículos 
Automotores (ANFAVEA), www.anfavea.com.br; UNCTAD 
GlobalStat.
46  Brazil and Argentina have been developing a common 
automotive policy since the creation of MERCOSUR. In 2002 
they subscribed to the “Agreement on Common Automotive 
Policy between the Argentine Republic and the Federative 
Republic of Brazil”, which establishes a bilateral regime of 
administered trade and was in force until 30 June 2014, 
before being extended in May 2014 for one year (“Brasil y 
Argentina prorrogarán su acuerdo automotriz por un año”, 
América Economía, 5 mayo 2014). 
47  UNCTAD GlobalStat.
48  On 1 November 2006, the Mexican government published 
the Decree for the Promotion of the Manufacturing, Maquila 
and Export Service Industry (the IMMEX Decree). This 
instrument integrates the programs for the Development and 
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Operation of the Maquila Export Industry and the Temporary 
Import Programs to Produce Export Goods. The companies 
supported by those programmes jointly represent 85 per cent 
of Mexico’s manufactured exports.
49  Mexico passed a tax reform law, which took effect on 1 January 
2014, that includes certain provisions that reduce benefits for 
IMMEX companies. However, in order to reduce the impact 
of these reforms on IMMEX companies, a presidential decree 
and resolutions issued in late 2013 enabled IMMEX companies 
to retain some benefits taken away in the general provisions. 
50  In general, despite the higher technology content of its 
manufactured exports than the Latin American average 
(19 per cent versus 12 per cent), Mexico lags behind countries 
like Brazil and Argentina in terms of research intensity (R&D as a 
share of GDP). This share was 0.5 per cent in 2013 compared 
with 1.3 per cent for Brazil and 0.6 per cent for Argentina. The 
country’s prospects for long-term growth based on innovation 
are perceived as limited, given its current resources, priorities 
and national aspirations. See “2014 global R&D funding 
forecast”, R&D Magazine, December 2013; and Economist 
Intelligent Unit, “Intellectual-Property Environment in Mexico”, 
2010.
51  For instance, anti-corrosion technologies related to the use of 
ethanol fuel have seen considerable development in research 
institutions in Brazil. In addition, national suppliers such as 
Arteb, Lupatech and Sabó have not only become more directly 
involved in co-design with assemblers’ affiliates in Brazil, but 
have even become involved in innovation projects led by 
assemblers’ headquarters or their European affiliates. Arteb 
and Lupatech provide innovation inputs directly from Brazil 
to General Motors. Sabó has worked with Volkswagen in 
Wolfsburg and through Sabó’s European subsidiary (Quadros, 
2009; Quadros et al., 2009).
52  Economist Intelligence Unit, Industry Report, Automotive, 
Brazil, January 2014. 
53  See Economist Intelligence Unit, Industry Report, Automotive, 
Brazil, January 2014; “Brazil’s growing taste for luxury”, 
Economist Intelligence Unit, 14 January 2014.
54  See Economist Intelligence Unit, Industry Report, Automotive, 
Mexico, April 2014.
55  The pipeline will transport natural gas from the giant Shah 
Deniz II development in Azerbaijan through Greece and 
Albania to Italy, from which it can be transported farther into 
Western and Central Europe.
56  The deal by Gazprom (Russian Federation) to take over one 
of Europe’s largest gas storage facilities is attracting fresh 
scrutiny in Germany. The State-owned enterprise is finalizing 
an asset swap with BASF, its long-term German partner, 
under which it will increase its stake in Wingas, a German gas 
storage and distribution business, from less than 50 per cent 
to 100 per cent. In return, BASF will obtain stakes in western 
Siberian gas fields. When the deal was announced in 2012, 
it raised little concern in Germany, where Gazprom has been 
the biggest foreign supplier of energy for decades and an 
increasingly important investor in domestic energy. But the 
recent crisis has prompted some to question the transaction.
57  Croatia is now counted as a developed country, as are all 
other EU member countries. 
58  “Companies flock to Europe to raise cash”, Financial Times, 
20 January 2014. The article reports data from Dealogic.
59  See, for example, “Microsoft favors Europe for record bond 
sale: corporate finance”, Bloomberg, 4 December 2013.
60  Widely cited but also disputed research by the Centre for 
Economic Policy Research estimates that if the most ambitious 
comprehensive agreement is reached, the deal would add 
€120 billion and €95 billion, respectively, to the GDP of the 
EU and the United States by 2027. The gains therefore would 
amount to about 0.5 per cent of projected GDP for 2027.
61  The exception is 2005, when there was a net divestment of 
United States FDI in Europe caused by the repatriation tax 
holiday introduced by the United States Government. 
62  “Cross-border mergers and acquisitions deals soared in 
2013”, Haaretz, 9 January 2014.
63  Moody’s Investors Service, “US non-financial corporates’ cash 
pile grows, led by technology”, announcement, 31 March 
2014.
64  The takeover was approved by the New Zealand Overseas 
Investment Office in February 2014.
65  If the plan is approved, ATMEA, the Paris-based joint venture 
between Mitsubishi Heavy Industries (Japan) and Areva 
(France), is to build reactors for the project worth $22 billion.
66  The power plant will be built by Daewoo Engineering and 
Construction (Republic of Korea).
67  The support is provided through the State-owned Japan Oil, 
Gas and Metals National Corporation.
68  In Chad, Glencore acquired partial stakes in exclusive exploration 
authorizations owned by Griffiths Energy International (Canada). 
In the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Glencore raised its 
stake in a copper mining company to 69 per cent by acquiring 
a 14.5 per cent stake from High Grade Minerals (Panama).
69  The number of projects in 2013 was 408, as compared with 
357 in 2012.
70  “Reykjavik plans to start $2 billion Ethiopian power project”, 
Bloomberg, 12 March 2014, www.bloomberg.com.
71  The largest was a $227 million project by the Mahindra 
Group in the automotive industry, followed by a $107 million 
telecommunication project by the Bharti Group and a $60 
million project in the transport industry by Hero Cycles.
72  Here, “infrastructure” refers to four sectors: energy and power, 
telecommunications, transportation, and water and sewerage.
73  Based on the project data registered in the Thomson ONE 
database.
74  The relevant project information for LDCs in the Thomson ONE 
database, however, is far from complete. For example, about 
40 per cent of registered projects do not report announced or 
estimated project costs.
75  The contributions by foreign sponsors could be greater 
because more than a quarter of foreign participating projects 
were registered without values. 
76  This project was reported with unspecified sponsors in the 
Thomson ONE database.
77  All three were registered as build-own-operate projects with 
no information on sponsors.
78  FDI inflows comprise capital provided by a foreign direct 
investor to an FDI enterprise (positive inflows) and capital 
received from an FDI enterprise by a foreign direct investor 
(negative inflows). Thus, external funding flows into LDCs 
under non-equity modes – without the involvement of direct 
investments – are beyond the scope of the FDI statistics.
79  For example, in large-scale projects, investors’ commitments 
are often divided in multiple phases, stretching into years or 
even decades. Delays in the execution of announced projects 
are also common, owing to changing political situations and 
to social or environmental concerns. These tendencies also 
apply to the value of announced greenfield FDI investments 
(table D), which are usually (but not always) much greater than 
annual FDI inflows in the corresponding years (figure B).
80  “Agreement to investigate development of DRC aluminium 
smelter using power from Inga 3 hydropower scheme”, 
23 October 2007, www.bhpbilliton.com.
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81  “Africa’s biggest electricity project, Inga 3 powers regional 
cooperation”, 11 October 2013, www.theafricareport.com.
82  “World Bank Group Supports DRC with Technical Assistance 
for Preparation of Inga 3 BC Hydropower Development”, 
20 March 2014, www.worldbank.org.
83  “US and Chinese work together on Inga 3?”, 22 January 2014, 
www.esi-africa.com.
84  “Myanmar-Thai Dawei project likely to begin construction in 
April”, 7 November 2012, www.4-traders.com.
85  “Italian-Thai ditched as Thailand, Myanmar seize Dawei 
development zone”, 21 November 2013, www.reuters.com; 
“Burma, Thailand push ahead with Dawei SEZ”, Bangkok 
Post, 31 December 2013.
86  To manage the Thilawa SEZ project, a Myanmar-Japan joint 
venture was established in October 2013. It comprises private 
and public entities from Myanmar (51 per cent), Japanese 
TNCs (about 40 per cent) and the Japan International 
Cooperation Agency (about 10 per cent).
87  “Mitsubishi to build massive power plant in Myanmar”,  
22 November 2013, http://asia.nikkei.com.
88  In this respect, UNCTAD’s plan of action for investment in 
LDCs recommends strengthening public-private infrastructure 
development efforts (UNCTAD 2011c).
89  In the OECD Creditor Reporting System, the corresponding 
sectors included here are “Energy” (excluding energy policy 
and administration management, and related education 
and training), “Transport & Storage” (excluding transport 
policy and administration management, and related 
education and training), “Telecommunications” and “Water 
Supply & Sanitation” (excluding water resources policy and 
administration management).
90  Non-concessional financing, provided mainly by multilateral 
development banks to developing economies, is not ODA 
and is reported as “other official flows” (OOF) in the OECD 
Creditor Reporting System. Because of the significance of 
such financing for supporting infrastructure development, 
OECD (2014) argues that ODF, which includes both ODA 
and OOF, better represents the reality of infrastructure finance 
from DAC members to developing economies. In the case of 
LDCs, however, the scale of OOF (cumulative total of $1.1 
billion in the selected four sectors) was insignificant, compared 
with that of ODA (cumulative total of $39.7 billion in the four 
sectors) for the period 2003–2012.
91  This represents 10 per cent of cumulative gross ODF 
disbursements to all sectors in LDCs for the period 2003–
2012.
92  The OECD (2014) estimates that gross ODF disbursements 
account for only 5–8 per cent of all infrastructure finance 
in developing economies and that the rest comes from the 
domestic public sector and citizens (55–75 per cent) and the 
private sector (20–30 per cent). The majority of ODF has gone to 
upper-middle-income countries rather than low-income ones. 
The low level of support for low-income countries reflects the 
difficulty of maximizing returns on investment, reflecting their 
weak enabling environment (OECD 2014, p. 6).
93  Estache (2010) estimated that the annual infrastructure 
investment needs (including both operating and capital 
expenditures for 2008–2015) in low-income countries were 
12.5 per cent of their GDP. Because no estimates were available 
for LDCs as a group, the suggested ratio of 12.5 per cent was 
applied to LDCs’ annual average GDP in 2003–2012 ($477 
billion) to derive the estimate of $59.6 billion. 
94  Calculations were based on annex tables C–D in WHO (2012) 
by extracting total financial capital costs estimated for LDCs. 
95  For example, the Government of Japan not only supports 
PPPs in infrastructure “at the heart of its development co-
operation” but also encourages domestic companies to take 
part in infrastructure projects in its aid recipient countries 
through the Japan International Cooperation Agency’s Private 
Sector Investment Finance (PSIF) component (OECD, 2014, 
p. 14).
96  Blending grants with loans, equity or guarantees from public or 
private financiers reduces the financial risk of projects. Through 
regional EU blending facilities (e.g. the EU-Africa Infrastructure 
Trust Fund), grants from the European Commission and EU 
member States are combined with long-term loans or equity 
provided by development financial institutions or private 
financiers (OECD, 2014). 
97  See, for example, United Nations, “Review of progress made 
in implementing the Buenos Aires Plan of Action, the new 
directions strategy for South-South cooperation and the 
Nairobi outcome document of the High-level United Nations 
Conference on South-South Cooperation, taking into account 
the complementary role of South-South cooperation in the 
implementation of relevant major United Nations conferences 
in the social, economic and related fields”, SSC/18/1, 31 
March 2014.
98  At the national level, this entails changes in fiscal policy and 
tax administration brought about by strengthening government 
capacity to manage revenues (UNCTAD 2013c).
99  The Law on Foreign Investment in Strategic Sectors (SEFIL) 
established comprehensive permitting requirements on FDI 
entry and operation by private and State-owned enterprises in 
a number of sectors, including mining, in May 2012.
100  Towards this end, UNCTAD will produce a comprehensive 
paper on investment in the LLDCs later in 2014. 
101  In Trinidad and Tobago, FDI to the services sector increased 
strongly in 2007–2011 as a consequence of one large 
acquisition undertaken in 2008 in the financial sector, namely 
the $2.2 billion purchase of RBTT Financial Group by the 
Royal Bank of Canada.
102  Other partners in the project are Australian Oil Search Limited, 
Santos, Merlin Petroleum, local landowners and the State-
owned Petromin.
103  Petroleum, chemical and metal products are among the 
most relevant downstream activities of the oil, gas and metal 
minerals industries. 
104  SIDS status confers no special trade preference. However, 
all SIDS qualify for at least one preference scheme. Although 
SIDS that fall within the LDC category benefit from LDC-
specific preferences, all other SIDS – a majority – are 
beneficiaries of preferences through special programmes 
such as the Caribbean Basin Initiative of the United States, 
Caribcan of Canada and SPARTECA of Australia and New 
Zealand. The EU grants special trade preferences to a 
large majority of SIDS by virtue of the Cotonou Partnership 
Agreement between African, Caribbean and Pacific countries 
on the one hand, and members of the EU on the other 
(UNCTAD, 2004).
105  See “Bankers on the Beach”, Finance and Development,  
vol. 48, no. 2, June 2011.
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A. NATIONAL INVESTMENT POLICIES
1. Overall trends
Most investment policy measures remain geared 
towards promotion and liberalization, but the share 
of regulatory or restrictive measures increased. 
In 2013, according to UNCTAD’s count, 59 
countries and economies adopted 87 policy 
measures affecting foreign investment. Of these 
measures, 61 related to liberalization, promotion 
and facilitation of investment, while 23 introduced 
new restrictions or regulations on investment (table 
III.1). The share of new regulations and restrictions 
increased slightly, from 25 per cent in 2012 to 27 
per cent in 2013 (figure III.1). Almost half of the 
policy measures applied across the board. Most 
of the industry-specific measures addressed the 
services sector (table III.2).
a. FDI liberalization and promotion
New FDI liberalization measures were mainly 
reported for countries in Asia. Several of them 
pertained to the telecommunications industry. For 
instance, India removed the cap on foreign direct 
investment in telecommunications.1 The Republic 
of Korea passed the amended Telecommunications 
Business Act, which allows foreign investors covered 
by a free trade agreement (FTA) with the Republic 
of Korea to acquire up to 100 per cent of Korea’s 
facility-based telecommunications businesses with 
the exception of SK and KT Telecom.2 Mexico 
increased the threshold for foreign investment in 
telecommunications to 100 per cent in all areas 
except radio and television broadcasting, where the 
limit is 49 per cent under certain conditions.3
In addition to liberalizing telecommunications 
investment, India raised the FDI cap in the defence 
sector beyond 26 per cent upon approval by 
the Cabinet Committee on Security and under 
specific conditions. In other sectors, including 
petroleum and natural gas, courier services, 
single-brand retail, commodity exchanges, credit 
information companies, infrastructure companies 
in the securities market and power exchanges, 
government approval requirements have been 
relaxed.4 Indonesia amended the list of business 
fields open to foreign investors and increased the 
foreign investment ceiling in several industries, 
including pharmaceuticals, venture capital 
operations in financial services and power plant 
projects in energy generation.5 The Philippines 
Table III.1. Changes in national investment policies, 2000−2013
(Number of measures)
Item 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Number of countries that 
introduced changes
46 52 44 60 80 78 71 50 41 47 55 49 54 59
Number of regulatory changes 81 97 94 125 164 144 126 79 68 88 121 80 86 87
Liberalization/promotion 75 85 79 113 142 118 104 58 51 61 80 59 61 61
Restriction/regulation 5 2 12 12 20 25 22 19 15 23 37 20 20 23
Neutral/indeterminatea 1 10 3 - 2 1 - 2 2 4 4 1 5 3
Source: UNCTAD, Investment Policy Monitor database.
a  In some cases, the expected impact of the policy measure on the investment is undetermined.
Figure III.1. Changes in national investment policies,
2000−2013
(Per cent)
Source: UNCTAD, Investment Policy Monitor.
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amended its Rural Bank Act to allow foreign 
individuals or entities to hold equity of up to 60 per 
cent in rural banks.6
Among the FDI promotion measures, the National 
Assembly of Cuba approved a new law on foreign 
investment which offers guarantees to investors 
and fiscal incentives.7 The country also set up a new 
special economic zone (SEZ) for foreign investors 
in Mariel.8 The Republic of Korea has introduced 
a new system lowering the minimum required area 
to designate an investment zone.9 In Pakistan, the 
Commerce Ministry finalized an agreement with the 
National Insurance Company for comprehensive 
insurance coverage of foreign investors.10
b.  Investment liberalization and 
promotion for domestic and 
foreign investors
General investment liberalization policies in 2013 
were characterized mainly by new privatizations. 
Full or partial privatizations benefiting both domestic 
and foreign investors took place in at least 10 
countries. For instance, in Peru, the Congress 
approved the privatization of up to 49 per cent 
of the State energy firm Petroperú – the first time 
that investment of private capital in Petroperú has 
been authorized.11 In Serbia, Etihad Airways (United 
Arab Emirates) acquired a 49 per cent stake in 
JAT Airways, the Serbian national flag carrier (see 
also chapter II.A.4).12 In Slovenia, the Parliament 
gave its support to the Government’s plan to 
sell 15 State-owned firms, including the largest 
telecommunications operator, Telekom Slovenia.13 
Another important liberalization relates to recent 
energy reforms in Mexico. In December 2013, the 
Mexican Congress approved modifications to the 
Constitution, including the lifting of a restriction on 
private capital in the oil industry (see also chapter 
II.A.3). The reforms allow the Government to issue 
licenses and enter into contracts for production 
sharing, profit sharing and services.14
Investment incentives and facilitation measures 
applying to investors irrespective of their nationality 
were enacted most commonly in Africa and in 
Asia. Promotion measures, which mainly focused 
on fiscal incentive schemes, included a number 
of sector-specific programs. Some policies were 
adopted in early 2014. For instance, the Dominican 
Republic extended tax benefits for investors in its 
tourism development law.15 Malaysia announced its 
National Automotive Policy 2014, which grants 
fiscal incentives with the objective to promote a 
competitive and sustainable domestic automotive 
industry.16
Facilitation measures concentrated on simplifying 
business registration. For instance, Mongolia 
passed a new Investment Law that reduces 
approval requirements, streamlines the registration 
process and provides certain legal guarantees and 
incentives.17 Mozambique passed a decree that 
will facilitate the establishment of new companies 
through a single business registration form.18 Dubai, 
in the United Arab Emirates, introduced a series of 
reforms making it easier to set up hotels.19
A number of countries introduced SEZs or revised 
policies related to existing SEZs. For instance, 
China launched the China (Shanghai) Pilot Free 
Trade Zone, introducing various new policy 
measures on trade, investment and finance (see 
also chapter II.A.2.a). With regard to inward FDI, 
Table III.2. Changes in national investment policies, by industry, 2013
(Per cent and number of measures)
Sector/industry
Liberalization/promotion 
(%)
Restriction/regulation 
(%)
Neutral/indeterminate 
(%)
Total number of 
measures
Total 72 25 3 93
Cross-industry 80 17 2 41
Agribusiness 80 20 - 5
Extractive industries 60 30 10 10
Manufacturing 75 25 - 4
Services 64 33 3 33
Source: UNCTAD, Investment Policy Monitor database.
Note:  Overall totals differ from table III.1 because some of the measures can be classified under more than one type. 
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this free trade zone adopts a new approach, 
providing for establishment rights, subject to 
exceptions. Specific segments in six service 
sectors – finance, transport, commerce and trade, 
professional services, cultural services and public 
services – were opened to foreign investors.20 The 
Government of South Sudan officially launched 
the Juba SEZ, an industrial area for business and 
investment activities.21
c.  New FDI restrictions and 
regulations
Newly introduced FDI restrictions and related 
policies included revision of entry regulations, 
rejection of investment projects after review and 
a nationalization. At least 13 countries introduced 
new restrictions specifically for foreign investors in 
2013. 
Among the revisions of entry regulations, Indonesia 
lowered the foreign ownership ceiling in several 
industries, including onshore oil production and 
data communications system services.22 Sri Lanka 
restricted foreigners from owning land but still 
allows long-term leases of land.23 Canada changed 
the Investment Canada Act to make it possible for 
the Minister of Industry to decide – in the context 
of “net benefit” reviews under the act – that an 
entity is controlled by one or more foreign State-
owned enterprises even though it would qualify as 
Canadian-controlled under the criteria established 
by the act.24 The Government of France issued 
a decree reinforcing its control mechanisms for 
foreign investments in the interests of public order, 
public security or national defence. The measure 
covers the following strategic sectors: energy, water, 
transportation, telecommunications, defence and 
health care.25 The Government of India amended 
the definition of the term “control” for the purpose 
of calculating the total foreign investment in Indian 
companies.26 Recently, the Russian Federation 
added three types of transport-related activities 
to its law on procedures for foreign investment in 
business entities of strategic importance for national 
defence and state security.27 
Some governments blocked a number of foreign 
takeovers. For instance, under the national 
security provisions of the Investment Canada 
Act, Canada rejected the proposed acquisition 
of the Allstream division of Manitoba Telecom 
Services by Accelero Capital Holdings (Egypt).28 
The Commission on Foreign Investment of the 
Russian Federation turned down the request by 
Abbott Laboratories (United States) to buy Russian 
vaccine maker Petrovax Pharm, citing protection 
of the country’s national security interests, among 
other considerations.29 In addition, the European 
Commission prohibited the proposed acquisition 
of TNT Express (the Netherlands) by UPS (United 
States). The Commission found that the takeover 
would have restricted competition in member 
States in the express delivery of small packages.30
The Plurinational State of Bolivia nationalized the 
Bolivian Airport Services (SABSA), a subsidiary 
of Abertis y Aena (Spain) for reasons of public 
interest.31
d.  New regulations or restrictions 
for domestic and foreign 
investors 
Some countries introduced restrictive or regulatory 
policies affecting both domestic and foreign 
investors. For instance, the Plurinational State 
of Bolivia introduced a new bank law that allows 
control by the State over the setting of interest 
rates by commercial banks. It also authorizes the 
Government to set quotas for lending to specific 
sectors or activities.32 Ecuador issued rules for 
the return of radio and television frequencies in 
accordance with its media law, requiring that 66 
per cent of radio frequencies be in the hands of 
private and public media (33 per cent each), with 
the remaining 34 per cent going to “community” 
media.33 The Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela 
adopted a decree regulating the automotive sector 
regarding the production and sale of automobiles.34
e.  Divestment prevention and 
reshoring promotion35
An interesting recent phenomenon entails 
government efforts to prevent divestments by foreign 
investors. In light of economic crises and persistently 
high domestic unemployment, some countries 
have introduced new approval requirements for 
dislocations and layoffs. In addition, some home 
countries have started to promote reshoring of 
overseas investment by their TNCs.
CHAPTER III  Recent Policy Developments and Key Issues 109
•	 	In France the Parliament passed a bill imposing 
penalties on companies that shut down opera-
tions that are deemed economically viable. The 
law requires firms with more than 1,000 em-
ployees to prove that they have exhausted op-
tions for selling a plant before closing it.36
•	 	Greece passed a law that makes it more dif-
ficult for companies listed on the Greek stock 
exchange to relocate their head offices abroad. 
The Greek capital markets law now requires 
approval of relocation by 90 per cent of share-
holders, rather than the prior threshold of 67 
per cent.37
•	 	The Republic of Korea passed the Act on Sup-
porting the Return of Overseas Korean Enter-
prises. Accordingly, the Government founded 
the Reshoring Support Centre and is planning 
to provide reshoring businesses with incentives 
that are similar to those provided to foreign-in-
vested companies.38
•	  Since 2011, the Government of the United States 
has been operating the “Select USA” program, 
which, inter alia, has the objective of attracting 
and retaining investment in the United States 
economy.39
2. Recent trends in investment incentives
Incentives are widely used for attracting investment. 
Linking them to sustainable development goals 
and monitoring their impact could improve their 
effectiveness. 
Policymakers use incentives to stimulate investments 
in specific industries, activities or disadvantaged 
regions. However, such schemes have been 
criticized for being economically inefficient and 
leading to misallocations of public funds.
a.  Investment incentives: types 
and objectives
Although there is no uniform definition of what 
constitutes an investment incentive, such incentives 
can be described as non-market benefits that 
are used to influence the behaviour of investors. 
Incentives can be offered by national, regional 
and local governments, and they come in many 
forms. These forms can be classified in three main 
categories on the basis of the types of benefits that 
are offered: financial benefits, fiscal benefits and 
regulatory benefits (see table III.3).
From January 2014 to April 2014, UNCTAD 
conducted a global survey of investment promotion 
agencies (IPAs) on their prospects for FDI and for 
the promotion of sustainable development through 
investment incentives for foreign investors.40 
According to the survey results, fiscal incentives 
are the most important type for attracting and 
benefiting from foreign investment (figure III.2).41 
This is particularly true in developing and transition 
economies. Financial and regulatory incentives are 
considered less important policy tools for attracting 
and benefiting from FDI. In addition to investment 
incentives, IPAs consider investment facilitation 
measures as particularly important for attracting 
investment.
Investment incentives can be used to attract or 
retain FDI in a particular host country (locational 
incentives). In such cases, they can be perceived 
as compensation for information asymmetries 
between the investor and the host government, as 
well as for deficiencies in the investment climate, 
such as weak infrastructure, underdeveloped 
human resources and administrative constraints. In 
this context, investment incentives can become a 
key policy instrument in the competition between 
countries and within countries to attract foreign 
investment.
Investment incentives can also be used as a tool to 
advance public policy objectives such as economic 
Figure III.2. Importance of investment incentives 
in the country’s overall strategy to attract 
and benefit from FDI
(Per cent)
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Regulatory incentives
Financial incentives
Fiscal incentives
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Source: UNCTAD survey of IPAs (2014).
Note: Regulatory incentives only refer to the lowering of 
standards.
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Table III.3. Investment incentives by type and mechanism
Financial incentives
Investment grants
“Direct subsidies” to cover (part of) capital, production or marketing costs in relation to an 
investment project
Subsidized credits and credit 
guarantees
Subsidized loans 
Loan guarantees 
Guaranteed export credits
Government insurance at preferential 
rates, publicly funded venture capital 
participating in investments involving 
high commercial risks
Government insurance at preferential rates, usually available to cover certain types of risks 
(such as exchange rate volatility, currency devaluation and non-commercial risks such as 
expropriation and political turmoil), often provided through an international agency
Fiscal incentives
Profit-based Reduction of the standard corporate income tax rate or profit tax rate, tax holiday
Capital-investment-based Accelerated depreciation, investment and reinvestment allowances
Labour-based
Reduction in social security contribution 
Deductions from taxable earnings based on the number of employees or other labour-
related expenditures
Sales-based Corporate income tax reductions based on total sales
Import-based
Duty exemptions on capital goods, equipment or raw materials, parts and inputs related to 
the production process 
Tax credits for duties paid on imported materials or supplies
Export-based
Export tax exemptions, duty drawbacks and preferential tax treatment of income from 
exports  
Income tax reduction for special foreign-exchange-earning activities or for manufactured 
exports 
Tax credits on domestic sales in return for export performance, income tax credits on net 
local content of exports 
Deduction of overseas expenditures and capital allowance for export industries
Based on other particular expenses
Corporate income tax deduction based on, for example, expenditures relating to marketing 
and promotional activities
Value added based
Corporate income tax reductions or credits based on the net local content of outputs 
Income tax credits based on net value earned
Reduction of taxes for expatriates
Tax relief to help reduce personal tax liability and reduce income tax and social security 
contribution
Other incentives (including regulatory incentives)
Regulatory incentives
Lowering of environmental, health, safety or labour standards 
Temporary or permanent exemption from compliance with applicable standards 
Stabilization clauses guaranteeing that existing regulations will not be amended to the 
detriment of investors
Subsidized services (in kind) 
Subsidized dedicated infrastructure: electricity, water, telecommunication, transportation or 
designated infrastructure at less than commercial price  
Subsidized services, including assistance in identifying sources of finance, implementing 
and managing projects and carrying out pre-investment studies; information on markets, 
availability of raw materials and supply of infrastructure; advice on production processes 
and marketing techniques; assistance with training and retraining; and technical facilities for 
developing know-how or improving quality control
Market privileges
Preferential government contracts 
Closing the market to further entry or the granting of monopoly rights 
Protection from import competition
Foreign exchange privileges
Special exchange rates 
Special foreign debt-to-equity conversion rates 
Elimination of exchange risks on foreign loans 
Concessions of foreign exchange credits for export earnings 
Special concessions on repatriation of earnings and capital
Source:  Based on UNCTAD (2004).
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growth through foreign investment or to make 
foreign affiliates in a country undertake activities 
regarded as desirable (behavioural incentives). For 
this purpose, incentives may focus on support for 
economic growth indicators, such as job creation, 
skill transfer, research and development (R&D), 
export generation and establishment of linkages 
with local firms. 
For most countries, job creation is the most 
important objective of investment incentives. About 
85 per cent of IPAs indicated that job creation 
ranks among their top five objectives (figure III.3), 
with almost 75 per cent ranking it their primary or 
secondary objective. In importance, job creation is 
followed by technology transfer, export promotion, 
local linkages and domestic value added, and skills 
development. Just over 40 per cent of respondents 
indicated that locational decisions and international 
competition rank among the top five objectives of 
their incentive policies. Interestingly, this is the case 
for more than half of IPAs from developed countries 
but less than one third of those from developing 
or transition economies. An explanation might 
be that other objectives, such as technological 
development, exports and skill development, are 
already relatively advanced in most developed 
countries. Finally, two potential objectives – 
environmental protection and promotion, and local 
development – do not rank as highly, confirming 
that there is considerable room for improvement 
when it comes to connecting incentive strategies 
with sustainable development goals such as those 
being discussed for the United Nations post-2015 
development agenda (see chapter IV for further 
details).
Investment incentives are usually conditioned on 
the fulfilment by the investor of certain performance 
requirements. The IPA survey shows that such 
requirements primarily relate to job creation and to 
technology and skill transfer, followed by minimum 
investment and locational and export requirements 
(figure III.4). Environmental protection, along with 
some other policy objectives, does not rank among 
the key concerns. 
Investment incentives may target specific industries. 
According to IPAs, the most important target 
industry for investment incentives is the IT and 
business services industry. Over 40 per cent of the 
respondents indicate that this industry is among 
their top five target industries (figure III.5). Other 
key target industries include agriculture and hotels 
and restaurants. Even though renewable energy is 
among the top target industries, still less than one 
third of promotion agencies rank it among the top 
five industries.
The use of FDI-specific investment incentives 
differs from country to country. About 40 per cent 
Figure III.3. Most important objectives of investment incentives for foreign investors
(Per cent)
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Source: UNCTAD survey of IPAs (2014).
Note: Based on number of times mentioned as one of the top five objectives.
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of IPAs indicated that incentives frequently target 
foreign investors specifically, while a quarter of the 
agencies say this is never the case. More than two 
thirds of IPAs indicated that incentive programmes 
frequently fulfil their purpose, while 11 per cent 
indicated that they always do so.
b.  Developments related to 
investment incentives
For the most part, investment incentives have 
escaped systematic monitoring. Therefore, data 
on trends in the use of investment incentives 
and changes in policy objectives – including the 
promotion of sustainable development – are scarce. 
Figure III.4. Most important performance requirements linked to investment incentives for foreign investors
(Per cent)
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Source: UNCTAD survey of IPAs (2014).
Note: Based on number of times mentioned as one of the top five performance requirements.
Figure III.5. Top 10 target industries of investment incentive policies
(Per cent)
Source: UNCTAD survey of IPAs (2014).
Note: Based on number of times mentioned as one of the top five target industries.
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the Russian Federation exempted education and 
health-care services from the corporate profit tax 
under certain conditions.45
A number of countries introduced measures 
to promote local development. For instance in 
2012, Algeria implemented an incentives regime 
that is applicable to the wilayas (provinces) of the 
South and the Highlands.46 China has provided 
preferential taxation rates on imports of equipment, 
technologies and materials by foreigners investing 
in the central and western areas of the country.47 
Japan recently designated six SEZs in an attempt 
to boost local economies. These zones are located 
around the country and focus on different industries, 
including agriculture, tourism and R&D.48 
Among regions, over the last decade Asia has 
introduced the most policy changes related to 
investment incentives, followed by Africa (figure 
III.7). China and the Republic of Korea took the lead 
in Asia, while Angola, Egypt, Libya and South Africa 
were the front-runners in Africa. Most of these 
incentives (75 per cent) do not target any industry 
in particular; of the industry-specific incentives, 
most target the services industries, followed by 
manufacturing.
c. Policy recommendations
Despite the fact that investment incentives have 
not been a major determinant of FDI and that 
their cost-effectiveness can be questioned, recent 
UNCTAD data show that policymakers continue to 
use incentives as an important policy instrument 
for attracting FDI. Linking investment incentives 
schemes to sustainable development goals could 
make them a more effective policy tool to remedy 
market failures and could offer a response to 
the criticism raised against the way investment 
incentives have traditionally been used (see also 
chapter IV).
Governments should also follow a number of 
good practices: (i) The rationale for investment 
incentives should derive explicitly from the country’s 
development strategy, and their effectiveness should 
be fully assessed before adoption. (ii) Incentives 
for specific industries should aim to ensure self-
sustained viability so as to avoid subsidizing non-
viable industries at the expense of the economy 
Data from UNCTAD’s Investment Policy Monitor 
suggest that investment incentives constitute a 
significant share of newly adopted investment policy 
measures that seek to create a more attractive 
investment climate for investors. Between 2004 and 
2013, this share fluctuated between 26 per cent and 
55 per cent, with their overall importance increasing 
during the period (figure III.6). In 2013, over half of 
new liberalization and promotion measures related 
to the provision of incentives to investors. More 
than half of these incentive measures are fiscal 
incentives.
Although sustainable development is not among 
the most prominent objectives of incentive policies, 
some recent measures cover areas such as health 
care, education, R&D and local development. 
For instance, in Angola, the Patrons Law of 2012 
defines the tax and other incentives available to 
corporations that provide funding and support to 
projects related to social initiatives, education, 
culture, sports, science, health and information 
technology.42 In 2010, Bulgaria adopted legislation 
that grants reimbursement of up to 50 per cent 
for spending on educational and R&D activities, 
and provides a subsidy of up to 10 per cent for 
investments in processing industries.43 In 2011, 
Poland adopted the “Programme to support 
investments of high importance to the Polish 
economy for 2011–2020”, with the aim of increasing 
innovation and the competitiveness of the economy 
by promoting FDI in high-tech sectors.44 In 2011, 
Figure III.6. Investment incentives as a share of total
number of liberalization, promotion and facilitation
 measures, 2004–2013
(Number of measures and per cent)
Source: UNCTAD, Investment Policy Monitor.
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as a whole. (iii) All incentives should be granted on 
the basis of pre-determined, objective, clear and 
transparent criteria, offered on a non-discriminatory 
basis and carefully assessed in terms of long-
term costs and benefits prior to implementation. 
(iv) The costs and benefits of incentives should 
be periodically reviewed and their effectiveness 
in achieving the desired objectives thoroughly 
evaluated and monitored.49
1.  Trends in the conclusion of international 
investment agreements
a. The IIA universe continues to grow
The past years brought an increasing dichotomy 
in investment treaty making: disengaging and “up-
scaling.” 
The year 2013 saw the conclusion of 44 inter-
national investment agree ments (IIAs) (30 bilateral 
investment treaties, or BITs, and 14 “other IIAs”50), 
bringing the total number of agreements to 3,236 
(2,902 BITs and 334 “other IIAs”) by year-end51 
(figure III.8). Countries that were particularly active 
in concluding BITs in 2013 include Kuwait (7); 
Turkey and the United Arab Emirates (4 each); 
and Japan, Mauritius and the United Republic of 
Tanzania (3 each). (See annex table III.7 for a list 
of each country’s total number of BITs and “other 
IIAs”.)
In 2013, several BITs were terminated.52 South 
Africa, for example, gave notice of the termination of 
its BITs with Germany, the Netherlands, Spain and 
Switzerland in 2013;53 and Indonesia gave notice 
of the termination of its BIT with the Netherlands 
in 2014. Once taking effect, the terminated BITs 
that were not replaced by new ones will reduce 
the total number of BITs, albeit only marginally 
(by 43, or less than 2 per cent). By virtue of 
“survival clauses”, however, investments made 
before the termination of these BITs will remain 
protected for periods ranging from 10 to 20 
years, depending on the relevant provisions of the 
terminated BITs.54 
“Other IIAs” concluded in 2013 can be grouped into 
three broad categories, as identified in WIR12: 
B. INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENT POLICIES
Figure III.7. Share of policy changes relating to investment incentives, 
by region and industry, 2004–2013
(Per cent)
Source: UNCTAD, Investment Policy Monitor. 
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Figure III.8. Trends in IIAs signed, 1983–2013
Source:  UNCTAD, IIA database.  
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•		Seven agreements with BIT-equivalent provisions. 
The Canada–Honduras Free Trade Agreement 
(FTA); the China–Iceland FTA; Colombia’s FTAs 
with Costa Rica, Israel, the Republic of Korea, 
and Panama; and New Zealand’s FTA with Taiwan 
Province of China all fall in the category of IIAs 
that contain obligations commonly found in BITs, 
including substantive standards of investment 
protection and investor–State dispute settlement 
(ISDS). 
•		Two agreements with limited investment 
provisions. The China–Switzerland FTA and the 
EFTA–Costa Rica–Panama FTA fall in the category 
of agreements that provide limited investment-
related provisions (e.g. national treatment with 
respect to commercial presence or free movement 
of capital relating to direct investments). 
•		Five agreements with investment cooperation 
provisions and/or a future negotiating mandate. 
The Chile–Thailand FTA and the EFTA–Bosnia 
and Herzegovina FTA, as well as the trade and 
investment framework agreements signed by the 
United States with the Caribbean Community 
(CARICOM), Myanmar and Libya, contain general 
provisions on cooperation in investment matters 
and/or a mandate for future negotiations on 
investment. 
An important development occurred in early 2014, 
when Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru, the four 
countries that formed the Pacific Alliance in 2011, 
signed a comprehensive protocol that includes 
a chapter on investment protection with BITs-like 
substantive and procedural investment protection 
standards.
In addition, at least 40 countries and 4 regional 
integration organizations are currently or have 
been recently revising their model IIAs. In terms of 
ongoing negotiations of “other IIAs”, the European 
Union (EU) is engaged in negotiating more than 20 
agreements that are expected to include investment-
related provisions (which may vary in their scope 
and depth).55 Canada is engaged in negotiating 12 
FTAs; the Republic of Korea is negotiating 10; Japan 
and Singapore are negotiating 9 agreements each; 
and Australia and the United States are negotiating 
8 each (figure III.9). Some of these agreements are 
megaregional ones (see below). 
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The agreements concluded in past years and 
those currently under negotiation are contributing 
to an “up-scaling” of the global investment 
policy landscape. This effect can be seen in the 
participation rate (i.e. the large number of countries 
that have concluded or are negotiating treaties), the 
process (which exhibits an increasing dynamism) 
and the substance of agreements (the expansion 
of existing elements and inclusion of new ones). All 
of this contributes to a growing dichotomy in the 
directions of investment policies over the last few 
years, which has manifested itself in simultaneous 
moves by countries to expand the global IIA regime 
and to disengage from it. 
In a general sense, the more countries engage in 
IIA negotiations, including megaregional ones, the 
more they create a spirit of action and engagement 
also for those countries that are not taking part. 
However, the successful creation of the numerous 
“other IIAs”, BITs and megaregional agreements 
under negotiation is far from certain. A stagnation or 
breakdown of one or several of these negotiations 
could cause the climate for international investment 
policymaking to deteriorate and effectively hinder 
the momentum and spirit of action at the bilateral, 
regional and multilateral levels. 
b.  Sustainable development 
elements increasingly feature 
in new IIAs 
New IIAs illustrate the growing tendency to 
craft treaties that are in line with sustainable 
development objectives. 
A review of the 18 IIAs concluded in 2013 for 
which texts are available (11 BITs and 7 FTAs 
with substantive investment provisions), shows 
that most of the treaties include sustainable-
development-oriented features, such as those 
identified in UNCTAD’s Investment Policy 
Framework for Sustainable Development (IPFSD) 
and in WIR12 and WIR13.56 Of these agreements, 
15 have general exceptions – for example, for 
the protection of human, animal or plant life or 
health, or the conservation of exhaustible natural 
resources57 – and 13 refer in their preambles to the 
protection of health and safety, labour rights, the 
environment or sustainable development. Twelve 
treaties under review contain a clause that explicitly 
Figure III.9. Most active negotiators of “other IIAs”: treaties under negotiation and partners involved
(Number)
Source: UNCTAD, IIA database. 
Note:  The selection of countries represented in this chart is based on those that are the “most active” negotiators of “other 
IIAs”. It has to be noted that the scope and depth of investment provisions under discussion varies considerably across 
negotiations.
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Table III.4. Selected aspects of IIAs signed in 2013
  Policy Objectives
Select aspects of IIAs 
commonly found in IIAs, in 
order of appearance
Sustainable-developm
ent-
enhancing features
Focus on investm
ents 
conducive to developm
ent
Preserve the right to regulate 
in the public interest
Avoid overexposure to 
litigation
Stim
ulate responsible 
business practices
Serbia-United Arab Em
irates 
BIT
Russian Federation-
Uzbekistan BIT 
New
 Zealand-Taiw
an Province 
of China FTA
M
orocco-Serbia BIT
Japan-Saudi Arabia BIT
Japan-M
yanm
ar BIT
Japan-M
ozam
bique BIT 
EFTA-Costa Rica-Panam
a FTA
Colom
bia-Singapore BIT
Colom
bia-Republic of Korea 
FTA
Colom
bia-Panam
a FTA
Colom
bia-Israel FTA 
Colom
bia-Costa Rica FTA 
Canada-United Republic of 
Tanzania BIT 
Canada-Honduras FTA
Benin-Canada BIT
Belarus-Lao People’s 
Dem
ocratic Republic BIT
Austria-Nigeria BIT
References to the protection 
of health and safety, labour 
rights, environment or 
sustainable development in 
the treaty preamble
X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
Refined definition of 
investment (exclusion 
of portfolio investment, 
sovereign debt obligations 
or claims of money arising 
solely from commercial 
contracts) 
X X X X X X X X X X X X X
A carve-out for prudential 
measures in the financial 
services sector
X X X X X X X X X X X X X
Fair and equitable standard 
equated to the minimum 
standard of treatment of 
aliens under customary 
international law
X X X X X X X X X X
Clarification of what does 
and does not constitute an 
indirect expropriation
X X X X X X X X X X X X
Detailed exceptions from 
the free-transfer-of-funds 
obligation, including 
balance-of-payments 
difficulties and/or 
enforcement of national 
laws 
X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
Omission of the so-called 
“umbrella” clause X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
General exceptions, e.g. for 
the protection of human, 
animal or plant life or 
health; or the conservation 
of exhaustible natural 
resources
X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
Explicit recognition 
that parties should not 
relax health, safety or 
environmental standards to 
attract investment
X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
Promotion of corporate 
and social responsibility 
standards by incorporating 
a separate provision into the 
IIA or as a general reference 
in the treaty preamble
X X X X X X
Limiting access to ISDS 
(e.g., limiting treaty 
provisions subject to ISDS, 
excluding policy areas from 
ISDS, limiting time period 
to submit claims, no ISDS 
mechanism) 
X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X X
Source:  UNCTAD. 
Note:  This table is based on IIAs concluded in 2013 for which the text was available. It does not include “framework agreements”, 
which do not include substantive investment provisions.
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recognizes that parties should not relax health, 
safety or environmental standards in order to attract 
investment. 
These sustainable development features are sup-
plemented by treaty elements that aim more broadly 
at preserving regulatory space for public policies 
of host countries and/or at minimizing exposure 
to investment arbitration. Provisions found with 
differing frequency in the 18 IIAs include clauses 
that  (i) limit treaty scope (for example, by excluding 
certain types of assets from the definition of 
investment); (ii) clarify obligations (by crafting detailed 
clauses on fair and equitable treatment (FET) and/
or indirect expropriation); (iii) set forth exceptions 
to the transfer-of-funds obligation or carve-outs 
for prudential measures; (iv) carefully regulate ISDS 
(for example, by limiting treaty provisions that are 
subject to ISDS, excluding certain policy areas 
from ISDS, setting out a special mechanism for 
taxation and prudential measures, and restricting 
the allotted time period within which claims can be 
submitted); or (v) omit the so-called umbrella clause 
(table III.4).
In addition to these two types of clauses 
(i.e. those strengthening the agreement’s 
sustainable development dimension and those 
preserving policy space), a large number of the 
treaties concluded in 2013 also add elements that 
expand treaty standards. Such expansion can 
take the form of adding a liberalization dimension 
to the treaty and/or strengthening investment 
protections (e.g. by enlarging the scope of the 
treaty or prohibiting certain types of government 
conduct previously unregulated in investment 
treaties). Provisions on pre-establishment and rules 
that prohibit additional performance requirements 
or that require the publication of draft laws and 
regulations are examples (included in, e.g., the 
Benin–Canada BIT, the Canada–Tanzania FTA, the 
Japan–Mozambique BIT and the New Zealand–
Taiwan Province of China FTA).
The ultimate protective and liberalizing strength of 
an agreement, as well as its impact on policy space 
and sustainable development, depends on the 
overall combination (i.e. the blend) of its provisions 
(IPFSD). Reconciling the two broad objectives – the 
pursuit of high standard investment protection and 
liberalization on the one hand and the preservation 
of the right to regulate in the public interest on the 
other – is the most important challenge facing IIA 
negotiators and investment policymakers today. 
Different combinations of treaty clauses represent 
each country’s attempt to identify the “best fit” 
combination of treaty elements. 
2.  Megaregional agreements: emerging 
issues and systemic implications 
Megaregional agreements are broad economic 
agreements among a group of countries that 
together have significant economic weight and in 
which investment is only one of several subjects 
addressed.58 The last two years have seen an 
expansion of negotiations for such agreements. 
Work on the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), 
the EU–United States Transatlantic Trade and 
Investment Partnership (TTIP) and the Canada–EU 
Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement 
(CETA) are cases in point. Once concluded, 
these are likely to have a major impact on global 
investment rule making and global investment 
patterns. 
During the past months, negotiations for 
megaregional agreements have become 
increasingly prominent in the public debate, 
attracting considerable attention – support and 
criticism alike – from different stakeholders. Prime 
issues relate to the potential economic benefits of 
the agreements on the one hand, and their likely 
impact on Contracting Parties’ regulatory space 
and sustainable development on the other. In this 
section, the focus is on the systemic implications of 
these agreements for the IIA regime.
a.  The magnitude of megaregional 
agreements 
Megaregional agreements merit attention because 
of their sheer size and potentially huge implications. 
Megaregional agreements merit attention 
because of their sheer size, among other 
reasons (table III.5; see also table I.1 in chapter I). 
Together, the seven negotiations listed in table III.5 
involve 88 countries.59 In terms of population, the 
biggest is the Regional Comprehensive Economic 
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Table III.5. Overview of selected megaregional agreements under negotiation
Selected indicators 2012
Megaregional 
agreement Negotiating parties
Number 
of 
countries
Items Value($ billion)
Share in 
global 
total
(%)
IIA impact No. 
CETA EU (28),  Canada 29
GDP:  18 565 26.1 Overlap with current BITs: 7
Exports: 2 588 17.5 Overlap with current “other IIAs”: 0
Intraregional exports: 81 New bilateral relationships created: a 21
FDI inward stock: 2 691 17.6
Intraregional FDI inflows:  28
 Tripartite 
Agreement 
COMESA,
EAC and SADC 26
b
GDP:  1 166 1.6 Overlap with current BITs: 43
Exports: 355 2.4 Overlap with current “other IIAs”: 8
Intraregional exports: 68 New bilateral relationships created: a 67
FDI inward stock: 372 2.4
Intraregional FDI inflows: 1.3
EU-Japan 
FTA EU (28), Japan 29
GDP: 22 729 32.0 Overlap with current BITs: 0
Exports: 2 933 19.9 Overlap with current “other IIAs”: 0
Intraregional exports: 154 New bilateral relationships created: a 28
FDI inward stock: 2 266 14.8
Intraregional FDI inflows: 3.6
PACER Plus
Australia, New Zealand, 
Pacific Islands Forum 
developing countries 
15
GDP: 1 756 2.5 Overlap with current BITs: 1
Exports: 299 2.0 Overlap with current “other IIAs”: 2
Intraregional exports: 24 New bilateral relationships created: a 103
FDI inward stock:  744 4.9
Intraregional FDI inflows: 1
RCEP
 ASEAN countries and 
Australia, China, Japan, 
India, Republic of Korea 
and New Zealand
16
GDP: 21 113 29.7 Overlap with current BITs: 68
Exports: 5 226 35.4 Overlap with current “other IIAs”: 28
Intraregional exports: 2 195 New bilateral relationships created: a 5
FDI inward stock: 3 618 23.7
Intraregional FDI inflows: 93
TPP
Australia, Brunei 
Darussalam, Canada, Chile, 
Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, 
New Zealand, Peru, 
Singapore, United States 
and Viet Nam
12
GDP: 26 811 37.7 Overlap with current BITs: 14
Exports: 4 345 29.4 Overlap with current “other IIAs”: 26
Intraregional exports: 2 012 New bilateral relationships created: a 22
FDI inward stock: 7 140 46.7
Intraregional FDI inflows: 136.1
TTIP EU (28),  United States 29
GDP: 31 784 44.7 Overlap with current BITs: 9
Exports: 3 680 24.9 Overlap with current “other IIAs”: 0
Intraregional exports: 649 New bilateral relationships created: a 19
FDI inward stock: 5 985 39.2
Intraregional FDI inflows: 152
Source:  UNCTAD. 
a  “New bilateral relationships” refers to the number of new bilateral IIA relationships created between countries upon signature of the megaregional 
agreement in question. 
b  Overlapping membership in COMESA, EAC and SADC have been taken into account.
Note:  This table does not take into account the negotiations for the Trade in Services Agreement (TISA) which have sectoral focus.
 ASEAN: Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand 
and Viet Nam.  
 COMESA: Burundi, the Comoros, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Egypt, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Libya, Madagascar, 
Malawi, Mauritius, Rwanda, Seychelles, Sudan, Swaziland, Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe. 
 EAC: Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda, Uganda, the United Republic of Tanzania. 
 EU (28): Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, 
Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, 
Sweden and the United Kingdom. 
 Pacific Island Forum countries: Australia, Cook Islands, Federated States of Micronesia, Kiribati, Nauru, New Zealand, Niue, Palau, Papua 
New Guinea, the Marshall Islands, Samoa, Solomon Islands, Tonga, Tuvalu and Vanuatu. 
 SADC: Angola, Botswana, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, 
Seychelles, South Africa, Swaziland, the United Republic of Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe.
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most-favoured-nation (MFN) treatment, FET, 
expropriation, transfer of funds, performance 
requirements), its liberalization dimension and its 
procedural protections, notably ISDS. 
Similar to what occurs in negotiations for “other 
IIAs”, megaregional negotiators are also tasked 
with addressing treaty elements beyond the 
investment chapter that have important investment 
implications. The protection of intellectual property 
rights (IPRs), the liberalization of trade in services 
and the facilitation of employee work visas are 
examples in this regard. 
In addition to issues that have been considered in 
numerous past agreements, some megaregional 
negotiators also face the challenge of dealing 
with new issues that have emerged only recently. 
How to address issues related to State-owned 
enterprises or sovereign wealth funds and how to 
pursue regulatory cooperation are cases in point. 
Table III.6. Selected investment and investment-related issues under consideration in 
negotiations of megaregional agreements
Selected investment provisions Selected investment-related provisions
Scope and coverage: the definition of public debt 
(i.e. whether or not debt instruments of a Party or of 
a State enterprise are considered covered investments), 
the type of sovereign wealth funds (SWF) investments that 
would be protected (e.g. only direct investments or also 
portfolio investments)
Regulatory cooperation: the requirement to provide information and 
to exchange data on regulatory initiatives (i.e. draft laws/regulations), 
the requirement to examine – where appropriate – regulations’ 
impact on international trade and investment prior to their adoption, 
the use of mutual recognition arrangements in specific sectors, the 
establishment of a regulatory cooperation council
Performance requirements: the prohibition of performance 
requirements beyond those listed in TRIMs (e.g. prohibiting 
the use or purchase of a specific (domestic) technology)
Intellectual property rights (IPRs): the property protected (e.g. 
undisclosed test data), the type of protection offered (e.g. exclusive 
rights) and the level of protection offered (e.g. extending the term of 
patent protection beyond what is required by TRIPS)
Standards of treatment: different techniques for clarifying 
the meaning of indirect expropriation and fair and equitable 
treatment (FET)
Trade in services: the nature of services investment covered (“trade 
in services” by means of commercial presence) and the relationship 
with the investment chapter
Investment liberalization: the depth of commitments, 
the possibility of applying ISDS to pre-establishment 
commitments 
Financial services: the coverage of “commercial presence”-type 
investments in the sector and the promotion of more harmonized 
regulatory practices
Denial of benefit: a requirement for investors to conduct 
“substantial business operations” in the home country  
in order to benefit from treaty protection
Government procurement: the obligation to not discriminate against 
foreign companies bidding for State contracts and the opening of 
certain aspects of governments’ procurement markets to foreign 
companies
Transfer of funds exceptions: the scope and depth of 
exceptions to free transfer obligations 
Competition: provisions on competitive neutrality (e.g. to ensure that 
competition laws of Parties apply to SOEs) 
ISDS: the inclusion of ISDS and its scope (e.g. only for 
post-establishment or also for pre-establishment 
commitments), potential carve-outs or special mechanisms 
applying to sensitive issues (e.g. public debt or financial 
issues), methods for effective dispute prevention and the 
inclusion of an appeals mechanism 
Corporate social responsibility (CSR): the inclusion of non-binding 
provisions on CSR 
Key personnel: the inclusion of provisions facilitating the 
presence of (foreign) natural persons for business purposes
General exceptions: the inclusion of GATT- or GATS-type general 
exceptions for measures aimed at legitimate public policy objectives
Source:  UNCTAD.
Partnership (RCEP), accounting for close to half of 
the global population. In terms of GDP, the biggest 
is TTIP, representing 45 per cent of global GDP. In 
terms of global FDI inward stock, TPP tops the list. 
Megaregional agreements are also significant in 
terms of the new bilateral IIA relationships they 
can create. For example, when it is concluded, 
the Pacific Agreement on Closer Economic 
Relations (PACER) Plus may create 103 such new 
relationships. 
b. Substantive issues at hand 
Megaregional negotiations cover several of the 
issues typically addressed in negotiations for BITs 
or “other IIAs”. For the investment chapter, nego-
tiators need to devise key IIA provisions, including 
the clause setting out the treaty’s coverage of 
investments and investors, the treaty’s substantive 
standards of protection (e.g. national treatment, 
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In all of this, negotiators have to carefully consider 
the possible interactions between megaregional 
agreements and other investment treaties; between 
the different chapters of the agreement; and 
between the clauses in the investment chapter of 
the agreement in question.
Table III.6 offers selected examples of key issues 
under discussion in various current megaregional 
negotiations. The table is not exhaustive, and 
the inclusion of an issue does not mean that it is 
being discussed in all megaregional agreements. 
Moreover, it should be noted that discussions 
on investment issues are at different stages (e.g. 
negotiations for the Tripartite agreement plan to 
address investment issues only in the second 
phase, which is yet to start). In sum, the table offers 
a snapshot of selected issues.
Negotiations of megaregional agreements may 
present opportunities for the formulation of a new 
generation of investment treaties that respond to the 
sustainable development imperative. Negotiators 
have to determine where on a spectrum between 
utmost investor protection and maximum policy 
flexibility a particular agreement should be located. 
This also offers space to apply lessons learned 
about how IIAs have been implemented and how 
they have been interpreted by arbitral tribunals.
c.  Consolidation or further 
complexities 
Depending on how they are implemented, 
megaregionals can either help consolidate the 
IIA regime or create further complexities and 
inconsistencies. 
Once concluded, megaregional agreements may 
have important systemic implications for the IIA 
regime. They offer opportunities for consolidating 
today’s multifaceted and multilayered treaty 
network. This is not automatic however. They could 
also create new inconsistencies resulting from 
overlaps with existing agreements. 
Megaregional agreements present an opportunity 
to consolidate today’s network of close to 3,240 
IIAs. Overlapping with 140 agreements (45 bilateral 
and regional “other IIAs” and 95 BITs), the six 
megaregional agreements in which BITs-type 
provisions are on the agenda have the potential 
of transforming the fragmented IIA network into a 
more consolidated and manageable one of fewer, 
but more inclusive and more significant, IIAs. At the 
same time, the six agreements would create close 
to 200 new bilateral IIA relationships (figure III.10).
The extent of consolidation of the IIA regime 
that megaregional agreements may bring about 
Figure III.10. Existing IIAs and new bilateral relationships created, for six megaregional agreements
(Number)
Source: UNCTAD, IIA database.
Note:    “New bilateral relationships” refers to the number of new IIA relationships created between countries upon signature of 
a megaregional agreement.
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depends crucially on whether the negotiating 
parties opt to replace existing bilateral IIAs with the 
pertinent megaregional agreement. The currently 
prevailing approach to regionalism has resulted 
in a degree of parallelism that adds complexities 
and inconsistencies to the system (WIR13). The 
coexistence of megaregional agreements and other 
investment treaties concluded between members 
of these agreements raises questions about which 
treaty should prevail.60 This may change, however, 
with the increasing number of agreements involving 
the EU, where prior BITs between individual EU 
member States and megaregional partners will be 
replaced by the new EU-wide treaties.
In addition, megaregional agreements may create 
new investment standards on top of those that 
exist in the IIAs of the members of the megaregional 
agreement with third countries – be they bilateral 
or plurilateral. Insofar as these standards will differ, 
they increase the chance for “treaty shopping” by 
investors for the best clauses from different treaties 
by using the MFN clause. This can work both 
ways, in terms of importing higher standards into 
megaregional agreements from other agreements 
(“cherry-picking”) or benefiting from megaregionals’ 
higher standards in other investment relationships 
(“free-riding”). 
Several arbitral decisions have interpreted the 
MFN clause as allowing investors to invoke more 
investor-friendly language from treaties between 
the respondent State and a third country, thereby 
effectively sidelining the “base” treaty (i.e. the treaty 
between the investor’s home and host countries) 
on the basis of which the case was brought. 
Therefore, the issue of “cherry-picking” requires 
careful attention in the drafting of the MFN clause 
(UNCTAD, 2010; see also IPFSD). 
Insofar as “free-riding” and excluding others from the 
megaregional agreement’s benefits are concerned, 
treaty provisions that except investor treatment 
granted within a regional economic integration or-
Figure III.11. Participation in key megaregionals and OECD membership
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ganization from the application of the MFN clause 
(the so-called regional economic integration organi-
zation, or REIO clause) can apply (UNCTAD, 2004). 
d.  Implications for existing 
plurilateral cooperation
Megaregional agreements can have implications for 
existing plurilateral cooperation.  
At the plurilateral level, they raise questions about 
their future relationship with existing investment 
codes, such as the OECD instruments (i.e. the OECD 
Codes on Liberalization of Capital Movements and 
on Liberalization of Current Invisible Operations) 
and the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT). 
Of the 34 OECD members, 22 would be bound by 
the TTIP’s investment provisions, 7 participate in 
TPP and 4 in RCEP, resulting in a situation where 
all but 5 (Iceland, Israel, Norway, Switzerland and 
Turkey) would be party to one or more megaregional 
agreement (figure III.11). Similarly, 28 ECT members 
would be subject to the TTIP’s provisions, and 2 
ECT members are engaged in the TPP and 2 in 
RCEP negotiations.61 
Once concluded, some megaregional agreements 
will therefore result in considerable overlap with 
existing plurilateral instruments and in possible 
inconsistencies that could give rise to “free-riding” 
problems. 
Related to this are questions concerning the 
rationale for including an investment protection 
chapter (including ISDS) in megaregional agree-
ments between developed countries that have 
advanced regulatory and legal systems and 
generally open investment environments. To date, 
developed countries have been less active in 
concluding IIAs among themselves. The share of 
“North-North” BITs is only 9 per cent (259 of today’s 
total of 2,902 BITs). Moreover, 200 of these BITs are 
intra-EU treaties – many of which were concluded 
by transition economies before they joined the 
EU (figure III.12).
e. Implications for non-
participating third parties
In terms of systemic implications for the IIA 
regime, megaregional agreements may also affect 
countries that are not involved in the negotiations. 
These agreements can create risks but also offer 
opportunities for non-parties. 
There is the risk of potential marginalization of 
third parties, which could further turn them from 
“rule makers” into “rule takers” (i.e. megaregional 
agreements make it even more difficult for non-
parties to effectively contribute to the shaping of the 
global IIA regime). To the extent that megaregional 
agreements create new IIA rules, non-parties may 
be left behind in terms of the latest treaty practices. 
At the same time, megaregional agreements may 
present opportunities. Apart from “free-riding” (see 
above), megaregional agreements can also have 
a demonstrating effect on other negotiations. This 
Figure III.12. Share of North-North BITs in global BITs, by end 2013
(Per cent)
Source: UNCTAD, IIA database.
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applies to both the inclusion of new rules and the 
reformulation or revision or omission of existing 
standards. 
Third parties may also have the option of acceding 
to megaregional agreements. This could, however, 
reinforce their role as “rule-takers” and expose them 
to the conditionalities that sometimes emanate 
from in accession procedures. This is particularly 
problematic, given that many non-participating 
third countries are poor developing countries. 
*		*			*
Megaregional agreements are likely to have a 
major impact on global investment rule making in 
the coming years. This also includes the overall 
pursuit of sustainable development objectives. 
Transparency in rule making, with broader 
stakeholder engagement, can help in finding 
optimal solutions and ensuring buy-in from those 
affected by a treaty. It is similarly important that the 
interests of non-parties are adequately considered. 
The challenge of marginalization that potentially 
arises from megaregional agreements can be 
overcome by “open regionalism”. A multilateral 
platform for dialogue among regional groupings on 
key emerging issues would be helpful in this regard.
3.  Trends in investor–State dispute 
settlement
With 56 new cases, the year saw the second 
largest number of known investment arbitrations 
filed in a single year, bringing the total number of 
known cases to 568. 
In 2013, investors initiated at least 56 known ISDS 
cases pursuant to IIAs (UNCTAD 2014) (figure III.13). 
This comes close to the previous year’s record-high 
number of new claims. In 2013 investors brought an 
unusually high number of cases against developed 
States (26); in the remaining cases, developing 
(19) and transition (11) economies are the 
respondents.
Figure III.13. Known ISDS cases, 1987–2013
Source:  UNCTAD, ISDS database.  
Note:  Due to new information becoming available for 2012 and earlier years the number of known ISDS cases has been 
revised.
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Forty-two per cent of cases initiated in 2013 were 
brought against member States of the EU. In all of 
these EU-related arbitrations, except for one, the 
claimants are EU nationals bringing the proceedings 
under either intra-EU BITs or the ECT (sometimes 
relying on both at the same time). In more than 
half of the cases against EU member States, the 
respondents are the Czech Republic or Spain.
In fact, nearly a quarter of all arbitrations initiated 
in 2013 involve challenges to regulatory actions by 
those two countries that affected the renewable 
energy sector. With respect to the Czech Republic, 
investors are challenging the 2011 amendments 
that placed a levy on electricity generated from solar 
power plants. They argue that these amendments 
undercut the viability of the investments and modified 
the incentive regime that had been originally put in 
place to stimulate the use of renewable energy in 
the country. The claims against Spain arise out of a 
7 per cent tax on the revenues of power generators 
and a reduction of subsidies for renewable energy 
producers. 
Investors also challenged the cancellation or 
alleged breaches of contracts by States, alleged 
direct or de facto expropriation, revocation of 
licenses or permits, regulation of energy tariffs, 
allegedly wrongful criminal prosecution and land 
zoning decisions. Investors also complained about 
the creation of a State monopoly in a previously 
competitive sector, allegedly unfair tax assessments 
or penalties, invalidation of patents and legislation 
relating to sovereign bonds.
By the end of 2013, the number of known ISDS 
cases reached 568, and the number of countries 
that have been respondents in at least one dispute 
increased to 98. (For comparison, the World Trade 
Organization had registered 474 disputes by that 
time, involving 53 members as respondents.) About 
three quarters of these ISDS cases were brought 
against developing and transition economies, of 
which countries in Latin America and the Caribbean 
account for the largest share. EU countries ranked 
third as respondents, with 21 per cent of all cases 
(figure III.14). The majority of known disputes 
continued to accrue under the ICSID Convention 
and the ICSID Additional Facility Rules (62 per 
cent), and the UNCITRAL Rules (28 per cent). Other 
arbitral venues have been used only rarely. 
The overwhelming majority (85 per cent) of all ISDS 
claims by end 2013 were brought by investors 
from developed countries, including the EU (53 per 
cent) and the United States (22 per cent).62 Among 
the EU member States, claimants come most 
frequently from the Netherlands (61 cases), the 
United Kingdom (43) and Germany (39). 
Figure III.14. Respondent States by geographical region and EU in focus, total by end 2013
(Per cent)
Source:  UNCTAD, ISDS database.  
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The three investment instruments most frequently 
used as a basis for all ISDS claims have been 
NAFTA (51 cases), the ECT (42) and the Argentina–
United States BIT (17). At least 72 arbitrations have 
been brought pursuant to intra-EU BITs.
At least 37 arbitral decisions were issued in 2013, 
including decisions on objections to a tribunal’s 
jurisdiction, on the substantive merits of the claims, 
on compensation and on applications for annulment 
of an arbitral award. For only 23 of these decisions 
are the texts in the public domain.
Known decisions on jurisdictional objections 
issued in 2013 show a 50/50 split – half of them 
rejecting the tribunal’s jurisdiction over the dispute 
and half affirming it and thereby letting the claims 
proceed to their assessment on the merits. Of eight 
decisions on the merits that were rendered in 2013, 
seven accepted – at least in part – the claims of 
the investors, and one dismissed all of the claims; 
this represents a higher share of rulings in favour 
of investors than in previous years. At least five 
decisions rendered in 2013 awarded compensation 
to the investors, including an award of $935 million 
plus interest, the second highest known award in 
the history of ISDS.63
Arbitral developments in 2013 brought the overall 
number of concluded cases  to 274.64 Of these, 
approximately 43 per cent were decided in favour 
of the State and 31 per cent in favour of the investor. 
Approximately 26 per cent of cases were settled. 
In these cases, the specific terms of settlement 
typically remain confidential. 
The growing number of cases and the broad 
range of policy issues raised in this context have 
turned ISDS into arguably the most controversial 
issue in international investment policymaking. 
Over the past year, the public discourse about 
the pros and cons of ISDS has continued to 
gain momentum. This has already spurred some 
action. For example, UNCITRAL adopted new 
Rules on Transparency in Treaty-based Investor–
State Arbitration on 11 July 2013. Similarly, the 
Energy Charter Secretariat invited Contracting 
Parties to discuss measures to reform investment 
dispute settlement under the ECT. In all of this 
effort, UNCTAD’s IPFSD table on policy options 
for IIAs (notably section 6) and the roadmap for 
five ways to reform the ISDS system identified in 
WIR13 can help and guide policymakers and other 
stakeholders (figure III.15). 
4.  Reform of the IIA regime: four paths of 
action and a way forward 
Four different paths of IIA regime reform emerge: 
status quo, disengagement, selective adjustments 
and systematic reform.  
The IIA regime is undergoing a period of reflection, 
review and reform. While almost all countries are 
parties to one or several IIAs, few are satisfied with 
the current regime for several reasons: growing 
uneasiness about the actual effects of IIAs in terms 
of promoting FDI or reducing policy and regulatory 
space, increasing exposure to ISDS and the lack 
of specific pursuit of sustainable development 
objectives. Furthermore, views on IIAs are strongly 
diverse, even within countries. To this adds the 
complexity and multifaceted nature of the IIA regime 
and the absence of a multilateral institution (like the 
WTO for trade). All of this makes it difficult to take 
a systematic approach towards comprehensively 
reforming the IIA (and the ISDS) regime. Hence, IIA 
reform efforts have so far been relatively modest. 
Many countries follow a “wait and see” approach. 
Hesitation in respect to more holistic and far-
reaching reform reflects a government’s dilemma: 
more substantive changes might undermine a 
country’s attractiveness for foreign investment, and 
first movers could particularly suffer in this regard. 
In addition, there are questions about the concrete 
content of a “new” IIA model and fears that some 
approaches could aggravate the current complexity 
and uncertainty.
IIA reform has been occurring at different levels 
of policymaking. At the national level, countries 
have revised their model treaties, sometimes 
on the basis of inclusive and transparent multi-
stakeholder processes. In fact, at least 40 countries 
(and 5 regional organizations) are currently in the 
process of reviewing and revising their approaches 
to international-investment-related rule making. 
Countries have also continued negotiating IIAs at 
the bilateral and regional levels, with novel provisions 
and reformulations (table III.4). Megaregional 
agreements are a case in point. A few countries 
have walked away from IIAs, terminating some of 
their BITs or denouncing international arbitration 
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conventions. At the multilateral level, countries 
have come together to discuss specific aspects of 
IIA reform. 
Bringing together these recent experiences allows 
the mapping of four broad paths that are emerging 
regarding actions for reforming the international 
investment regime (table III.7): 
•		Maintaining the status quo 
•		Disengaging from the regime 
•		Introducing selective adjustments 
•		Engaging in systematic reform 
Each of the four paths of action comes with its own 
advantages and disadvantages, and responds to 
specific concerns in a distinctive way (table III.7). 
Depending on the overall objective that is being 
pursued, what is considered an advantage by some 
stakeholders may be perceived as a challenge 
by others. In addition, the four paths of action, 
as pursued today, are not mutually exclusive; a 
country may adopt elements from one or several 
of them, and the content of a particular IIA may be 
influenced by one or several paths of action.
This section discusses each path from the 
perspective of strategic regime reform. The 
discussion begins with the two most opposed 
approaches to investment-related international 
commitments: at one end is the path that maintains 
the status quo; at the other is the path that 
disengages from the IIA regime. In between are 
Table III.7. Four paths of action: an overview
Path Content of policy action Level of policy action
Systematic 
reform
Designing investment-related international commitments 
that: 
•	 create proactive sustainable-development-oriented IIAs (e.g. 
add SDG investment promotion) 
•	 effectively rebalance rights and obligations in IIAs (e.g. add 
investor responsibilities, preserve policy space) 
•	 comprehensively reform ISDS (i.e. follow five ways identified in 
WIR 13)
•	 properly manage interactions and foster coherence between 
different levels of investment policies and investment and other 
public policies (e.g. multi-stakeholder review) 
Taking policy action at three levels of 
policymaking (simultaneously and/or 
sequentially):                                        
•	 national (e.g. creating a new model IIA) 
•	 bilateral/regional (e.g. (re-)negotiating IIAs 
based on new model) 
•	 multilateral (e.g. multi-stakeholder 
consensus-building, including collective 
learning)
Selective 
adjustments  
Pursuing selective changes to:
•	 add a sustainable development dimension to IIAs (e.g. 
sustainable development in preamble) 
•	 move towards rebalancing rights and obligations (e.g. non-
binding CSR provisions) 
•	 change specific aspects of ISDS (e.g. early discharge of 
frivolous claims)
•	 selectively address policy interaction (e.g. not lowering 
standards clauses)
Taking policy action at three levels of 
policymaking (selectively):
•	 national (e.g. modifying a new model IIA)
•	 bilateral/regional (e.g. negotiating IIAs 
based on revised models or issuing joint 
interpretations)
•	 multilateral (e.g. sharing of experiences)
Status quo Not pursuing any substantive change to IIA clauses or 
investment-related international commitments
Taking policy action at bilateral and 
regional levels:        
•	 continue negotiating IIAs based on existing 
models 
•	 leave existing treaties untouched
Disengagement Eliminating investment-related commitments Taking policy action regarding different 
aspects:
•	 national (e.g. eliminating consent to 
ISDS in domestic law and terminating 
investment contracts)  
•	 bilateral/regional (e.g. terminating existing 
IIAs)
Source:  UNCTAD.
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the two paths of action that opt for reform of the 
regime, albeit to different degrees. 
The underlying premise of the analysis here is that 
the case for reform has already been made (see 
above). UNCTAD’s IPFSD, with its principle of 
“dynamic policymaking” – which calls for a con-
tinuing assessment of the effectiveness of policy 
instruments – is but one example. The questions 
are not about whether to reform the international 
investment regime but how to do so. Furthermore, 
today’s questions are not only about the change 
to one aspect in a particular agreement but about 
the comprehensive reorientation of the global IIA 
regime to balance investor protection with sustain-
able development considerations. 
a. Maintaining the status quo 
At one end of the spectrum is a country’s choice 
to maintain the status quo. Refraining from 
substantive changes to the way that investment-
related international commitments are made sends 
an image of continuity and investor friendliness. 
This is particularly the case when maintaining the 
status quo involves the negotiation of new IIAs 
that are based on existing models. Above all, this 
path might be attractive for countries with a strong 
outward investment perspective and for countries 
that have not yet responded to numerous – and 
highly politicized – ISDS cases. 
Intuitively, this path of action appears to be the 
easiest and most straightforward to implement. It 
requires limited resources (e.g. there is no need 
for assessments, domestic reviews and multi-
stakeholder consultations) and avoids unintended, 
potentially far-reaching consequences arising from 
innovative approaches to IIA clauses.
At the same time, however, maintaining the status 
quo does not address any of the challenges arising 
from today’s global IIA regime and might contribute 
to a further stakeholder backlash against IIAs. 
Moreover, as an increasing number of countries 
are beginning to reform IIAs, maintaining the status 
quo (i.e. maintaining BITs and negotiating new 
ones based on existing templates) may become 
increasingly difficult. 
b. Disengaging from the IIA regime 
At the other end of the spectrum is a country’s choice 
to disengage from the international investment 
regime, be it from individual agreements, multilateral 
arbitration conventions or the regime as a whole. 
Unilaterally quitting IIAs sends a strong signal of 
dissatisfaction with the current regime. This path of 
action might be particularly attractive for countries 
in which IIA-related concerns feature prominently in 
the domestic policy debate.
Intuitively, disengaging from the IIA regime might 
be perceived as the strongest, or most far-
reaching path of action. Ultimately, for inward and 
outward investors, it would result in the removal 
of international commitments on investment 
protection that are enshrined in international 
treaties. Moreover, this would result in the effective 
shielding from ISDS-related risks. 
However, most of the desired implications will 
materialize only over time, and only for one treaty 
at a time. Quitting the system does not immediately 
protect the State against future ISDS cases, as IIA 
commitments usually endure for a period through 
survival clauses. In addition, there may be a need 
to review national laws and State contracts, as 
they may also provide for ISDS (including ICSID 
arbitration), even in the absence of an IIA. Moreover, 
unless termination is undertaken on a consensual 
basis, a government’s ability to terminate an 
IIA is limited. Its ability to do so depends on the 
formulation of the treaty at issue (i.e. the “survival” 
clause) and may be available only at a particular, 
limited point in time (WIR13). 
Moreover, eliminating single international commit-
ments at a time (treaty by treaty) does not contribute 
to the reform of the IIA regime as a whole, but 
only takes care of individual relationships. Only if 
such treaty termination is pursued with a view to 
renegotiation can it also constitute a move towards 
reforming the entire IIA regime.
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c.  Introducing selective 
adjustments 
Limited, i.e. selective, adjustments that address 
specific concerns is the path of action that is gaining 
ground rapidly. It may be particularly attractive 
for those countries that wish to respond to the 
challenges posed by IIAs but wish to demonstrate 
their continued, constructive engagement with 
the investment regime. It can be directed towards 
sustainable development and other policy 
objectives. 
This path of action has numerous advantages. The 
selective choice of modifications can permit the 
prioritization of “low-hanging fruit” or concerns that 
appear most relevant and pressing, while leaving 
the treaty core untouched (see for example, the 
option of “tailored modifications” in UNCTAD’s 
five paths of reform for ISDS, figure III.15). It 
also allows the tailoring of the modification to a 
particular negotiating counterpart so as to suit 
a particular economic relationship. Moreover, 
selective adjustment also allows the testing and 
piloting of different solutions; the focus on future 
treaties facilitates straightforward implementation 
(i.e. changes can be put in practice directly by the 
parties to individual negotiations); the use of “soft” 
(i.e. non-binding) modifications minimizes risk; and 
the incremental step-by-step approach avoids a 
“big bang” effect (and makes the change less prone 
to being perceived as reducing the agreement’s 
protective value). Indeed, introducing selective 
adjustments in new agreements may appear as 
an appealing – if not the most realistic – option for 
reducing the mounting pressure on IIAs.
At the same time, however, selective adjustments 
in future IIAs cannot comprehensively address 
the challenges posed by the existing stock of 
treaties.65 It cannot fully deal with the interaction of 
Figure III.15. Five ways of reform for ISDS, as identified in WIR13, illustrative actions
 ISDS reform 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
Promoting alternative dispute resolution
(ADR)
Tailoring the existing system through individual IIAs
Limiting investor access to ISDS
 Creating a standing international investment court
Introducing an appeals facility
• Fostering ADR methods 
(e.g. conciliation or mediation)
• Fostering dispute prevention 
policies (DPPs) (e.g. ombudsman)
• Emphasizing mutually acceptable 
solutions and preventing 
escalation of disputes
• Implementing at the domestic 
level, with (or without) reference in 
IIAs
• Setting time limits for bringing 
claims
•  Expanding the contracting 
parties' role in interpreting the 
treaty
•  Providing for more transparency 
in ISDS
•  Including a mechanism for early 
discharge of frivolous claims
• Reducing the subject-matter 
scope for ISDS claims 
•  Denying potection to investors 
that engage in “nationality 
planning”
• Introducing the requirement to 
exhaust local remedies before 
resorting to ISDS
• Allowing for the substantive review of awards 
rendered by tribunals (e.g. reviewing issues of law) 
• Creating a standing body (e.g. constituted of 
members appointed by States)
• Requiring subsequent tribunals to follow the 
authoritative pronouncements of the appeals facility
• Replacing the current system (of ad hoc 
tribunals) with a new institutional structure
• Creating a standing international court of 
judges (appointed by States )
• Ensuring security of tenure (for a fixed term) 
to insulate judges from outside interests 
(e.g. interest in repeat appointments) 
• Considering the possibility of an appeals 
chamber
Source: UNCTAD. 
130 World Investment Report 2014: Investing in the SDGs: An Action Plan
treaties with each other and, unless the selective 
adjustments address the MFN clause, it can allow 
for “treaty shopping” and “cherry-picking”.66 It may 
not satisfy all stakeholders. And, throughout all of 
this, it may lay the groundwork for further change, 
thus creating uncertainty instead of stability. 
d. Pursuing systematic reform 
Pursuing systematic reform means designing 
international commitments that promote sustainable 
development and that are in line with the investment 
and development paradigm shift (WIR12). With 
policy actions at all levels of governance, this is the 
most comprehensive approach to reforming the 
current IIA regime. 
This path of action would entail the design of a 
new IIA treaty model that effectively addresses 
the three challenges mentioned above (increasing 
the development dimension, rebalancing rights 
and obligations, and managing the systemic 
complexity of the IIA regime), and that focuses on 
proactively promoting investment for sustainable 
development. Systematic reform would also entail 
comprehensively dealing with the reform of the ISDS 
system, as outlined in last year’s World Investment 
Report (figure III.15).
At first glance, this path of action appears daunting 
and challenging on numerous fronts. It may be time- 
and resource-intensive. Its result – more “balanced” 
IIAs – may be perceived as reducing the protective 
value of the agreements at issue and offering a 
less attractive investment climate. Comprehensive 
implementation of this path requires dealing with 
existing IIAs, which may be seen as affecting 
investors’ “acquired rights.” And amendments 
or renegotiation may require the cooperation of a 
potentially large number of treaty counterparts. 
Yet this path of action is the only one that can bring 
about comprehensive and coherent reform. It is 
also the one best suited for fostering a common 
response from the international community to 
today’s shared challenge of promoting investment 
for the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). 
*		*			*
A way forward: UNCTAD’s perspective 
Multilateral facilitation and a comprehensive gradual 
approach to reform could effectively address the 
systemic challenges of the IIA regime. 
Whichever paths countries take, a multilateral 
process is helpful to bring all parties together. It 
also brings a number of other benefits to the reform 
process:
•	 facilitating a more holistic and more coordi-
nated approach, in the interest of sustainable 
development (see chapter IV) and the interests 
of developing countries, particularly the LDCs;
•	 factoring in universally agreed principles related 
to business and development, including those 
adopted in the UN context and international 
standards;
•	 building on the 11 principles of investment poli-
cymaking set out in UNCTAD’s IPFSD (table 
III.8);
•	 ensuring inclusiveness by involving all stake-
holders; 
•	 backstopping bilateral and regional actions; 
and 
•	 helping to address first mover challenges. 
Such multilateral engagement could facilitate a 
gradual approach with carefully sequenced actions. 
This could first define the areas for reform (e.g. by 
identifying key and emerging issues and lessons 
learned, and agreeing on what to change and what 
not to change), then design a roadmap for reform 
(e.g. by identifying different options for reform, 
assessing them and agreeing on a roadmap), and 
finally implement reform. Naturally, such multilateral 
engagement in consensus building is not the same 
as negotiating legally binding rules on investment.
The actual implementation of reform-oriented policy 
choices will be determined by and happening 
at the national, bilateral, and regional levels. For 
example, national input is essential for identifying 
key and emerging issues and lessons learned; 
consultations between countries (at the bilateral and 
regional levels) are required for agreeing on areas 
for change and areas for disagreement; national 
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Table III.8. Core Principles for investment policymaking for sustainable development
 Area Core Principles
1 Investment for sustainable development
•		The overarching objective of investment policymaking is to promote investment for inclusive 
growth and sustainable development.
2 Policy coherence
•		Investment policies should be grounded in a country’s overall development strategy. All 
policies that impact on investment should be coherent and synergetic at both the national and 
international levels.
3 Public governance and institutions
•		Investment policies should be developed involving all stakeholders, and embedded in an 
institutional framework based on the rule of law that adheres to high standards of public 
governance and ensures predictable, efficient and transparent procedures for investors.
4 Dynamic policymaking •		Investment policies should be regularly reviewed for effectiveness and relevance and adapted to changing development dynamics.
5 Balanced rights and obligations
•		Investment policies should be balanced in setting out rights and obligations of States and 
investors in the interest of development for all.
6 Right to regulate
•		Each country has the sovereign right to establish entry and operational conditions for foreign 
investment, subject to international commitments, in the interest of the public good and to 
minimize potential negative effects.
7 Openness to investment •		In line with each country’s development strategy, investment policy should establish open, stable and predictable entry conditions for investment.
8 Investment protection and treatment
•		Investment policies should provide adequate protection to established investors. The 
treatment of established investors should be non-discriminatory.
9 Investment promotion and facilitation 
•		Policies for investment promotion and facilitation should be aligned with sustainable 
development goals and designed to minimize the risk of harmful competition for investment. 
10 Corporate governance and responsibility 
•		Investment policies should promote and facilitate the adoption of and compliance with best 
international practices of corporate social responsibility and good corporate governance.
11 International cooperation  
•		The international community should cooperate to address shared investment-for-development 
policy challenges, particularly in least developed countries. Collective efforts should also be 
made to avoid investment protectionism.  
Source:  IPFSD.
experiences are necessary for identifying different 
options for reform; and sharing such experiences at 
the multilateral level can help in assessing different 
options. 
The successful pursuit of these steps requires 
effective support in four dimensions: consensus 
building, analytical support, technical assistance, 
and multi-stakeholder engagement. 
•	 A multilateral focal point and platform could 
provide the infrastructure and institutional 
backstopping for consensus building activities 
that create a comfort zone for engagement, 
collective learning, sharing of experiences and 
identifyication of best practices and the way 
forward.
•	 A multilateral focal point could provide general 
backstopping and analytical support, with evi-
dence-based policy analysis and system-wide 
information to provide a global picture and 
bridge the information gap.
•	 A multilateral focal point and platform could 
also offer effective technical assistance, par-
ticularly for low-income and vulnerable devel-
oping countries (including LDCs, LLDCs and 
SIDS) that face challenges when striving to en-
gage effectively in IIA reform, be it at the bilat-
eral or the regional level. Technical assistance 
is equally important when it comes to the im-
plementation of policy choices at the national 
level. 
•	 A multilateral platform can also help ensure the 
inclusiveness and universality of the process. 
International investment policymakers (e.g. IIA 
negotiators) would form the core of such an ef-
fort but be joined by a broad set of other in-
vestment-development stakeholders. 
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Through all of these means, a multilateral focal 
point and platform can effectively support national, 
bilateral and regional investment policymaking, 
facilitating efforts towards redesigning international 
commitments in line with today’s sustainable 
development priorities. UNCTAD already offers 
some of these support functions. UNCTAD’s 
2014 World Investment Forum will offer a further 
opportunity in this regard.
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A. INTRODUCTION
Table IV.1. Overview of prospective SDG focus areas
•	 Poverty	eradication,	building	shared	
prosperity	and	promoting	equality
•	 Sustainable	agriculture,	food	security	
and	nutrition
•	 Health	and	population	dynamics
•	 Education	and	lifelong	learning
•	 Gender	equality	and	women’s	
empowerment
•	 Water	and	sanitation
•	 Energy
•	 Economic	growth,	employment	
infrastructure
•	 Industrialization	and	promotion	of	
equality	among	nations
•	 Sustainable	cities	and	human	
settlements
•	 Sustainable	consumption	and	
production
•	 Climate	change
•	 Conservation	and	sustainable	use	of	
marine	resources,	oceans	and	seas
•	 Ecosystems	and	biodiversity
•	 Means	of	implementation;	global	
partnership	for	sustainable	development
•	 Peaceful	and	inclusive	societies,	rule	of	law	
and	capable	institutions
Source:		UN	Open	Working	Group	on	Sustainable	Development	Goals,	working	document,	5-9	May	2014	session.
1.  The United Nations’ Sustainable 
Development Goals and implied 
investment needs
The Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) that 
are being formulated by the international community 
will have very significant implications for investment 
needs.
Faced	 with	 common	 global	 economic,	 social	
and	 environmental	 challenges,	 the	 international	
community	 is	 in	 the	 process	 of	 defining	 a	 set	 of	
Sustainable	Development	Goals	(SDGs).	The	SDGs,	
to	be	adopted	in	2015,	are	meant	to	galvanize	action	
by	 governments,	 the	 private	 sector,	 international	
organizations,	 non-governmental	 organizations	
(NGOs)	 and	 other	 stakeholders	 worldwide	 by	
providing	 direction	 and	 setting	 concrete	 targets	
in	 areas	 ranging	 from	 poverty	 reduction	 to	 food	
security,	 health,	 education,	 employment,	 equality,	
climate	 change,	 ecosystems	 and	 biodiversity,	
among	others	(table	IV.1).	
The	 experience	 with	 the	 Millenium	 Development	
Goals	 (MDGs),	which	were	agreed	 in	2000	at	 the	
UN	 Millennium	 Summit	 and	 will	 expire	 in	 2015,	
has	 shown	 how	 achievable	 measurable	 targets	
can	 help	 provide	 direction	 in	 a	 world	 with	 many	
different	 priorities.	 They	 have	 brought	 focus	 to	
the	 work	 of	 the	 development	 community	 and	
helped	mobilize	investment	to	reduce	poverty	and	
achieve	notable	 advances	 in	 human	well-being	 in	
the	world’s	poorest	countries.	However,	the	MDGs	
were	 not	 designed	 to	 create	 a	 dynamic	 process	
of	 investment	 in	 sustainable	 development	 and	
resilience	 to	 economic,	 social	 or	 environmental	
shocks.	 They	 were	 focused	 on	 a	 relatively	
narrow	 set	 of	 fundamental	 goals	 –	 for	 example,	
eradicating	extreme	poverty	and	hunger,	 reducing	
child	 mortality,	 improving	 maternal	 health	 –	 in	
order	 to	 trigger	 action	 and	 spending	 on	 targeted	
development	programmes.	
The	 SDGs	 are	 both	 a	 logical	 next	 step	 (from	
fundamental	 goals	 to	 broad-based	 sustainable	
development)	 and	 a	more	 ambitious	 undertaking.	
They	represent	a	concerted	effort	to	shift	the	global	
economy	–	developed	as	well	as	developing	–	onto	
a	more	sustainable	 trajectory	of	 long-term	growth	
and	 development.	 The	 agenda	 is	 transformative,	
as	 for	 instance	 witnessed	 by	 the	 number	 of	
prospective	SDGs	that	are	not	primarily	oriented	to	
specific	 economic,	 social	 or	 environmental	 issues	
but	instead	aim	to	put	in	place	policies,	institutions	
and	 systems	 necessary	 to	 generate	 sustained	
investment	and	growth.	
Where	 the	 MDGs	 required	 significant	 financial	
resources	 for	 spending	 on	 focused	 development	
programmes,	 the	 SDGs	 will	 necessitate	 a	 major	
escalation	 in	 the	 financing	effort	 for	 investment	 in	
broad-based	 economic	 transformation,	 in	 areas	
such	 as	 basic	 infrastructure,	 clean	 water	 and	
sanitation,	 renewable	 energy	 and	 agricultural	
production.	
The	formulation	of	the	SDGs	–	and	their	associated	
investment	 needs	 –	 takes	 place	 against	 a	
seemingly	unfavourable	macroeconomic	backdrop.	
Developed	countries	are	only	barely	recovering	from	
the	 financial	 crisis,	 and	 in	 many	 countries	 public	
sector	finances	are	precarious.	Emerging	markets,	
where	investment	needs	in	economic	infrastructure	
are	greatest,	but	which	also	represent	new	potential	
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sources	 of	 finance	 and	 investment,	 are	 showing	
signs	 of	 a	 slowdown	 in	 growth.	 And	 vulnerable	
economies,	such	as	the	least	developed	countries	
(LDCs),	still	 rely	 to	a	significant	extent	on	external	
sources	 of	 finance,	 including	 official	 development	
assistance	 (ODA)	 from	 donor	 countries	 with	
pressured	budgets.	
2.  Private sector contributions to the 
SDGs
The role of the public sector is fundamental and 
pivotal. At the same time the contribution of the 
private sector is indispensable.
Given	 the	broad	 scope	of	 the	prospective	SDGs,	
private	sector	contributions	can	take	many	forms.	
Some	will	primarily	place	behavioural	demands	on	
firms	and	investors.	Private	sector	good	governance	
in	relation	to	SDGs	is	key,	this	includes,	e.g.:	
•	 commitment	 of	 the	 business	 sector	 to	
sustainable	development;
•	 commitment	specifically	to	the	SDGs;
•	 transparency	 and	 accountability	 in	 honoring	
sustainable	 development	 in	 economic,	 social	
and	environmental	practices;
•	 responsibility	to	avoid	harm,	e.g.	environmental	
externalities,	even	if	such	harms	are	not	strictly	
speaking	prohibited;
•	 partnership	 with	 government	 on	 maximizing	
co-benefits	of	investment.
Beyond	good	governance	aspects,	a	great	deal	of	
financial	resources	will	be	necessary.	
The	 investment	 needs	 associated	with	 the	 SDGs	
will	 require	 a	 step-change	 in	 the	 levels	 of	 both	
public	 and	 private	 investment	 in	 all	 countries,	
and	 especially	 in	 LDCs	 and	 other	 vulnerable	
economies.	 Public	 finances,	 though	 central	 and	
fundamental	to	 investment	 in	SDGs,	cannot	alone	
meet	 SDG-implied	 demands	 for	 financing.	 The	
combination	of	huge	investment	requirements	and	
pressured	public	budgets	–	added	to	the	economic	
transformation	objective	of	the	SDGs	–	means	that	
the	role	of	the	private	sector	is	even	more	important	
than	before.	The	private	sector	cannot	supplant	the	
big	public	sector	push	needed	to	move	investment	
in	the	SDGs	in	the	right	direction.	But	an	associated	
big	 push	 in	 private	 investment	 can	 build	 on	 the	
complementarity	and	potential	synergies	in	the	two	
sectors	to	accelerate	the	pace	in	realizing	the	SDGs	
and	meeting	crucial	targets.	In	addition	to	domestic	
private	 investment,	 private	 investment	 flows	 from	
overseas	 will	 be	 needed	 in	 many	 developing	
countries,	 including	 foreign	direct	 investment	 (FDI)	
and	other	external	sources	of	finance.	
At	 first	 glance,	 private	 investors	 (and	 other	
corporates,	 such	 as	 State-owned	 firms	 and	
sovereign	 wealth	 funds;	 see	 box	 IV.1),	 domestic	
and	 foreign,	 appear	 to	 have	 sufficient	 funds	 to	
potentially	cover	some	of	those	investment	needs.	
For	instance,	in	terms	of	foreign	sources,	the	cash	
holdings	of	transnational	corporations	(TNCs)	are	in	
the	order	of	$5	trillion;	sovereign	wealth	fund	(SWF)	
assets	 today	 exceed	 $6	 trillion;	 and	 the	 holdings	
of	pension	funds	domiciled	in	developed	countries	
alone	have	reached	$20	trillion.	
At	 the	same	 time,	 there	are	 instances	of	goodwill	
on	 the	 part	 of	 the	 private	 sector	 to	 invest	 in	
sustainable	 development;	 in	 consequence,	 the	
value	of	investments	explicitly	linked	to	sustainability	
objectives	 is	growing.	Many	 “innovative	financing”	
initiatives	 have	 sprung	 up,	 many	 of	 which	 are	
collaborative	efforts	between	the	public	and	private	
sectors,	 as	 well	 as	 international	 organizations,	
foundations	and	NGOs.	Signatories	of	the	Principles	
for	Responsible	Investment	(PRI)	have	assets	under	
management	 of	 almost	 $35	 trillion,	 an	 indication	
that	 sustainability	 principles	 do	 not	 necessarily	
impede	the	raising	of	private	finance.	
Thus	 there	 appears	 to	 be	 a	 paradox	 that	 has	 to	
be	 addressed.	 Enormous	 investment	 needs	 and	
opportunities	 are	 associated	 with	 sustainable	
development.	Private	investors	worldwide	appear	to	
have	sufficient	funds	available.	Yet	these	funds	are	
not	 finding	 their	way	 to	 sustainable-development-
oriented	projects,	especially	in	developing	countries:	
e.g.	only	about	2	per	cent	of	the	assets	of	pension	
funds	 and	 insurers	 are	 invested	 in	 infrastructure,	
and	FDI	to	LDCs	stands	at	a	meagre	2	per	cent	of	
global	flows.	
The	macroeconomic	 backdrop	 of	 this	 situation	 is	
related	 to	 the	 processes	which	 have	 led	 to	 large	
sums	of	 financial	 capital	 being	underutilized	while	
parts	of	 the	real	sector	are	starved	of	 funds	 (TDR	
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Figure IV.1. Strategic framework for private investment in the SDGs
MOBILIZATION
Raising nance and 
reorienting nancial markets 
towards investment in SDGs
IMPACT
Maximizing sustainable 
development benets, 
minimizing risks
LEADERSHIP
Setting guiding principles, 
galvanizing action, ensuring
policy coherence 
CHANNELLING
Promoting and facilitating 
investment into SDG sectors
Source:	UNCTAD.	
2009;	TDR	2011;	UNCTAD	2011d;	Wolf,	M.	2010);	
this	chapter	deals	with	some	of	the	microeconomic	
aspects	 of	 shifting	 such	 capital	 to	 productive	
investment	in	the	SDGs.1
3.  The need for a strategic framework 
for private investment in the SDGs
A strategic framework for private sector investment 
in SDGs can help structure efforts to mobilize funds, 
to channel them to SDG sectors, and to maximize 
impacts and mitigate drawbacks.
Since	the	formulation	of	the	MDGs,	many	initiatives	
aimed	 at	 increasing	 private	 financial	 flows	 to	
sustainable	 development	 projects	 in	 developing	
countries	have	sprung	up.	They	range	from	impact	
investing	 (investments	 with	 explicit	 social	 and	
environmental	objectives)	to	numerous	“innovative	
financing	 mechanisms”	 (which	 may	 entail	
partnerships	 between	 public	 and	 private	 actors).	
These	 private	 financing	 initiatives	 distinguish	
themselves	 either	 by	 the	 source	 of	 finance	 (e.g.	
institutional	investors,	private	funds,	corporations),	
their	 issue	 area	 (general	 funds,	 environmental	
investors,	 health-focused	 investors),	 the	 degree	
of	 recognition	 and	public	 support,	 or	many	 other	
criteria,	 ranging	 from	geographic	 focus	 to	 size	 to	
investment	horizon.	All	face	specific	challenges,	but	
broadly	there	are	three	common	challenges:	
•	 Mobilizing funds for sustainable development 
–	 raising	 resources	 in	 financial	 markets	 or	
through	 financial	 intermediaries	 that	 can	 be	
invested	in	sustainable	development.
•	 Channelling funds to sustainable development 
projects –	 ensuring	 that	 available	 funds	
make	 their	 way	 to	 concrete	 sustainable-
development-oriented	 investment	 projects	
on	 the	 ground	 in	 developing	 countries,	 and	
especially	LDCs.	
•	 Maximizing impact and mitigating drawbacks	
–	 creating	 an	 enabling	 environment	 and	
putting	 in	 place	 appropriate	 safeguards	 that	
need	 to	 accompany	 increased	 private	 sector	
engagement	 in	 what	 are	 often	 sensitive	
sectors.
The	urgency	of	solving	the	problem,	i.e.	“resolving	
the	 paradox”,	 to	 increase	 the	 private	 sector’s	
contribution	to	SDG	investment	is	the	driving	force	
behind	 this	 chapter.	 UNCTAD’s	 objective	 is	 to	
show	how	the	contribution	of	the	private	sector	to	
investment	in	the	SDGs	can	be	increased	through	
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Box Iv.1. Investing in Sustainable development: Scope and definitions
The	research	for	this	chapter	has	benefited	from	a	significant	amount	of	existing	work	on	financing	for	development,	
by	many	international	and	other	stakeholder	organizations.	The	scope	of	these	efforts	varies	significantly	along	the	
dimensions	of	public	and	private	sources	of	finance;	domestic	and	international	sources;	global	and	developing-
country	financing	needs;	overall	financing	needs	and	capital	investment;	direct	and	portfolio	investment;	and	overall	
development	financing	and	specific	SDG	objectives.	Within	this	context,	the	chapter	focuses	on	five	dimensions:
•	 Private investment by	firms, including	corporate	investment.	The	term	“corporate”	is	meant	to	include	(semi-)
public	entities	such	as	State-owned	enterprises	and	SWFs.	Private	individuals,	who	mostly	invest	in	sustainable	
development	through	funds	or	dedicated	corporate-like	vehicles	are	as	such	included.	Other	private	sources	of	
finance	by	individuals,	such	as	remittances,	are	not	addressed	here.	As much of the data on investment distin-
guishes between public and private (rather than corporate) origin, and for ease of exposition, the term “private 
sector investment” will be used throughout the chapter.
•	 Domestic and foreign investors.	Unless	specified	differently,	domestic	firms	are	 included	 in	the	scope	of	the	
analysis	and	recommendations.	The	respective	roles	of	domestic	and	foreign	investors	in	SDG	projects	will	vary	
by	country,	sector	and	industry.	A	crucial	aspect	of	sustainable	development	financing	and	investment	will	be	
linkages	that	foreign	investors	establish	with	the	local	economy.
•	 Developing countries.	The	focus	of	the	chapter	is	on	developing	countries,	with	specific	attention	to	weak	and	
vulnerable	economies	(LDCs,	landlocked	developing	countries	and	small	island	developing	States).	However,	
some	of	the	data	used	are	solely	available	as	global	estimates	(indicated,	where	pertinent).
•	 Capital investment.	 “Investment”	normally	 refers	 to	“capital	expenditures”	 (or	“capex”)	 in	a	project	or	 facility.	
Financing	needs	also	include	operating	expenditures	(or	“opex”)	–	for	example,	on	health	care,	education	and	
social	services	–	in	addition	to	capital	expenditures	(or	“capex”).	While	not	regarded	as	investment,	these	ex-
penditures	are	referred	to	where	they	are	important	from	an	SDG	perspective.	In	keeping	with	this	definition,	the	
chapter	does	not	examine	corporate	philanthropic	initiatives,	e.g.	funds	for	emergency	relief.	
•	 Broad-based sustainable development financing needs. The	chapter	examines	investment	in	all	three	broadly	
defined	pillars	of	the	SDGs:	economic	growth,	social	inclusion	and	environmental	stewardship.	In	most	cases,	
these	are	hard	to	separate	in	any	given	SDG	investment.	Infrastructure	investments	will	have	elements	of	all	
three	objectives.	The	use	of	the	terms	“SDG	sectors”	or	“SDG	investments”	in	this	chapter	generally	refers	to	
social	pillar	investments	(e.g.	schools,	hospitals,	social	housing);	environmental	pillar	investments	(e.g.	climate	
change	mitigation,	conservation);	and	economic	pillar	investments	(e.g.	infrastructure,	energy,	industrial	zones,	
agriculture).
Source:	UNCTAD.
a	concerted push	by	 the	 international	community,	
within	a	holistic	strategic	framework	that	addresses	
all	 key	 challenges	 in	mobilizing	 funds,	channelling 
them	 to	sustainable	development	and	maximizing	
beneficial impact	(figure	IV.1).
The	chapter	poses	the	following	questions:	
1.	 How	 large	 is	 the	 disparity	 between	 available	
financing	 and	 the	 investment	 required	 to	
achieve	 the	 SDGs?	 What	 is	 the	 potential	 for	
the	 private	 sector	 to	 fill	 this	 gap?	What	 could	
be	 realistic	 targets	 for	 private	 investment	 in	
SDGs?	(Section	B.)
2.	 How	can	the	basic	policy	dilemmas	associated	
with	 increased	 private	 sector	 investment	 in	
SDG	sectors	be	resolved	through	governments	
providing	 leadership	 in	 this	 respect?	 (Section	
C.)
3.	 What	 are	 the	 main	 constraints	 to	 mobilizing 
private	 sector	 financial	 resources	 for	
investment	 in	 sustainable	 development,	 and	
how	can	they	be	surmounted?	(Section	D.)
4.	 What	 are	 the	main	 constraints	 for	channelling 
investment	 into	 SDG	 sectors,	 and	 how	 can	
they	be	overcome?	(Section	E.)	
5.	 What	 are	 the	 main	 challenges	 for	 investment	
in	SDG	sectors	to	have	maximum	 impact,	and	
what	 are	 the	 key	 risks	 involved	 with	 private	
investment	 in	 SDG	 sectors?	 How	 can	 these	
challenges	 be	 resolved	 and	 risks	 mitigated?	
(Section	F.)
The	concluding	section	(section	G)	of	 the	chapter	
brings	key	findings	together	into	an	Action Plan for 
Private Investment in the SDGs	 that	 reflects	 the	
structure	of	the	strategic	framework.	
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B. The INVeSTmeNT GAP AND PRIVATe SeCTOR POTeNTIAl 
This	 section	 explores	 the	 magnitude	 of	 total	
investment	required	to	meet	the	SDGs	in	developing	
countries;	 examines	how	 these	 investment	needs	
compare	to	current	investment	in	pertinent	sectors	
(the	investment	gap);	and	establishes	the	degree	to	
which	the	private	sector	can	make	a	contribution,	
with	specific	attention	to	potential	contributions	 in	
vulnerable	economies.	
Private	 sector	 contributions	 often	 depend	 on	
facilitating	 investments	 by	 the	 public	 sector.	 For	
instance,	in	some	sectors	–	such	as	food	security,	
health	or	energy	sustainability	–	publicly	supported	
R&D	investments	are	needed	as	a	prelude	to	large-
scale	SDG-related	investments.
1.  SDG investment gaps and the role of 
the private sector
The SDGs will have very significant resource 
implications worldwide. Total investment needs in 
developing countries alone could be about $3.9 
trillion per year. Current investment levels leave a 
gap of some $2.5 trillion. 
This	 section	 examines	 projected	 investment	
needs	 in	 key	SDG	sectors	over	 the	period	2015-
2030,	 as	 well	 as	 the	 current	 levels	 of	 private	
sector	 participation	 in	 these	 sectors.	 It	 draws	 on	
a	 wide	 range	 of	 sources	 and	 studies	 conducted	
by	 specialized	agencies,	 institutions	 and	 research	
entities	(box	IV.2).	
At	the	global	level,	total	investment	needs	are	in	the	
order	of	$5	to	$7	trillion	per	year.	Total	investment	
needs	in	developing	countries	in	key	SDG	sectors	
are	estimated	at	$3.3	to	$4.5	trillion	per	year	over	
the	proposed	SDG	delivery	period,	with	a	midpoint	
at	 $3.9	 trillion	 (table	 IV.2).2	 Current	 investment	 in	
these	 sectors	 is	 around	 $1.4	 trillion,	 implying	 an	
annual	 investment	gap	of	between	$1.9	and	$3.1	
trillion.	
Economic infrastructure
Total	 investment	 in	 economic infrastructure in	
developing	 countries	 –	 power,	 transport	 (roads,	
rails	and	ports),	telecommunications	and	water	and	
sanitation	–	is	currently	under	$1	trillion	per	year	for	
all	sectors,	but	will	need	to	rise	to	between	$1.6	and	
$2.5	trillion	annually	over	the	period	2015-2030.		
Increases	in	investment	of	this	scale	are	formidable,	
and	much	of	the	additional	amount	needs	to	come	
from	the	private	sector.	One	basis	for	gauging	the	
potential	 private	 sector	 contribution	 in	 meeting	
the	 investment	 gap	 in	 economic	 infrastructure	 is	
to	compare	the	current	level	of	this	contribution	in	
developing	 countries,	 with	 what	 could	 potentially	
be	the	case.	For	instance,	the	private	sector	share	
in	 infrastructure	 industries	 in	 developed	 countries	
(or	more	advanced	developing	countries)	gives	an	
indication	of	what	is	possible	as	countries	climb	the	
development	ladder.	
Apart	from	water	and	sanitation,	the	private	share	of	
investment	in	infrastructure	in	developing	countries	
is	already	quite	high	(30-80	per	cent	depending	on	
the	industry);	and	if	developed	country	participation	
levels	 are	 used	 as	 a	 benchmark,	 the	 private	
sector	contribution	could	be	much	higher.	Among	
developing	 countries,	 private	 sector	 participation	
ranges	widely,	 implying	 that	 there	 is	 considerable	
leeway	for	governments	to	encourage	more	private	
sector	 involvement,	depending	on	conditions	and	
development	strategies.	
Recent	trends	in	developing	countries	have,	in	fact,	
been	 towards	 greater	 private	 sector	 participation	
in	 power,	 telecommunications	 and	 transport	
(Indonesia,	 Ministry	 of	 National	 Development	
Planning		2011;	Calderon	and	Serven	2010;	OECD	
2012;	 India,	Planning	Commission	2011).	Even	 in	
water	 and	 sanitation,	 private	 sector	 participation	
can	be	as	high	as	20	per	cent	 in	some	countries.	
At	 the	 same	 time,	 although	 the	 rate	 reaches	 80	
per	 cent	 in	 a	 number	 of	 developed	 countries,	 it	
can	be	as	low	as	20	per	cent	in	others,	indicating	
varying	public	policy	preferences	due	to	the	social	
importance	of	water	and	sanitation	in	all	countries.	
Given	the	sensitivity	of	water	provision	to	the	poor	
in	 developing	 countries,	 it	 is	 likely	 that	 the	 public	
sector	 there	will	 retain	 its	primacy	 in	 this	 industry,	
although	a	greater	role	for		private	sector	in	urban	
areas	is	likely.
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Box Iv.2. data, methods and sources used in this section
As	the	contours	of	the	future	SDGs	are	becoming	clearer,	many	organizations	and	stakeholders	in	the	process	have	
drawn	up	estimates	of	the	additional	financing	requirements	associated	with	the	economic,	social	and	environmental	
pillars	of	sustainable	development.	Such	estimates	take	different	forms.	They	may	be	lump-sum	financing	needs	
until	2030	or	annual	requirements.	They	may	aggregate	operational	costs	and	capital	expenditures.	And	they	are	
often	global	estimates,	as	some	of	the	SDGs	are	aimed	at	global	commons	(e.g.	climate	change	mitigation).
This	 section	 uses	 data	 on	 SDG	 investment	 requirements	 as	 estimated	 and	 published	 by	 specialized	 agencies,	
institutions	 and	 research	 entities	 in	 their	 respective	 areas	 of	 competence,	 using	 a	meta-analytic	 approach.	 As	
much	as	possible,	the	section	aims	to	express	all	data	 in	common	terms:	(i)	as	annual	or	annualized	investment	
requirements	and	gaps;	(ii)	focusing	on investment	(capital	expenditures	only);	and	(iii)	primarily	narrowing	the	scope	
to	investment	in	developing	countries	only.	Any	estimates	by	UNCTAD	are	as	much	as	possible	consistent	with	the	
work	of	other	agencies	and	institutions.	Figures	are	quoted	on	a	constant	price	basis	to	allow	comparisons	between	
current	investment,	future	investment	needs	and	gaps.	However	agencies’	estimates	use	different	base	years	for	the	
GDP	deflator,	and	the	GDP	rate	assumed	also	varies	(usually	between	4–5	per	cent	constant	GDP	growth).	
This	 section	 has	 extensively	 reviewed	 many	 studies	 and	 analyses	 to	 establish	 consensus	 estimates	 on	 future	
investment	requirements.1	The	principal	sources	drawn	upon	are:		
•	 Infrastructure:	McKinsey	 provided	 valuable	 support,	 including	 access	 to	 the	MGI	 ISS	 database.	McKinsey	
(2013),	Bhattacharya	et	al.	in	collaboration	with	G-24	(2012),	MDB	Committee	on	Development	Effectiveness	
(2011),	Fay	et	al	(2011),	Airoldi	et	al.	(2013),	OECD	(2006,	2007,	2012),	WEF/PwC	(2012).
•	 Climate	Change:	CPI	and	UNCTAD	jointly	determined	the	investment	needs	ranges	provided	in	table	IV.2,	in-
cluding	unpublished	CPI	analysis.	Buchner	et	al.	(2013),	World	Bank	(2010),	McKinsey	(2009),	IEA	(2009,	2012),	
UNFCCC	(2007),	WEF	(2013).
•	 Food	security	and	agriculture:	FAO	analysis,	updated	 jointly	by	FAO-UNCTAD;	context	and	methodology	 in	
Schmidhuber	and	Bruinsma	(2011).	
•	 Ecosystems/Biodiversity:	HLP	(2012)	and	Kettunen	et	al.	(2013).
Further	 information	and	subsidiary	sources	used	are	provided	 in	 table	 IV.2.	These	sources	were	used	 to	 “sense	
check”	the	numbers	in	table	IV.2	and	estimate	the	private	share	of	investment	in	each	sector.
There	are	no	available	studies	on	social	sectors	(health	and	education)	conducted	on	a	basis	comparable	to	the	above	
sectors.	UNCTAD	estimated	investment	needs	over	2015-2030	for	social	sectors	using	a	methodology	common	to	
studies	in	other	sectors,	i.e.	the	sum	of:	the	annualized	investment	required	to	shift	low-income	developing	countries	
to	 the	next	 level	of	middle	 income	developing	countries,	 the	 investment	 required	 to	shift	 this	 latter	group	 to	 the	
next	level,	and	so	on.	The	raw	data	required	for	the	estimations	were	primarily	derived	from	the	World	Bank,	World	
Development	Indicators	Database.	
The	 data	 presented	 in	 this	 chapter,	 while	 drawing	 on	 and	 consistent	 with	 other	 organizations,	 and	 based	 on	
recognized	methodological	principles,	should	nonetheless	be	treated	only	as	a	guide	to	likely	investment.	In	addition	
to	the	many	data	and	methodological	difficulties	that	confront	all	agencies,	projections	many	years	into	the	future	
can	never	fully	anticipate	the	dynamic	nature	of	climate	change,	population	growth	and	interest	rates	–	all	of	which	
will	 have	unknown	 impacts	on	 investment	 and	development	 needs.2	Bearing	 in	mind	 the	 above	 limitations,	 the	
estimates	reported	in	this	section	provide	orders	of	magnitude	of	investment	requirements,	gaps	and	private	sector	
participation.
Source:	UNCTAD.
1		 In	a	number	of	cases,	 this	section	draws	on	estimates	 for	 future	 investment	 requirements	and	gaps	not	made	
specifically	with	SDGs	 in	mind.	Nevertheless,	 the	aims	underlying	 these	estimates	are	normally	 for	sustainable	
development	purposes	consistent	with	 the	SDGs	 (e.g.	estimates	pertaining	 to	climate	change	mitigation	or	
infrastructure).	This	approach	has	also	been	taken	by	the	UN	System	Task	Team	(UNTT	2013)	and	other	United	
Nations	bodies	aiming	to	estimate	the	financing	and	investment	implications	of	the	SDGs.	
2	 For	 instance,	a	spate	of	megaprojects	 in	power	and	road	transport	 in	developing	countries	during	 the	 last	 few	
years	has	caused	the	proportion	of	infrastructure	to	GDP	to	rise	for	developing	countries	as	a	whole.	A	number	of	
studies	on	projected	investment	requirements	in	infrastructure	–	which	assume	a	baseline	ratio	of	infrastructure,	
normally	3-4	per	cent	–	do	not	fully	factor	this	development	in.
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Table IV.2. Current investment, investment needs and gaps and private sector participation in key SDG 
sectors in developing countriesa
2015-2030
Sector Description
Estimated
current 
investment
Total 
investment  
required
Investment 
Gap
Average private sector 
participation in current 
investmentb
(latest	
available	year)
$	billion
Annualized	$	billion
(constant	price)
Developing
countries
Developed	
countries
A B C = B - A Per	cent
Powerc
Investment	in	generation,	
transmission	and	distribution	of	
electricity
~260 630–950 370–690 40–50 80–100
Transportc Investment	in	roads,	airports,	ports	and	rail ~300 350–770 50–470 30–40 60–80
Telecommunicationsc Investment	in	infrastructure	(fixed	lines,	mobile	and	internet) ~160 230–400 70–240 40–80 60–100
Water	and	sanitationc Provision	of	water	and	sanitation	to	industry	and	households ~150 ~410 ~260 0–20 20–80
Food	security	and	
agriculture
Investment	in	agriculture,	research,	
rural	development,	safety	nets,	etc. ~220 ~480 ~260 ~75 ~90
Climate	change	
mitigation
Investment	in	relevant	infrastructure,	
renewable	energy	generation,	
research	and	deployment	of	climate-
friendly	technologies,	etc.
170 550–850 380–680 ~40 ~90
Climate	change	
adaptation
Investment	to	cope	with	impact	
of	climate	change	in	agriculture,	
infrastructure,	water	management,	
coastal	zones,	etc.
~20 80–120 60–100 0–20 0–20
Eco-systems/
biodiversity
Investment	in	conservation	and	
safeguarding	ecosystems,	marine	
resource	management,	sustainable	
forestry,	etc.
70–210d
Health Infrastructural	investment,	e.g.	new	hospitals ~70 ~210 ~140 ~20 ~40
Education Infrastructural	investment,	e.g.	new	schools ~80 ~330 ~250 ~15 0–20
Source:		 UNCTAD.
a		 Investment	refers	to	capital	expenditure.	Operating	expenditure,	though	sometimes	referred	to	as	‘investment’	is	not	included.	
The	main	sources	used,	in	addition	to	those	in	box	IV.2,	include,	by	sector: 
 Infrastructure:	ABDI	(2009);	Australia,	Bureau	of	Infrastructure,	Transport	and	Regional	Economics	(2012);	Banerjee	(2006);	
Bhattacharyay	(2012);	Australia,	Reserve	Bank	(2013);	Doshi	et	al.	(2007);	Calderon	and	Serven	(2010);	Cato	Institute	(2013);	
US	Congress	(2008);	Copeland	and	Tiemann	(2010);	Edwards	(2013);	EPSU	(2012);	Estache	(2010);	ETNO	(2013);	Foster	and	
Briceno-Garmendia	(2010);	Goldman	Sachs	(2013);	G-30	(2013);	Gunatilake	and	Carangal-San	Jose	(2008);	Hall	and	Lobina	
(2010);	UK	H.M.	Treasury	(2011,	2013);	Inderst	(2013);	Indonesia,	Ministry	of	National	Development	Planning	(2011);	Izaguirre	
and	Kulkarni	(2011);	Lloyd-Owen	(2009);	McKinsey	(2011b);	Perrotti	and	Sánchez	(2011);	Pezon	(2009);	Pisu	(2010);	India,	
Planning	Commission	(2011,	2012);	Rhodes	(2013);	Rodriguez	et	al.	(2012);	Wagenvoort	et	al.	(2010);	World	Bank	(2013a)	
and	Yepes	(2008);	
	 Climate Change:		AfDB	et	al.	(2012);	Buchner	et	al.	(2011,	2012)	and	Helm	et	al.(2010).	
	 Social sectors:	Baker	(2010);	High	Level	Task	Force	on	Innovative	International	Financing	for	Health	Systems	(2009);	Institute	
for	Health	Metrics	and	Evaluation	(2010,	2012);	Leading	Group	on	Innovative	Financing	to	Fund	Development	(2010);	McCoy	
et	al.	(2009);	The	Lancet	(2011,	2013);	WHO	(2012)	and	UNESCO	(2012,	2013).
b		 The	private	sector	share	for	each	sector	shows	large	variability	between	countries.	
c		 Excluding	investment	required	for	climate	change,	which	is	included	in	the	totals	for	climate	change	mitigation	and	adaptation.	
d		 Investment	requirements	in	ecosystems/biodiversity	are	not	included	in	the	totals	used	in	the	analysis	in	this	section,	as	they	
overlap	with	other	sectors.
CHAPTER Iv  Investing	in	the	SDGs:	An	Action	Plan	for	promoting	private	sector	contributions 143
 Food security
Turning	 to	 investment	 in	 food security and 
agriculture, current	 relevant	 investment	 is	 around	
$220	billion	per	year.	Investment	needs	in	this	area	
refer	to	the	FAO’s	“zero	hunger	target”	and	primarily	
covers	 investment	 in	 relevant	 agriculture	 areas	
such	as:	agriculture-specific	 infrastructure,	natural	
resource	 development,	 research,	 and	 food	 safety	
nets,	which	are	all	a	part	of	the	relevant	SDG	goals.	
On	 this	 basis,	 total	 investment	 needs	 are	 around	
$480	 billion	 per	 year,	 implying	 an	 annual	 gap	 of	
some	$260	billion	over	and	above	the	current	level.	
The	corporate	sector	contribution	in	the	agricultural	
sector	as	a	whole	is	already	high	at	75	per	cent	in	
developing	countries,	 and	 is	 likely	 to	be	higher	 in	
the	future	(as	in	developed	countries).	
Social infrastructure
Investment	 in	 social	 infrastructure,	 such	 as	
education	 and	 health,	 is	 a	 prerequisite	 for	
effective	 sustainable	 development,	 and	 therefore	
an	 important	 component	 of	 the	 SDGs.	 Currently	
investment	 in	 education	 is	 about	 $80	 billion	 per	
year	 in	 developing	 countries.	 In	 order	 to	 move	
towards	 sustainable	 development	 in	 this	 sector	
would	require	$330	billion	to	be	invested	per	year,	
implying	an	annual	gap	of	about	$250	billion	over	
and	above	the	current	level.		
Investment	 in	health	 is	 currently	 about	 $70	billion	
in	 developing	 countries.	 The	SDGs	would	 require	
investment	 of	 $210	 billion	 per	 year,	 implying	 an	
investment	gap	of	some	$140	billion	per	year	over	
and	 above	 the	 current	 level.	 The	 private	 sector	
investment	contribution	in	healthcare	in	developing	
countries	as	a	whole	is	already	very	high,	and	this	
is	 likely	 to	 continue,	 though	 perhaps	 less	 so	 in	
vulnerable	 economies.	 In	 contrast,	 the	 corporate	
contribution	 in	 both	 developed	 and	 developing	
countries	in	education	is	small	to	negligible	and	likely	
to	 remain	 that	way.	Generally,	 unlike	 in	 economic	
infrastructure,	 private	 sector	 contributions	 to	
investment	 in	social	 infrastructure	are	not	 likely	 to	
see	a	marked	increase.	
For	 investment	 in	 social	 infrastructure	 it	 is	 also	
especially	important	to	take	into	account	additional	
operational	 expenditures	 as	 well	 as	 capital	
expenditures	 (i.e.	 investment	 per	 se).	 The	 relative	
weight	 of	 capital	 expenditures	 and	 operating	
expenditures	varies	considerably	between	sectors,	
depending	 on	 technology,	 capital	 intensity,	 the	
importance	 of	 the	 service	 component	 and	 many	
other	factors.	In	meeting	SDG	objectives,	operating	
expenditures	 cannot	 be	 ignored,	 especially	 in	
new	 facilities.	 In	 the	 case	 of	 health,	 for	 example,	
operating	 expenditures	 are	 high	 as	 a	 share	 of	
annual	 spending	 in	 the	 sector.	 After	 all,	 investing	
in	 new	 hospitals	 in	 a	 developing	 country	 is	
insufficient	to	deliver	health	services	–	that	is	to	say	
doctors,	nurses,	administrators,	etc.	are	essential.	
Consideration	of	operating	cost	 is	 important	 in	all	
sectors;	not	allowing	for	this	aspect	could	see	the	
gains	of	investment	in	the	SDGs	reversed.	
Environmental sustainability
Investment	 requirements	 for	 environmental 
sustainability objectives	 are	 by	 nature	 hard	 to	
separate	from	investments	in	economic	and	social	
objectives.	To	avoid	double	counting,	the	figures	for	
the	 investment	gap	 for	 economic	 infrastructure	 in	
table	IV.2	exclude	estimates	of	additional	investment	
required	 for	 climate	 change	 adaptation	 and	
mitigation.	The	figures	for	social	 infrastructure	and	
agriculture	 are	 similarly	 adjusted	 (although	 some	
overlap	remains).	From	a	purely	environmental	point	
of	view,	including	stewardship	of	global	commons,	
the	 investment	 gap	 is	 largely	 captured	 through	
estimates	for	climate	change,	especially	mitigation,	
and	 under	 ecosystems/biodiversity	 (including	
forests,	oceans,	etc.).	
Current	investments	for	climate	change	mitigation,	
i.e.	 to	 limit	 the	 rise	 in	 average	 global	 warming	 to	
2o	Celsius,	are	$170	billion	in	developing	countries,	
but	require	a	large	increase	over	2015-2030	(table	
IV.2).	Only	a	minority	share	is	presently	contributed	
by	the	private	sector	–	estimates	range	up	to	40	per	
cent	in	developing	countries.	A	bigger	contribution	
is	possible,	inasmuch	as	the	equivalent	contribution	
in	 developed	 countries	 is	 roughly	 90	 per	 cent,	
though	much	of	 this	 is	 the	 result	 of	 legislation	 as	
well	as	incentives	and	specific	initiatives.
The	 estimated	 additional	 investment	 required	
for	 climate	 change	 mitigation	 are	 not	 just	 for	
infrastructure,	 but	 for	 all	 sectors	 –	 although	 the	
specific	areas	for	action	depend	very	much	on	the	
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Figure IV.2. example investment needs in vulnerable and excluded groups
(Billions of dollars per year)
Source:	:	UNCTAD,	WHO	(2012),	IEA	(2009,	2011),	World	Bank	and	IEA	(2013),	Bazilian	et	al.		(2010)	and	UNESCO	(2013).
Note:	 These	needs	are	calculated	on	a	different	basis	from	table	IV.2	and	the	numbers	are	not	directly	comparable.
types	of	policies	and	legislation	that	are	enacted	by	
governments	 (WIR10).	 In	 future	 these	policies	will	
be	 informed	by	the	SDGs,	 including	those	related	
to	 areas	 such	 as	 growth,	 industrialization	 and	
sustainable	cities/settlements.	The	size	and	pattern	
of	future	investment	in	climate	change	in	developing	
countries	(and	developed	ones)	depends	very	much	
on	which	policies	 are	 adopted	 (e.g.	 feed-in	 tariffs	
for	 renewable	 energy,	 emissions	 from	 cars,	 the	
design	of	buildings,	etc.),	which	is	why	the	range	of	
estimates	is	wide.	
Investment	 in	 climate	 change	 adaptation	 in	
developing	 countries	 is	 currently	 very	 small,	 in	
the	 order	of	 $20	billion	per	 year,	but	 also	need	
to	 increase	 substantially,	 even	 if	 mitigation	 is	
successful	 (table	 IV.2).	 If	 it	 is	 not,	 with	 average	
temperatures	 rising	 further	 than	 anticipated,	 then	
adaptation	 needs	 will	 accelerate	 exponentially,	
especially	with	 respect	 to	 infrastructure	 in	 coastal	
regions,	 water	 resource	 management	 and	 the	
viability	of	ecosystems.	
The	 current	 private	 sector	 share	 of	 investment	 in	
climate	change	adaptation	in	developing	countries	
appears	 to	be	no	different,	 at	 up	 to	20	per	 cent,	
than	in	developed	ones.	In	both	cases	considerable	
inventiveness	 is	 required	 to	 boost	 corporate	
contribution	 into	 territory	 which	 has	 traditionally	
been	 seen	 as	 the	 purview	 of	 the	 State,	 and	 in	
which	–	from	a	private	sector	perspective	–	the	risks	
outweigh	the	returns.	
Other investment needs: towards 
inclusiveness and universality
There	are	vulnerable	communities	in	all	economies.	
This	 is	 perhaps	 more	 so	 in	 structurally	 weak	
economies	such	as	LDCs,	but	numerically	greater	
pockets	 of	 poverty	 exist	 in	 better	 off	 developing	
countries	(in	terms	of	average	incomes)	such	as	in	
South	Asia.	
Thus,	 while	 the	 estimated	 investment	 needs	
discussed	in	this	section	are	intended	to	meet	the	
overall	 requirements	 for	 sustainable	 investment	 in	
all	developing	countries,	they	may	not	fully	address	
the	 specific	circumstance	of	many	of	 the	poorest	
communities	 or	 groups,	 especially	 those	who	are	
isolated	(e.g.	in	rural	areas	or	in	forests)	or	excluded	
(e.g.	people	living	in	slums).	
For	 this	 reason,	 a	 number	 of	 prospective	 SDGs	
(or	specific	elements	of	all	SDGs)	–	such	as	those	
focusing	 on	 energy,	water	 and	 sanitation,	 gender	
and	 equality	 –	 include	 elements	 addressing	 the	
prerequisites	 of	 the	 otherwise	 marginalized.	
Selected	 examples	 of	 potential	 types	 of	 targets	
Universal access to clean drinking
water and sanitation
Universal access to energy
Universal access to schooling
Estimated current investment and private sector 
participation ($ Billion/year)
10-15
~ 10
Estimated annual 
investment needs
~ 80
~ 50
~ 30
Private sector 
participation
>100
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Potential private sector contribution to bridging the gap
At current level of participation 
At a higher rate of participation
3.9
1.4
2.5
Total annual
investment needs
Current annual
investment
Annual 
investment
gap
1.8
0.9
Figure IV.3.  estimated annual investment needs and potential private sector contribution, 
2015–2030
(Trillions of dollars)
Source:	UNCTAD	based	on	table	IV.2.	
Note:	 Totals	are	the	mid-points	of	range	estimates.
are	presented	 in	 figure	 IV.2,	with	estimates	of	 the	
associated	financing	requirements.
In	most	such	cases	the	private	sector	contribution	
in	 developing	 countries	 is	 low,	 although	 it	 should	
be	possible	to	increase	it	(for	instance,	in	electricity	
access).	However,	boosting	this	share	will	be	easier	
in	 some	 places	 (e.g.	 in	 urban	 areas),	 but	 difficult	
in	others	 (e.g.	 remote	 locations,	among	very	 low-
income	groups,	and	where	the	number	of	individuals	
or	 communities	 are	 relatively	 small	 or	 highly	
dispersed).	The	private	sector	contribution	to	goals	
aimed	 at	 vulnerable	 individuals	 and	 communities	
therefore	needs	to	be	considered	carefully.	
2.  exploring private sector potential
At today’s level of private sector participation in 
SDG investments in developing countries, a funding 
shortfall of some $1.6 trillion would be left for the 
public sector (and ODA) to cover.
The	previous	section	has	established	the	order	of	
magnitude	 of	 the	 investment	 gap	 that	 has	 to	 be	
bridged	 in	 order	 to	meet	 the	 SDGs.	 Total	 annual	
SDG-related	 investment	 needs	 in	 developing	
countries	until	2030	are	in	the	range	of	$3.3	to	$4.5	
trillion,	based	on	estimates	for	the	most	important	
SDG	 sectors	 from	 an	 investment	 point	 of	 view	
(figure	 IV.3).	 This	 entails	 a	 mid-point	 estimate	 of	
$3.9	 trillion	 per	 year.	 Subtracting	 current	 annual	
investment	 of	 $1.4	 trillion	 leaves	 a	 mid-point	
estimated	investment	gap	of	$2.5	trillion,	over	and	
above	current	 levels.	At	 the	current	private	sector	
share	 of	 investment	 in	 SDG	 areas,	 the	 private	
sector	 would	 cover	 only	 $900	 billion	 of	 this	 gap,	
leaving	 $1.6	 trillion	 to	 be	 covered	 by	 the	 public	
sector	 (including	 ODA).	 For	 developing	 countries	
as	 a	 group,	 including	 fast-growing	 emerging	
markets,	 this	scenario	corresponds	approximately	
to	 a	 “business	 as	 usual”	 scenario;	 i.e.	 at	 current	
average	 growth	 rates	 of	 private	 investment,	 the	
current	 private	 sector	 share	 of	 total	 investment	
needs	could	be	covered.	However,	 increasing	 the	
participation	of	the	private	sector	in	SDG	financing	
in	 developing	 countries	 could	 potentially	 cover	 a	
larger	part	of	the	gap,	if	the	relative	share	of	private	
sector	 investment	 increased	 to	 levels	observed	 in	
developed	countries.	It	is	clear	that	in	order	to	avoid	
what	 could	 be	 unrealistic	 demands	 on	 the	 public	
sector	 in	 many	 developing	 countries,	 the	 SDGs	
must	 be	 accompanied	 by	 strategic	 initiatives	 to	
increase	private	sector	participation.	
The	 potential	 for	 increasing	 private	 sector	
participation	 is	 greater	 in	 some	 sectors	 than	 in	
others	 (figure	 IV.4).	 Infrastructure	sectors,	such	as	
power	and	renewable	energy	(under	climate	change	
mitigation),	 transport	 and	 water	 and	 sanitation,	
are	 natural	 candidates	 for	 greater	 private	 sector	
participation,	 under	 the	 right	 conditions	 and	 with	
appropriate	 safeguards.	 Other	 SDG	 sectors	 are	
less	 likely	to	generate	significantly	higher	amounts	
of	private	sector	interest,	either	because	it	is	difficult	
to	 design	 risk-return	 models	 attractive	 to	 private	
investors	 (e.g.	 climate	 change	 adaptation),	 or	
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Figure IV.4.  Potential private-sector contribution to investment gaps at current and high participation levels
(Billions of dollars)
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Source:	UNCTAD.
Note:		 Private-sector	contribution	to	investment	gaps	calculated	using	mid-points	of	range	estimates	in	table	IV.2.	The	higher	
participation	level	is	the	average	private-sector	investment	shares	observed	in	developed	countries.	Some	sectors	do	
not	have	a	range	of	estimates,	hence	the	mid-point	is	the	single	estimated	gap.
because	they	are	more	in	the	realm	of	public	sector	
responsibilities	 and	 consequently	 highly	 sensitive	
to	 private	 sector	 involvement	 (e.g.	 education	 and	
healthcare).
3.  Realistic targets for private sector 
SDG investment in lDCs
The SDGs will necessitate a significant increase in 
public sector investment and ODA in LDCs. In order 
to reduce pressure on public funding requirements, 
a doubling of the growth rate of private investment 
is desirable.
Investment	and	private	sector	engagement	across	
SDG	sectors	are	highly	variable	across	developing	
countries.	 The	 extent	 to	 which	 policy	 action	 to	
increase	 private	 sector	 investment	 is	 required	
therefore	differs	by	country	and	country	grouping.	
Emerging	markets	face	entirely	different	conditions	
to	vulnerable	economies	such	as	LDCs,	LLDCs	and	
small	 island	 developing	 States	 (SIDS),	 which	 are	
necessarily	a	focus	of	the	post-2015	SDG	agenda.	
In	 LDCs,	 for	 instance,	 ODA	 remains	 the	 largest	
external	capital	flow,	at	$43	billion	 in	2012	(OECD	
2013a),	 compared	 to	 FDI	 inflows	 of	 $28	 billion	
and	 remittances	of	$31	billion	 in	2013.	Moreover,	
a	 significant	 proportion	 of	 ODA	 is	 spent	 on	
government	 budget	 support	 and	 goes	 directly	 to	
SDG	 sectors	 like	 education	 and	 health.	Given	 its	
importance	to	welfare	systems	and	public	services,	
ODA	will	continue	to	have	an	important	role	to	play	
in	 the	 future	 ecology	 of	 development	 finance	 in	
LDCs	and	other	vulnerable	economies;	and	often	it	
will	be	indispensable.	
Nevertheless,	 precisely	 because	 the	 SDGs	 entail	
a	large-scale	increase	in	financing	requirements	in	
LDCs	and	other	vulnerable	economies	 (relative	 to	
their	economic	size	and	financing	capacity),	policy	
intervention	 to	 boost	 private	 investment	 will	 also	
be	 a	 priority.	 It	 is	 therefore	 useful	 to	 examine	 the	
degree	 to	which	private	sector	 investment	should	
be	targeted	by	such	policy	actions.
Extrapolating	 from	 the	 earlier	 analysis	 of	 the	 total	
SDG	investment	need	for	developing	countries	as	
a	whole	 (at	 about	 $3.9	 trillion	per	 year),	 the	 LDC	
share	of	investment	in	SDG	sectors,	based	on	the	
current	size	of	their	economies	and	on	the	specific	
needs	related	to	vulnerable	communities,	amounts	
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Figure IV.5. Private sector SDG investment scenarios in lDCs
Source:	UNCTAD	estimates,	based	on	table	IV.2	and	figure	IV.3.	
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to	nearly	$120	billion	a	year	and	a	total	for	the	2015-
2030	 period	 of	 $1.8	 trillion.	 Current	 investments	
in	 LDCs	 in	 SDG	 sectors	 are	 around	 $40	 billion.3	
Figure	IV.5	provides	an	example	of	a	target-setting	
scenario	for	private	investment	in	LDCs.	
Total	investment	needs	of	$1.8	trillion	would	imply	a	
target	in	2030,	the	final	year	of	the	period,	of	$240	
billion.4	 The	 current	 growth	 rate	 of	 private	 sector	
investment	 in	LDCs,	at	around	8	per	cent,	would	
quadruple	investment	by	2030,	but	still	fall	short	of	
the	 investment	 required	 (Scenario	 1).	 This	 “doing	
nothing”	scenario	thus	leaves	a	shortfall	that	would	
have	 to	be	filled	by	public	sector	 funds,	 including	
ODA,	 requiring	 an	 eight-fold	 increase	 to	 2030.	
This	scenario,	with	 the	 limited	 funding	capabilities	
of	 LDC	 governments	 and	 the	 fact	 that	 much	 of	
ODA	 in	 LDCs	 is	 already	 used	 to	 support	 current 
(not	 investment)	 spending	 by	 LDC	 governments,	
is	 therefore	 not	 a	 viable	 option.	 Without	 higher	
levels	 of	 private	 sector	 investment,	 the	 financing	
requirements	 associated	 with	 the	 prospective	
SDGs	 in	 LDCs	 will	 be	 unrealistic	 for	 the	 public	
sector	to	bear.
One	 target	 for	 the	 promotion	 of	 private	 sector	
investment	in	SDGs	could	be	to	cover	that	part	of	
the	total	investment	needs	that	corresponds	to	its	
current	share	of	investment	in	LDCs’	SDG	sectors	
(40	per	cent),	requiring	a	private	sector	investment	
growth	rate	of	11	per	cent	per	year	but	still	implying	
a	six-fold	increase	in	public	sector	investment	and	
ODA	by	 2030	 (Scenario	 2).	 A	 “stretch”	 target	 for	
private	 investment	 (but	 one	 that	 would	 reduce	
public	funding	requirements	to	more	realistic	levels)	
could	 be	 to	 raise	 the	 share	 of	 the	 private	 sector	
in	SDG	 investments	 to	 the	75	per	cent	observed	
in	 developed	 countries.	 This	 would	 obviously	
require	the	right	policy	setting	both	to	attract	such	
investment	and	to	put	 in	place	appropriate	public	
policy	safeguards,	and	would	imply	the	provision	of	
relevant	technical	assistance.	Such	a	stretch	target	
would	ease	the	pressure	on	public	sector	funds	and	
ODA,	but	still	imply	almost	trebling	the	current	level.	
Public	 sector	 funds,	 and	 especially	 ODA,	 will	
therefore	remain	important	for	SDG	investments	in	
LDCs,	including	for	leveraging	further	private	sector	
participation.	At	the	same	time,	the	private	sector	
contribution	must	also	rise	in	order	to	achieve	the	
SDGs.
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Box Iv.3. External sources of finance and the role of FdI
External	sources	of	finance	to	developing	and	transition	economies	include	FDI,	portfolio	investment,	other	investment	
flows	(mostly	bank	loans),	ODA	and	remittances.	Together	these	flows	amount	to	around	$2	trillion	annually	(box	
figure	IV.3.1).	After	a	sharp	drop	during	the	global	financial	crisis	they	returned	to	high	levels	in	2010,	although	they	
have	seen	a	slight	decline	since	then,	driven	primarily	by	fluctuating	flows	in	bank	loans	and	portfolio	investment.	
The	composition	of	external	sources	of	finance	differs	by	countries’	level	of	development	(box	figure	IV.3.2).	FDI	is	an	
important	source	for	all	groups	of	developing	countries,	including	LDCs.	ODA	accounts	for	a	relatively	large	share	of	
external	finance	in	LDCs,	whereas	these	countries	receive	a	low	amount	of	portfolio	investment,	reflecting	the	lack	
of	developed	financial	markets.		
The	 components	 of	 external	 finance	 show	
different	 degrees	 of	 volatility.	 FDI	 has	 been	 the	
largest	 and	 most	 stable	 component	 over	 the	
past	 decade,	 and	 the	most	 resilient	 to	 financial	
and	 economic	 crises.	 It	 now	 accounts	 for	 just	
under	 half	 of	 all	 net	 capital	 flows	 to	 developing	
and	 transition	 economies.	 The	 relative	 stability	
and	steady	growth	of	FDI	arises	primarily	because	
it	 is	 associated	 with	 the	 build-up	 of	 productive	
capacity	 in	 host	 countries.	Direct	 investors	 tend	
to	 take	 a	 long-term	 interest	 in	 assets	 located	
in	 host	 countries,	 leading	 to	 longer	 gestation	
periods	 for	 investment	 decisions,	 and	 making	
existing	 investments	 more	 difficult	 to	 unwind.	
FDI	thus	tends	to	be	less	sensitive	to	short-term	
macroeconomic,	 exchange	 rate	 or	 interest	 rate	
fluctuations.
 /... 
Box figure Iv.3.1. External development finance to developing 
and transition economies, 2007–2013
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Source:	UNCTAD,	based	on	data	from	IMF	(for	portfolio	and	other	investment),	from	
the	UNCTAD	FDI-TNC-GVC	Information	System	(for	FDI	inflows),	from	OECD	
(for	ODA)	and	the	World	Bank	(for	remittances).
Note:		 Data	are	shown	 in	 the	standard	balance-of-payments	presentation,	 thus	
on	a	net	basis.	
Box figure Iv.3.2. Composition of external sources 
of development finance, 2012
Source:	UNCTAD,	based	on	data	from	IMF	(for	portfolio	and	other	
investment),	 from	the	UNCTAD	FDI-TNC-GVC	 Information	
System	(for	FDI	inflows),	from	OECD	(for	ODA)	and	the	World	
Bank	(for	remittances).
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Reaching	 the	 “stretch”	 target	over	a	period	of	15	
years	 requires	 a	 doubling	 in	 the	 current	 growth	
rate	 of	 private	 investment.	 Such	 an	 increase	
has	 implications	 for	 the	 components	 of	 private	
investment.	 For	 instance,	 foreign	 investment,	
especially	 FDI,	 is	 relatively	 important	 in	 private	
sector	 capital	 formation	 in	 LDCs	 (box	 IV.3).	While	
FDI	amounts	to	less	than	10	per	cent	of	the	value	
of	 gross	 fixed	 capital	 formation	 in	 developing	
countries,	 in	LDCs	it	reaches	around	15	per	cent,	
with	higher	peaks	in	particular	groups	of	structurally	
weak	 economies	 (for	 example,	more	 than	 23	per	
cent	in	landlocked	developing	countries).	As	private	
capital	formation	is	around	half	of	the	total	in	LDCs	
on	 average,	 foreign	 investment	 could	 therefore	
constitute	close	to	30	per	cent	of	private	investment,	
potentially	with	higher	growth	potential.	Pursuing	a	
“stretch”	target	for	private	investment	in	LDCs	may	
thus	require	a	particular	focus	on	the	attraction	of	
external	sources	of	private	finance.	
Box Iv.3. External sources of finance and the role of FdI (concluded)
The	nature	of	FDI	as	a	relatively	stable	and	long-term	investment	in	productive	assets	thus	brings	it	close	to	the	type	
of	investment	required	in	SDG	sectors.	A	number	of	caveats	are	warranted,	including:	
•	 The	relative	importance	of	FDI	is	lower	in	the	poorest	countries;	on	its	own,	FDI	(like	all	types	of	private	sector	
investment)	will	first	flow	to	lower	risk/higher	return	opportunities,	both	in	terms	of	location	and	in	terms	of	sec-
tor.	This	is	an	important	consideration	in	balancing	public	and	private	investment	policy	priorities.
•	 FDI	 flows	do	not	 always	 translate	 into	 equivalent	 capital	 expenditures,	 especially	where	 they	 are	driven	by	
retained	earnings	or	by	transactions	(such	as	mergers	and	acquisitions	(M&As),	although	some	M&A	transac-
tions,	such	as	brownfield	investment	in	agriculture	do	results	in	significant	capital	expenditure).
•	 FDI	can	contain	short-term,	relatively	volatile	components,	such	as	“hot	money”	or	investments	in	real	estate.	
Nevertheless,	a	comparison	with	other	external	sources	of	finance	shows	that	FDI	will	have	a	key	role	to	play	 in	
investing	in	the	SDGs.	For	example,	ODA	is	partly	used	for	direct	budgetary	support	in	the	poorest	countries	and	
on	current	spending	 in	SDG	sectors,	 rather	 than	 for	capital	expenditures.	Remittances	are	predominantly	spent	
on	household	consumption	(although	a	small	but	growing	share	is	used	for	investment	entrepreneurial	ventures).	
Portfolio	investment	is	typically	in	more	liquid	financial	assets	rather	than	in	fixed	capital	and	tends	to	be	more	volatile.	
And	with	portfolio	 investment,	bank	 loans	have	been	 the	most	volatile	external	source	of	finance	 for	developing	
economies	over	the	last	decade.
	Source:	UNCTAD.
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1.  leadership challenges in raising 
private sector investment in the SDGs 
Increasing the involvement of private investors 
in SDG sectors, many of which are sensitive or 
involve public services, leads to a number of policy 
dilemmas. Public and private sector investment are 
no substitutes, but they can be complementary.
Measures	 to	 increase	 private	 sector	 involvement	
in	 investment	 in	 sustainable	 development	 lead	 to	
a	number	of	policy	dilemmas	which	require	careful	
consideration.
•	 Increasing private investment is necessary. 
But the role of public investment remains 
fundamental.	 Increases	 in	 private	 sector	
investment	 to	 help	 achieve	 the	 prospective	
SDGs	 are	 necessary,	 but	 public	 sector	
investment	 remains	 vital	 and	 central.	 The	
two	 sectors	 are	 not	 substitutes,	 they	 are	
complementary.	 Moreover,	 the	 role	 of	 the	
public	sector	goes	beyond	 investment	per	se,	
and	 includes	 all	 the	 conditions	 necessary	 to	
meet	the	SDG	challenge.	
•	 Attracting private investment into SDG sectors 
entails a conducive investment climate. 
At the same time, there are risks involved. 
Private	 sector	 engagement	 in	 a	 number	 of	
SDG	 sectors	 where	 a	 strong	 public	 sector	
responsibility	 exists	 has	 traditionally	 been	 a	
sensitive	issue.	Private	sector	service	provision	
in	 healthcare	 and	 education,	 for	 instance,	
can	 have	 negative	 effects	 on	 standards	
unless	 strong	 governance	 and	 oversight	
is	 in	 place,	 which	 in	 turn	 requires	 capable	
institutions	 and	 technical	 competencies.	
Private	 sector	 involvement	 in	 essential	
infrastructure	 industries,	 such	 as	 power	
or	 telecommunications	 can	 be	 sensitive	 in	
countries	 where	 this	 implies	 the	 transfer	 of	
public	 sector	 assets	 to	 the	 private	 sector,	
requiring	 appropriate	 safeguards	 against	
anti-competitive	 behaviour	 and	 for	 consumer	
protection.	 Private	 sector	 operations	 in	
infrastructure	 such	 as	 water	 and	 sanitation	
are	particularly	sensitive	because	of	 the	basic-
needs	nature	of	these	sectors.	
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•	 Private sector investors require attractive risk-
return rates. At the same time, basic-needs 
services must be accessible and affordable 
to all.	 The	 fundamental	 hurdle	 for	 increased	
private	 sector	 contributions	 to	 investment	 in	
SDG	 sectors	 is	 the	 inadequate	 risk-return	
profile	 of	 many	 such	 investments.	 Perceived	
risks	can	be	high	at	all	levels,	including	country	
and	 political	 risks,	 risks	 related	 to	 the	market	
and	 operating	 environment,	 down	 to	 project	
and	 financial	 risks.	 Projects	 in	 the	 poorest	
countries,	in	particular,	can	be	easily	dismissed	
by	 the	 private	 sector	 as	 “poor	 investments”.	
Many	 mechanisms	 exist	 to	 share	 risks	 or	
otherwise	 improve	 the	 risk-return	 profile	 for	
private	 sector	 investors.	 Increasing	 investment	
returns,	 however,	 cannot	 lead	 to	 the	 services	
provided	 by	 private	 investors	 ultimately	
becoming	 inaccessible	 or	 unaffordable	 for	 the	
poorest	 in	 society.	 Allowing	 energy	 or	 water	
suppliers	 to	cover	only	economically	attractive	
urban	 areas	 while	 ignoring	 rural	 needs,	 or	 to	
raise	 prices	 of	 essential	 services,	 are	 not	 a	
sustainable	outcome.	
•	 The scope of the SDGs is global. But 
LDCs need a special effort to attract more 
private investment.	 From	 the	 perspective	
of	 policymakers	 at	 the	 international	 level,	
the	 problems	 that	 the	 SDGs	 aim	 to	 address	
are	 global	 issues,	 although	 specific	 targets	
may	 focus	 on	 particularly	 acute	 problems	
in	 poor	 countries.	 While	 overall	 financing	 for	
development	 needs	 may	 be	 defined	 globally,	
with	 respect	 to	 private	 sector	 financing	
contribution,	 special	 efforts	 are	 required	 for	
LDCs	and	other	vulnerable	economies.	Without	
targeted	policy	intervention	these	countries	will	
not	be	able	to	attract	resources	from	investors	
which	 often	 regard	 operating	 conditions	 and	
risks	in	those	economies	as	prohibitive.	
2.  meeting the leadership challenge: key 
elements 
The process of increasing private investment in 
SDGs requires leadership at the global level, as well 
as from national policymakers, to provide guiding 
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principles, set targets, galvanize action, foster 
dialogue, and guarantee inclusiveness.
Given	 the	 massive	 financing	 needs	 concomitant	
to	 the	achievement	of	 the	SDGs,	what	 is	needed	
is	a	concerted push,	which	in	turn	requires	strong	
global	 leadership,	 (i)	 providing	 clear	 direction	 and	
basic	principles	of	action,	(ii)	setting	objectives	and	
targets,	 (iii)	 building	strong	and	 lasting	consensus	
among	 many	 stakeholders	 worldwide	 and	 (iv)	
ensuring	 that	 the	process	 is	 inclusive,	keeping	on	
board	countries	that	require	support	along	the	way	
(figure	IV.6).	
Guiding principles for private sector 
investment in the SDGs
The	many	stakeholders	involved	in	stimulating	private	
investment	in	SDGs	will	have	varying	perspectives	
on	how	to	resolve	the	policy	dilemmas	inherent	 in	
seeking	greater	private	sector	participation	in	SDG	
sectors.	A	common	set	of	principles	for	investment	
in	 SDGs	 can	 help	 establish	 a	 collective	 sense	 of	
direction	and	purpose.	
The	 following	 broad	 principles	 could	 provide	 a	
framework.
•	 Balancing liberalization and regulation.	Greater	
private	 sector	 involvement	 in	 SDG	 sectors	
is	 a	 must	 where	 public	 sector	 resources	 are	
insufficient	 (although	 selective,	 gradual	 or	
sequenced	 approaches	 are	 possible);	 at	 the	
same	 time,	 such	 increased	 involvement	 must	
be	 accompanied	 by	 appropriate	 regulations	
and	government	oversight.	
•	 Balancing the need for attractive risk-
return rates with the need for accessible 
and affordable services for all.	 This	 requires	
governments	 to	 proactively	 address	 market	
failures	in	both	respects.	It	means	placing	clear	
obligations	 on	 investors	 and	 extracting	 firm	
commitments,	 while	 providing	 incentives	 to	
improve	 the	 risk-return	 profile	 of	 investment.	
And	 it	 implies	 making	 incentives	 or	 subsidies	
conditional	on	social	inclusiveness.	
•	 Balancing a push for private investment funds 
with the push for public investment. Synergies	
between	 public	 and	 private	 funds	 should	 be	
found	 both	 at	 the	 level	 of	 financial	 resources	
–	 e.g.	 raising	 private	 sector	 funds	 with	 public	
sector	funds	as	base	capital	–	and	at	the	policy	
level,	where	governments	can	seek	to	engage	
Figure IV.6. Providing leadership to the process of raising private-sector investment in the SDGs: 
key challenges and policy options
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Source:	UNCTAD.	
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private	 investors	 to	 support	 programmes	 of	
economic	 or	 public	 service	 reform.	 Private	
and	 public	 sector	 investment	 should	 thus	 be	
complementary	and	mutually	supporting.
•	 Balancing the global scope of the SDGs with 
the need to make a special effort in LDCs.	
Special	 targets	 and	 special	 measures	 should	
be	 adopted	 for	 private	 investment	 in	 LDCs.	
ODA	 and	 public	 funds	 should	 be	 used	where	
possible	 to	 leverage	 further	 private	 sector	
financing.	 And	 targeted	 technical	 assistance	
and	 capacity-building	 should	 be	 aimed	 at	
LDCs	to	help	attract	and	manage	investment.
Beyond	 such	 broad	 principles,	 in	 its	 Investment	
Policy	 Framework	 for	 Sustainable	 Development	
(IPFSD),	 an	 open-source	 tool	 for	 investment	
policymakers,	 UNCTAD	 has	 included	 a	 set	 of	
principles	 specifically	 focused	 on	 investment	
policies	 that	 could	 inform	 wider	 debate	 on	
guiding	principles	for	investment	in	the	SDGs.	The 
IPFSD	Principles	are	 the	design	criteria	 for	sound	
investment	policies,	at	the	national	and	international	
levels,	that	can	support	SDG	investment	promotion	
and	 facilitation	 objectives	 while	 safeguarding	
public	interests.	UNCTAD	has	already	provided	the	
infrastructure	for	further	discussion	of	the	Principles	
through	 its	 Investment Policy Hub,	 which	 allows	
stakeholders	 to	discuss	and	provide	 feedback	on	
an	ongoing	basis.	
SDG investment targets
The	rationale	behind	the	SDGs,	and	the	experience	
with	 the	 MDGs,	 is	 that	 targets	 help	 provide	
direction	 and	 purpose.	 Ambitious	 investment	
targets	are	 implied	by	 the	prospective	SDGs.	The	
international	 community	 would	 do	 well	 to	 make	
targets	 explicit	 and	 spell	 out	 the	 consequences	
for	 investment	 policies	 and	 investment	 promotion	
at	 national	 and	 international	 levels.	 Achievable	
but	 ambitious	 targets,	 including	 for	 increasing	
public	and	private	sector	 investment	 in	LDCs,	are	
thus	 a	 must.	 Meeting	 targets	 to	 increase	 private	
sector	 investment	 in	 the	 SDGs	will	 require	 action	
at	many	 levels	by	policymakers	 in	developed	and	
developing	countries;	internationally	in	international	
policymaking	 bodies	 and	 by	 the	 development	
community;	and	by	 the	private	sector	 itself.	Such	
broad	engagement	needs	coordination	and	strong	
consensus	on	a	common	direction.
Policy coherence and synergies
Policymaking	 for	 investment	 in	 SDG	 sectors,	
and	 setting	 investment	 targets,	 needs	 to	 take	
into	 account	 the	 broader	 context	 that	 affects	
the	 sustainable	 development	 outcome	 of	 such	
investment.	 	 Ensuring	 coherence	 and	 creating	
synergies	 with	 a	 range	 of	 other	 policy	 areas	 is	 a	
key	 element	 of	 the	 leadership	 challenge,	 at	 both	
national	 and	 global	 levels.	 Policy	 interaction	 and	
coherence	are	important	principally	at	three	levels:
•	 National and international investment policies.	
Success	 in	 attracting	 and	 benefiting	 from	
foreign	investment	for	SDG	purposes	depends	
on	the	interaction	between	national	investment	
policies	 and	 international	 investment	
rulemaking.	 National	 rules	 on	 investor	 rights	
and	 obligations	 need	 to	 be	 consistent	 with	
countries’	 commitments	 in	 international	
investment	 agreements,	 and	 these	 treaties	
must	 not	 unduly	 undermine	 regulatory	 space	
required	 for	 sustainable	 development	 policies.	
In	addition,	it	is	important	to	ensure	coherence	
between	different	 IIAs	 to	which	 a	 country	 is	 a	
party.	
•	 Investment and other sustainable-
development-related policies. Accomplishing	
SDGs	 through	 private	 investment	 depends	
not	 only	 on	 investment	 policy	 per	 se	 (i.e.,	
entry	 and	 establishment	 rules,	 treatment	 and	
protection,	 promotion	 and	 facilitation)	 but	
on	 a	 host	 of	 investment-related	 policy	 areas	
including	 tax,	 trade,	 competition,	 technology,	
and	 environmental,	 social	 and	 labour	 market	
policies.	 These	 policy	 areas	 interact,	 and	 an	
overall	 coherent	 approach	 is	 needed	 to	make	
them	conducive	to	investment	in	the	SDGs	and	
to	achieve	synergies	(WIR12,	p.	108;	IPFSD).	
•	 Micro- and macroeconomic policies. 
Sound	 macro-economic	 policies	 are	 a	 key	
determinant	 for	 investment,	 and	 financial	
systems	 conducive	 to	 converting	 financial	
capital	 into	 productive	 capital	 are	 important	
facilitators,	 if	 not	 prerequisites,	 for	 promoting	
investment	 in	 the	 SDGs.	 A	 key	 part	 of	 the	
leadership	challenge	is	to	push	for	and	support	
coordinated	efforts	towards	creating	an	overall	
macro-economic	 climate	 that	 provides	 a	
stable	 environment	 for	 investors,	 and	 towards	
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D. mOBIlIzING FUNDS FOR INVeSTmeNT IN The SDGs
re-orienting	 the	 global	 financial	 architecture	
to	 focus	 on	 mobilizing	 and	 channelling	 funds	
into	 real,	 productive	assets,	 especially	 in	SDG	
sectors	 (TDR	 2009;	 TDR	 2011;	 UNCTAD	
2011b,	Wolf,	M.	2010).5
Global multi-stakeholder platform 
on investing in the SDGs
At	 present	 international	 discussions	 on	 private	
sector	 investment	 in	 sustainable	development	are	
dispersed	 among	many	 organizations,	 institutions	
and	 forums,	 each	 addressing	 specific	 areas	 of	
interest.	 There	 is	 a	 need	 for	 a	 regular	 body	 that	
provides	 a	 platform	 for	 discussion	 on	 overall	
investment	goals	and	targets,	shared	mechanisms	
for	 mobilization	 of	 finance	 and	 channelling	 of	
investment	 into	sustainable	development	projects,	
and	ways	and	means	of	measuring	and	maximizing	
positive	impact	while	minimizing	negative	effects.		
A	global multi-stakeholder platform on investing in 
the SDGs could	fill	that	gap,	galvanizing	promising	
initiatives	 to	 mobilize	 finance	 and	 spreading	
good	 practices,	 supporting	 actions	 on	 the	
ground	 channelling	 investment	 to	 priority	 areas,	
and	 ensuring	 a	 common	 approach	 to	 impact	
measurement.		Such	a	multi-stakeholder	platform	
could	 have	 subgroups	by	 sector,	 e.g.	 on	 energy,	
agriculture,	 urban	 infrastructure,	 because	 the	
cross-sector	span	of	investments	is	so	great.
Multi-agency technical assistance 
facility
Finally,	 many	 of	 the	 solutions	 discussed	 in	 this	
chapter	are	complex,	requiring	significant	technical	
capabilities	 and	 strong	 institutions.	 Since	 this	 is	
seldom	the	case	in	some	of	the	poorest	countries,	
which	 often	 have	 relatively	 weak	 governance	
systems,	 technical	 assistance	 will	 be	 required	 in	
order	to	avoid	leaving	behind	vulnerable	countries	
where	progress	on	the	SDGs	is	most	essential.	A	
multi-agency consortia (a	“one-stop	shop”	for	SDG	
investment	solutions) could	help	to	support	LDCs,	
advising	 on,	 for	 example,	 investment	 guarantee	
and	insurance	schemes,	the	set-up	of	SDG	project	
development	agencies	that	can	plan,	package	and	
promote	 pipelines	 of	 bankable	 projects,	 design	
of	 SDG-oriented	 incentive	 schemes,	 regulatory	
frameworks,	 etc.	 Coordinated	 efforts	 to	 enhance	
synergies	are	imperative.	
The mobilization of funds for SDG investment occurs 
within a global financial system with numerous and 
diverse participants. Efforts to direct more financial 
flows to SDG sectors need to take into account the 
different challenges and constraints faced by all 
actors.
1.  Prospective sources of finance
The	 global	 financial	 system,	 its	 institutions	 and	
actors,	 can	mobilize	 capital	 for	 investment	 in	 the	
SDGs.	The	flow	of	funds	from	sources	to	users	of	
capital	is	mediated	along	an	investment	chain	with	
many	actors	(figure	IV.7),	including	owners	of	capital,	
financial	 intermediaries,	 markets,	 and	 advisors.	
Constraints	 to	mobilizing	 funds	 for	SDG	financing	
can	be	found	both	at	the	systemic	level	and	at	the	
level	 of	 individual	 actors	 in	 the	 system	 and	 their	
interactions.	Policy	responses	will	therefore	need	to	
address	each	of	these	levels.
Policy	 measures	 are	 also	 needed	 more	 widely	
to	 stimulate	 economic	 growth	 in	 order	 to	 create	
supportive	 conditions	 for	 investment	 and	 capital	
mobilization.	This	requires	a	coherent	economic	and	
development	strategy,	addressing	macroeconomic	
and	 systemic	 issues	 at	 the	 global	 and	 national	
levels,	feeding	into	a	conducive	investment	climate.	
In	 return,	 if	 global	 and	 national	 leaders	 get	 their	
policies	 right,	 the	 resulting	 investment	 will	 boost	
growth	and	macroeconomic	conditions,	creating	a	
virtuous	cycle.	
Prospective	 sources	 of	 investment	 finance	 range	
widely	 from	 large	 institutional	 investors,	 such	 as	
pension	funds,	to	the	private	wealth	industry.	They	
include	private	sector	 sources	as	well	 as	publicly	
owned	and	backed	funds	and	companies;	domestic	
and	 international	 sources;	and	direct	and	 indirect	
investors	 (figure	 IV.8	 illustrates	 some	 potential	
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Figure IV.7. SDG investment chain and key actors involved
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corporate	 sources	 of	 finance;	 others,	 including	
some	non-traditional	sources,	are	discussed	in	box	
IV.4).	
The	overall	gap	of	about	$2.5	trillion	is	daunting,	but	
not	impossible	to	bridge;	domestic	and	international	
sources	 of	 capital	 are	 notionally	 far	 in	 excess	 of	
SDG	requirements.	However,	existing	savings	and	
assets	of	private	sector	actors	are	not	sitting	 idle;	
they	 are	 already	 deployed	 to	 generate	 financial	
returns.	Nevertheless,	 the	 relative	 sizes	 of	 private	
sector	sources	of	finance	can	help	set	priorities	for	
action.	
All	the	sources	indicated	in	figure	IV.8	are	invested	
globally,	 of	 which	 a	 proportion	 is	 in	 developing	
countries	(including	by	domestic	companies).	In	the	
case	of	TNCs,	for	example,	a	third	of	global	inward	
FDI	 stock	 in	 2013	 was	 invested	 in	 developing	
countries	 (and	 a	 bigger	 share	 of	 FDI	 flows).	
Pension	funds,	insurance	companies,	mutual	funds	
and	 sovereign	 wealth	 funds,	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	
currently	have	much	less	involvement	in	developing	
markets.	The	majority	of	bank	lending	also	goes	to	
developed	markets.	
Each	group	of	investor	has	a	different	propensity	for	
investment	in	the	SDGs.
•	 Banks.	 Flows	of	 cross-border	bank	 lending	 to	
developing	countries	were	roughly	$325	billion	
in	 2013,	 making	 international	 bank	 lending	
the	 third	 most	 important	 source	 of	 foreign	
capital	after	FDI	and	remittances.	The	stock	of	
international	 cross-border	 bank	 claims	 on	 all	
countries	 stood	 at	 $31.1	 trillion	 at	 the	 end	 of	
Figure IV.8. Relative sizes of selected potential sources 
of investment, 2012
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2014,	 of	which	$8.8	 trillion,	 or	 28	per	 cent	 of	
the	total,	was	in	developing	countries.6	
	 As	well	as	an	important	source	of	project	debt	
finance,	 banks	 are	 in	 a	 powerful	 position	 to	
contribute	 to	 the	 SDGs	 through,	 for	 instance,	
the	 implementation	 of	 the	 Equator	 Principles	
(EPs),	a	risk	management	framework	that	helps	
determine,	 assess	 and	manage	 environmental	
and	social	risk	specifically	 in  infrastructure	and	
other	 industrial	 projects.	 Currently	 78	 financial	
institutions	 in	 34	 countries	 have	 officially	
adopted	 the	 EPs,	 a	 third	 of	 which	 are	 in	
developing	 countries.	 These	 institutions	 cover	
over	70	per	cent	of	international	project	finance	
debt	in	emerging	markets.7	
	 State-owned	 banks	 (including	 development	
banks),	 regional	 development	 banks	 and	
local	 banking	 institutions	 (Marois,	 2013)	 all	
have	 particular	 and	 significant	 relevance	 for	
investment	 in	 SDGs.	 State-owned	 banks	 and	
other	 financial	 institutions	 have	 always	 played	
an	 important	 role	 in	 development,	 targeting	
specific	 sectors,	 for	 example,	 infrastructure	
and	 public	 services,	 often	 at	 preferential	
rates.	 Today	 State-owned	 financial	 institutions	
(SOFI)	 account	 for	25	per	 cent	of	 total	 assets	
in	 banking	 systems	 around	 the	 world;	 and	
the	 capital	 available	 in	 SOFIs	 in	 developing	
countries	 can	 be	 used	 both	 for	 investment	
in	 SDGs	 directly	 and	 to	 leverage	 funds	 and	
investment	 from	 the	 private	 sector	 (sections	
D.3	and	E).
•	 Pension funds. UNCTAD	 estimates	 that	
pension	 funds	 have	 at	 least	 $1.4	 trillion	 of	
assets	invested	in	developing	markets;	and	the	
value	 of	 developed-country	 assets	 invested	 in	
the	South	is	growing	in	addition	to	the	value	of	
pension	 funds	 based	 in	 developing	 countries	
(and	 which	 are	 predominantly	 invested	 in	
their	 own	 domestic	 markets).	 By	 2020,	 it	 is	
estimated	 that	 global	 pension	 fund	 assets	will	
have	 grown	 to	 more	 than	 $56	 trillion	 (PwC	
2014a).	 Pension	 funds	 are	 investors	 with	
long-term	 liabilities	 able	 to	 take	 on	 less	 liquid	
investment	products.	In	the	past	two	decades,	
they	 have	 begun	 to	 recognize	 infrastructure	
investment	 as	 a	 distinct	 asset	 class	 and	
there	 is	 the	 potential	 for	 future	 investment	 by	
them	 in	 more	 illiquid	 forms	 of	 infrastructure	
investment.	 Current	 engagement	 of	 pension	
funds	 in	 infrastructure	 investment	 is	 still	 small,	
at	an	estimated	average	of	2	per	cent	of	assets	
(OECD	 2013b).	 However,	 lessons	 can	 be	
drawn	from	some	countries,	including	Australia	
and	 Canada,	 which	 have	 been	 successful	 in	
packaging	 infrastructure	 projects	 specifically	
to	 increase	 investment	 by	 pension	 funds	 (in	
both	cases	infrastructure	investment	makes	up	
some	5	per	cent	of	pension	fund	portfolios).	
•	 Insurance companies.	 Insurance	 companies	
are	comparable	 in	size	 to	pension	and	mutual	
funds.	 With	 similar	 long-term	 liabilities	 as	
pension	 funds	 (in	 the	 life	 insurance	 industry),	
insurance	 companies	 are	 also	 less	 concerned	
about	 liquidity	 and	 have	 been	 increasingly	
prepared	 to	 invest	 in	 infrastructure,	 albeit	
predominantly	 in	 developed	 markets.	 One	
study	 suggests	 that	 insurance	 companies	
currently	 allocate	 an	 average	 of	 2	 per	 cent	 of	
their	 portfolio	 to	 infrastructure,	 although	 this	
increases	 to	 more	 than	 5	 per	 cent	 in	 some	
countries	 (Preqin	 2013).	 While	 insurance	
companies	 could	 provide	 a	 source	 of	
finance	 for	 investment	 in	 SDG	 sectors,	 their	
greater	 contribution	 may	 come	 from	 off-
setting	 investments	 in	 areas	 such	 as	 climate	
change	 adaptation	 against	 savings	 from	
fewer	 insurance	 claims	 and	 lower	 insurance	
premiums.8		
	 The	 growth	 of	 parts	 of	 the	 insurance	 industry	
is	 therefore	 intimately	 tied	 to	 investment	
in	 sustainable	 development	 sectors,	 e.g.	
investment	in	agricultural	technologies	to	resist	
climate	 change,	 or	 flood	 defences	 to	 protect	
homes	 and	 businesses,	 can	 have	 a	 positive	
impact	 on	 the	 sustainability	 of	 the	 insurance	
fund	 industry.	 There	 is	 a	 virtuous	 cycle	 to	 be	
explored	whereby	insurance	funds	can	finance	
the	 type	 of	 investment	 that	 will	 reduce	 future	
liabilities	 to	 events	 such	 as	 natural	 disasters.	
Already,	the	insurance	industry	is	committed	to	
mainstreaming	ESG	goals	into	its	activities	and	
raising	 awareness	 of	 the	 impact	 of	 new	 risks	
on	 the	 industry,	 for	 example	 through	 the	 UN-
backed	Principles	for	Sustainable	Insurance.	
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•	 Transnational corporations (TNCs).	 With	 $7.7	
trillion	currently	invested	by	TNCs	in	developing	
economies,	 and	 with	 some	 $5	 trillion	 in	 cash	
holdings,	 TNCs	 offer	 a	 significant	 potential	
source	 of	 finance	 for	 investment	 in	 SDG	
sectors	 in	 developing	 countries.	 FDI	 already	
represents	 the	 largest	 source	 of	 external	
finance	 for	 developing	 countries	 as	 a	 whole,	
and	 an	 important	 source	 (with	 ODA	 and	
remittances)	 even	 in	 the	 poorest	 countries.	
It	 is	 an	 important	 source	 of	 relatively	 stable	
development	 capital,	 partly	 because	 investors	
typically	 seek	 a	 long-term	 controlling	 interest	
in	 a	 project	 making	 their	 participation	 less	
volatile	than	other	sources.	In	addition,	FDI	has	
the	advantage	of	bringing	with	 it	a	package	of	
technology,	 managerial	 and	 technical	 know-
how	 that	 may	 be	 required	 for	 the	 successful	
set-up	 and	 running	 of	 SDG	 investment	
projects.	
•	 Sovereign wealth funds (SWFs).	 With	 80	 per	
cent	 of	 SWF	 assets	 owned	 by	 developing	
countries,	 there	 is	 significant	 potential	 for	
SWFs	 to	 make	 a	 contribution	 to	 investment	
in	SDG	sectors	 in	 the	global	South.	However,	
more	 than	 70	 per	 cent	 of	 direct	 investments	
by	 SWFs	 are	 currently	 made	 in	 developed	
markets	 (chapter	 I),	 and	 a	 high	 proportion	 of	
their	total	assets	under	management	may	also	
be	invested	in	developed	markets.	SWFs	share	
many	 similarities	 with	 institutional	 investors	
such	 as	 pension	 funds	 –	 several	 SWFs	 are	
constituted	 for	 this	 purpose,	 or	 also	 have	
that	 function,	 such	 as	 CalPERS	 and	 SPU	
(Truman	 2008;	 Monk	 2008).	 Other	 SWFs	 are	
established	 as	 strategic	 investment	 vehicles	
(Qatar	 holdings	 of	 the	 Qatar	 Investment	
Authority);	 as	stabilization	 funds	displaying	 the	
characteristics	of	a	central	bank	(SAMA);	or	as	
development	funds	(Temasek).	
Box Iv.4. Selected examples of other sources of capital for investment in the SdGs
Foundations, endowments and family offices.	Some	estimates	put	total	private	wealth	at	$46	trillion	(TheCityUK	2013),	
albeit	a	third	of	this	figure	is	estimated	to	be	incorporated	in	other	investment	vehicles,	such	as	mutual	funds.	The	
private	wealth	management	of	family	offices	stands	at	$1.2	trillion	and	foundations/endowment	funds	at	$1.3	trillion	
in	2011	(WEF	2011).	From	this	source	of	wealth	it	may	be	possible	to	mobilize	greater	philanthropic	contributions	to	
long-term	investment,	as	well	as	investments	for	sustainable	development	through	the	fund	management	industry.	In	
2011	the	United	States	alone	were	home	to	more	than	80,000	foundations	with	$662	billion	in	assets,	representing	
over	20	per	cent	of	estimated	global	foundations	and	endowments	by	assets,	although	much	of	this	was	allocated	
domestically.	
Venture capital.	The	venture	capital	industry	is	estimated	at	$42	billion	(E&Y	2013)	which	is	relatively	small	compared	
to	some	of	 the	sums	 invested	by	 institutional	 investors	but	which	differs	 in	several	 important	respects.	 Investors	
seeking	to	allocate	finance	through	venture	capital	often	take	an	active	and	direct	 interest	 in	their	 investment.	 In	
addition,	they	might	provide	finance	from	the	start	or	early	stages	of	a	commercial	venture	and	have	a	long-term	
investment	horizon	for	the	realization	of	a	return	on	their	initial	capital.	This	makes	venture	capital	more	characteristic	
of	a	direct	investor	than	a	short-term	portfolio	investor.	
Impact investment.	 Sources	 for	 impact	 investment	 include	 individuals,	 foundations,	NGOs	 and	 capital	markets.	
Impact	investments	funded	through	capital	markets	are	valued	at	more	than	$36	billion	(Martin	2013).	The	impact	
investment	 industry	 has	 grown	 in	 size	 and	 scope	 over	 the	 past	 decade	 (from	 the	Acumen	 fund	 in	 2001	 to	 an	
estimated	125	 funds	 supporting	 impact	 investment	 in	2010	 (Simon	and	Barmeier	2010)).	Again,	while	 relatively	
small	 in	 comparison	 to	 the	 potential	 of	 large	 institutional	 investors,	 impact	 investments	 are	 directly	 targeted	 at	
SDG	 sectors,	 such	 as	 farming	 and	 education.	Moreover,	 their	 promotion	 of	 social	 and	 economic	 development	
outcomes	in	exchange	for	lower	risk-adjusted	returns	makes	impact	investment	funds	a	potentially	useful	source	of	
development	finance.	
Microfinance.	 Some	 studies	 show	 that	microfinance	 has	 had	 some	 impact	 on	 consumption	 smoothing	 during	
periods	of	economic	stress	and	on	consumption	patterns.	However,	other	studies	also	indicate	that	there	has	been	
limited	impact	on	health	care,	education	and	female	empowerment	(Bauchet	et	al	2011;	Bateman	and	Chang	2012).	
Nevertheless,	as	the	microfinance	industry	has	matured,	initiatives	such	as	credit	unions	have	had	more	success;	
the	encouragement	of	responsible	financial	behaviour	through	prior	saving	and	affordable	loans	has	made	valuable	
contributions	to	consumption,	health	and	education.
Source:	UNCTAD,	based	on	sources	in	text.	
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	 Despite	 several	 reported	 concerns	 about	
SWF	 governance	 (Bagnall	 and	 Truman	 2013),	
SWFs	 can	 offer	 a	 number	 of	 advantages	 for	
investment	 in	 SDG	 sectors	 in	 poor	 countries,	
not	 least	because	their	finance	 is	unleveraged,	
and	 their	 investment	 outlook	 is	 often	 long	
term.	 For	 example,	 60	 per	 cent	 of	 SWFs	
already	 actively	 invest	 in	 infrastructure	 (Preqin	
2013);	moreover	 in	sectors	such	as	water	and	
energy,	 SWFs	may	 honour	 the	 inherent	 public	
nature	 of	 these	 services	 in	 a	 way	 that	 private	
investors	may	not.	This	is	because	some	SWFs	
(and	 public	 pension	 funds)	 have	 non-profit	
driven	 obligations,	 such	 as	 social	 protection	
or	 intergenerational	 equity;	 they	also	 represent	
a	 form	 of	 “public	 capital”	 that	 could	 be	 used	
for	 the	 provision	 of	 essential	 services	 in	 low-
income	 communities	 (Lipschutz	 and	 Romano	
2012).	
All	 the	 institutions	 and	 markets	 described	 above	
face	obstacles	and	incentives,	internal	and	external,	
that	 shape	 investment	 decisions	 and	 determine	
whether	 their	 choices	 contribute	 to	 or	 hinder	
attainment	 of	 the	 SDGs.	 Policy	 interventions	 can	
thus	 target	 specific	 links	 in	 the	 investment	 chain	
and/or	specific	types	of	 institutions	to	ensure	that	
financial	markets	and	end	users	are	better	geared	
towards	sustainable	outcomes	than	is	presently	the	
case.	
2.  Challenges to mobilizing funds for SDG 
investments
Constraints in financial markets hindering the flow 
of funds to SDG investments include start-up and 
scaling problems for innovative solutions market 
failures, lack of transparency on ESG performance 
and misaligned rewards for market participants.
There	are	a	number	of	impediments	or	constraints	
to	mobilizing	 funds	 for	 investment	 in	SDG-related	
projects	(figure	IV.9).	
An	important	constraint	lies	in	start-up and scaling 
issues for innovative financing solutions. Tapping	
the	 pool	 of	 available	 global	 financial	 resources	
for	 SDG	 investments	 requires	 greater	 provision	
Source:	UNCTAD.	
Figure IV.9. mobilizing funds for SDG investment: key challenges and policy options
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of	 financial	 instruments	 and	mechanisms	 that	 are	
attractive	 for	 institutions	 to	 own	 or	 manage.	 A	
range	of	innovative	solutions	has	begun	to	emerge,	
including	 new	 financial	 instruments	 (e.g.	 green	
bonds)	 and	 financing	 approaches	 (e.g.	 future	
income	 securitization	 for	 development	 finance);	
new	investor	classes	are	also	becoming	important	
(e.g.	 funds	 pursuing	 impact	 investing).	 To	 date,	
however,	 these	 solutions	 remain	 relatively	 small	
in	 scale	 and	 limited	 in	 scope,	 or	 operate	 on	 the	
margins of	capital	markets	(figure	IV.9,	section	D.3).	
Over	 time,	 changing	 the	 mindset	 of	 investors	
towards	 SDG	 investment	 is	 of	 fundamental	
importance,	 and	 a	 number	 of	 further	 constraints	
hinder	 this.	 First,	market failures	 in	 global	 capital	
markets	 contribute	 to	 a	 misallocation	 of	 capital	
in	 favour	 of	 non-sustainable	 projects/firms	 and	
against	those	that	could	contribute	positively	to	the	
SDGs.	 Failure	 by	 markets	 and	 holders	 of	 capital	
to	 price	 negative	 externalities	 into	 their	 capital	
allocation	decisions means	that	the	cost	of	capital	
for	 investors	 reflects	solely	 the	private	cost.	Thus,	
profit-maximizing	 investors	 do	 not	 take	 sufficient	
account	 of	 environmental	 and	 other	 social	 costs	
when	 evaluating	 potential	 investments	 because	
these	 costs	 do	 not	 materially	 affect	 their	 cost	 of	
capital,	 earnings	 or	 profitability.	 For	 instance,	 the	
absence	 of	 a	 material	 price	 for	 carbon	 implies	
social	costs	associated	with	emissions	are	virtually	
irrelevant	for	capital	allocation	decisions.
Second,	a	lack of transparency on ESG performance	
further	 precludes	 consideration	 of	 such	 factors	
in	 the	 investment	 decisions	 of	 investors,	 financial	
intermediaries	and	their	advisors	(and	the	ultimate	
sources	 of	 capital,	 such	 as	 households).	 The	
fragmentation	 of	 capital	markets,	while	 facilitating	
the	 allocation	 of	 capital,	 has	 disconnected	 the	
sources	 of	 capital	 from	 end	 users.	 For	 example,	
households	do	not	have	sufficient	information	about	
where	and	how	their	pensions	are	invested	in	order	
to	evaluate	whether	it	is	being	invested	responsibly	
and,	for	example,	whether	it	is	in	line	with	the	SDGs.	
Similarly,	asset	managers	and	institutional	investors	
do	 not	 have	 sufficient	 information	 to	make	 better	
informed	 investment	 decisions	 that	 might	 align	
firms	with	the	SDGs.
Third,	the	rewards that individuals and firms receive 
in terms of pay, performance and reporting	 also	
influence	 investment	 allocations	 decisions.	 This	
includes	not	only	incentive	structures	at	TNCs	and	
other	direct	investors	in	SDG-relevant	sectors,	but	
also	incentive	structures	at	financial	 intermediaries	
(and	their	advisors)	who	fund	these	investors.	The	
broad	 effects	 of	 these	 incentive	 structures	 are	
three-fold:	 (i)	an	excessive	short-term	focus	within	
investment	and	portfolio	allocation	decisions;	 (ii)	a	
tendency	 towards	 passive	 investment	 strategies	
and	 herding	 behaviour	 in	 financial	 markets;	 and	
(iii)	 an	emphasis	on	financial	 returns	 rather	 than	a	
consideration	 of	 broader	 social	 or	 environment	
risk-return	trade-offs.	These	market	incentives	and	
their	effects	have	knock-on	consequences	for	real	
economic	activity.	
3.  Creating fertile soil for innovative 
financing approaches
Innovative financial instruments and funding 
mechanisms to raise resources for investment in 
SDGs deserve support to achieve scale and scope.
A	 range	 of	 innovative	 financing	 solutions	 to	
support	sustainable	development	have	emerged	in	
recent	 years,	 including	 new	 financial	 instruments,	
investment	funds	and	financing	approaches.	These	
have	the	potential	to	contribute	significantly	to	the	
realization	of	the	SDGs,	but	need	to	be	supported,	
adapted	to	purpose	and	scaled	up	as	appropriate.	
It	is	important	to	note	that	many	of	these	solutions	
are	led	by	the	private	sector,	reflecting	an	increasing	
alignment	between	UN	and	international	community	
priorities	and	those	of	the	business	community	(box	
IV.5).	
Facilitate and support SDG-
dedicated financial instruments 
and impact investment 
Financial	 instruments	 which	 raise	 funds	 for	
investment	 in	 social	 or	 environmental	 programs	
are	 proliferating,	 and	 include	 green	 bonds9	 and	
the	 proposed	 development	 impact	 bonds.	 They	
target	 investors	 that	 are	 keen	 to	 integrate	 social	
and	 environmental	 concerns	 into	 their	 investment	
decisions.	They	are	appealing	because	they	ensure	
a	 safer	 return	 to	 investors	 (many	 are	 backed	 by	
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donors	 or	 multilateral	 banks),	 but	 also	 because	
they	 are	 clearly	 defined	 sustainable	 projects	 or	
products.10	 The	 proceeds	 are	 often	 credited	 to	
special	accounts	that	support	 loan	disbursements	
for	 SDG	 projects	 (e.g.	 development	 or	 climate	
change	adaptation	and	mitigation	projects).
These	 instruments	were	 often	 initially	 the	 domain	
of	multilateral	development	banks	(MDBs)	because	
this	 lent	 credibility	 with	 investors	 in	 terms	 of	
classifying	 which	 investments	 were	 socially	 and	
environmentally	 friendly.	 More	 recently,	 however,	
a	number	of	TNCs	have	 issued	green	bonds.	For	
instance,	EDF	Energy	undertook	a	€1.4	billion	issue	
to	 finance	 investment	 in	 solar	 and	wind	 energy;11	
Toyota	raised	$1.75	billion	 for	 the	development	of	
hybrid	vehicles;12	and	Unilever	 raised	£250	million	
for	 projects	 that	 would	 reduce	 greenhouse	 gas	
emissions,	water	usage	or	waste	within	 its	supply	
Box Iv.5. Convergence between UN priorities and those of the 
international business community
In	 a	 globe-spanning	 series	 of	 consultations,	 UN	 Global	 Compact	 participants	 offered	 their	 views	 on	 global	
development	priorities	they	consider	central	to	any	future	development	agenda.	The	results	of	these	consultations	
reflect	a	growing	understanding	of	the	convergence	between	the	priorities	of	the	United	Nations	and	those	of	the	
international	business	community	on	a	wide	range	of	global	issues	and	challenges.	
Box Figure Iv.5.1. Global development Priorities Identified by Businesses
Private Sustainability Finance: from managing risks to embracing new opportunities that create value for business 
and society.	Over	 the	past	decade,	a	number	of	principles-based	 initiatives	have	been	adopted	 throughout	 the	
finance-production	value	chain,	from	portfolio	investors,	banks	and	insurance	companies,	to	foundations	and	TNCs	
in	the	real	economy.	For	instance,	led	by	private	actors	Responsible Private Finance has	already	reached	a	significant	
critical	mass	across	the	private	sector.	There	 is	now	a	broad	consensus	that	 incorporating	social,	environmental	
and	governance	concerns	in	decision-making	improves	risk	management,	avoids	harmful	investments	and	makes	
business	 sense.	 Examples	 of	 this	 trend	 include	 initiatives	 such	 as	 the	 Principles	 for	 Responsible	 Investment,	
the	Equator	Principles,	 the	Principles	 for	Sustainable	 Insurance,	 the	Sustainable	Stock	Exchanges	 initiative	 and	
innovative	approaches	to	sustainable	foreign	direct	investment	by	multinationals.	
Private	sustainability	finance	holds	enormous	potential	to	contribute	to	the	broad	implementation	efforts	in	the	post-
2015	 future.	However,	public	action	 through	good	governance,	conducive	policies,	 regulations	and	 incentives	 is	
required	to	drive	the	inclusion	of	sustainability	considerations	in	private	investment	decisions.	And	it	requires	private	
action	to	significantly	enhance	the	scale	and	intensity	of	private	sustainability	finance.	
Source:	UN	Global	Compact.				
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chain.13	While	 the	 development	 of	 this	market	 by	
corporate	issuers	is	positive,	its	continued	advance	
may	give	rise	to	the	need	for	labelling	or	certification	
of	investments,	so	investors	have	assurance	about	
which	are	genuinely	“green”	or	have	“social	impact”.	
Impact	 investing	 is	 a	 phenomenon	 that	 reflects	
investors’	desire	to	generate	societal	value	(social,	
environmental,	cultural)	as	well	as	achieve	financial	
return.	Impact	investment	can	be	a	valuable	source	
of	capital,	 especially	 to	 finance	 the	needs	of	 low-
income	 developing	 countries	 or	 for	 products	 and	
services	aimed	at	vulnerable	communities.	The	types	
of	projects	targeted	can	include	basic	infrastructure	
development,	 social	and	health	services	provision	
and	education	–	all	of	which	are	being	considered	
as	 SDGs.	 Impact	 investors	 include	 aid	 agencies,	
NGOs,	 philanthropic	 foundations	 and	 wealthy	
individuals,	as	well	as	banks,	institutional	investors	
and	other	types	of	firms	and	funds.	Impact	investing	
is	defined	not	by	the	type	of	 investor,	but	by	their	
motives	and	objectives.14	
A	 number	 of	 financial	 vehicles	 have	 emerged	
to	 facilitate	 impact	 investing	 by	 some	 such	
groups	 (others	 invest	 directly).	 Estimated	 impact	
investments	 through	 these	 funds	 presently	 range	
from	 $30	 to	 $100	 billion,	 depending	 on	 which	
sectors	 and	 types	 of	 activity	 are	 defined	 as	
constituting	 “impact	 investing”;	 and	 similarly	 the	
estimated	future	global	potential	of	impact	investing	
varies	from	the	relatively	modest	to	up	to	$1	trillion	
in	total	(J.P.	Morgan	2010).	A	joint	study	of	impact	
investment	 by	 UNCTAD	 and	 the	 United	 States	
Department	of	State	observed	in	2012	that	over	90	
per	cent	of	impact	investment	funds	are	still	invested	
in	the	developed	world,	mostly	in	social	impact	and	
renewable	 energy	 projects.	 Among	 developing	
countries,	the	largest	recipient	of	impact	investing	is	
Latin	America	and	the	Caribbean,	followed	by	Africa	
and	South	Asia	(Addis	et	al.	2013).	A	key	objective	
should	 be	 to	 direct	 more	 impact	 investment	 to	
developing	countries,	and	especially	LDCs.
A	number	of	constraints	hold	back	the	expansion	
of	 impact	 investing	 in	 developing	 countries.	 Key	
constraints	 related	 to	 the	 mobilization	 of	 impact	
investment	 funds	 include	 lack	 of	 capital	 across	
the	 risk-return	 spectrum;	 lack	 of	 a	 common	
understanding	 of	what	 impact	 investment	 entails;	
inadequate	 ways	 to	 measure	 “impact”;	 lack	 of	
research	and	data	on	products	and	performance;	
and	 a	 lack	 of	 investment	 professionals	 with	 the	
relevant	 skills.	 Key	 demand-related	 constraints	 in	
developing	countries	 are:	 shortage	of	 high-quality	
investment	opportunities	with	a	track	record;	and	a	
lack	of	innovative	deal	structures	to	accommodate	
portfolio	 investors’	 needs.	 A	 number	 of	 initiatives	
are	 underway	 to	 address	 these	 constraints	 and	
expand	 impact	 investment,	 including	 the	 Global	
Impact	Investing	Network	(GIIN),	the	United	States	
State	Department	Global	Impact	Economy	Forum,	
Impact	 Reporting	 and	 Investment	 Standards,	
Global	 Impact	 Investment	 Ratings	 System,	 the	
United	Kingdom	Impact	Program	for	sub-Saharan	
Africa	 and	 South	 Asia	 and	 the	G8	 Social	 Impact	
Investing	Taskforce.
Expand and create funding 
mechanisms that use public sector 
resources to catalyze mobilization 
of private sector resources 
A	 range	 of	 initiatives	 exist	 to	 use	 the	 capacity	 of	
the	public	sector	to	mobilize	private	finance.	Often	
these	operate	at	 the	project	 level	 (Section	E),	but	
initiatives	also	exist	at	a	macro	level	to	raise	funds	
from	the	private	sector,	 including	through	financial	
markets.
Vertical funds	 (or	 financial	 intermediary	 funds)	
are	 dedicated	 mechanisms	 which	 allow	 multiple	
stakeholders	 (government,	civil	society,	 individuals	
and	 the	 private	 sector)	 to	 provide	 funding	 for	
pre-specified	 purposes,	 often	 to	 underfunded	
sectors	 such	 as	 disease	 eradication	 or	 climate	
change.	 Funds	 such	 as	 the	Global	 Fund	 to	 Fight	
AIDS,	 Tuberculosis	 and	 Malaria15	 or	 the	 Global	
Environment	Fund16	have	now	reached	a	significant	
size.	 Similar	 funds	 could	 be	 created	 in	 alignment	
with	other	specific	SDG	focus	areas	of	the	SDGs	in	
general.	The	Africa	Enterprise	Challenge	Fund17	 is	
another	prominent	example	of	a	fund	that	has	been	
used	as	a	vehicle	 to	provide	preferential	 loans	 for	
the	purpose	of	developing	inclusive	business.	
Matching funds	have	been	used	to	incentivize	private	
sector	 contributions	 to	 development	 initiatives	 by	
making	 a	 commitment	 that	 the	 public	 sector	 will	
contribute	 an	 equal	 or	 proportionate	 amount.	 For	
example,	under	the	GAVI	Matching	Fund,	the	United	
Kingdom	Department	for	International	Development	
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and	 the	 Bill	 and	Melinda	 Gates	 Foundation	 have	
pledged	 about	 $130	 million	 combined	 to	 match	
contributions	from	corporations,	foundations,	their	
customers,	 members,	 employees	 and	 business	
partners.18
Front-loading of aid.	 In	 addition	 to	 catalyzing	
additional	 contributions,	 the	 public	 sector	 can	
induce	 private	 sector	 actors	 to	 use	 financing	
mechanisms	 that	 change	 the	 time	 profile	 of	
development	financing,	through	front-loading	of	aid	
disbursements.	 The	 International	 Finance	 Facility	
for	 Immunization	 (IFFIm)	 issues	 AAA-rated	 bonds	
in	capital	markets	which	are	backed	by	 long-term	
donor	government	pledges.	As	such,	aid	flows	to	
developing	countries	which	would	normally	 occur	
over	 a	 period	 of	 20	 years	 are	 converted	 to	 cash	
immediately	 upon	 issuance.	 For	 investors,	 the	
bonds	 are	 attractive	 due	 to	 the	 credit	 rating,	 a	
market-comparable	interest	rate	and	the	perceived	
“socially	 responsible	 return”	 on	 investment.	 IFFIm	
has	 raised	more	 than	$4.5	billion	 to	date  through	
bond	issuances	purchased	by	institutional	and	retail	
investors	 in	 a	 range	 of	 different	 mature	 financial	
markets.19
Future-flow securitization.	 Front-loading	 of	 aid	 is	
a	 subset	 of	 a	 broader	 range	 of	 initiatives	 under	
the	 umbrella	 of	 future-flow	 securitization	 which	
allows	 developing	 countries	 to	 issue	 marketable	
financial	 instruments	 whose	 repayments	 are	
secured	against	a	relatively	stable	revenue	stream.	
These	 can	 be	 used	 to	 attract	 a	 broader	 class	 of	
investors	than	would	otherwise	be	the	case.	Other	
prominent	 examples	 are	 diaspora	 bonds	 whose	
issuance	 is	 secured	 against	 migrant	 remittance	
flows,	 and	 bonds	 backed	 by	 the	 revenue	 stream	
from,	 e.g.	 natural	 resources.	 These	 instruments	
allow	 developing	 countries	 to	 access	 funding	
immediately	 that	would	normally	be	 received	over	
a	protracted	period.		
Build and support “go-to-market” 
channels for SDG investment 
projects in financial markets
A	 range	 of	 options	 is	 available,	 and	 can	 be	
expanded,	to	help	bring	concrete	SDG	investment	
projects	 of	 sufficient	 scale	 directly	 to	 financial	
markets	 and	 investors	 in	 mature	 economies,	
reducing	 dependence	 on	 donors	 and	 increasing	
the	engagement	of	the	private	sector.
Project aggregation and securitization. SDG	
investment	projects	and	SDG	sectors	are	often	not	
well	aligned	with	the	needs	of	institutional	investors	
in	 mature	 financial	 markets	 because	 projects	 are	
too	 small	 and	 sectors	 fragmented.	 For	 example,	
renewable	energy	markets	are	more	disaggregated	
than	 traditional	 energy	 markets.	 Institutional	
investors	 prefer	 to	 invest	 in	 assets	 which	 have	
more	 scale	 and	 marketability	 than	 investment	 in	
individual	 projects	 provide.	 As	 such,	 aggregating	
individual	projects	 in	a	pooled	portfolio	can	create	
investment	products	more	in	line	with	the	appetite	
of	 large	 investors.	 This	 can	 be	 achieved	 through	
securitization	 of	 loans	 to	many	 individual	 projects	
to	 create	 tradable,	 rated	 asset	 backed	 securities.	
For	 instance,	 a	 group	 of	 insurers	 and	 reinsurers	
with	$3	 trillion	of	assets	under	management	have	
recently	called	 for	more	scale	and	standardization	
of	products	in	low-carbon	investments.20	
Crowd funding.	 Crowd	 funding	 is	 an	 internet-
based	 method	 for	 raising	 money,	 either	 through	
donations	or	 investments,	 from	a	 large	number	of	
individuals	or	organizations.	Globally	it	is	estimated	
that	crowd	funding	platforms	raised $2.7	billion  in	
2012	 and	 were	 forecast	 to	 increase	 81	 per	 cent	
in	 2013,	 to  $5.1	billion	 (Massolution	2013).	While	
currently	more	prevalent	 in	developed	countries,	 it	
has	 the	 potential	 to	 fund	 SDG-related	 projects	 in	
developing	countries.	Crowd	funding	has	been	an	
effective	 means	 for	 entrepreneurs	 or	 businesses	
in	 developed	 countries	 that	 do	 not	 have	 access	
to	more	 formal	financial	markets.	 In	a	similar	way,	
crowd	funding	could	help	dormant	entrepreneurial	
talent	and	activity	 to	circumvent	 traditional	capital	
markets	 and	 obtain	 finance.	 For	 example,	 since	
2005	the	crowd	funding	platform	Kiva	Microfunds	
has	 facilitated	 over	 $560	 million	 in	 internet-
based	 loans	 to	 entrepreneurs	 and	 students	 in	 70	
countries.21
4.  Building an SDG-supportive financial 
system
A	 financial	 system	 supportive	 of	 SDG	 investment	
ensures	 that	 actors	 in	 the	 SDG	 investment	 chain	
(i)	 receive	 the	 right	 stimuli	 through	 prices	 for	
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investment	instruments	that	internalize	social	costs	
and	 benefits;	 (ii)	 have	 access	 to	 information	 on	
the	 sustainability	 performance	 of	 investments	 so	
that	 they	 can	 make	 informed	 decisions;	 and	 (iii)	
are	 rewarded	 through	mechanisms	 that	 take	 into	
account	 responsible	 investment	 behavior.	 	 These	
elements	 are	 part	 of	 a	wider	 context	 of	 systemic	
issues	 in	 the	 global	 financial	 architecture,22	which	
is	 not	 functioning	 optimally	 for	 the	 purposes	 of	
channeling	funds	to	productive,	real	assets	(rather	
than	financial	assets).23
a.   Build or improve pricing 
mechanisms to curb 
externalities 
Effective pricing mechanisms to internalize social 
and environmental costs are necessary to align 
market signals with sustainable development goals. 
The	most	effective	and	yet	most	challenging	way	to	
ensure	 that	 global	 capital	 allocation	decisions	 are	
aligned	with	the	needs	of	sustainable	development	
would	be	to	“get	the	prices	right”.	That	is,	to	ensure	
that	negative	(and	positive)	social	and	environmental	
externalities	are	factored	into	the	price	signals	that	
financial	 market	 participants	 and	 direct	 investors	
receive.	
A	 long-term	 influence	 is	adherence	to	responsible	
investment	principles	which	helps	firms	to	recognize	
and	 price-in	 both	 the	 financial	 costs	 associated	
with	 compliance,	 but	 also	 the	 rewards:	 i.e.	 less	
risk,	 potential	 efficiency	 gains,	 and	 the	 positive	
externalities	arising	from	a	good	reputation.
A	number	of	environmental	externalities	have	been	
traditionally	 addressed	 using	 tools	 such	 as	 fines	
or	 technical	 standards,	 but	 more	 recently	 pricing	
and	tax	methods	have	become	more	common.	In	
the	area	of	climate	change,	 for	carbon	emissions,	
a	 number	 of	 countries	 have	 experimented	 with	
innovative	approaches	over	the	past	two	decades.	
Two	 principle	 methods	 have	 been	 explored	 for	
establishing	 a	 price	 for	 carbon	 emissions:	 a	 cap	
and	 trade	 “carbon	 market”	 characterized	 by	 the	
trading	 of	 emissions	 permits;	 and	 “carbon	 taxes”	
characterized	by	 a	 special	 tax	 on	 fossil	 fuels	 and	
other	carbon-intensive	activities.	The	EU	Emissions	
Trading	Scheme	 (ETS)	was	 the	first	major	carbon	
market	 and	 remains	 the	 largest.	 Carbon	markets	
exist	 in	 a	 handful	 of	 other	 developed	 countries,	
and	regional	markets	exist	in	a	few	US	states	and	
Canadian	provinces.	Carbon	trading	schemes	are	
rarer	 in	 developing	 countries,	 although	 there	 are	
pilot	 schemes,	 such	as	one	covering	 six	Chinese	
cities	and	provinces.	
Complexities	 associated	 with	 carbon	 markets,	
and	the	failure	so	far	of	such	markets	to	establish	
prices	 in	 line	 with	 the	 social	 costs	 of	 emissions,	
have	 increased	experimentation	with	 taxation.	For	
instance,	Ireland,	Sweden	and	the	United	Kingdom	
are	examples	of	countries	 that	have	 implemented	
some	form	of	carbon	tax	or	“climate	levy”.	Carbon	
taxes	have	also	been	implemented	in	the	Canadian	
provinces	 of	 British	 Columbia	 and	 Quebec,	 and	
in	 2013	 a	Climate	Protection	Act	was	 introduced	
in	 the	 United	 States	 Senate	 proposing	 a	 federal	
carbon	tax.	The	experience	with	carbon	pricing	 is	
applicable	to	other	sectors,	appropriately	adapted	
to	context.
b.  Promote Sustainable Stock 
Exchanges 
Sustainable stock exchanges provide listed entities 
with the incentives and tools to improve transparency 
on ESG performance, and allow investors to make 
informed decisions on responsible allocation of 
capital.
Sustainability	 reporting	 initiatives	 are	 important	
because	 they	 help	 to	 align	 capital	market	 signals	
with	 sustainable	 development	 and	 thereby	 to	
mobilize	 responsible	 investment	 in	 the	 SDGs.	
Sustainability	 reporting	 should	 be	 a	 requirement	
not	only	for	TNCs	on	their	global	activities,	but	also	
for	 asset	 owners	 and	 asset	 managers	 and	 other	
financial	 intermediaries	 outlined	 in	 figure	 IV.8	 on	
their	investment	practices.	
Many	 pension	 funds	 around	 the	 world	 do	 not	
report	on	if	and	how	they	incorporate	sustainability	
issues	 into	 their	 investment	 decisions	 (UNCTAD	
2011c).	 Given	 their	 direct	 and	 indirect	 influence	
over	 a	 large	 share	 of	 the	 global	 pool	 of	 available	
financial	resources,	all	institutional	investors	should	
be	 required	 to	 formally	 articulate	 their	 stance	 on	
sustainable	development	issues	to	all	stakeholders.
Such	disclosure	would	be	in	line	with	best	practices	
and	 the	 current	 disclosure	 practices	 of	 funds	 in	
other	areas.		
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Greater	accountability	and	transparency	of	the	entire	
investment	chain	is	essential,	including	investment	
allocation	 decisions,	 proxy	 voting	 practices	
and	 advice	 of	 asset	 owners,	 asset	 managers,	
pension	 funds,	 insurance	 companies,	 investment	
consultants	and	investment	banks.	Without	proper	
measurement,	verification	and	reporting	of	financial,	
social	and	environmental	sustainability	information,	
ultimate	 sources	 of	 capital	 (especially	 households	
and	governments)	cannot	determine	how	the	funds	
that	have	been	entrusted	to	these	institutions	have	
been	deployed.	
Stock	exchanges	and	capital	market	regulators	play	
an	 important	 role	 in	 this	 respect,	because	of	 their	
position	at	the	intersection	of	investors,	companies	
and	 government	 policy.	 The	 United	 Nations	
Sustainable	 Stock	 Exchanges	 (SSE)	 initiative	 is	 a	
peer-to-peer	 learning	 platform	 for	 exploring	 how	
exchanges	 can	 work	 together	 with	 investors,	
regulators,	 and	 companies	 to	 enhance	 corporate	
transparency,	and	ultimately	performance,	on	ESG	
(environmental,	 social	 and	 corporate	 governance)	
issues	 and	 encourage	 responsible	 long-term	
approaches	 to	 investment.	 Launched	 by	 the	 UN	
Secretary-General	in	2009,	the	SSE	is	co-organized	
by	 UNCTAD,	 the	 UN	 Global	 Compact,	 the	 UN-
supported	 Principles	 for	 Responsible	 Investment,	
and	the	UNEP	Finance	Initiative.24	
An	 increasing	 number	 of	 stock	 exchanges	 and	
regulators	have	introduced,	or	are	in	the	process	of	
developing,	initiatives	to	help	companies	meet	the	
evolving	 information	 needs	 of	 investors;	 navigate	
increasingly	complex	disclosure	 requirements	and	
expectations;	 manage	 sustainability	 performance;	
and	 understand	 and	 address	 social	 and	
environmental	 risks	 and	 opportunities.	 UNCTAD	
has	 provided	 guidance	 to	 help	 policymakers	 and	
stock	exchanges	in	this	effort.
c.  Introduce financial market 
reforms 
Realigning rewards in financial markets to favour 
investment in SDGs will require action, including 
reform of pay and performance structures, and 
innovative rating methodologies.
Reforms	 at	 both	 the	 regulatory	 and	 institutional	
levels	 may	 lead	 to	 more	 effective	 alignment	 of	
the	 system	of	 rewards	 to	 help	 ensure	 that	 global	
capital	 markets	 serve	 the	 needs	 of	 sustainable	
development.	This	would	require	policy	action	and	
corporate-led	 initiatives	 affecting	 a	 wide	 range	 of	
different	 institutions,	 markets	 as	 well	 as	 financial	
behaviour.
Reform pay, performance and 
reporting structures to favour 
long-term investment conducive to 
SDG realization
The	performance	evaluation	and	reward	structures	
of	 both	 institutions	 and	 individuals	 operating	 in	
financial	markets	are	not	conducive	to	 investment	
in	SDGs.	Areas	of	action	may	include:
•	 Pay and performance structures.	 Pay	 and	
performance	structures	should	be	aligned	with	
long-term	 sustainable	 performance	 objectives	
rather	 than	 short-term	 relative	 performance.	
For	 instance,	 compensation	 schemes	 for	
asset	 managers,	 corporate	 executives	 and	 a	
range	 of	 financial	 market	 participants	 could	
be	 paid	 out	 over	 the	 period	 during	 which	
results	 are	 realized,	 and	 compensation	 linked	
to	 sustainable,	 fundamental	 drivers	 of	 long-
term	 value.	 Companies	 need	 to	 take	 action	
to	 minimize	 the	 impact	 of	 short-termism	 on	
the	 part	 of	 financial	 intermediaries	 on	 their	
businesses	 and,	 more	 positively,	 create	 the	
conditions	 that	 enable	 these	 capital	 sources	
to	 support	 and	 reward	 action	 and	 behaviour	
by	 direct	 investors	 that	 contribute	 to	 the	
realization	of	the	SDGs.	
•	 Reporting requirements. Reporting	
requirements	 could	 be	 revised	 to	 reduce	
pressure	 to	 make	 decisions	 based	 on	 short-
term	 financial	 or	 investment	 performance. 
Reporting	 structures	 such	 as	 quarterly	
earnings	 guidance	 can	 over	 emphasise	 the	
significance	 of	 short-term	 measures	 at	 the	
expense	 of	 the	 longer-term	 sustainable	 value	
creation.	
Promote rating methodologies that 
reward long-term investment in 
SDG sectors 
Ratings	 that	 incorporate	 ESG	 performance	 help	
investors	 make	 informed	 decisions	 for	 capital	
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allocation	 towards	 SDGs.	 Existing	 initiatives	 and	
potential	areas	for	development	include:
•	 Non-financial ratings. Rating	 agencies	 have	 a	
critical	 influence	 on	 asset	 allocation	 decisions	
by	 providing	 an	 independent	 assessment	 of	
the	 credit	 risk	 associated	 with	 marketable	
debt	 instruments.	 Rating	 agencies’	 traditional	
models	 are	 based	 on	 an	 estimation	 of	 the	
relative	 probability	 of	 default	 only,	 and	 hence	
do	 not	 incorporate	 social	 or	 environmental	
risks	 and	 benefits	 associated	 with	 particular	
investments.	 In	 order	 to	 invest	 in	 SDG-
beneficial	 firms	 and	 projects,	 investors	 need	
access	 to	 ratings	 which	 assess	 the	 relative	
ESG	performance	of	 firms.	Dow	Jones,	MSCI	
and	Standard	and	Poor’s	have	for	several	years	
been	incorporating	ESG	criteria	into	specialized	
sustainability	 indices	and	ratings	 for	securities.	
Standard	 and	Poor’s	 also	 announced	 in	 2013	
that	 risks	 from	 climate	 change	 will	 be	 an	
increasingly	 important	 factor	 in	 its	 ratings	 of	
sovereign	 debt.	 Greater	 effort	 could	 be	 taken	
to	 further	 integrate	 sustainability	 issues	
into	 both	 debt	 and	 equity	 ratings.	 An	
important	 dimension	 of	 sustainability	
ratings	 for	 equity	 is	 that	 ratings	 are	
typically	paid	for	by	investors,	the	users	
of	 the	 rating.	 This	 helps	 address	 the	
conflict	 of	 interest	 inherent	 within	 the	
“issuer	 pays”	 model	 that	 has	 plagued	
financial	 ratings	 agencies	 in	 the	 wake	
of	the	global	financial	crisis	and	remains	
common	for	debt	ratings.	
•	 Connecting reporting, ratings, 
integration and capacity-building. 
Maximizing	the	contribution	of	corporate	
sustainability	 reporting	 to	 sustainable	
development	 is	 a	 multi-stage	 process	
(figure	 IV.10).	 Corporate	 sustainability	
information	 should	 feed	 into	 systems	
of	analysis	 that	can	produce	actionable	
information	 in	 the	 form	 of	 corporate	
sustainability	 ratings.	 Such	 ratings	
on	 corporate	 debt	 and	 equities	 should	 be	
integrated	 into	 the	decision-making	processes	
of	 key	 investment	 stakeholders	 including	
policymakers	 and	 regulators,	 portfolio	
investors,	 TNCs,	 media	 and	 civil	 society.	
These	 investment	 stakeholders	 can	 seek	 to	
implement	a	range	of	incentives	and	sanctions	
to	 provide	 market	 signals	 that	 help	 to	 better	
align	 the	 outcomes	 of	 market	 mechanisms	
with	 the	 sustainable	 development	 policies	
of	 countries.	 To	 be	 truly	 transformative,	 this	
integration	 process	 needs	 to	 align	 itself	 with	
the	policy	objectives	of	the	SDGs	and	to	create	
material	 implications	 for	 poor	 sustainability	
performance.	 Finally,	 sustainability	 ratings	
and	 standards	 can	 also	 be	 used	 as	 a	 basis	
for	 capacity-building	 programmes	 to	 assist	
developing-country	 TNCs	 and	 small	 and	
medium-sized	 enterprises	 to	 adopt	 best	
practices	 in	 the	area	of	sustainability	 reporting	
and	 management	 systems.	 This	 will	 provide	
new	 information	 to	 guide	 investors	 and	
promote	investment.
Figure IV.10. The reporting and ratings chain of action
 
Reporting
• Standards development and harmonization (regulators)
• Requirements and incentives (policy makers)
Ratings
• Methodology development
• Compilation and dissemination
• Trends analysis
Integration
• Portfolio investors: asset allocation and proxy voting
• Governments: incentives and sanctions
• Companies: pay incentives and management systems
• Media: name and shame
• Civil society: engagement and dialogue
Capacity 
Building
• Implement best practices in sustainability reporting
• Adopt sustainable development management systems
Source:	UNCTAD.	
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e. ChANNellING INVeSTmeNT INTO The SDGs
1.  Challenges to channelling funds into 
the SDGs
Key constraints to channelling funds into SDGs 
include entry barriers, inadequate risk-return ratios 
for SDG investments, a lack of information, effective 
packaging and promotion of projects, and a lack of 
investor expertise. 
Investment	in	SDG	sectors	is	not	solely	a	question	
of	availability	and	mobilization	of	capital,	but	also	of	
the	allocation	of	capital	to	sustainable	development	
projects.	Macroeconomic	policies	improving	overall	
conditions	 for	 investment	 and	 growth,	 industrial	
policies	 establishing	 or	 refining	 a	 development	
strategy,	 and	 similar	 policies,	 can	 encourage	
investment,	public	or	private,	domestic	or	 foreign,	
into	SDG	sectors	or	others.	However,	while	they	are	
necessary	conditions	 for	 investment,	 they	are	not	
necessarily	enough.	
Investors	 face	 a	 number	 of	 constraints	 and	
challenges	in	channelling	funds	to	SDG	projects:
Entry barriers to SDG investments.	 Investment	
for	 sustainable	 development	 can	 be	 discouraged	
by	 an	 unwelcoming	 investment	 climate.	 Investors	
may	 face	 administrative	 or	 policy-related	 hurdles	
in	 some	sectors	 related	 to	SDGs	which	are	often	
sensitive	 as	 many	 constitute	 a	 public	 service	
responsibility.	 These	 sectors	may	 even	 be	 closed	
either	 to	private	 investors	 in	general,	or	 to	 foreign	
investors	in	particular.	
Inadequate risk-return ratios for SDG investment.	
Risks	related	to	SDG	investment	projects	can	occur	
at	the	country	and	policy	level	(e.g.	legal	protection	
for	 investment);	at	 the	market	or	sector	 level	 (e.g.	
uncertain	 demand);	 and	 at	 the	 project	 (financial)	
level.	 For	 example,	 investments	 in	 agriculture	
or	 infrastructure	 are	 subject	 to	 uncertainty	 and	
concerns	about	local	demand	and	spending	power	
of	 the	 local	 population;	 ownership	 or	 access	 to	
sensitive	 resources	 (e.g.	 land);	 and	 the	 very	 long	
payback	 periods	 involved.	 As	 a	 result,	 investors,	
especially	 those	 not	 accustomed	 to	 investing	 in	
SDG	 sectors	 in	 developing	 countries,	 demand	
higher	 rates	 of	 return	 for	 investment	 in	 countries	
with	greater	(perceived	or	real)	risks.
Lack of information, effective packaging and 
promotion of bankable investment projects in SDG 
sectors. Investment	 opportunities	 in	 commercial	
activities	 are	 usually	 clearly	 delineated;	 location	
options	may	be	pre-defined	in	industrial	zones;	the	
investment	process	and	associated	rules	are	clearly	
framed;	and	investors	are	familiar	with	the	process	
of	appraising	risks	and	assessing	potential	financial	
returns	on	investment	 in	their	own	business.	SDG	
sectors	 are	 usually	 more	 complex.	 Investment	
projects	such	as	in	infrastructure,	energy	or	health,	
may	 require	 a	 process	 	 where	 political	 priorities	
need	 to	 be	 defined,	 regulatory	 preparation	 is	
needed	 (e.g.	 planning	 permissions	 and	 licenses,	
market	 rules)	and	feasibility	studies	carried	out.	 In	
addition,	smaller	projects	may	not	easily	provide	the	
scale	that	 large	 investors,	such	as	pension	 funds,	
require.	 Therefore,	 aggregation	 and	 packaging	
can	 be	 necessary.	While	 commercial	 investments	
are	often	more	of	a	“push”	nature,	where	investors	
are	 looking	 for	 opportunities,	 SDG	 projects	 may	
be	more	of	a	“pull”	nature,	where	local	needs	drive	
the	 shaping	 of	 investment	 opportunities.	 Effective	
promotion	 and	 information	 provision	 is	 therefore	
even	 more	 important	 because	 investors	 face	
greater	difficulty	 in	appraising	potential	 investment	
risks	 and	 returns,	 due	 to	 a	 lack	of	 historical	 data	
and	 investment	 benchmarks	 to	 make	meaningful	
comparisons	of	performance.
Lack of investor expertise in SDG sectors.	 Some	
of	 the	 private	 sector	 investors	 that	 developing	
countries	 are	 aiming	 to	 attract	 to	 large-scale	
projects,	 such	 as	 infrastructure	 or	 agriculture,	
are	 relatively	 inexperienced,	 including	 private	
equity	funds	and	SWFs.	These	investors	have	not	
traditionally	 been	 engaged	 in	 direct	 investment	
in	 these	 countries	 (particularly	 low-income	
economies)	nor	in	SDG	sectors,	and	they	may	not	
have	the	necessary	expertise	in-house	to	evaluate	
investments,	 to	 manage	 the	 investment	 process	
(and,	where	applicable,	to	manage	operations).	
These	 constraints	 can	 be	 addressed	 through	
public	policy	responses,	as	well	as	by	actions	and	
behavioural	 change	 by	 corporations	 themselves	
(see	figure	IV.11).	
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Figure IV.11. Channelling investment into SDG sectors: key challenges and policy options
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Source:	UNCTAD.	
2.  Alleviating entry barriers, while 
safeguarding public interests
A basic prerequisite for successful promotion 
of SDG investment is a sound overall policy 
climate, conducive to attracting investment while 
safeguarding public interests, especially in sensitive 
sectors. 
A	development	strategy	 for	attracting	and	guiding	
private	investment	into	priority	areas	for	sustainable	
development	 requires	 the	 creation	 of	 an	 enabling	
policy	 environment.	 Key	 determinants	 for	 a	 host	
country’s	attractiveness,	such	as	political,	economic	
and	social	stability;	clear,	coherent	and	transparent	
rules	 on	 the	 entry	 and	 operational	 conditions	 for	
investment;	and	effective	business	facilitation	are	all	
relevant	for	encouraging	investment	in	SDG	sectors.	
The	 rule	 of	 law	 needs	 to	 be	 respected,	 together	
with	 a	 credible	 commitment	 to	 transparency,	
participation	and	sound	institutions	that	are	capable,	
efficient	 and	 immune	 to	 corruption	 (Sachs	 2012).	
At	 the	same	time,	alleviating	policy	constraints	 for	
private	investment	in	SDG	sectors	must	not	come	
at	 the	 price	 of	 compromising	 legitimate	 public	
interests	 concerning	 the	 ownership	 structure	 and	
the	 regulatory	 framework	 for	 activities	 related	 to	
sustainable	 development.	 This	 calls	 for	 a	 gradual	
approach	towards	liberalization	of	SDG	sectors	and	
proper	sequencing.
The	 enabling	 policy	 framework	 should	 clearly	
stipulate	 in	what	SDG	areas	private	 investment	 is	
permitted	and	under	what	conditions.	While	many	
SDG	 sectors	 are	 open	 to	 private	 investment	 in	
numerous	 countries,	 important	 country-specific	
limitations	persist.	One	case	in	point	is	infrastructure,	
where	public	monopolies	are	common.25	Reducing	
investment	 barriers	 can	 open	 up	 new	 investment	
opportunities,	but	may	require	a	gradual	approach,	
starting	 with	 those	 SDG	 sectors	 where	 private	
involvement	 faces	 fewer	 political	 concerns.	 Host	
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countries	may	first	allow	service	and	management	
contracts	 and	 move	 to	 PPPs	 once	 contractual	
partners	have	gained	more	experience.	
Private	 investment	 may	 also	 be	 hindered	 by	
exclusive	 rights	 that	 governments	 grant	 to	 single	
service	 providers	 (e.g.	 in	water	 or	 energy	 supply)	
to	 ensure	 sufficient	 revenue	 for	 the	 operator	
through	economies	of	scale.	Such	policies	should	
not	entirely	 impede	market	access	 for	small-scale	
providers,	since	the	latter	can	be	essential	to	fill	the	
gap	of	 service	provision	where	 the	main	operator	
fails	 to	 reach	 the	poorest	or	 isolated	segments	of	
the	population	(OECD	2009).	
If	 concerns	 exist	 particularly	 in	 respect	 of	 foreign 
participation	 in	 SDG	 sectors,	 host	 countries	 can	
opt	 for	 foreign	 ownership	 limitations	 instead	 of	
complete	prohibitions.	They	can	also	subject	foreign	
investment	to	a	national	benefit	test	on	a	case-by-
case	basis,	 for	 instance	 as	 regards	 investment	 in	
critical	 infrastructure.	 Investment	 contracts	 (such	
as	 PPPs)	 between	 the	 host	 country	 and	 foreign	
investors,	as	well	as	business	concessions	offer	the	
possibility	 to	 admit	 foreign	 investment	 under	 the	
condition	 that	 the	 investor	 actively	 contributes	 to	
SDGs.	For	instance,	foreign	investors	have	received	
the	 right	 to	 exploit	 natural	 resources	 in	 exchange	
for	a	commitment	to	build	certain	infrastructure	or	
social	institutions,	such	as	hospitals	or	schools.	
With	respect	to	foreign	participation	 in	agriculture,	
unambiguous	 land	 tenure	 rights,	 including	 a	 land	
registry	 system,	 are	 critical	 not	 only	 for	 attracting	
investors,	but	also	for	protecting	smallholders	from	
dispossession	 and	 for	 increasing	 their	 bargaining	
power	 vis-à-vis	 foreign	 investors.	 Political	
opposition	against	foreign	investment	in	agriculture	
can	be	alleviated	by	promoting	outgrower	schemes	
(WIR09, UNCTAD	and	World	Bank	2014).	
In	infrastructure	sectors,	which	are	often		monopolies,	
a	crucial	prerequisite	for	liberalization	or	opening	up	
to	private	or	foreign	investors	is	the	establishment	
of	effective	competition	policies	and	authorities.	In	
such	cases,	 the	establishment	of	an	 independent	
regulator	 can	 help	 ensure	 a	 level	 playing	 field.	 A	
similar	case	can	be	made	 in	other	sectors,	where	
policy	action	can	help	avoid	a	crowding	out	of	local	
micro-	and	small	and	medium-sized	firms	(such	as	
agricultural	 smallholders)	who	 form	 the	backbone	
of	the	economy	in	most	developing	countries.	
Other	 regulatory	 and	policy	 areas	 are	 relevant	 for	
the	creation	of	a	conducive	investment	climate	and	
for	 safeguarding	 public	 policy	 interest.	 UNCTAD’s	
Investment	 Policy	 Framework	 for	 Sustainable	
Development	 (IPFSD)	 has	 been	 successful	 in	
moving	discussion	and	policy	in	this	direction	since	
its	publication	in	2012.
3.  expanding the use of risk-sharing tools 
for SDG investments 
A number of tools, including PPPs, investment 
insurance, blended financing and advance market 
commitments, can help improve the risk-return 
profile of SDG investment projects. 
A	 key	 means	 to	 improve	 the	 risk-return	 profile	
for	 private	 sector	 actors	 is	 the	 ability	 of	 relevant	
stakeholders	 (the	 public	 sector,	 typically	 home-
country	 governments,	 development	 banks	 or	
international	 organizations)	 to	 share,	 minimize	
or	 offer	 alternatives	 to	 the	 risks	 associated	 with	
investment	in	sustainable	development.	
Innovative	risk	management	tools	can	help	channel	
finance	and	private	investment	in	SDGs	depending	
on	 the	 specific	 requirements	 of	 sustainable	
development	projects.	
Widen the use of public-private 
partnerships 
The	 use	 of	 PPPs	 can	 be	 critical	 in	 channelling	
investment	 to	 SDG	 sectors	 because	 they	 involve	
the	 public	 and	 private	 sectors	 working	 together,	
combining	skills	and	resources	(financial,	managerial	
and	technical),	and	sharing	risks.	Many	governments	
turn	 to	 PPPs	 when	 the	 scale	 and	 the	 level	 of	
resources	 required	 for	projects	mean	 they	cannot	
be	 undertaken	 solely	 through	 conventional	 public	
expenditures	 or	 procurement.	 PPPs	 are	 typically	
used	for	infrastructure	projects,	especially	for	water	
and	transportation	projects	(such	as	roads,	rail	and	
subway	networks),	but	also	in	social	infrastructure,	
health	care	and	education.26	PPPs	may	also	involve	
international	sustainable	development	programmes	
and	 donor	 funds;	 for	 instance,	 the	 International	
Finance	 Facility	 for	 Immunization	 is	 a	 PPP,	which	
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uses	 the	 long-term	 borrowing	 capacity	 of	 donor	
governments,	 with	 support	 of	 the	 international	
capital	 markets	 to	 collect	 funds	 and	 finance	 the	
GAVI	immunization	programmes.
PPPs	can	offer	various	means	for	improving	the	risk-
return	profile	of	sustainable	development	projects.	
They	offer	the	possibility	for	tailor-made	risk	sharing	
in	 respect	 of	 individual	 sustainable	 development	
investments.	 PPPs	 also	 allow	 for	 cost	 sharing	
concerning	 the	 preparation	 of	 feasibility	 studies;	
risk	 sharing	 of	 the	 investment	 operations	 through	
co-investment,	guarantees	and	insurances;	and	an	
increase	of	investor	returns	through,	for	example,	tax	
credits	and	industry	support	by	providing	capacity	
for	research	and	innovation.	Direct	financial	support	
agreed	upon	in	PPPs	can	help	to	overcome	start-
up	 barriers	 for	 sustainable-development-related	
investments.		
Caution	is	needed	when	developing	PPPs	as	they	
can	prove	relatively	expensive	methods	of	financing	
and	may	 increase	 the	cost	 to	 the	public	 sector	 if	
up-front	investment	costs	and	subsequent	revenue	
streams	 (investment	 returns)	 are	 not	 adequately	
assessed.	This	is	especially	relevant	for	LDCs	and	
small	 vulnerable	 economies	 (SVEs)	 with	 weaker	
technical,	 institutional	 and	 negotiation	 capacities	
(Griffiths	et	al.	2014).		Examples	of	risks	associated	
with	 PPPs	 for	 governments	 include	 high	 fiscal	
commitments	 and	 difficulty	 in	 the	 estimation	 of	
the	 cost	 of	 guarantees	 (e.g.	 when	 governments	
provide	guarantees	on	demand,	exchange	rates	or	
other	costs).	Governments	should	carefully	design	
contractual	 arrangements,	 ensure	 fair	 risk	 sharing	
between	the	public	and	the	private	sector,	develop	
the	capacities	to	monitor	and	evaluate	partnerships,	
and	promote	good	governance	in	PPP	projects.27		
Given	 the	 technical	 complexity	 of	 PPP	 projects	
and	 the	 institutional	 and	 governance	 capabilities	
required	 on	 the	 part	 of	 developing	 countries,	
widening	the	use	of	PPPs	will	require:
•	 the	 creation	 of	 dedicated	 units	 and	 expertise	
in	 public	 institutions,	 e.g.	 in	 SDG	 investment	
development	 agencies	 or	 relevant	 investment	
authorities,	 or	 in	 the	 context	 of	 regional	 SDG	
investment	 development	 compacts	 where	
costs	and	know-how	can	be	shared.
•	 technical	 assistance	 from	 the	 international	
development	 community,	 e.g.	 through	
dedicated	 units	 in	 international	 organizations	
(or	 in	a	multi-agency	context)	advising	on	PPP	
project	set-up	and	management.	
An	 option	 that	 can	 alleviate	 risks	 associated	with	
PPPs,	 further	 leverage	of	public	 funds	to	 increase	
private	sector	contributions,	and	bring	in	technical	
expertise,	 are	 three-	 or	 four-way	 PPP	 schemes	
with	the	involvement	not	only	of	local	governments	
and	 private	 sector	 investors,	 but	 also	with	 donor	
countries	and	MDBs	as	partners.	
Link the availability of guarantee 
and risk insurance facilities to 
SDGs
Numerous	countries	promote	outward	 investment	
by	 providing	 investment	 guarantees	 that	 protect	
investors	 against	 certain	 political	 risks	 in	 host	
countries	 (such	 as	 the	 risk	 of	 discrimination,	
expropriation,	 transfer	 restrictions	 or	 breach	
of	 contract).	 Granting	 such	 guarantees	 can	 be	
conditional	 on	 the	 investment	 complying	 with	
sustainability	criteria.	A	number	of	countries,	such	as	
Australia,	Austria,	Belgium,	Japan,	the	Netherlands,	
the	United	Kingdom	and	the	United	States	require	
environmental	 and	 social	 impact	 assessments	 be	
done	for	projects	with	potentially	significant	adverse	
impacts.28	
In	 addition	 to	 mechanisms	 providing	 insurance	
against	 political	 risks	 at	 the	 country	 level,	
mechanisms	 providing	 guarantees	 and	 risk	
insurance offered	 by	 multilateral	 development	
institutions	 also	 take	 into	 account	 sustainable	
development	objectives.	For	instance,	in	determining	
whether	 to	 issue	 a	 guarantee,	 the	 Multilateral	
Investment	Guarantee	Agency	evaluates	all	projects	
in	accordance	with	its	Policy	on	Environmental	and	
Social	Sustainability,	adopted	in	October	2013.	29	
Public sector and ODA-leveraging 
and blended financing 
National,	 regional	 and	 multilateral	 development	
banks,	 as	 well	 as	 ODA,	 can	 represent	 critical	
sources	of	finance	that	can	be	used	as	leveraging	
mechanisms.	In	a	similar	vein,	development	banks	
can	 play	 a	 crowding-in	 role,	 enabling	 private	
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investment,	 or	 providing	 support	 for	 the	 private	
sector	 in	 periods	 of	 crisis	 when	 firms	 cannot	
receive	 financing	 from	 private	 banks.	 In	 addition	
development	 banks	 have	 played,	 and	 continue	
to	 play,	 a	 role	 in	 socially	 oriented	 projects	 where	
private	investment	is	lacking.
ODA	can	play	similar	roles,	especially	in	vulnerable	
economies.	 For	 instance,	 the	 2002	 Monterrey	
Consensus	 already	 pointed	 out	 the	 need	 to	
intensify	 efforts	 to	 promote	 the	 use	 of	 ODA	 to	
leverage	additional	financing	for	development.	ODA	
continues	to	be	of	critical	importance,	particularly	for	
LDCs,	because	financial	flows	to	these	countries	are	
small	and	the	capacity	to	raise	sufficient	resources	
domestically	is	lacking.	Aid	can	act	as	a	catalyst	for	
private	investment,	and	there	is	growing	consensus	
on	 the	 potential	 complementarity	 of	 public	 aid	
and	 private	 investment	 to	 foster	 development	
(UNECOSOC	 2013).	 To	 date,	 the	 share	 of	 ODA	
supporting	private	investment	is	small,	but	interest	
in	this	mechanism	is	rising	among	donor	countries	
and	development	finance	institutions;	for	example,	
blended	 ODA	 from	 EU	 institutions	 rose	 from	 0.2	
per	 cent	 in	 2007	 to	 almost	 4	 per	 cent	 in	 2012	
(EURODAD	2014).	The	amount	of	ODA	directed	to	
private	sector	blending	mechanisms	is	expected	to	
increase.	
Public	 sector	 and	 ODA-leveraged	 and	 blended	
financing	involves	using	public	and	donor	funds	as	
base	capital,	 to	 share	 risks	or	 improve	 risk-return	
profiles	 for	 private	 sector	 funders.	 Blending	 can	
reduce	costs	as	it	involves	the	complementary	use	
of	 grants	 and	 non-grant	 sources	 such	 as	 loans	
or	 risk	 capital	 to	 finance	 investment	 projects	 in	
developing	countries.	It	can	be	an	effective	tool	for	
investment	 with	 long	 gestation	 periods	 and	 with	
economic	and	social	rates	of	return	exceeding	the	
pure	financial	 rate	of	 return	 (e.g.	 in	 the	 renewable	
energy	sector).	
Caution	must	be	exercised	in	the	use	of	blending,	
as	 it	 involves	 risks.	 Where	 the	 private	 funding	
component	 exclusively	 pursues	 financial	 returns,	
development	 impact	 objectives	 may	 be	 blurred.	
ODA	can	also	crowd	out	non-grant	finance	(Griffiths	
et	 al.	 2014).	 Evaluating	 blended	 projects	 is	 not	
easy	 and	 it	 can	 be	 difficult	 to	 demonstrate	 key	
success	factors,	such	as	additionality,	transparency	
and	 accountability	 and	 to	 provide	 evidence	 of	
development	impact.
Advance market commitments and 
other market creation mechanisms
In	 several	 SDG	 sectors,	 private	 investment	 is	
severely	constrained	by	the	absence	of	a	sufficient	
market.	 For	 instance,	 private	 basic	 health	 and	
education	services,	but	also	infrastructure	services,	
such	 as	 private	water	 and	 electricity	 supply,	may	
not	be	affordable	to	 large	parts	of	 the	population.	
Examples	of	policy	options	to	help	create	markets	
in	 SDG	 sectors	 that	 can	 attract	 private	 sector	
investment	include:
•	 Policies	 aimed	 at	 enhancing	 social 
inclusiveness and accessibility of	 basic	
services	 –	 such	 as	 subsidy	 schemes	 for	 the	
poor	in	the	form	of	education	vouchers	or	cash	
grants	for	energy	and	water	distribution.	
•	 Public procurement policies,	 through	 which	
governments	at	 the	central	and	 local	 level	can	
give	preference	 to	 the	purchase	of	goods	 that	
have	been	produced	in	an	environmentally	and	
socially-friendly	 manner.	 Cities,	 for	 example,	
increasingly	 have	 programs	 relating	 to	 the	
purchase	of	 hybrid	 fleets	or	 renewable	power,	
the	upgrading	of	mass	transportation	systems,	
green	 city	 buildings	 or	 recycling	 systems	
(WIR10).	
•	 Feed-in tariffs	 for	 green	 electricity	 produced	
by	 households	 or	 other	 private	 sector	 entities	
that	are	not	utilities	but	that	can	supply	excess	
energy	to	the	grid	(WIR10).	
•	 Regional cooperation	can	help	create	markets,	
especially	 for	 cross-border	 infrastructure	
projects,	 such	 as	 roads,	 electricity	 or	 water	
supply,	by	overcoming	market	fragmentation.	
Other	concrete	mechanisms	may	include	so-called	
advance	market	commitments.	These	are	binding	
contracts	 typically	 offered	 by	 governments	 or	
financing	entities	which	can	be	used	(i)	to	guarantee	
a	viable	market,	e.g.	for	goods	that	embody	socially	
beneficial	 technologies	 for	 which	 private	 demand	
is	 inadequate,	 such	 as	 in	 pharmaceuticals	 and	
renewable	 energy	 technologies	 (UNDESA	 2012);	
(ii)	 to	 provide	 assured	 funding	 for	 the	 innovation	
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of	 socially	 beneficial	 technologies,	 e.g.	 through	
rewards,	 payments,	 patent	 buyouts,	 even	 if	
the	 private	 demand	 for	 the	 resulting	 goods	 is	
insufficient;	 and/or	 (iii)	 to	 act	 as	 a	 consumption	
subsidy	 when	 the	 R&D	 costs	 are	 high	 and	 the	
returns	uncertain,	with	a	result	of	lowering	the	price	
for	consumers,	often	allowing	the	private	sector	to	
remain	in	charge	of	the	production,	marketing	and	
distribution	 strategies.	 Donors	 guarantee	 a	 viable	
market	 for	 a	 known	 period,	 which	 reduces	 the	
risks	for	producers	associated	with	R&D	spending	
(i.e.	commitments	act	as	 incentives	 for	producers	
to	 invest	 in	research,	staff	 training	and	production	
facilities).	 Advance	 market	 commitments	 (United	
Nations	 I-8	Group	2009)	have	been	used	to	 raise	
finance	for	development	of	vaccine	production	for	
developing	countries,	 for	 instance	by	successfully	
accelerating	 the	 availability	 of	 the	 pneumococcal	
vaccine	in	low-income	countries.	
4.  establishing new incentives schemes 
and a new generation of investment 
promotion institutions
Alleviating	 constraints	 in	 the	 policy	 framework	
of	 host	 countries	may	 not	 be	 sufficient	 to	 trigger	
private	investment	in	SDGs.	Potential	investors	may	
still	 hesitate	 to	 invest	 because	 they	 consider	 the	
overall	risk-return	ratio	as	unfavourable.	Investment	
promotion	and	facilitation	efforts	can	help	overcome	
investor	reluctance.	
a.  Transform IPAs into SDG 
investment development 
agencies 
A new generation of investment promotion requires 
agencies to target SDG investors and to develop 
and market pipelines of bankable projects.
Through	their	investment	promotion	and	facilitation	
policies,	 and	 especially	 in	 the	 priorities	 given	
to	 investment	 promotion	 agencies	 (IPAs),	 host	
countries	 pursue	 a	 variety	 of	 mostly	 economic	
objectives,	above	all	job	creation,	export	promotion,	
technology	 dissemination	 and	 diffusion,	 linkages	
with	 local	 industry	 and	 domestic	 value	 added	
as	 well	 as	 skills	 development	 (see	 figure	 III.4	 in	
chapter	 III).	 Most	 IPAs,	 therefore,	 do	 not	 focus	
specifically	on	SDG	investment	objectives	or	SDG	
sectors,	although	the	existing	strategic	priorities	do	
contribute	to	sustainable	development	through	the	
generation	of	income	and	poverty	alleviation.	
Pursuing	investments	in	SDGs	implies,	(i)	targeting	
investors	in	sectors	or	activities	that	are	particularly	
conducive	 to	 SDGs	 and	 (ii)	 creating	 and	 bringing	
to	 market	 a	 pipeline	 of	 pre-packaged	 bankable	
projects.
In	 pursuing	 SDG-related	 investment	 projects,	
IPAs	 face	 a	 number	 of	 challenges	 beyond	 those	
experienced	in	the	promotion	of	conventional	FDI.	
In	particular:	
•	 A	broadening	of	 the	 IPA	network	of	 in-country	
partnerships.	 Currently,	 typical	 partners	 of	
IPAs	 include	 trade	 promotion	 organizations,	
economic	 development	 agencies,	 export	
processing	 zones	 and	 industrial	 estates,	
business	 development	 organizations,	 research	
institutions	 and	 universities.	 While	 these	
relationships	 can	 help	 promote	 investment	 in	
SDG	projects,	the	network	needs	to	expand	to	
include	 public	 sector	 institutions	 dealing	 with	
policies	 and	 services	 related	 to	 infrastructure,	
health,	 education,	 energy	 and	 rural	
development,	 as	 well	 as	 local	 governments,	
rural	 extension	 services,	 non-profit	
organizations,	 donors	 and	 other	 development	
stakeholders.
•	 Broadening	 of	 contacts	 with	 wider	 groups	 of	
targets	 and	 potential	 investors,	 including	 not	
only	 TNCs	 but	 also	 new	 potential	 sources	
of	 finance,	 such	 as	 sovereign	 wealth	 funds,	
pension	 funds,	 asset	 managers,	 non-profit	
organizations,	and	others.
•	 Development	 of in-house expertise	 on	
sustainable	 development-related	 investment	
projects,	 new	 sectors	 and	 possible	 support	
measures.	 IPAs,	 which	 traditionally	 focus	
on	 attracting	 investments	 in	 manufacturing	
and	 commercial	 services,	 need	 to	 become	
familiar	 with	 the	 concept	 of	 SDG-related	
investment	 projects,	 including	 PPPs.	 Training	
in	 international	 best	 practice	 and	 investment	
promotion	 techniques	 could	 be	 acquired	 from	
international	 organizations	 and	 private	 sector	
groups.	 For	 example,	 in	 2013,	 UNCTAD	
started	 a	 program	 that	 assists	 IPAs	 from	
developing	countries	in	the	promotion	of	green	
FDI.
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To	channel	investment	into	SDG	sectors	that	may	be	
less	visible	or	attractive	to	 investors,	governments	
–	 alone	 or	 in	 the	 context	 of	 regional	 cooperation	
–	 should	 develop	 a	 pipeline of bankable SDG 
investment projects.	
Key	 characteristics	 of	 bankable	 projects	 are	
prioritization,	preparation	and	packaging:
•	 Political prioritization	 involves	 the	 identification	
of	 priority	 projects	 and	 the	 determination	
of	 priority	 sectors,	 based	 on	 national	
development	 objectives	 and	 strategies.	 The	
projects	should	be	politically	feasible	within	the	
economic	development	strategy	of	the	country,	
with	 a	 clear	 political	 consensus	 at	 all	 levels	
(national,	 state	 and	 provincial	 as	 applicable)	
and	 public	 support.	 Thus	 projects	 should	 be	
selected	 on	 the	 basis	 of	 a	 consensus	 among	
government	 entities	 on	 their	 priorities.	 At	
this	 inception	 stage,	 policymakers	 should	
identify	scalable	business	models	and	develop	
strategies	 for	 large-scale	 roll-out	over	 the	 long	
term.	
•	 Regulatory preparation	 involves	 the	 pre-
clearing	of	regulatory	aspects	and	facilitation	of	
administrative	procedures	that	might	otherwise	
deter	investors.	Examples	include	pre-approval	
of	 market-support	 mechanisms	 or	 targeted	
financial	 incentives	 (such	 fiscal	 incentives	
aiming	 to	 reduce	 the	cost	of	capital);	advance	
processing	 of	 required	 licenses	 and	 permits	
(e.g.	 planning	 permissions);	 or	 carrying	 out	
environmental	 impact	 studies	 prior	 to	 inviting	
bids	from	investors.
•	 Packaging	 relates	 to	 the	 preparation	 of	
concrete	 project	 proposals	 that	 show	 viability	
from	the	standpoint	of	all	relevant	stakeholders,	
e.g.	 technical	 feasibility	 studies	 for	 investors,	
financial	 feasibility	 assessments	 for	 banks	
or	 environmental	 impact	 studies	 for	 wider	
stakeholders.	 Governments	 can	 call	 upon	
service	 providers	 (e.g.	 technical	 auditors,	
test	 and	 certification	 organizations)	 to	 assist	
in	 packaging	 projects.	 Packaging	 may	 also	
include	 break	 up	 or	 aggregation/bundling	
of	 projects	 into	 suitable	 investment	 sizes	 for	
relevant	 target	 groups.	 And	 it	 will	 include	 the	
production	 of	 the	 “prospectus”	 that	 can	 be	
marketed	to	investors.
Public	 funding	 needs	 for	 feasibility	 studies	 and	
other	project	preparation	costs	can	be	significant.	
They	typically	average	5–10	per	cent	of	total	project	
costs,	which	can	add	up	to	hundreds	of	millions	of	
dollars	for	large	infrastructure	projects	(World	Bank	
2013b).	 To	 accelerate	 and	 increase	 the	 supply	
of	 bankable	 projects	 at	 the	 national	 and	 regional	
levels,	 particularly	 in	 LDCs,	 international	 support	
programmes	could	be	established	with	the	financial	
support	of	ODA	and	technical	assistance	of	MDBs.
b.  Redesign of investment 
incentives for SDGs 
Reorienting investment incentives towards SDGs 
implies targeting investments in SDG sectors 
and making incentives conditional on social and 
environmental performance.
Designing	 investment	 incentives	 schemes	 for	
SDGs	 implies	 putting	 emphasis	 on	 the	 quality	
of	 investments	 in	 terms	 of	 their	 mid-	 and	 long-
term	 social	 and	 environmental	 effects	 (table	
IV.3).	 Essentially,	 incentives	 would	 move	 from	
purely	 “location-focused” (a	 tool	 to	 increase	 the	
competitiveness	 of	 a	 location)	 to	 more	 “SDG-
focused” (a	 tool	 to	 promote	 investment	 in	
sustainable	development).
SDG-oriented	investment	incentives	can	be	of	two	
types:
•	 Incentives	 targeted	 specifically	 at	 SDG	
sectors	 (e.g.	 those	 provided	 for	 investment	 in	
renewable	energy,	infrastructure	or	health).
•	 Incentives	 conditional	 upon	 social	 and	
environmental	 performance	 of	 investors	
(including,	 for	 instance,	 related	 to	 policies	
on	 social	 inclusion).	 Examples	 include	
performance	 requirements	 relating	 to	
employment,	 training,	 local	 sourcing	of	 inputs,	
R&D,	energy	efficiency	or	location	of	facilities	in	
disadvantaged	regions.
Table	 IV.4	contains	 some	examples	of	 investment	
incentives	related	to	environmental	sustainability.
In	 UNCTAD’s	 most	 recent	 survey	 of	 IPAs,	 these	
agencies	noted	that	among	SDG	sectors	investment	
incentive	schemes	are	mostly	provided	for	energy,	
R&D	 and	 infrastructure	 development	 projects.	 In	
addition	to	these	sectors,	incentives	are	sometimes	
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Table IV.3. Traditional and sustainable development oriented investment incentives
Traditional economic growth oriented investment 
incentives
Investment incentives that take into account sustainable 
development considerations
Focus	on	sectors	important	for	economic	growth,	job	
creation	and	export	generation
Additional	focus	on	SDG	sectors
Focus	on	short-	and	medium-term	economic	gains Long-term	implications	of	investment	for	sustainable	development	
considered
Cost-benefit	analysis	in	favour	of	economic	gains	 Cost-benefit	analysis	with		adequate	weight	to	long-term	social	and	
environmental	costs	of	investment	
Lowering	of	regulatory	standards	considered	as	a	policy	
option	
Lowering	of	regulatory	standards	as	part	of	the	incentives	package	
excluded
Monitoring	primarily	of	economic	impacts	of	the	investment	 Monitoring	of	the	overall	impact	of	the	investment	on	sustainable	
development
Source:	UNCTAD.
provided	for	projects	across	numerous	SDG	areas,	
or	 linked	 to	SDG	objectives	 through	performance	
criteria. 
In	addition	to	financial,	fiscal	or	regulatory	incentives,	
governments	 can	 facilitate	 investors	 by	 building	
surrounding	 enabling	 infrastructure	 or	 by	 letting	
them	use	 such	 infrastructure	 at	 low	or	 zero	cost.	
For	instance,	investments	in	agricultural	production	
require	 good	 storage	 and	 transportation	 facilities.	
Investments	in	renewable	energy	(e.g.	wind	or	solar	
parks)	necessitate	the	building	of	a	grid	to	transport	
the	 energy	 to	 consumers.	 The	 construction	 of	
schools	 and	 hospitals	 in	 rural	 areas	 calls	 for	
adequate	roads,	and	public	transportation	to	make	
education	 and	 health	 services	 easily	 reachable.	
There	 is	 an	 important	 role	 for	 domestic,	 regional	
and	 multilateral	 development	 banks	 in	 realizing	
such	enabling	projects.	
A	 reorientation	 of	 investment	 incentives	 policies	
(especially	 regulatory	 incentives)	 towards	
sustainable	development	could	also	necessitate	a	
phasing	out	 of	 incentives	 that	may	have	negative	
social	or	ecological	side	effects,	in	particular	where	
such	 incentives	 result	 in	 a	 “race-to-the-bottom”	
with	regard	to	social	or	environmental	standards	or	
in	a	financially	unsustainable	“race	to	the	top”.	
A	stronger	focus	on	sustainable	development	may	
call	 for	 a	 review	 of	 existing	 subsidy	 programs	 for	
entire	 industries.	 For	 example,	 the	 World	 Bank	
estimates	 that	 $1	 trillion	 to	 $1.2	 trillion	 per	 year	
are	 currently	 being	 spent	 on	 environmentally	
harmful	subsidies	for	fossil	fuels,	agriculture,	water	
and	 fisheries	 (World	 Bank	 2012).	More	 generally,	
investment	incentives	are	costly.	Opportunity	costs	
must	 be	 carefully	 considered.	 Public	 financial	
outlays	 in	 case	 of	 financial	 incentives,	 or	 missed	
revenues	in	case	of	fiscal	incentives,	could	be	used	
directly	for	SDG	investment	projects.
Investment	 incentives	 should	 also	 not	 become	
permanent;	 the	 supported	 project	must	 have	 the	
potential	 to	 become	 self-sustainable	 over	 time	 –	
something	that	may	be	difficult	to	achieve	in	some	
SDG	 sectors.	 This	 underlines	 the	 importance	
of	 monitoring	 the	 actual	 effects	 of	 investment	
incentives	 on	 sustainable	 development,	 including	
the	 possibility	 of	 their	 withdrawal	 if	 the	 impact	
proves	unsatisfactory.	
c.  Establish regional SDG 
investment compacts 
Regional SDG investment compacts can help spur 
private investment in cross-border infrastructure 
projects and build regional clusters of firms in SDG 
sectors.
Regional	cooperation	can	 foster	SDG	 investment.	
A	 key	 area	 for	 such	 SDG-related	 cross-border	
cooperation	is	infrastructure	development.	
Existing	 regional	 economic	 cooperation	 initiatives	
could	 evolve	 towards	 regional SDG investment 
compacts. Such	 compacts	 could	 focus	 on	
liberalization	 and	 facilitation	 of	 investment	 and	
establish	 joint	 investment	 promotion	mechanisms	
and	 institutions.	 Regional	 industrial	 development	
compacts	 could	 include	 in	 their	 scope	 all	 policy	
areas	important	for	enabling	regional	development,	
such	 as	 the	 harmonization,	mutual	 recognition	 or	
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Table IV.4. examples of investment incentives linked to environmental sustainability 
Country Environmental incentives
Brazil •	 Initiative	and	incentive	programs	for	wind,	power,	biomass	and	small	hydro-subsectors
Canada •	 Special	tax	credits	for	development	of	new	technologies	that	address	issues	of	climate	change,	clean	air,	and	water	and	soil	quality			
•	 Nova	Scotia	provides	up	to	20	per	cent	of	the	development	cost	of	ocean	tech	and	non-traditional	energy	
sources
Germany •	 Grant	programs	for	projects	related	to	energy	efficiency,	CO2	reduction	and	renewable	energy
Indonesia •	 5-	to	10-year	tax	break	in	renewable	energy
Japan •	 Investments	in	smart	communities	that	unite	information	networks,	energy	systems	and	traffic	systems	as	well	as	improve	comfort	and	reduce	CO2	emissions
South	Africa •	 Accelerated	depreciation	for	investments	in	renewable	energy	and	biofuel	production
•	 Tax	break	for	entities	that	become	more	energy-efficient
•	 Allowance	for	expenditure	on	green	technology	and	improved	resource	efficiency
Turkey •	 Interest-free	loans	for	renewable	energy	production	and	for	projects	to	improve	energy	efficiency	and	reduce	
environmental	impact
United	Kingdom •	 Funding	schemes	for	off-shore	wind	farms
United	States •	 Guaranteed	loans	to	eligible	clean	energy	projects	and	direct	loans	to	manufacturers	of	advanced	technology	vehicles	and	components
•	 Tax	incentives	to	improve	energy	efficiency	in	the	industrial	sector
•	 Incentives	at	the	state	level
Source:		UNCTAD	based	on	desk	research.30
approximation	 of	 regulatory	 standards	 and	 the	
consolidation	of	private	standards	on	environmental,	
social	and	governance	issues.	
Regional	SDG	 investment	compacts	could	aim	 to	
create	 cross-border	 clusters	 through	 the	build-up	
of	 relevant	 infrastructure	 and	 absorptive	 capacity.	
Establishing	 such	 compacts	 implies	 working	 in	
partnership,	 between	 governments	 of	 the	 region	
to	 identify	 joint	 investment	 projects,	 between	
investment	promotion	agencies	for	joint	promotion	
efforts,	 between	 governments	 and	 international	
organizations	for	technical	assistance	and	capacity-
building,	and	between	the	public	and	private	sector	
for	 investment	 in	 infrastructure	 and	 absorptive	
capacity	(figure	IV.12)	(see	also	WIR13).	
5.  Building SDG investment partnerships
Partnerships	between	home	countries	of	investors,	
host	 countries,	 TNCs	 and	 MDBs	 can	 help	
overcome	knowledge	gaps	as	well	as	generate	joint	
investments	in	SDG	sectors.
Private	 investors’	 lack	 of	 awareness	 of	 suitable	
sustainable	 development	 projects,	 and	 a	 shortfall	
in	expertise,	can	be	overcome	through	knowledge-
sharing mechanisms, networks and multi-
stakeholder partnerships.	
Multi-stakeholder	 partnerships	 can	 support	
investment	in	SDG	sectors	because	they	enhance	
cooperation,	 understanding	 and	 trust	 between	
key	 partners.	 Partnerships	 can	 facilitate	 and	
strengthen	 expertise,	 for	 instance	 by	 supporting	
the	development	of	innovative	and	synergistic	ways	
to	 pool	 resources	 and	 talents,	 and	 by	 involving	
relevant	stakeholders	that	can	make	a	contribution	
to	 sustainable	 development.	 Partnerships	 can	
have	a	number	of	goals,	such	as	joint	analysis	and	
research,	 information	 sharing	 to	 identify	 problems	
and	solutions,	development	of	guidelines	 for	best	
practices,	 capacity-building,	 progress	 monitoring	
and	implementation,	or	promotion	of	understanding	
and	trust	between	stakeholders.	The	following	are	
two	 examples	 of	 potential	 partnerships	 that	 can	
raise	investor	expertise	in	SDGs.	
Partnerships between home- and 
host-country investment promotion 
agencies. 
Cooperation	 between	 outward	 investment	
agencies	 in	 home	 countries	 and	 IPAs	 in	 host	
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Figure IV.12. Regional SDG Investment Compacts
Source:	UNCTAD.	
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countries	 could	 be	 ad	 hoc	 or	 systematic,	 and	
potentially	institutionalized.	IPAs	that	target	projects	
related	 to	 sustainable	 development	 could	 partner	
with	outward	 investment	agencies	for	three	broad	
purposes:
•	 Information	 dissemination	 and	 marketing	
of	 SDG	 investment	 opportunities	 in	 home	
countries.	Outward	 investment	agencies	could	
provide	matching	services,	helping	IPAs	identify	
potential	investors	to	approach.	
•	 Where	 outward	 investment	 agencies	 provide	
investment	 incentives	 and	 facilitation	 services	
to	 their	 investors	 for	 SDG	 projects,	 the	
partnership	could	increase	chances	of	realizing	
the	investment.
•	 Outward	 investment	 agencies	 incentives	 for	
SDG	 investments	 could	 be	 conditional	 on	
the	 ESG	 performance	 of	 investors,	 ensuring	
continued	 involvement	 of	 both	 parties	 in	
the	 partnership	 for	 monitoring	 and	 impact	
assessment.
Through	 such	 partnerships	 outward	 investment	
agencies	 could	 evolve	 into	 genuine	 business	
development	 agencies	 for	 investments	 in	 SDGs	
in	 developing	 countries,	 raising	 awareness	 of	
investment	opportunities,	helping	 investors	bridge	
knowledge	gaps	and	gain	expertise,	and	practically	
facilitating	the	investment	process.
SVE-TNC-MDB triangular 
partnerships
Partnerships	 between	 governments	 of	 SVEs,	
private	 investors	 (TNCs),	 and	 MDBs	 could	 be	
fostered	 with	 the	 aim	 of	 promoting	 investments	
in	 SDG	 sectors	 which	 are	 of	 strategic	 interest	 to	
SVEs.	 Depending	 on	 the	 economy,	 the	 strategic	
sector	 may	 be	 infrastructure,	 a	 manufacturing	
industry	or	even	a	value	chain	segment.	Crucially,	
in	 such	 “triangular”	 partnerships,	 stakeholders	
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would	 work	 together	 to	 identify	 the	 bottlenecks	
for	 private	 investment,	 and	 jointly	 develop	public-
private	 solutions	 to	 develop	 the	 strategic	 sector,	
bearing	 in	 mind	 wider	 socioeconomic	 and	 long-
term	 ramifications.	 In	 particular,	 the	 partnership	
would	work	towards	raising	long-term,	sound	and	
sustainable	investment	in	SDGs,	but	also	promote	
investment	 in	 surrounding	 economic	 and	 social	
infrastructure,	 giving	 support	 to	 governments	
towards	a	sound	management	of	resources	through	
collaborative	stakeholder	engagement.	In	all	cases,	
the	SVE	government	has	to	be	in	the	“driver’s	seat”.
Participating	 TNCs	will	 typically	 be	 players	 in	 the	
sector,	 with	 consequent	 reputational	 risks	 if	 the	
partnership	fails.	In	some	case	the	SVE	may	make	
up	 (or	 become)	 an	 important	 part	 of	 the	 TNCs’	
operations	in	a	sector	–	e.g.	as	a	supply	base	for	a	
commodity	–	 leading	to	the	firm	having	a	stake	 in	
a	well-run	economy	and	local	development.	TNCs	
may	 also	 enter	 the	 partnership	 to	 demonstrate	
good	 corporate	 citizenship.	 The	 participation	
of	 MDBs	 –	 or	 equivalent	 entities	 –	 is	 required	 to	
monitor	 progress	 and	 impact,	 safeguard	 against	
unwarranted	economic	dominance,	provide	policy	
advice,	and	 run	contiguous	development	projects	
(e.g.	linkages	created	with	local	firms).	
Beyond	 formal	 partnerships,	 broad	 knowledge-
sharing	 platforms	 can	 also	 help.	 Governments,	
private	 and	 public	 research	 institutions,	 market	
intermediaries	 and	 development	 agencies	 all	 play	
a	 role	 in	producing	and	disseminating	 information	
on	 investment	 experience	 and	 future	 project	
opportunities.	This	can	be	done	through	platforms	
for	 knowledge	 sharing	 and	 dissemination.	
Examples	 include	 the	 Green	 Growth	 Knowledge	
Platform	 (GGKP),	 launched	 by	 the	 Global	 Green	
Growth	Institute,	the	OECD,	UNEP	and	the	World	
Bank.	Investors	themselves	also	establish	networks	
that	 foster	 relationships,	 propose	 tools,	 support	
advocacy,	 allow	 sharing	 of	 experiences,	 and	 can	
lead	to	new	investment	opportunities.	
F. eNSURING SUSTAINABle DeVelOPmeNT ImPACT OF 
INVeSTmeNT IN The SDGs
1.  Challenges in managing the impact of 
private investment in SDG sectors
Key challenges in managing the impact of private 
investment in SDG sectors include weak absorptive 
capacity in some developing countries, social and 
environmental impact risks, the need for stakeholder 
engagement and effective impact monitoring.
Once	 investment	 has	 been	 mobilized	 and	
channelled	 towards	 SDG	 sectors,	 there	 remain	
challenges	to	overcome	in	order	to	ensure	that	the	
resultant	benefits	 for	sustainable	development	are	
maximized,	and	the	potential	associated	drawbacks	
mitigated	(figure	IV.13).	Key	challenges	include	the	
following.
Weak absorptive capacity in developing economies.	
Developing	 countries,	 LDCs	 in	 particular,	 often	
suffer	from	a	lack	of	capacity	to	absorb	the	benefits	
of	 investment.	 There	 is	 a	 risk	 that	 the	gains	 from	
investment	accrue	primarily	to	the	investor	and	are	
not	 shared	 through	 spillovers	 and	 improvement	
in	 local	 productive	 capacity.	 A	 lack	 of	managerial	
or	 technical	 capabilities	 among	 local	 firms	 and	
workers	hinders	the	extent	to	which	they	can	form	
business	 linkages	with	 foreign	 investors,	 integrate	
new	 technologies,	 and	 develop	 local	 skills	 and	
capacity.		
Risks associated with private investment in SDG 
sectors.	 There	 are	 challenges	 associated	 with	
greater	private	sector	engagement	in	often	sensitive	
SDG	sectors	in	developing	countries.	At	a	general	
level,	the	social	and	environmental	impacts	of	private	
sector	 operations	 need	 to	 be	 addressed	 across	
the	board.	But	opening	basic-needs	sectors	such	
as	water	 and	sanitation,	 health	care	or	 education	
to	 private	 investors	 requires	 careful	 preparation	
and	 the	 establishment	 of	 appropriate	 regulatory	
frameworks	within	which	firms	will	operate.	
In	 addition,	 where	 efforts	 are	 made	 specifically	
to	 attract	 private	 investment	 from	 international	
investors,	 there	 are	 risks	 that	 part	 of	 the	 positive	
impact	of	such	investment	for	local	economies	does	
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Figure IV.13. maximizing the sustainable development impact of investment and minimizing risks
•
Key challenges Policy options
Establish effective regulatory frameworks and standards
• Environmental, labour, social regulations; effective taxation; mainstreaming of  SDGs 
into IIAs; coordination of SDG investment policies at national and international levels.
Need to minimize risks 
associated with private 
investment in SDG sectors
Inadequate investment 
impact measurement and
reporting tools
• Weak absorptive capacity in 
developing countries
Need to engage 
stakeholders and manage
impact trade-offs
Build productive capacity, entrepreneurship, technology, skills, linkages
• Entrepreneurship development, inclusive nance initiatives, technology dissemination, 
business linkages.
• New economic zones for SDG investment, or conversion of existing SEZs and 
technology zones.
Good governance, capable institutions, stakeholders engagement 
• Stakeholder engagement for private investment in sensitive SDG sectors; 
institutions with the power to act in the interest of stakeholders.
Implement SDG impact assessment systems 
• Indicators for measuring (and reporting to stakeholders) the economic, social and 
environmental performance of SDG investments.
• Corporates to add ESG and SDG dimensions to nancial reporting to inuence their
behaviour on the ground. 
•
•
Source:	UNCTAD.	
not	materialize	or	leaks	away	as	a	result	of	relatively	
low	 taxes	 paid	 by	 investors	 (in	 cases	where	 they	
are	 attracted	with	 the	 help	 of	 fiscal	 incentives)	 or	
profits	 being	 shifted	out	 of	 the	 country	within	 the	
international	networks	of	TNCs.	The	tax	collection	
capabilities	of	developing	countries,	and	especially	
LDCs,	may	not	be	 sufficient	 to	 safeguard	against	
such	practices.
Finally,	 regulatory	 options	 for	 governments	 to	
mitigate	 risks	 and	 safeguard	 against	 negative	
effects	 when	 attracting	 private	 investment	 into	
SDG	 sectors	 can	 be	 affected	 by	 international	
commitments	that	reduce	policy	space.	
Need to engage stakeholders and manage trade-
offs effectively.	 Attracting	 needed	 investment	
in	 agriculture	 to	 increase	 food	 production	 may	
have	 consequences	 for	 smallholders	 or	 displace	
local	 populations.	 Investments	 in	 infrastructure	
can	affect	 local	communities	 in	a	variety	of	ways.	
Investments	 in	 water	 supply	 can	 involve	 making	
trade-offs	 between	 availability	 and	 affordability	 in	
urban	areas	versus	wider	accessibility.	Health	and	
education	investments,	especially	by	private	sector	
operators,	are	generally	sensitive	areas	that	require	
engagement	 with	 stakeholders	 and	 buy-in	 from	
local	 communities.	 Managing	 such	 engagement	
in	 the	 investment	 process,	 and	 managing	
the	 consequences	 or	 negative	 side	 effects	 of	
investments	 requires	 adequate	 consultation	
processes	and	strong	institutions.
Inadequate investment impact measurement and 
reporting tools.	Ensuring	the	on-the-ground	impact	
of	 investment	 in	 SDG	 sectors	 is	 fundamental	
to	 justifying	 continued	 efforts	 to	 attract	 private	
investment	 in	 them	 and	 to	 enhance	 governance	
of	 such	 investment.	 Many	 initiatives	 to	 mobilize	
and	 channel	 funds	 to	 SDGs	 are	 hampered	 by	 a	
lack	 of	 accurate	 impact	 indicators.	 Even	 where	
measurement	 tools	 exist	 at	 the	 project	 level	 (e.g.	
for	direct	impacts	of	individual	investments	on	their	
immediate	 environment),	 they	 may	 be	 available	
at	 the	 macro	 level	 (e.g.	 long-term	 aggregate	
impacts	of	investments	across	a	sector).	Adequate	
measurement	of	 impact	 is	a	prerequisite	for	many	
upstream	initiatives.	
CHAPTER Iv  Investing	in	the	SDGs:	An	Action	Plan	for	promoting	private	sector	contributions 177
2.   Increasing absorptive capacity
The	 development	 of	 local	 enterprise	 and	 local	
technological	 capabilities	 that	 will	 enhance	 the	
ability	of	domestic	 firms	 to	engage	 in	 and	benefit	
from	technology	and	skills	dissemination	is	referred	
to	in	this	chapter	as	domestic	absorptive	capacity.	
Domestic	absorptive	capacity	is	crucial	not	only	to	
increase	chances	of	attracting	private	 investment,	
but	also	in	order	to	maximize	the	benefits	of	private	
investment	in	SDG	sectors.	Policy	can	help	create	
an	 operating	 environment	 that	 allows	 local	 firms,	
entrepreneurs	and	workers	to	realize	the	benefits	of	
investment	in	SDG	sectors.	The	key	elements	that	
enhance	absorptive	capacity	differ	by	SDG	sector	
(table	 IV.5).	 The	 development	 of	 these	 absorptive	
capacity	elements	also	builds	productive	capacity	
in	host	countries	which	in	turn	encourages	further	
investment,	creating	a	virtuous	circle.		
a.  Key policy areas: 
entrepreneurship, technology, 
skills, linkages
A range of policy tools is available to increase 
absorptive capacity, including the promotion 
and facilitation of entrepreneurship, support to 
technology development, human resource and 
skills development, business development services 
and promotion of business linkages.
A	 wide	 range	 of	 policy	 options	 exist	 for	
governments	to	improve	the	absorptive	capacity	of	
local	economies,	in	order	to	maximize	the	benefits	
of	private	investment	entering	SDG	sectors.	Firstly,	
this	revolves	around	increasing	involvement	of	local	
entrepreneurs;	 micro,	 small	 and	 medium-sized	
firms;	and	smallholders,	 in	the	case	of	agricultural	
investment.	 Secondly,	 governments	 can	 increase	
the	 domestic	 skills	 base	 not	 only	 as	 an	 enabler	
for	 private	 investment,	 but	 also	 to	 increase	 the	
transfer	 of	 benefits	 to	 local	 economies.	 Thirdly,	
local	 enterprise	 development	 and	 upgrading	 can	
be	 further	 encouraged	 through	 the	widening	 and	
deepening	of	SDG-oriented	linkages	programmes.	
Technology	dissemination	and	knowledge	sharing	
between	firms	is	key	to	technological	development,	
for	 instance	of	new	technologies	that	would	result	
in	green	growth.	Fostering	linkages	between	firms,	
within	and	across	borders,	can	facilitate	the	process	
of	 technology	 dissemination	 and	 diffusion,	 which	
in	 turn	 can	 be	 instrumental	 in	 helping	 developing	
countries	 catch	 up	with	 developed	 countries	 and	
shift	towards	more	sustainable	growth	paths.	
Promote entrepreneurship
•	 Stimulating entrepreneurship, including social 
entrepreneurship, for sustainable development. 
Domestic	 entrepreneurial	 development	 can	
strengthen	 participation	 of	 local	 entrepreneurs	
within	 or	 related	 to	 SDG	 sectors,	 and	 foster	
inclusiveness	(see	UNCTAD’s	Entrepreneurship	
Policy	 Framework31).	 In	 particular,	 through	
social	 entrepreneurship,	 governments	 can	
create	 special	 business	 incubators	 for	 social	
enterprises.	 The	 criteria	 for	 ventures	 to	 be	
hosted	 in	 such	 “social	 business	 incubators”	
are	 that	 they	 should	 have	 a	 social	 impact,	 be	
sustainable	 and	 show	 potential	 for	 growth.	
These	 kinds	 of	 initiatives	 are	 proliferating	
worldwide,	 as	 social	 entrepreneurs	 are	
identified	 as	 critical	 change	 agents	 who	 will	
use	economic	and	 technological	 innovation	 to	
achieve	social	development	goals.32	
Table IV.5. Selected ways to raise absorptive 
capacity in SDG sectors
SDG sector Examples
Infrastructure	
(50%)
Construction	and	engineering	capabilities	of	
local	firms	and	workforce
Project	management	expertise	of	local	
workforce
Presence	of	local	suppliers	and	contractors
Climate	
change																		
and	
environment	
(27%)	
Entrepreneurship	skills,	clusters	of	renewable	
energy	firms
R&D,	science	and	technology	parks	for	low	
carbon	technology
Presence	of	laboratories,	research	institutes,	
universities
Food	security	
(12%)	
Clusters	of	agribusiness	processing	firms
Local	suppliers	of	inputs,	crops,	fertilizers,	
replacement	machinery
Local	workforce	skilled	in	crop	production	and	
processing
Social	sectors	
(11%)	
Local	skills	in	provision	of	services	e.g.	teaching,	
nursing	
Managerial	capabilities	to	run	schools,	hospitals
Local	(social)	entrepreneurship	skills
Source:		UNCTAD.
Note:		 Percentages	represent	the	average	share	of	investment	
needs	identified	for	each	sector	in	section	B.
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•	 Encourage financial inclusiveness.	 Initiatives	
and	 programmes	 can	 be	 encouraged	 to	
facilitate	 access	 to	 finance	 for	 entrepreneurs	
in	 micro,	 small	 and	 medium-sized	 firms	 or	
women-owned	firms	(or	firms	owned	by	under-
represented	 groups).	 In	 order	 to	 improve	
access	 to	 credit	 by	 local	 small	 and	 medium-
sized	 enterprises	 and	 smallholders,	 loans	
can	 be	 provided	 by	 public	 bodies	 when	 no	
other	 reasonable	 option	 exists.	 They	 enable	
local	 actors	 to	 make	 investments	 of	 a	 size	
and	 kind	 that	 the	 domestic	 private	 banking	
sector	 may	 not	 support.	 Financial	 guarantees	
by	 governments	 put	 commercial	 banks	 in	 a	
position	 to	 grant	 credits	 to	 small	 customers	
without	a	financial	history	or	collateral.	Policies	
can	 also	 relax	 some	 regulatory	 requirements	
for	 providing	 credits,	 for	 instance	 the	 “know	
your	 customer”	 requirement	 in	 financial	
services	(Tewes-Gradl	et	al.	2013).	
Boost technology and skills 
development
•	 Support science and technology development.	
Technical	 support	 organizations	 in	 standards,	
metrology,	 quality,	 testing,	 R&D,	 productivity	
and	 extension	 for	 small	 and	 medium-sized	
enterprises	 are	 necessary	 to	 complete	 and	
improve	 the	 technology	 systems	 with	 which	
firms	 operate	 and	 grow.	 Appropriate	 levels	
of	 intellectual	 property	 (IP)	 protection	 and	 an	
effective	 IP	 rights	 framework	 can	 help	 give	
firms	 confidence	 in	 employing	 advanced	
technologies	 and	 provide	 incentives	 for	
local	 firms	 to	 develop	 or	 adapt	 their	 own	
technologies.
•	 Develop human resources and skills. Focus	on	
training	 and	 education	 to	 raise	 availability	 of	
relevant	 local	skills	 in	SDG	sectors	 is	a	crucial	
determinant	 to	 maximize	 long-term	 benefits	
from	investment	in	SDG	sectors.	Countries	can	
also	 adopt	 a	 degree	 of	 openness	 in	 granting	
work	 permits	 to	 skilled	 foreign	 workers,	
to	 allow	 for	 a	 lack	 of	 domestic	 skills	 and/
or	 to	 avail	 themselves	 of	 foreign	 skills	 which	
complement	 and	 fertilize	 local	 knowledge	 and	
expertise.	
•	 Provide business development services.	
A	 range	 of	 services	 can	 facilitate	 business	
activity	 and	 investment,	 and	 generate	
spillover	 effects.	 Such	 services	 might	 include	
business	 development	 services	 centres	 and	
capacity-building	 facilities	 to	 help	 local	 firms	
meet	 technical	 standards	 and	 improve	 their	
understanding	 of	 international	 trade	 rules	 and	
practices.	 Increased	 access	 could	 be	 granted	
for	 social	 enterprises,	 including	 through	 social	
business	 incubators,	 clusters	 and	 green	
technology	parks.
•	 Establish enterprise clustering and networking. 
Enterprise	 agglomeration	 may	 determine	
“collective	 efficiency”	 that	 in	 turn	 enhances	
the	 productivity	 and	 overall	 performance	
of	 clustered	 firms.	 Both	 offer	 opportunities	
to	 foster	 competitiveness	 via	 learning	 and	
upgrading.	 Other	 initiatives	 include	 the	
creation	 of	 social	 entrepreneurship	 networks	
and	 networks	 of	 innovative	 institutions	 and	
enterprises	 to	 support	 inclusive	 innovation	
initiatives.
Widen and deepen SDG-oriented 
linkages programmes
•	 Stimulate business linkages. Domestic	 and	
international	 inter-firm	 and	 inter-institution	
linkages	 can	 provide	 local	 firms	 with	 the	
necessary	 externalities	 to	 cope	 with	 the	
dual	 challenge	 of	 knowledge	 creation	 and	
upgrading.	 Policies	 should	 be	 focused	 on	
promoting	 more	 inclusive	 business	 linkages	
models,	including	support	for	the	development	
of	 local	 processing	 units;	 fostering	 inclusive	
rural	 markets	 including	 through	 pro-poor	
public-private	 sector	 partnerships;	 integrating	
inclusive	 business	 linkages	 promotion	
into	 national	 development	 strategies;	 and	
encouraging	domestic	and	foreign	investors	to	
develop	inclusive	business	linkages.	
•	 Create pro-poor business linkages 
opportunities. Private	 investment	 in	 SDGs	
can	 create	 new	 pro-poor	 opportunities	 for	
local	 suppliers	 –	 small	 farmers,	 small	 service	
providers	 and	 local	 vendors.	 Potential	 policy	
actions	 to	 foster	 pro-poor	 linkages	 include	
disseminating	 information	about	bottom	of	 the	
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pyramid	 consumers’	 needs;	 creating	 shared	
supplier	 databases;	 leveraging	 local	 logistics	
networks;	 introduce	 market	 diversification	
services	 for	 local	 suppliers;	 addressing	
constraints	 related	 to	 inadequate	 physical	
infrastructure	 through	 supply	 collection	
centres,	 shared	 premises	 and	 internet-based	
solutions;	 and	 promoting	 micro-franchising	
schemes,	for	instance	in	the	health-care	sector,	
in	order	to	promote	access	(to	health	services),	
awareness,	availability	and	affordability.
b.  SDG incubators and special 
economic zones
Development of linkages and clusters in incubators 
or economic zones specifically aimed at stimulating 
businesses in SDG sectors may be particularly 
effective.
The	aforementioned	range	of	initiatives	to	maximize	
absorptive	 capacity	 of	 SDG	 investment	 could	 be	
made	more	 (cost-)	effective	 if	 they	are	conducted	
in	 one	 place	 through	 the	 creation	 of	 special	
economic	 zones	 (SEZs)	 or	 technology	 zones,	 or	
the	conversion	of	existing	ones	 into	SDG-focused	
clusters.	 These	 can	 be	 used	 to	 promote,	 attract,	
and	 retain	 investment	 in	 specific	 and	 interrelated	
SDG	sectors	with	a	positive	impact	arising	from:	
•	 Clusters and networks	 of	 closely	 associated	
firms	and	activities	supporting	the	development	
of	 inclusive	 spillovers	 and	 linkages	 within	
zones,	and	beyond.	As	 local	firms’	capabilities	
rise,	 demonstration	 effects	 become	
increasingly	important.
•	 Incubator facilities and processes designed	
into	 zones’	 sustainable	 development	 support	
services	 and	 infrastructure	 to	 nurture	 local	
business	 and	 social	 firms/entrepreneurs	
(and	 assist	 them	 in	 benefitting	 from	 the	 local	
cluster).	
•	 Zones	 acting	 as	 mechanisms	 to	 diffuse 
responsible practices,	 including	 in	 terms	 of	
labour	practices,	environmental	sustainability,33	
health	and	safety,	and	good	governance.
An	SDG-focused	zone	could	be	rural-based,	linked	
to	 specific	 agricultural	 products,	 and	designed	 to	
support	 and	 nurture	 smallholder	 farmers,	 social	
entrepreneurs	from	the	informal	sector	and	ensure	
social	inclusion	of	disadvantaged	groups.	
In	the	context	of	SDG-focused	SEZs,	policymakers	
should	 consider	 broadening	 the	 availability	 of	
sustainable-development-related	policies,	 services	
and	 infrastructure	 to	assist	companies	 in	meeting	
stakeholder	 demands	 –	 for	 instance,	 improved	
corporate	 social	 responsibility	 policies	 and	
practices.	This	would	strengthen	the	State’s	ability	
to	promote	environmental	best	practices	and	meet	
its	obligation	to	protect	the	human	rights	of	workers.	
Finally,	 SEZs	 should	 improve	 their	 reporting	 to	
better	 communicate	 the	 sustainable	 development	
services.	
3.  establishing effective regulatory 
frameworks and standards 
Increased private sector engagement in often 
sensitive SDG sectors needs to be accompanied 
by effective regulation. Particular areas of attention 
include human health and safety, environmental and 
social protection, quality and inclusiveness of public 
services, taxation, and national and international 
policy coherence. 
Reaping	the	development	benefits	from	investment	
in	 SDG	 sectors	 requires	 not	 only	 an	 enabling	
policy	 framework,	 but	 also	 adequate	 regulation	
to	minimize	 any	 risks	 associated	with	 investment	
(see	 table	 IV.6	 for	 examples	 of	 regulatory	 tools).	
Moreover,	 investment	policy	and	 regulations	must	
be	adequately	enforced	by	 impartial,	capable	and	
efficient	public	institutions,	which	is	as	important	for	
policy	effectiveness	as	policy	design	itself.	
In	 regulating	 investment	 in	 SDG	 sectors,	 and	 in	
investment	regulations	geared	towards	sustainable	
development	 in	 general,	 protection	 of	 human	
rights,	 health	 and	 safety	 standards,	 social	 and	
environmental	 protection	 and	 respect	 of	 core	
labour	 rights	 are	 essential.	 A	 number	 of	 further	
considerations	are	especially	important:
•	 Safeguarding quality and inclusiveness of 
public services.	 Easing	 constraints	 for	 private	
investors	 in	SDGs	must	not	come	at	 the	price	
of	poor	quality	of	services	 (e.g.	 in	electricity	or	
water	 supply,	 education	 and	 health	 services).	
This	 calls	 for	 appropriate	 standard	 setting	 by	
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host	countries	concerning	the	content,	quality,	
inclusiveness	 and	 reliability	 of	 the	 services	
(e.g.	 programs	 for	 school	 education,	 hygienic	
standards	in	hospitals,	provision	of	clean	water,	
uninterrupted	 electricity	 supply,	 compulsory	
contracting	 for	 essential	 infrastructure	
services),	and	for	monitoring	compliance.	Laws	
on	 consumer	 protection	 further	 reinforce	 the	
position	of	service	recipients.	
•	 Contractual	 arrangements	 between	 host	
countries	 and	 private	 investors	 can	 play	
a	 significant	 role.	 Through	 the	 terms	 of	
concession	 agreements,	 joint	 ventures	 or	
PPPs,	 host	 countries	 can	 ensure	 that	 private	
service	 providers	 respect	 certain	 quality	
standards	 in	 respect	 of	 human	 health,	
environmental	 protection,	 inclusiveness	 and	
reliability	 of	 supply.	 This	 includes	 a	 sanction	
mechanism	 if	 the	 contractual	 partners	 fail	 to	
live	up	to	their	commitments.	
•	 Balancing the need for fair tax revenues 
with investment attractiveness.	 Effective	 tax	
policies	are	crucial	to	ensure	that	tax	revenues	
are	 sufficient	 and	 that	 they	 can	 be	 used	
for	 SDGs,	 such	 as	 the	 financing	 of	 public	
services,	 infrastructure	 development	 or	 health	
and	 education	 services.	 Taxation	 is	 also	 an	
important	policy	 tool	 to	correct	market	 failures	
in	 respect	 of	 the	 SDG	 impact	 of	 investment,	
e.g.	 through	 imposing	 carbon	 taxes	 or	
providing	 tax	 relief	 for	 renewable	 energies.	
Introducing	 an	 efficient	 and	 fair	 tax	 system	 is,	
however,	 far	 from	straightforward,	especially	 in	
developing	 countries.	 A	 recent	 report	 on	 tax	
compliance	 puts	 many	 developing	 countries	
at	 the	 bottom	 in	 the	 ranking	 on	 tax	 efficiency	
(PwC	 2014b).	 Countries	 should	 consider	
how	 to	broaden	 the	 tax	base,	 (i)	 by	 reviewing	
incentive	 schemes	 for	 effectiveness,	 and	 (ii)	
by	 improving	 tax	 collection	 capabilities	 and	
combating	 tax	 avoidance.	 An	 example	 of	
a	 successful	 recent	 tax	 reform	 is	 Ecuador,	
which	 significantly	 increased	 its	 tax	 collection	
rate.	 These	 additional	 revenues	 were	 spent	
for	 infrastructure	 development	 and	 other	
social	 purposes.	 The	 country	 now	 has	 the	
highest	 proportion	 of	 public	 investment	 as	 a	
share	 of	 GDP	 in	 the	 region.34	 To	 combat	 tax	
avoidance	 and	 tax	 evasion,	 it	 is	 necessary	 to	
close	 existing	 loopholes	 in	 taxation	 laws.	 In	
addition	 to	 efforts	 at	 the	 domestic	 level,	 this	
requires	 more	 international	 cooperation,	 as	
demonstrated	 by	 recent	 undertakings	 in	 the	
G-20,	 the	 OECD	 and	 the	 EU,	 among	 others.	
Developing	 countries,	 especially	 LDCs,	 will	
require	 technical	 assistance	 to	 improve	 tax	
collection	capabilities	and	to	deal	with	new	and	
complex	 rules	 that	 will	 emerge	 from	 ongoing	
international	initiatives.
•	 Ensuring coherence in national and 
international policymaking. Regulations	
need	 to	 cover	 a	 broad	 range	 of	 policy	 areas	
beyond	 investment	 policies	 per	 se,	 such	 as	
taxation,	competition,	labour	market	regulation,	
environmental	policies	and	access	to	land.	The	
coverage	of	such	a	multitude	of	different	policy	
areas	 confirms	 the	 need	 for	 consistency	 and	
coherence	 in	policymaking	across	government	
institutions.	At	 the	domestic	 level,	 this	means,	
e.g.	 coordination	 at	 the	 interministerial	 level	
and	 between	 central,	 regional	 and	 local	
governments.	
Table IV.6. examples of policy tools to ensure the 
sustainability of investment  
SDG Regulations
Environmental	
sustainability	
Pollution	emission	rules	(e.g.	carbon	taxes)
Environmental	protection	zones
Risk-sensitive	land	zoning
Environmental	impact	assessments of	investments
Reporting	requirements	on	environmental	
performance	of	investment
Good	corporate	citizenship
Social	
sustainability
Labour	policies and	contract	law
Human	rights
Land	tenure	rights
Migration	policies
Safety	regulations
Provisions	on	safe	land	and	housing	for	low-
income	communities
Prohibition	of	discrimination	
Reporting	requirements	on	social	performance	of	
investment
Social	impact	assessments of	investments
Source:		UNCTAD.
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	 Coherence	 is	also	an	 issue	for	 the	relationship	
between	domestic	 legislation	and	 international	
agreements	 in	 the	 areas	 of	 investment,	
environmental	 protection	 and	 social	 rights,	
among	 others.	 Numerous	 international	
conventions	and	non-binding	principles	provide	
important	 policy	 guidance	 on	 how	 to	 design	
and	 improve	 domestic	 regulatory	 frameworks,	
including	UNCTAD’s	IPFSD.
•	 Making international investment agreements 
(IIAs) proactive in mobilizing and channelling 
investment into SDGs. Most	 IIAs	 still	 remain	
silent	 on	 environmental	 and	 social	 issues.	
Only	 recent	 agreements	 start	 dealing	 with	
sustainability	 issues,	 but	 primarily	 from	 the	
perspective	 of	 maintaining	 regulatory	 space	
for	 environmental	 and	 social	 purposes.	 IIAs	
could	do	more	and	also	promote	investment	in	
SDGs	in	a	proactive	manner.	This	includes,	for	
example,	emphasising	the	importance	of	SDGs	
as	 an	 overarching	 objective	 of	 the	 agreement	
or	 a	 commitment	 of	 contracting	 parties	 to	
particularly	encourage	and	facilitate	investment	
in	 SDGs.	 These	 are	 issues	 both	 for	 the	
negotiation	 of	 new	 IIAs	 and	 the	 renegotiation	
of	 existing	 agreements.	 Systematic	 reform,	 as	
outlined	in	chapter	III	of	this	report,	can	help.	
Finally,	while	 laws	and	regulations	are	the	basis	of	
investor	responsibility,	voluntary	CSR	initiatives	and	
standards	have	proliferated	in	recent	years,	and	they	
are	 increasingly	 influencing	 corporate	 practices,	
behaviour	and	investment	decisions.	Governments	
can	 build	 on	 them	 to	 complement	 the	 regulatory	
framework	 and	 maximize	 the	 development	
benefits	 of	 investment.	 A	 number	 of	 areas	 can	
benefit	 from	the	encouragement	of	CSR	initiatives	
and	 the	 voluntary	 dissemination	 of	 standards;	 for	
example,	they	can	be	used	to	promote	responsible	
investment	 and	 business	 behaviour	 (including	 the	
avoidance	of	corrupt	business	practices),	and	they	
can	play	an	important	role	in	promoting	low-carbon	
and	environmentally	sound	investment.	
4.  Good governance, capable institutions, 
stakeholder engagement
Good governance and capable institutions are  key 
enablers for the attraction of private investment in 
general, and in SDG sectors in particular. They are 
also needed for effective stakeholder engagement 
and management of impact trade-offs.
Good	 governance	 and	 capable	 institutions	 are	
essential	 to	 promoting	 investment	 in	 SDGs	 and	
maximizing	 positive	 impact	 in	 a	 number	 of	ways:	
(i)	 to	 attract	 investment,	 (ii)	 to	 guarantee	 inclusive	
policymaking	and	impacts,	(iii)	to	manage	synergies	
and	trade-offs.
Attracting investment.	 Good	 governance	 is	 a	
prerequisite	 for	 attracting	 investment	 in	 general,	
and	 in	 SDG	 sectors	 in	 particular.	 Investments	 in	
infrastructure,	 with	 their	 long	 gestation	 period,	
are	 particularly	 contingent	 on	 a	 stable	 policy	
environment	 and	 capable	 local	 institutions.	
Institutional	capabilities	are	also	important	in	dealing	
or	negotiating	with	 investors,	and	 for	 the	effective	
implementation	of	investment	regulation.
Stakeholder engagement.	 Additionally,	 investment	
in	 SDG	 areas	 affects	 many	 stakeholders	 in	
different	 ways.	 Managing	 differential	 impacts	 and	
“side	 effects”	 of	 SDG	 investments	 requires	 giving	
a	 say	 to	 affected	 populations	 through	 effective	
consultative	 processes.	 It	 also	 requires	 strong	
capabilities	on	the	part	of	governments	to	deal	with	
consequences,	 for	 example	 to	 mitigate	 negative	
impacts	 on	 local	 communities	 where	 necessary,	
while	 still	 progressing	 on	 investment	 in	 targeted	
SDG	objectives.
Adequate	 participation	 of	 multiple	 stakeholders	
at	 various	 levels	 is	 needed,	 as	 governance	 of	
investment	 in	 SDGs	 is	 important	 not	 just	 at	 the	
national	level	but	also	at	the	regional	and	local	levels.	
In	fact,	SDG	investments	are	subject	to	governance	
at	different	levels,	e.g.	from	local	metropolitan	areas	
to	 national	 investments	 to	 regional	 infrastructure	
(such	 as	 highways,	 intercity	 rail,	 port-related	
services	 for	 many	 countries,	 transnational	 power	
systems).	
Synergies and trade-offs.	A	holistic,	cross-sectoral	
approach	 that	 creates	 synergies	 between	 the	
different	 SDG	 pillars	 and	 deals	 with	 trade-offs	 is	
important	 to	 promote	 sustainable	 development.	
Objectives	 such	 as	 economic	 growth,	 poverty	
reduction,	 social	 development,	 equity,	 and	
sustainability	 should	 be	 considered	 together	 with	
a	 long-term	 outlook	 to	 ensure	 coherence.	 To	 do	
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this,	 governments	 can	 make	 strategic	 choices	
about	which	 sectors	 to	 build	 on,	 and	 all	 relevant	
ministries	can	be	involved	in	developing	a	focused	
development	 agenda	 grounded	 on	 assessments	
of	 emerging	 challenges.	 Integration	 of	 budgets	
and	 allocating	 resources	 to	 strategic	 goals	 rather	
than	individual	ministries	can	encourage	coherence	
across	 governments.	 Integrated	 decision-making	
for	 SDGs	 is	 also	 important	 at	 sub-national	 levels	
(Clark	2012).	
Promoting	 SDGs	 through	 investment-related	
policies	 may	 also	 result	 in	 trade-offs	 between	
potentially	 conflicting	 policy	 objectives.	 For	
example,	 excessive	 regulation	 of	 investor	 activity	
can		deter	investment;	fiscal	or	financial	investment	
incentives	 for	 the	 development	 of	 one	 SDG	 pillar	
can	reduce	the	budget	available	for	the	promotion	
of	other	pillars.	Also,	within	regions	or	among	social	
groups,	 choices	 may	 have	 to	 be	 made	 when	 it	
comes	to	prioritizing	individual	investment	projects.	
At	 the	 international	 policymaking	 level,	 synergies	
are	equally	important.	International	macroeconomic	
policy	 setting,	 and	 reforms	 of	 the	 international	
financial	 architecture,	 have	 a	 direct	 bearing	 on	
national	and	 international	 investment	policies,	and	
on	the	chances	of	success	in	attracting	investment	
in	SDGs.
5.  Implementing SDG impact assessment 
systems 
a.  Develop a common set of SDG 
impact indicators
Monitoring of the impact of investment, especially 
along social and environmental dimensions, is key 
to effective policy implementation. A set of core 
quantifiable impact indicators can help.
Monitoring.	 SDG-related	 governance	 requires	
monitoring	 the	 impact	 of	 investments,	 including	
measuring	 progress	 against	 goals.	 UNCTAD	 has	
suggested	a	number	of	guiding	principles	that	are	
relevant	in	this	context	(IPFSD,	WIR12).	Investment	
policies	 should	 be	 based	 on	 a	 set	 of	 explicitly	
formulated	objectives	 related	 to	SDGs	and	 ideally	
include	 a	 number	 of	 quantifiable	 goals	 for	 both	
the	 attraction	 of	 investment	 and	 the	 impact	 of	
investment	 on	 SDGs.	 The	 objectives	 should	 set	
clear	 priorities,	 a	 time	 frame	 for	 achieving	 them,	
and	the	principal	measures	intended	to	support	the	
objectives.	
To	measure	 policy	 effectiveness	 for	 the	 attraction	
of	investment,	policymakers	should	use	a	focused	
set	 of	 key	 indicators	 that	 are	 the	 most	 direct	
expression	 of	 the	 core	 sustainable	 development	
contributions	 of	 private	 investments,	 including	
direct	 contributions	 to	 GDP	 growth	 through	
additional	 value	 added,	 capital	 formation	 and	
export	 generation;	 entrepreneurial	 development	
and	 development	 of	 the	 formal	 sector	 and	 tax	
base;	 and	 job	 creation.	Central	 to	 this	 should	 be	
indicators	addressing	labour,	social,	environmental	
and	sustainability	development	aspects.
The	 impact	 indicator	 methodology	 developed	
for	 the	 G-20	 Development	 Working	 Group	 by	
UNCTAD,	in	collaboration	with	other	agencies,	may	
provide	guidance	to	policymakers	on	the	choice	of	
indicators	of	investment	impact	and,	by	extension,	
of	 investment	policy	effectiveness	 (see	 table	 IV.7).	
The	 indicator	 framework,	 which	 has	 been	 tested	
in	 a	 number	 of	 developing	 countries,	 is	 meant	
to	 serve	 as	 a	 tool	 that	 countries	 can	 adapt	 and	
adopt	in	accordance	with	their	national	sustainable	
development	 priorities	 and	 strategies	 (see	 also	
IPFSD,	WIR12).	
Sustainable	development	impacts	of	investment	in	
SDGs	can	be	cross-cutting.	For	instance,	clusters	
promoting	green	technology	entrepreneurship	can	
serve	as	economic	growth	poles,	with	employment	
generation	 and	 creation	 of	 value	 added	 as	
positive	side	effects.	 Investments	 in	environmental	
protection	 schemes	 can	 have	 positive	 effects	 on	
human	health	and	 indirectly	on	economic	growth.	
Such	 cross-cutting	 effects	 should	 be	 reflected	 in	
impact	measurement	methodologies.
At	the	micro	level	(i.e.	the	sustainable	development	
impact	 of	 individual	 investments),	 the	 choice	 of	
indicators	can	be	further	detailed	and	sophisticated,	
as	data	availability	 is	greater.	Additional	 indicators	
might	 include	 qualitative	 measures	 such	 as	 new	
management	 practices	 or	 techniques	 transferred,	
social	benefits	generated	for	workers	(health	care,	
pensions,	 insurance),	 or	 ancillary	 benefits	 not	
directly	related	to	the	investment	project	objectives	
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(recreational	 facilities,	 schools	 and	 clinics	 for	
workers,	families	or	local	communities).
b.  Require integrated corporate 
reporting for SDGs
Impact measurement and reporting by private 
investors on their social and environmental 
performance promotes corporate responsibility 
on the ground and supports mobilization and 
channelling of investment. 
Corporate	 sustainability	 reporting	 is	 an	 important	
enabler	of	policies	to	promote	the	SDGs.	High-quality	
sustainability	 reporting	 involves	 the	 generation	 of	
internal	 company	 data	 on	 sustainability	 related	
activities	and	control	systems,	facilitating	proactive	
management,	 target	 setting	 and	 benchmarking.	
Publicly	reported	data	can	play	an	important	role	in	
enabling	governments	to	monitor	the	effectiveness	
of	policies	and	incentive	structures,	and	often	serve	
as	a	prerequisite	for	resource	mobilization	for	SDG	
investment.	
The	importance	of	sustainability	reporting	has	been	
recognized	 throughout	 the	 process	 leading	 up	
to	 the	 formation	of	 the	SDGs.	 In	2013,	 the	High-
Level	Panel	of	Eminent	Persons	on	the	Post-2015	
Development	Agenda	proposed	that	“in	future	–	at	
latest	 by	 2030	 –	 all	 large	 businesses	 should	 be	
reporting	on	their	environmental	and	social	impact	
–	or	explain	why	if	they	are	not	doing	so”.	(United	
Nations	 2013).	 In	 2014,	 the	European	Parliament	
adopted	a	directive	which	will	require	the	disclosure	
of	 environmental	 and	 social	 information	 by	 large	
public-interest	 companies	 (500+	 employees).	
Individual	 UN	 Member	 States	 around	 the	 world	
have	 also	 taken	 steps	 to	 promote	 sustainability	
reporting.35	Apart	 from	 regulatory	 initiatives,	 some	
Table IV.7. Possible indicators for the definition of investment impact objectives and 
the measurement of policy effectiveness
Area   Indicators Details and examples
Economic	
value	added 1. Total	value	added
•	 Gross	output	(GDP	contribution)	of	the	new/additional	economic	activity	
resulting	from	the	investment	(direct	and	induced)
2. Value	of	capital	formation •	 Contribution	to	gross	fixed	capital	formation	
3. Total	and	net	export	generation •	 Total	 export	 generation;	 net	 export	 generation	 (net	 of	 imports)	 is	 also	captured	by	the	value	added	indicator	
4. Number	of	formal	business	entities
•	 Number	of	businesses	 in	 the	value	chain	supported	by	 the	 investment;	
this	 is	 a	 proxy	 for	 entrepreneurial	 development	 and	 expansion	 of	 the	
formal	(tax-paying)	economy
5. Total	fiscal	revenues •	 Total	fiscal	take	from	the	economic	activity	resulting	from	the	investment,	through	all	forms	of	taxation
Job	creation 6. Employment	(number) •	 Total	number	of	jobs	generated	by	the	investment,	both	direct	and	induced	(value	chain	view),	dependent	and	self-employed
7. Wages •	 Total	household	income	generated,	direct	and	induced
8. Typologies	of	employee	skill	levels •	 Number	of	jobs	generated,	by	ILO	job	type,	as	a	proxy	for	job	quality	and	technology	levels	(including	technology	dissemination)
Sustainable	
development 9. Labour	impact	indicators	
•	 Employment	 of	 women	 (and	 comparable	 pay)	 and	 of	 disadvantaged	
groups
•	 Skills	upgrading,	training	provided	
•	 Health	and	safety	effects,	occupational	injuries
10. Social	impact	indicators •	 Number	of	families	lifted	out	of	poverty,	wages	above	subsistence	level	
•	 Expansion	of	goods	and	services	offered,	access	to	and	affordability	of	
basic	goods	and	services
11. Environmental	impact	indicators •	 GHG	emissions,	carbon	offset/credits,	carbon	credit	revenues
•	 Energy	and	water	consumption/efficiency	hazardous	materials
•	 Enterprise	development	in	eco-sectors
12. Development	impact	indicators •	 Development	of	local	resources
•	 Technology	dissemination	
Source:		IAWG	(2011).
Note:		 The	report	was	produced	by	an	inter-agency	working	group	coordinated	by	UNCTAD.
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stock	 exchanges	 have	 implemented	 mandatory	
listing	 requirements	 in	 the	 area	 of	 sustainability	
reporting.36	
The	 content	 and	 approach	 to	 the	 preparation	 of	
sustainability	 reports	 is	 influenced	 by	 a	 number	
of	 international	 initiatives	 actively	 promoting	
reporting	 practices,	 standards	 and	 frameworks.	
Recent	 examples	 of	 such	 initiatives	 and	 entities	
include	 the	 Global	 Reporting	 Initiative	 (GRI),37	
the	 Carbon	 Disclosure	 Project	 (CDP),38	 the	
International	 Integrated	Reporting	Council	 (IIRC),39	
the	 Accounting	 for	 Sustainability	 (A4S)40	 and	
the	 Sustainability	 Accounting	 Standards	 Board	
(SASB).41	UNCTAD	has	also	been	active	in	this	area	
(box	IV.6)
Box Iv.6. UNCTAd’s initiative on sustainability reporting
UNCTAD	has	provided	guidance	on	sustainability	rule	making	via	its	Intergovernmental	Working	Group	of	Experts	
on	International	Standards	of	Accounting	and	Reporting	(ISAR)	(UNCTAD	2014).		Member	States	at	ISAR	endorsed	
the	following	recommendations:
•	 Introducing	voluntary	sustainability	 reporting	 initiatives	can	be	a	practical	option	 to	allow	companies	 time	to	
develop	the	capacity	to	prepare	high-quality	sustainability	reports.
•	 Sustainability	reporting	initiatives	can	also	be	introduced	on	a	comply	or	explain	basis,	to	establish	a	clear	set	of	
disclosure	expectations	while	allowing	for	flexibility	and	avoiding	an	undue	burden	on	enterprises.	
•	 Stock	exchanges	and/or	regulators	may	consider	advising	the	market	on	the	future	direction	of	sustainability	
reporting	rules.	Companies	should	be	allotted	sufficient	time	to	adapt,	especially	if	stock	exchanges	or	regulators	
are	considering	moving	from	a	voluntary	approach	to	a	mandatory	approach.	
•	 Sustainability	reporting	initiatives	should	avoid	creating	reporting	obligations	for	companies	that	may	not	have	
the	capacity	to	meet	them.	Particularly	in	the	case	of	mandatory	disclosure	initiatives,	one	option	is	to	require	
only	a	subset	of	companies	 (e.g.	 large	companies	or	State-owned	companies)	 to	disclose	on	sustainability	
issues.	
•	 Stock	exchanges	and	regulators	may	wish	to	consider	highlighting	sustainability	issues	in	their	existing	definitions	
of	what	constitutes	material	information	for	the	purposes	of	corporate	reporting.	
•	 With	a	view	to	promoting	an	internationally	harmonized	approach,	stock	exchanges	and	regulators	may	wish	to	
consider	basing	sustainability	reporting	initiatives	on	an	international	reporting	framework.	
Considerations	 for	 the	 design	 and	 implementation	 of	 sustainability	 reporting	 initiatives	 include	 using	 a	 multi-
stakeholder	consultation	approach	in	the	development	process	for	creating	widespread	adoption	and	buy-in	and	
creating	incentives	for	compliance,	including	public	recognition	and	investor	engagement.
Source:	UNCTAD.	
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The	 range	 of	 challenges	 discussed	 in	 previous	
sections,	as	well	as	the	wide	array	of	existing	and	
potential	 policy	 solutions	 available	 to	 overcome	
those	 challenges,	 demonstrate	 above	 all	 that	
there	 is	 no	 single	 all-encompassing	 solution	 or	
“magic	bullet”	for	increasing	the	engagement	of	the	
private	 sector	 in	 raising	 finance	 for,	 and	 investing	
in,	sustainable	development.	The	potential	sources	
and	destinations	of	 financial	 resources	are	varied,	
and	so	are	the	constraints	they	face.	This	chapter	
has	attempted	to	highlight	some	of	the	paths	that	
financial	flows	can	follow	towards	useful	investment	
in	 sustainable	 development	 projects,	 indicating	
a	 number	 of	 policy	 solutions	 to	 encourage	 such	
flows,	to	remove	hurdles,	to	maximize	the	positive	
impacts	and	to	minimize	the	potential	risks	involved.	
Many	of	the	more	concrete	solutions	have	been	tried	
and	tested	over	a	significant	period	of	time	already	
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–	such	as	risk-sharing	mechanisms	including	PPPs	
and	investment	guarantees.	Others	have	emerged	
more	recently,	such	as	various	ways	to	raise	finance	
for	and	stimulate	impact	investment.	And	yet	others	
require	broader	change	in	markets	themselves,	 in	
the	mindset	of	participants	in	the	market,	in	the	way	
sustainable	 development	 projects	 are	 packaged	
and	marketed,	or	 in	the	broader	policy	setting	for	
investment.
Given	 the	 massive	 financing	 needs	 that	 will	 be	
associated	 with	 the	 achievement	 of	 the	 SDGs,	
all	 of	 these	 solutions	 are	 worth	 exploring.	 What	
they	 need	 is	 a	 concerted push	 to	 address	 the	
main	 challenges	 they	 face	 in	 raising	 finance	 and	
in	 channelling	 it	 to	 sustainable	 development	
objectives.	 Figure	 IV.14	 summarizes	 the	 key	
challenges	and	solutions	discussed	in	this	chapter	
in	the	context	of	the	proposed	Strategic	Framework	
for	Private	Investment	in	the	SDGs.
Figure IV.14. Key challenges and possible policy responses
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policymaking
• Set SDG investment targets
•  Ensure policy coherence and synergies
• Multi-stakeholder platform and multi-agency technical 
assistance facility
• Build an investment policy climate conducive to investing in 
SDGs, while safeguarding public interests
• Expand use of risk sharing mechanisms for SDG 
investments
• Establish new incentives schemes and a new generation of 
investment promotion institutions
• Build SDG investment partnerships
• Build productive capacity, entrepreneurship, technology, 
skills, linkages
• Establish effective regulatory frameworks and standards
• Good governance, capable institutions, stakeholder
 engagements
• Implement a common set of SDG investment impact 
indicators and push Integrated Corporate Reporting
• Create fertile soil for innovative SDG-financing approaches 
and corporate initiatives
• Build or improve pricing mechanisms for externalities
• Promote Sustainable Stock Exchanges
• Introduce financial market reforms
• Start-up and scaling issues for new financing 
solutions
• Failures in global capital markets
• Lack of transparency on sustainable corporate 
performance
• Misaligned investor rewards/pay structures
• Entry barriers 
• Lack of information and effective packaging and 
promotion of SDG investment projects
• Inadequate risk-return ratios for SDG investments
• Lack of investor expertise in SDG sectors
• Weak absorptive capacity in developing countries
• Need to minimize risks associated with  private 
investment in SDG sectors
• Need to engage stakeholders and manage impact 
trade-offs
• Inadequate investment impact measurement and 
reporting tools
Source:	UNCTAD.	
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1.  A Big Push for private investment in 
the SDGs 
While there is a range of policy ideas and options 
available to policymakers, a focused set of priority 
packages can help shape a big push for SDG 
investment.
There	are	many	solutions,	mechanisms	and	policy	
initiatives	 that	 can	 work	 in	 raising	 private	 sector	
investment	in	sustainable	development.	However,	a	
concerted	push	by	the	international	community,	and	
by	policymakers	at	national	 levels,	needs	to	focus	
on	 few	priority	actions	–	or	packages.	Six	priority	
packages	 that	 address	 specific	 segments	 of	 the	
“SDG	investment	chain”	and	relatively	homogenous	
groups	 of	 stakeholders,	 could	 constitute	 a	
significant	 “Big	Push”	 for	 investment	 in	 the	SDGs	
(figure	IV.15).	Such	actions	must	be	in	line	with	the	
guiding	 principles	 for	 private	 sector	 investment	 in	
SDGs	(section	C.2),	namely	balancing	liberalization	
and	regulation,	attractive	risk	return	with	accessible	
and	affordable	services,	the	push	for	private	funds	
with	 the	 fundamental	 role	 of	 the	 State,	 and	 the	
global	 scope	of	 the	SDGs	with	 special	 efforts	 for	
LDCs	and	other	vulnerable	economies.	
1. A new generation of investment promotion 
strategies and institutions. Sustainable	
development	 projects,	 whether	 in	 infrastructure,	
social	 housing	 or	 renewable	 energy,	 require	
intensified	 efforts	 for	 investment	 promotion	
and	 facilitation.	 Such	 projects	 should	 become	
a	priority	of	 the	work	of	 investment	promotion	
agencies	 and	 business	 development	
organizations,	 taking	 into	 account	 their	
peculiarities	 compared	 to	 other	 sectors.	 For	
example,	some	categories	of	investors	in	such	
projects	may	 be	 less	 experienced	 in	 business	
operations	 in	challenging	host	economies	and	
require	 more	 intensive	 business	 development	
support. 
	 The	most	frequent	constraint	faced	by	potential	
investors	 in	 sustainable	 development	 projects	
is	 the	 lack	 of	 concrete	 proposals	 of	 sizeable,	
impactful,	 and	 bankable	 projects.	 Promotion	
and	 facilitation	 of	 investment	 in	 sustainable	
development	 should	 include	 the	 marketing	
of	 pre-packaged	 and	 structured	 projects	
with	 priority	 consideration	 and	 sponsorship	
at	 the	 highest	 political	 level.	 This	 requires	
specialist	 expertise	 and	 dedicated	 units,	
e.g.	 government-sponsored	 “brokers”	 of	
sustainable	development	investment	projects.	
	 Putting	 in	 place	 such	 specialist	 expertise	
(ranging	 from	 project	 and	 structured	 finance	
expertise	 to	 engineering	 and	 project	 design	
skills)	 can	 be	 supported	 by	 technical	
assistance	 from	 international	 organizations	
and	MDBs.	Units	 could	 also	 be	 set	 up	 at	 the	
regional	 level	 (see	also	 the	 regional	compacts)	
to	 share	 costs	 and	 achieve	 economies	 of	
scale.	
	 At	 the international investment policy level,	
promotion	 and	 facilitation	 objectives	 should	
be	 supported	 by	 ensuring	 that	 IIAs	 pursue	
the	 same	 objectives.	 Current	 agreements	
focus	 on	 the	 protection	 of	 investment.	
Mainstreaming	sustainable	development	in	IIAs	
requires,	 among	 others,	 proactive	 promotion	
of	 SDG	 investment,	 with	 commitments	 in	
areas	 such	 as	 technical	 assistance.	 Other	
measures	include	linking	investment	promotion	
institutions,	 facilitating	 SDG	 investments	
through	 investment	 insurance	and	guarantees,	
and	regular	impact	monitoring.
2.	 SDG-oriented investment incentives. 
Investment	 incentive	 schemes	 can	 be	
restructured	specifically	to	facilitate	sustainable	
development	 projects,	 e.g.	 as	 part	 of	 risk-
sharing	 solutions.	 In	 addition,	 investment	
incentives	 in	 general	 –	 independent	 of	 the	
economic	 sector	 for	 which	 they	 are	 granted	
–	 can	 incorporate	 sustainable	 development	
considerations	 by	 encouraging	 corporate	
behaviour	 in	 line	with	 SDGs.	 A	 transformation	
is	 needed	 to	 move	 incentives	 from	 purely	
“location-focused”	 (aiming	 to	 increase	
the	 attractiveness	 of	 a	 location)	 towards	
increasingly	“SDG-focused”,	aiming	to	promote	
investment	for	sustainable	development.
	 Regional	 economic	 cooperation	 organizations,	
with	 national	 investment	 authorities	 in	 their	
region	 could	 adopt	 common	 incentive	 design	
criteria	 with	 the	 objective	 of	 reorienting	
investment	 incentive	 schemes	 towards	
sustainable	development.
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Source:	UNCTAD.	
Figure IV.15. A Big Push for private investment in the SDGs: action packages
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3.	 Regional SDG Investment Compacts.	Regional	
South-South	 cooperation	 can	 foster	 SDG	
investment.	 A	 key	 area	 for	 such	 SDG-related	
cross-border	 cooperation	 is	 infrastructure	
development.	 Existing	 regional	 economic	
cooperation	 initiatives	 could	 evolve	 towards	
regional	 SDG	 investment	 compacts.	 Such	
compacts	 could	 focus	 on	 reducing	 barriers	
and	 facilitating	 investment	 and	 establish	
joint	 investment	 promotion	 mechanisms	 and	
institutions.	 Regional	 industrial	 development	
compacts	 could	 include	 all	 policy	 areas	
important	 for	 enabling	 regional	 development,	
such	as	 the	harmonization,	mutual	 recognition	
or	 approximation	 of	 regulatory	 standards	
and	 the	 consolidation	 of	 private	 standards	 on	
environmental,	social	and	governance	issues.
4.	 New forms of partnership for SDG investments.	
Partnerships	 in	 many	 forms,	 and	 at	 different	
levels,	including	South-South,	are	crucial	to	the	
performance	and	success	of	SDG	investments.	
First,	cooperation	between	outward	investment	
agencies	 in	 home	 countries	 and	 IPAs	 in	
host	 countries	 could	 be	 institutionalized	 for	
the	 purpose	 of	 marketing	 SDG	 investment	
opportunities	 in	 home	 countries,	 provision	 of	
investment	 incentives	 and	 facilitation	 services	
for	 SDG	 projects;	 and	 joint	 monitoring	 and	
impact	 assessment.	 Outward	 investment	
agencies	 could	 evolve	 into	 genuine	 business	
development	 agencies	 for	 investments	 in	
SDG	 sectors	 in	 developing	 countries,	 raising	
awareness	 of	 investment	 opportunities,	
helping	 investors	 bridge	 knowledge	 gaps	
and	 gain	 expertise,	 and	 practically	 facilitating	
the	 investment	 process.	 Concrete	 tools	 that	
might	 support	 SDG	 investment	 business	
development	 services	 might	 include	 on-line	
tools	 with	 pipelines	 of	 bankable	 projects,	
and	 opportunities	 for	 linkages	 programmes	
in	 developing	 countries.	 Multi-agency 
consortia	 (a	 “one-stop	 shop”	 for	 SDG	
investment	 solutions)	 could	 help	 to	 support	
LDCs	 in	 establishing	 appropriate	 institutions	
and	 schemes	 to	 encourage,	 channel	 and	
maximize	 the	 impact	 from	 private	 sector	
investment.
	 Other	 forms	of	partnership	might	 lead	 to	SDG	
incubators	and	special	economic	zones	based	
on	 close	 collaboration	 between	 the	 public	
and	 private	 sectors	 (domestic	 and	 foreign),	
such	 as	 SDG-focused	 rural-based	 agriculture	
zones	 or	 SDG	 industrial	 model	 towns,	 which	
could	 support	 more	 effective	 generation,	
dissemination	 and	 absorption	 of	 technologies	
and	 skills.	 They	 would	 represent	 hubs	 from	
which	 activity,	 knowledge	 and	 expertise	 could	
spill	into	and	diffuse	across	the	wider	economy.	
In	 a	 similar	 vein,	 triangular	 partnerships,	 such	
as	between	SVEs,	TNCs	and	MDBs	could	be	
fostered	 to	 engage	 the	 private	 sector	 in	 the	
nurturing	 and	 expansion	 of	 sectors,	 industries	
or	value	chain	segments.	
5.	 Enabling innovative financing mechanisms 
and reorienting financial markets.	 New	 and	
existing	 innovative	 financing	 mechanisms,	
such	 as	 green	 bonds	 and	 impact	 investing,	
would	 benefit	 from	 a	 more	 effective	 enabling	
environment,	 allowing	 them	 to	 be	 scaled	 up	
and	targeted	at	relevant	sources	of	capital	and	
ultimate	beneficiaries.	Systematic	 support	 and	
effective	 inclusion	would	 especially	 encourage	
the	 emergence,	 take-up	 and/or	 expansion	
of	 under-utilized	 catalytic	 instruments	 (e.g.	
vertical	 funds)	 or	 go-to-market	 channels	 such	
as	 crowd	 funding.	 Beyond	 this,	 integrated	
reporting	 on	 the	 economic,	 social	 and	
environmental	 impact	 of	 private	 investors	 is	
a	 first	 step	 towards	 encouraging	 responsible	
behaviour	 by	 investors	 on	 the	 ground.	 It	
is	 a	 condition	 for	 other	 initiatives	 aimed	 at	
channelling	 investment	 into	 SDG	 projects	
and	 maximizing	 impact;	 for	 example,	 where	
investment	 incentives	 are	 conditional	 upon	
criteria	of	social	inclusiveness	or	environmental	
performance,	 such	 criteria	 need	 clear	 and	
objective	 measurement.	 In	 addition,	 it	 is	 an	
enabler	 for	 responsible	 investment	 behaviour	
in	 financial	 markets	 and	 a	 prerequisite	 for	
initiatives	 aimed	 at	 mobilizing	 funds	 for	
investment	in	SDGs.	
6.	 Changing the business mindset and 
developing SDG investment expertise. The	
majority	 of	 managers	 in	 the	 world’s	 financial	
institutions	 and	 large	 multinational	 enterprises	
–	 the	 main	 sources	 of	 global	 investment	 –	
as	 well	 as	 most	 successful	 entrepreneurs	
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tend	 to	 be	 strongly	 influenced	 by	 models	 of	
business,	 management	 and	 investment	 that	
are	 commonly	 taught	 in	 business	 schools.	
Such	 models	 tend	 to	 focus	 on	 business	 and	
investment	opportunities	in	mature	or	emerging	
markets,	with	the	risk-return	profiles	associated	
with	 those	markets,	while	 they	 tend	 to	 ignore	
opportunities	 outside	 the	 parameters	 of	 these	
models.	Conventional	models	 also	 tend	 to	 be	
driven	 exclusively	 by	 calculations	of	 economic	
risks	and	returns,	often	ignoring	broader	social	
and	 environmental	 impacts,	 both	 positive	 and	
negative.	Moreover,	 a	 lack	 of	 consideration	 in	
standard	 business	 school	 teachings	 of	 the	
challenges	 associated	 with	 operating	 in	 poor	
countries,	and	the	resulting	need	for	innovative	
problem	 solving,	 tend	 to	 leave	 managers	 ill-
prepared	for	pro-poor	investments.	
	 The	 majority	 of	 students	 interested	 in	 social	
entrepreneurship	 end	 up	 starting	 projects	
in	 middle-	 to	 high-income	 countries,	 and	
most	 impact	 investments	 –	 investments	 with	
objectives	 that	 explicitly	 include	 social	 or	
environmental	 returns	 –	 are	 located	 in	mature	
markets.	 A	 curriculum	 for	 business	 schools	
that	 generates	 awareness	 of	 investment	
opportunities	 in	poor	countries	and	 that	 instils	
in	students	the	problem	solving	skills	needed	in	
developing-country	operating	environments	will	
have	an	important	long-term	impact.
	 UNCTAD,	 in	 partnership	with	 business	 school	
networks,	 teachers,	 students	 as	 well	 as	
corporates,	 is	 currently	 running	 an	 initiative	
to	 develop	 an	 “impact	 curriculum”	 for	 MBA	
programmes	 and	 management	 schools,	 and	
a	platform	for	knowledge	sharing,	exchange	of	
teaching	 materials	 and	 pooling	 of	 “pro-poor”	
internship	 opportunities	 in	 LDCs.	 UNCTAD	
invites	 all	 stakeholders	 who	 can	 contribute	 to	
join	the	partnership.
2.  Stakeholder engagement and a 
platform for new ideas
The Strategic Framework for Private Investment 
in the SDGs provides a basis for stakeholder 
engagement and development of further ideas. 
UNCTAD’s World Investment Forum and its 
Investment Policy Hub provide the infrastructure.
The	 Plan	 of	 Action	 for	 Private	 Investment	 in	 the	
SDGs	(figure	IV.16)	proposed	in	this	chapter	is	not	
an	all-encompassing	or	exhaustive	list	of	solutions	
and	 initiatives.	 Primarily	 it	 provides	 a	 structured	
framework	 for	 thinking	 about	 future	 ideas.	Within	
each	 broad	 solution	 area,	 a	 range	 of	 further	
options	 may	 be	 available	 or	 may	 be	 developed,	
by	 stakeholders	 in	 governments,	 international	
organizations,	NGOs,	or	corporate	networks.
UNCTAD	 is	 keen	 to	 learn	 about	 such	 ideas	 and	
to	engage	 in	discussion	on	how	 to	operationalize	
them,	 principally	 through	 two	 channels:	 first,	
through	 UNCTAD’s	 intergovernmental	 and	 expert	
group	 meetings	 on	 investment,	 and	 in	 particular	
the	 biennial	 World	 Investment	 Forum	 (WIF);	 and,	
second,	 through	 an	 open	 process	 for	 collecting	
inputs	 and	 feedback	 on	 the	 Plan	 of	 Action,	 and	
through	an	on-line	discussion	forum	on	UNCTAD’s	
Investment	Policy	Hub.
(i)  The World Investment Forum: 
Investing in Sustainable 
Development
The	 World	 Investment	 Forum	 2014	 will	 be	 held	
in	 October	 2014	 in	 Geneva,	 and	 will	 have	 as	 its	
theme	 “Investing	 in	 Sustainable	 Development”.	
High-level	 participants	 including	 Heads	 of	 State,	
parliamentarians,	ministers,	 heads	 of	 international	
organizations,	CEOs,	 stock	 exchange	 executives,	
SWF	 managers,	 impact	 investors,	 business	
leaders,	academics,	and	many	other	stakeholders	
will	consider	how	to	 raise	financing	by	 the	private	
sector,	 how	 to	 channel	 investment	 to	 sustainable	
development	 projects,	 and	 how	 to	 maximize	
the	 impact	 of	 such	 investment	 while	 minimizing	
potential	 risks	 involved.	 They	 will	 explore	 existing	
and	new	solutions	and	discuss	questions	such	as:
•	 which	 financing	mechanisms	 provide	 the	 best	
return,	 i.e.	 which	 mechanisms	 can	 mobilize	
more	resources,	more	rapidly	and	at	the	lowest	
opportunity	cost	for	sustainable	development;
•	 which	 types	 of	 investments	 will	 yield	 the	
most	 progress	 on	 the	 SDGs	 and	 are	 natural	
candidates	 for	 involvement	 of	 the	 private	
sector;
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•	 which	types	of	investment	in	which	a	significant	
role	 is	envisaged	 for	 the	private	sector	 require	
the	most	policy	attention.
As	suggested	in	the	Plan	of	Action,	the	biennial	WIF	
could	 become	 a	 permanent	 “Global	 Stakeholder	
Review	Mechanism”	 for	 investment	 in	 the	 SDGs,	
reporting	 to	 ECOSOC	 and	 the	 UN	 General	
Assembly.
(ii) UNCTAD’s Investment Policy 
Hub
In	its	current	form,	the	Plan	of	Action	for	Investment	
in	 the	 SDGs	 has	 gone	 through	 numerous	
consultations	 with	 experts	 and	 practitioners.	 It	 is	
UNCTAD’s	intention	to	provide	a	platform	for	further	
consultation	and	discussion	with	all	investment	and	
sustainable	 development	 stakeholders,	 including	
policymakers,	 the	 international	 development	
community,	 investors,	 business	 associations,	
and	 relevant	NGOs	 and	 interest	 groups.	 To	 allow	
for	 further	 improvements	 resulting	 from	 such	
consultations,	the	Plan	of	Action	has	been	designed	
as	 a	 “living	 document”.	 The	 fact	 that	 the	 SDGs	
are	still	under	discussion,	as	wells	as	the	dynamic	
nature	of	the	investment	policy	environment	add	to	
the	rationale	for	such	an	approach.	
The	Plan	of	Action	provides	a	point	of	reference	and	
a	common	structure	for	debate	and	cooperation	on	
national	and	international	policies	to	mobilize	private	
sector	funds,	channel	them	to	SDGs,	and	maximize	
impact.	UNCTAD	will	add	the	infrastructure	for	such	
cooperation,	 not	 only	 through	 its	 policy	 forums	
on	 investment,	 but	 also	 by	 providing	 a	 platform	
for	 “open	 sourcing”	 of	 best	 practice	 investment	
policies	 through	 its	 website,	 as	 a	 basis	 for	 the	
inclusive	 development	 of	 further	 options	 with	 the	
participation	of	all.
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Figure IV.16. Detailed plan of action for private investment in the SDGs
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Figure IV.16. Detailed plan of action for private investment in the SDGs (concluded)
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




– Require integrated corporate reporting for SDGs
Implement SDG impact assessment systems
– Develop a common set of SDG investment impact 
indicators
Addition of ESG and SDG dimensions to nancial reporting to
inuence corporate behavior on the ground.

Indicators for measuring (and reporting to stakeholders) the
economic, social and environmental performance of SDG
investments.


 Stakeholder engagement for private investment in sensitive 
SDG sectors; institutions with the power to act in the
 interest of stakeholders, etc.
Build SDG investment partnerships
– Partner home- and host-country investment 
promotion agencies for investment in the SDGs
– Develop  SVE-TNC-MDB triangular partnerships
Create a global SDG Wiki platform and investor 

Home-country partner to act as business development agency
to facilitate investment in SDG sectors in developing countries.
Global companies and MDBs to partner with LDCs and small 
vulnerable economies, focusing on a key SDG sector or a 
product key to economic development.
Knowledge-sharing platforms and networks to share expertise 
on SDG investments and signal opportunities



networks
Further
policy
options
Impact
Maximizing
sustainable
development
benets,
minimizing
risks
Chanelling
Promoting 
and
facilitating
investment in
SDG sectors
Source:	UNCTAD.	
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Notes
1		 For	 the	macroeconomic	 aspects	 of	 investment,	 see	 TDR	
2008,	TDR	2013,	UNDESA	2009.
2	 Estimates	 for	 ecosystems/biodiversity	 are	 excluded	 from	
totals	 because	 these	 overlap	 with	 estimates	 for	 other	
sectors,	such	as	climate	change	and	agriculture.
3	 Both	 figures	 are	 annualized	 averages	 over	 the	 period	
2015-2030.
4	 The	 final	 year	 target	 results	 from	 a	 standard	 exponential	
growth	 projection,	 to	 avoid	 an	 unrealistic	 increase	 in	
investment	in	the	first	year.
5	 See	also	Summers,	L.	 (2010).	“The	over-financialization	of	
the	 US	 economy”,	 www.cambridgeforecast.wordpress.
com.
6	 BIS	International	Banking	Statistics	(2014),	www.bis.org.
7	 Equator	Principles,	www.equator-principles.com.
8	 Joint	 statement	 by	 Climatewise,	 MunichRe	 Climate	
Insurance	Initiative	and	the	UNPRI,	November	2013	www.
climatewise.org.uk.
9	 Green	 bonds	 were	 designed	 in	 partnership	 with	 the	
financial	 group	 Skandinaviska	 Enskilda	 Banken	 so	 that	
they	 could	 ensure	 a	 triple	 A	 rated	 fixed-income	 product	
to	 support	 projects	 related	 to	 climate	 change.	 They	
can	 be	 linked	 to	 carbon	 credits,	 so	 that	 investors	 can	
simultaneously	fight	global	warming,	support	SDG	projects	
and	 hedge	 their	 exposure	 to	 carbon	 credits.	 According	
to	 the	WEF	(2013	-	Box	2.2)	“The	size	of	 the	green	bond	
market	 has	been	estimated	at	 $174	billion	by	HSBC	and	
the	 Climate	 Bonds	 Initiative,	 under	 a	 definition	 that	 looks	
beyond	 explicitly	 labeled	 ‘green/climate	 bonds’.	 Other	
estimates,	 including	 those	 from	 the	 OECD,	 place	 the	
market	nearer	to	$86	billion.”	
10	 In	the	case	of	green	bonds,	these	were	mainly	the	preserve	
of	 international	 financial	 institutions	 until	 recently.	 In	 2013	
and	 2014,	 EDF	 and	 Toyota	 became	 issuers	 of	 green	
bonds	and	in	2014	Unilever	went	beyond	projects	such	as	
renewable	 energy	 and	 electric	 vehicles,	 aiming	 to	 reduce	
the	environmental	footprint	of	its	ordinary	activities	(“Green	
Bonds:	Spring	in	the	air”,	The	Economist,	22	March	2014).	
11	 “EDF:	 Successful	 launch	 of	 EDF’s	 first	 Green	 Bond”,	
Reuters,	20	November	2013.		
12	 “Toyota	Said	to	Issue	$1.75	Billion	of	Green	Asset-Backed	
Bonds”,	Bloomberg	News,	11	March	2014.	
13	 	“Unilever	issues	first	ever	green	sustainability	bond”,	www.
unilever.com.
14	 Some	 typologies	 differentiate	 between	 social	 and	 impact	
investment,	 with	 the	 former	 stressing	 the	 generation	 of	
societal	 value	 and	 the	 latter	 profit,	 but	 the	 distinction	
is	 not	 clear	 (a	 mix	 of	 impact	 and	 profit	 prevails	 in	 both	
types);	many	 organisations	 and	 institutions	 use	 the	 terms	
interchangeably.
15	 The	 Global	 Fund	 to	 fight	 AIDS,	 Tuberculosis	 and	Malaria	
has	secured	pledges	of	about	$30	billion	since	its	creation	
in	2002,	and	over	60	per	cent	of	pledges	have	been	paid	
to	date	(World	Bank	2013b).
16	 The	 Global	 Environment	 Fund	 GEF	 –	 a	 partnership	
between	182	countries,	international	agencies,	civil	society	
and	 private	 sector	 –	 has	 provided	 $11.5	 billion	 in	 grants	
since	 its	creation	 in	1991	and	 leveraged	$57	billion	 in	co-
financing	 for	 over	 3,215	 projects	 in	 over	 165	 countries	
(World	Bank	2013b).
17	 Africa	Enterprise	Challenge	Fund,	www.aecfafrica.org.
18	 GAVI	Matching	Fund,	www.gavialliance.org.
19	 The	 International	Finance	Facility	 for	 Immunisation	Bonds,	
www.iffim.org.
20	 “Call	 to	 increase	 opportunities	 to	 make	 low	 carbon	 fixed	
income	investments”,	www.climatewise.org.uk.
21	 Kiva,	www.kiva.org.
22		 A	 wide	 range	 of	 institutions	 has	 made	 proposals	 in	 this	
area,	 for	 example,	 UNCTAD	 (2009a),	 Council	 of	 the	 EU	
(2009),	FSB	(2008),	G-20	(2009),	IMF	(2009),	UK	Financial	
Services	 Authority	 (2009),	 UK	 H.M.	 Treasury	 (2009),	 US	
Treasury	(2009),	among	others.	
23	 For	 an	 update	 on	 global	 financial	 architecture	 see	 FSB	
(2014).
24	 The	SSE	has	a	number	of	Partner	Exchanges	from	around	
the	world,	 including	 the	 Bombay	 Stock	 Exchange,	 Borsa	
Istanbul,	BM&FBOVESPA	 (Brazil),	 the	Egyptian	Exchange,	
the	 Johannesburg	 Stock	 Exchange,	 the	 London	 Stock	
Exchange,	 the	 Nigerian	 Stock	 Exchange,	 the	 New	 York	
Stock	 Exchange,	 NASDAX	OMX,	 and	 the	Warsaw	 Stock	
Exchange.	 Collectively	 these	 exchanges	 list	 over	 10,000	
companies	with	a	market	capitalization	of	over	$32	trillion.
25	 However,	 certain	 SDG	 sectors,	 such	 as	 water	 supply	 or	
energy	distribution,	may	 form	a	natural	monopoly,	 thereby	
de-facto	 impeding	 the	 entry	 of	 new	 market	 participants	
even	in	the	absence	of	formal	entry	barriers.
26	 Examples	and	case	studies	can	be	found	in	UNDP	(2008),	
World	Bank	(2009a),	IFC	(2011),	UNECE	(2012).	
27	 There	exist	a	number	of	useful	guides,	for	 instance,	World	
Bank	(2009b)	and	UNECE	(2008).		
28	 Australia,	 Export	 Finance	 and	 Insurance	 Commission,	
http://stpf.efic.gov.au;	 	 Austrian	 Environmental	 and	 Social	
Assessment	 Procedure,	 www.oekb.at;	 Delcredere	 |	
Ducroire	 (2014);	Nippon	Export	and	 Investment	 Insurance	
“Guidelines	 on	 Environmental	 and	 Social	 Considerations	
in	 Trade	 Insurance”,	 http://nexi.go.jp;	 Atradius	 Dutch	
State	 Business,	 “Environmental	 and	 Social	 Aspects”,	
www.atradiusdutchstatebusiness.nl;	 UK	 Export	 Finance,	
“Guidance	 to	 Applicants:	 Processes	 and	 Factors	 in	 UK	
Export	 Finance	 Consideration	 of	 Applications”,	 www.gov.
uk;	Overseas	Private	Investment	Corporation	(2010).
29	 Multilateral	 Investment	Guarantee	Agency,	“Policy	on	Envi-
ronmental	and	Social	Sustainability”,	www.miga.org.	
30	 ApexBrasil	 -	 Renewable	 Energy,	 www2.apexbrasil.com.
br;	 Deloitte	 (2013b);	 “Environmental	 financial	 incentives	 in	
South	 Africa”,	 Green	 Business	 Guide,	 14	 January	 2013,	
www.greenbusinessguide.co.za;	 Japan	 External	 Trade	
Organization	-	Attractive	Sectors:	Future	Energy	Systems,	
http://jetro.org;	Nova	Scotia	–	Capital	Investment	Incentive,	
www.novascotia.ca;	Regulation	of	 the	Minister	 of	 Finance	
of	 Indonesia	 Number	 130/PMK.011/2011,	 “Provision	 of	
Corporate	 Income	Tax	Relief	or	Reduction	Facility”;	South	
Africa	 Department	 of	 Trade	 and	 Industry,	 “A	 Guide	 to	
Incentive	 Schemes	 2012/13”,	 www.thedti.gov.za;	 Turkey	
Investment	 Support	 and	 Promotion	 Agency	 –	 Turkey’s	
Investment	 Incentives	 System,	 www.invest.gov.tr;	 United	
Kingdom	of	Great	Britain	and	Northern	Ireland.	Department	
for	 Business,	 Innovation	 &	 Skills	 –	 Grant	 for	 Business	
Investment:	 Guidelines,	 www.gov.uk;	 U.S.	 Department	
of	 Energy	 –	 About	 the	 Loan	 Programs	 Office	 (LPO):	 Our	
Mission,	 www.energy.gov/lpo/mission;	 U.S.	 Department	
of	 Energy	 –	 State	 Energy	 Efficiency	 Tax	 Incentives	 for	
Industry,	www.energy.gov.
31	 UNCTAD	 Entrepreneurship	 Policy	 Framework,	 www.
unctad-org/diae/epf.
32	 For	 example,	 RLabs	 Innovation	 Incubator	 in	 South	 Africa	
provides	 entrepreneurs	 with	 a	 space	 to	 develop	 social	
businesses	 ideas	 aimed	 at	 impacting,	 reconstructing	 and	
empowering	 local	 communities	 through	 innovation.	 	 The	
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Asian	Social	Enterprise	 Incubator	 (ASEI)	 in	 the	Philippines	
provides	 comprehensive	 services	 and	 state	 of	 the	 art	
technology	 for	 social	 enterprises	 engaged	 at	 the	 base	
of	 the	 pyramid.	 The	 GSBI	 Accelerator	 program,	 from	
Santa	 Clara	 University,	 California,	 pairs	 selected	 social	
entrepreneurs	 with	 two	 Silicon	 Valley	 executive	 mentors,	
to	enable	them	to	achieve	scale,	sustainability	and	impact.	
At	 the	 global	 level,	 the	 Yunus	 Social	 Business	 Incubator	
Fund	 operates	 in	 several	 developing	 countries	 to	 create	
and	 empower	 local	 social	 businesses	 and	 entrepreneurs	
to	 help	 their	 own	 communities	 by	 providing	 pro-poor	
healthcare,	 housing,	 financial	 services,	 nutrition,	 safe	
drinking	water	and	renewable	energy.
33	 For	 instance,	 the	 zones	 may	 have	 well	 developed	
environmental	 reporting	 requirements	 under	 which	
companies	are	required	to	report	their	anticipated	amounts	
of	wastes,	 pollutants,	 and	 even	 the	decibel	 level	 of	 noise	
that	 is	 expected	 to	 be	 produced	 (see	 also	 WIR	 2013).	
Several	zones	around	the	world	have	been	certified	to	the	
ISO	14001	environmental	management	system	standard.	
34	 World	Bank	–	Ecuador	Overview,	www.worldbank.org.
35	 India,	 for	 example,	 requires	 the	 largest	 100	 listed	
companies	 on	 its	 major	 stock	 exchanges	 to	 report	 on	
environmental	and	social	impacts.
36	 For	example,	the	Johannesburg	Stock	Exchange	in	South	
Africa.	Many	 other	 exchanges,	 such	 as	BM&FBovespa	 in	
Brazil,	have	actively	promoted	voluntary	mechanisms	such	
as	reporting	standards	and	indices	to	incentivize	corporate	
sustainability	reporting.
37	 Producer	 of	 the	most	widely	 used	 sustainability	 reporting	
guidelines.	According	to	a	2013	KPMG	study,	93	per	cent	
of	 the	 world’s	 largest	 250	 companies	 issue	 a	 CR	 report,	
of	 which	 82	 per	 cent	 refer	 to	 the	GRI	Guidelines.	 Three-
quarters	 of	 the	 largest	 100	 companies	 in	 41	 countries	
produce	CR	reports,	with	78	per	cent	of	these	referring	to	
the	GRI	Guidelines	(KPMG	2013).
38	 A	 global	 system	 for	 companies	 and	 cities	 to	 measure,	
disclose,	 manage	 and	 share	 environmental	 information	
and	 host	 to	 the	 Climate	 Disclosure	 Standards	 Board.	
Over	 4,000	 companies	worldwide	 use	 the	CDP	 reporting	
system.
39	 Producer	 of	 the	 International	 Integrated	 Reporting	
Framework,	 recognizes	 sustainability	 as	 a	 contributor	 to	
value	creation.
40	 Works	 to	 catalyze	 action	 by	 the	 finance,	 accounting	 and	
investor	community	to	support	a	fundamental	shift	towards	
resilient	business	models	and	a	sustainable	economy.
41	 Provides	standards	 for	use	by	publicly	 listed	corporations	
in	 the	 United	 States	 in	 disclosing	 material	 sustainability	
issues	for	the	benefit	of	investors	and	the	public.	
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Annex table 1. FDI flows, by region and economy, 2008–2013
(Millions of dollars)
Region/economy
FDI inflows FDI outflows
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
World 1 818 834 1 221 840 1 422 255 1 700 082 1 330 273 1 451 965 1 999 326 1 171 240 1 467 580 1 711 652 1 346 671 1 410 696
Developed economies 1 032 385  618 596  703 474  880 406  516 664  565 626 1 599 317  846 305  988 769 1 215 690  852 708  857 454
Europe  577 952  408 924  436 303  538 877  244 090  250 799 1 045 129  431 433  591 326  653 000  299 478  328 729
European Union  551 413  363 133  383 703  490 427  216 012  246 207  983 601  383 598  483 002  585 275  237 865  250 460
Austria  6 858  9 303   840  10 618  3 939  11 083  29 452  10 006  9 994  21 878  17 059  13 940
Belgium  193 950  60 963  77 014  119 022 - 30 261 - 2 406  221 023  7 525  24 535  96 785 - 17 443 - 26 372
Bulgaria  9 855  3 385  1 525  1 849  1 375  1 450   765 -  95   230   163   345   179
Croatia  5 938  3 346   490  1 517  1 356   580  1 405  1 273 -  152   53 -  36 -  187
Cyprus  1 414  3 472   766  2 384  1 257   533  2 717   383   679  2 201 -  281   308
Czech Republic  6 451  2 927  6 141  2 318  7 984  4 990  4 323   949  1 167 -  327  1 790  3 294
Denmark  1 824  3 917 - 11 522  13 094  2 831  2 083  13 240  6 305 -  124  12 610  7 976  9 170
Estonia  1 731  1 840  1 598   340  1 517   950  1 114  1 547   142 - 1 452   952   357
Finland - 1 144   718  7 359  2 550  4 153 - 1 065  9 297  5 681  10 167  5 011  7 543  4 035
France  64 184  24 215  33 628  38 547  25 086  4 875  155 047  107 136  64 575  59 552  37 195 - 2 555
Germany  8 109  23 789  65 620  59 317  13 203  26 721  72 758  69 639  126 310  80 971  79 607  57 550
Greece  4 499  2 436   330  1 143  1 740  2 567  2 418  2 055  1 558  1 772   677 -  627
Hungary  6 325  1 995  2 202  6 290  13 983  3 091  2 234  1 883  1 148  4 663  11 337  2 269
Ireland - 16 453  25 715  42 804  23 545  38 315  35 520  18 949  26 616  22 348 - 1 165  18 519  22 852
Italy - 10 835  20 077  9 178  34 324   93  16 508  67 000  21 275  32 655  53 629  7 980  31 663
Latvia  1 261   94   380  1 466  1 109   808   243 -  62   19   62   192   345
Lithuania  1 965 -  14   800  1 448   700   531   336   198 -  6   55   392   101
Luxembourg  16 853  19 314  39 731  18 116  9 527  30 075  14 809  1 522  21 226  7 750  3 063  21 626
Malta   943   412   924   276   4 - 2 100   457   136   130   4 -  42 -  7
Netherlands  4 549  38 610 - 7 324  21 047  9 706  24 389  68 334  34 471  68 341  39 502   267  37 432
Poland  14 839  12 932  13 876  20 616  6 059 - 6 038  4 414  4 699  7 226  8 155   727 - 4 852
Portugal  4 665  2 706  2 646  11 150  8 995  3 114  2 741   816 - 7 493  14 905   579  1 427
Romania  13 909  4 844  2 940  2 522  2 748  3 617   274 -  88 -  21 -  33 -  112   119
Slovakia  4 868 -  6  1 770  3 491  2 826   591   550   904   946   713 -  73 -  422
Slovenia  1 947 -  659   360   998 -  59 -  679  1 468   262 -  207   118 -  272   58
Spain  76 993  10 407  39 873  28 379  25 696  39 167  74 717  13 070  37 844  41 164 - 3 982  26 035
Sweden  36 888  10 093   140  12 924  16 334  8 150  30 363  26 202  20 349  29 861  28 951  33 281
United Kingdom  89 026  76 301  49 617  51 137  45 796  37 101  183 153  39 287  39 416  106 673  34 955  19 440
Other developed Europe  26 539  45 791  52 600  48 450  28 079  4 592  61 528  47 835  108 323  67 725  61 613  78 269
Gibraltar   159a   172a   165a   166a   168a   166a - - - - - -
Iceland   917   86   246  1 108  1 025   348 - 4 209  2 292 - 2 357   23 - 3 206   395
Norway  10 251  16 641  17 044  20 586  16 648  9 330  20 404  19 165  23 239  19 880  19 782  17 913
Switzerland  15 212  28 891  35 145  26 590  10 238 - 5 252  45 333  26 378  87 442  47 822  45 037  59 961
North America  367 919  166 304  226 449  263 428  203 594  249 853  387 573  327 502  312 502  438 872  422 386  380 938
Canada  61 553  22 700  28 400  39 669  43 025  62 325  79 277  39 601  34 723  52 148  55 446  42 636
United States  306 366  143 604  198 049  223 759  160 569  187 528  308 296  287 901  277 779  386 724  366 940  338 302
Other developed countries  86 514  43 368  40 722  78 101  68 980  64 975  166 615  87 371  84 942  123 818  130 844  147 786
Australia  47 162  27 192  35 799  65 209  55 518  49 826  30 661  11 933  19 607  8 702  6 212  6 364
Bermuda   78 -  70   231 -  258   48   55   323   21 -  33 -  337   241   50
Israel  10 875  4 607  5 510  10 766  9 481  11 804  7 210  1 751  8 656  5 329  2 352  4 932
Japan  24 425  11 938 - 1 252 - 1 758  1 732  2 304  128 020  74 699  56 263  107 599  122 549  135 749
New Zealand  3 974 -  299   434  4 142  2 202   987   401 - 1 034   448  2 525 -  510   691
Developing economies  668 758  532 580  648 208  724 840  729 449  778 372  338 354  276 664  420 919  422 582  440 164  454 067
Africa  59 276  56 043  47 034  48 021  55 180  57 239  4 947  6 278  6 659  6 773  12 000  12 418
North Africa  23 153  18 980  16 576  8 506  16 624  15 494  8 752  2 588  4 847  1 575  3 273  1 481
Algeria  2 632  2 746  2 301  2 581  1 499  1 691   318   215   220   534 -  41 -  268
Egypt  9 495  6 712  6 386 -  483  6 881  5 553  1 920   571  1 176   626   211   301
Libya  3 180  3 310  1 909 -  1 425   702  5 888  1 165  2 722   131  2 509   180
Morocco  2 487  1 952  1 574  2 568  2 728  3 358   485   470   589   179   406   331
Sudan  2 600  2 572  2 894  2 692  2 488  3 094   98   89   66   84   175   915
Tunisia  2 759  1 688  1 513  1 148  1 603  1 096   42   77   74   21   13   22
Other Africa  36 124  37 063  30 458  39 515  38 556  41 744 - 3 805  3 690  1 813  5 198  8 726  10 937
West Africa  12 538  14 764  12 024  18 649  16 575  14 203  1 709  2 120  1 292  2 731  3 155  2 185
Benin   170   134   177   161   282   320 -  4   31 -  18   60   40   46
Burkina Faso   106   101   35   144   329   374 -  0   8 -  4   102   73   83
Cabo Verde   264   174   158   153   57   19   0 -  0   0   1 -  1   2a
Côte d’Ivoire   446   377   339   302   322   371 - -  9   25   15   29   33
Gambia   70   40   37   36   25   25a - - - - - -
Ghana  1 220  2 897  2 527  3 222  3 293  3 226a   8   7 -   25   1   9a
Guinea   382   141   101   956   606   25   126 - -   1   3   1
Guinea-Bissau   5   17   33   25   7   15 -  1 -  0   6   1 -  0   0
Liberia   284   218   450   508   985  1 061   382   364   369   372  1 354   698a
Mali   180   748   406   556   398   410   1 -  1   7   4   16   9
Mauritania   343a -  3a   131a   589a  1 383a  1 154a   4a   4a   4a   4a   4a   4a
Niger   340   791   940  1 066   841   631   24   59 -  60   9   2 -  7
/…
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Annex table 1.  FDI flows, by region and economy, 2008-2013 (continued)
(Millions of dollars)
Region/economy
FDI inflows FDI outflows
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Nigeria  8 249  8 650  6 099  8 915  7 127  5 609  1 058  1 542   923   824  1 543  1 237
Senegal   398   320   266   338   276   298   126   77   2   47   56   32
Sierra Leone   58   111   238   950   548   579a - - - - - -
Togo   24   49   86   728   94   84 -  16   37   37  1 264   35   37
Central Africa  5 021  6 027  9 389  8 527  9 904  8 165   149   53   590   366   222   634
Burundi   4   0   1   3   1   7   1 - - - - -
Cameroon   21   740   538   652   526   572a -  2 -  69   503   187 -  284   135a
Central African Republic   117   42   62   37   71   1 - - - - - -
Chad   466a   376a   313a   282a   343a   538a - - - - - -
Congo  2 526a  1 862a  2 211a  3 056a  2 758a  2 038a - - - - - -
Congo, Democratic Republic of the  1 727   664  2 939  1 687  3 312  2 098   54   35   7   91   421   401
Equatorial Guinea -  794  1 636  2 734a  1 975a  2 015a  1 914a - - - - - -
Gabon   773a   573a   499a   696a   696a   856a   96a   87a   81a   88a   85a   85a
Rwanda   102   119   42   106   160   111 - - - - -   14
São Tomé and Príncipe   79   16   51   32   23   30   0   0   0   0   0   0
East Africa  4 358  3 928  4 511  4 778  5 378  6 210   109   89   141   174   205   148
Comoros   5   14   8   23   10   14a - - - - - -
Djibouti   229   100   27   78   110   286 - - - - - -
Eritrea   39a   91a   91a   39a   41a   44a - - - - - -
Ethiopia   109   221   288   627   279   953a - - - - - -
Kenya   96   115   178   335   259   514   44   46   2   9   16   6
Madagascar  1 169  1 066   808   810   812   838a - - - - - -
Mauritius   383   248   430   433   589   259   52   37   129   158   180   135
Seychelles   130   171   211   207   166   178   13   5   6   8   9   8
Somalia   87a   108a   112a   102a   107a   107a - - - - - -
Uganda   729   842   544   894  1 205  1 146 - -   4 -  1 -  0 -  1
United Republic of Tanzania  1 383   953  1 813  1 229  1 800  1 872 - - - - - -
Southern Africa  14 206  12 343  4 534  7 561  6 699  13 166 - 5 771  1 429 -  210  1 927  5 144  7 970
Angola  1 679  2 205 - 3 227 - 3 024 - 6 898 - 4 285 - 2 570 -  7 - 1 340  2 093  2 741  2 087
Botswana   521   129   136  1 093   147   188 -  91   6   1 -  10   9 -  0
Lesotho   194   178   51   53   50   44 -  0   3   21   22   20   17
Malawi   195   49   97   129   129   118a   19 -  1   42   50   50   47a
Mozambique   592   893  1 018  2 663  5 629  5 935   0   3 -  1   3   3 -  0
Namibia   720   522   793   816   861   699   5 -  3   5   5 -  6 -  8
South Africa  9 209  7 502  3 636  4 243  4 559  8 188 - 3 134  1 151 -  76 -  257  2 988  5 620
Swaziland   106   66   136   93   90   67a -  8   7 -  1   9 -  6   1a
Zambia   939   695  1 729  1 108  1 732  1 811 -   270  1 095 -  2 -  702   181
Zimbabwe   52   105   166   387   400   400   8 -   43   14   49   27
Asia  396 025  323 683  409 021  430 622  415 106  426 355  236 380  215 294  296 186  304 293  302 130  326 013
East and South-East Asia  245 786  209 371  313 115  333 036  334 206  346 513  176 810  180 897  264 271  269 605  274 039  292 516
East Asia  195 446  162 578  213 991  233 423  216 679  221 058  142 852  137 826  206 699  213 225  220 192  236 141
China  108 312  95 000  114 734  123 985  121 080  123 911  55 910  56 530  68 811  74 654  87 804  101 000
Hong Kong, China  67 035  54 274  82 708  96 125  74 888  76 633  57 099  57 940  98 414  95 885  88 118  91 530
Korea, Democratic People’s Republic of   44a   2a   38a   56a   120a   227a - - - - - -
Korea, Republic of  11 188  9 022  9 497  9 773  9 496  12 221  19 633  17 436  28 280  29 705  30 632  29 172
Macao, China  2 591   852  2 831   726  3 437  2 331a -  83 -  11 -  441   120   456   45a
Mongolia   845   624  1 691  4 715  4 452  2 047   6   54   62   94   44   50
Taiwan Province of China  5 432  2 805  2 492 - 1 957  3 207  3 688  10 287  5 877  11 574  12 766  13 137  14 344
South-East Asia  50 340  46 793  99 124  99 613  117 527  125 455  33 958  43 071  57 572  56 380  53 847  56 374
Brunei Darussalam   330   371   626  1 208   865   895a   16   9   6   10 -  422a -  135a
Cambodia   815   539   783   815  1 447  1 396a   20   19   21   29   36   42a
Indonesia  9 318  4 877  13 771  19 241  19 138  18 444a  5 900  2 249  2 664  7 713  5 422  3 676a
Lao People’s Democratic Republic   228   190   279   301   294   296a -  75a   1a -  1a   0a -  21a -  7a
Malaysia  7 172  1 453  9 060  12 198  10 074  12 306a  14 965a  7 784a  13 399a  15 249a  17 115a  13 600a
Myanmar   863   973  1 285  2 200  2 243  2 621 - - - - - -
Philippines  1 340  2 065  1 070  2 007  3 215  3 860  1 970  1 897  2 712  2 350  4 173  3 642
Singapore  12 201  23 821  55 076  50 368  61 159  63 772  6 806  26 239  33 377  23 492  13 462  26 967
Thailand  8 455  4 854  9 147  3 710  10 705  12 946  4 057  4 172  4 467  6 620  12 869  6 620
Timor-Leste   40   50   29   47   18   20a - -   26 -  33   13   13a
Viet Nam  9 579  7 600  8 000  7 519  8 368  8 900   300   700   900   950  1 200  1 956
South Asia  56 692  42 427  35 038  44 372  32 442  35 561  21 647  16 507  16 383  12 952  9 114  2 393
Afghanistan   94   76   211   83   94   69 - - - - - -
Bangladesh  1 086   700   913  1 136  1 293  1 599   9   29   15   13   53   32
Bhutan   20   72   31   26   22   21 - - - - - -
India  47 139  35 657  27 431  36 190  24 196  28 199  21 147  16 031  15 933  12 456  8 486  1 679
Iran, Islamic Republic of  1 980  2 983  3 649  4 277  4 662  3 050   380a   356a   346a   360a   430a   380a
Maldives   181   158   216   256   284   325a - - - - - -
Nepal   1   39   87   95   92   74 - - - - - -
Pakistan  5 438  2 338  2 022  1 326   859  1 307   49   71   47   62   82   237
/…
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Annex table 1.  FDI flows, by region and economy, 2008-2013 (continued)
(Millions of dollars)
Region/economy
FDI inflows FDI outflows
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Sri Lanka   752   404   478   981   941   916   62   20   43   60   64   65
West Asia  93 547  71 885  60 868  53 215  48 458  44 282  37 922  17 890  15 532  21 736  18 977  31 104
Bahrain  1 794   257   156   781   891   989  1 620 - 1 791   334   894   922  1 052
Iraq  1 856  1 598  1 396  2 082  2 376  2 852a   34   72   125   366   448   538a
Jordan  2 826  2 413  1 651  1 474  1 497  1 798   13   72   28   31   5   16
Kuwait -  6  1 114  1 304  3 260  3 931  2 329a  9 100  8 584  3 663  4 434  3 231  8 377a
Lebanon  4 333  4 804  4 280  3 485  3 674  2 833a   987  1 126   487   755   572   690a
Oman  2 952  1 485  1 782  1 563  1 040  1 626   585   109  1 498  1 233   877  1 384
Qatar  3 779  8 125  4 670 -  87   327 -  840  3 658  3 215  1 863  6 027  1 840  8 021
Saudi Arabia  39 456  36 458  29 233  16 308  12 182  9 298  3 498  2 177  3 907  3 430  4 402  4 943
State of Palestine   52   301   180   214   244   177 -  8 -  15   77 -  37 -  2 -  9
Syrian Arab Republic  1 466  2 570  1 469   804 - -   2a - - - - -
Turkey  19 762  8 629  9 058  16 171  13 224  12 866  2 549  1 553  1 464  2 349  4 074  3 114
United Arab Emirates  13 724  4 003  5 500  7 679  9 602  10 488  15 820  2 723  2 015  2 178  2 536  2 905
Yemen  1 555   129   189 -  518 -  531 -  134   66a   66a   70a   77a   71a   73a
Latin America and the Caribbean  211 138  150 913  189 513  243 914  255 864  292 081  95 931  55 026  117 420  110 598  124 382  114 590
South and Central America  129 440  78 631  125 567  163 106  168 695  182 389  37 237  13 358  46 423  40 939  45 100  32 258
South America  93 394  56 677  95 875  131 120  142 063  133 354  35 869  3 920  30 996  28 042  22 339  18 638
Argentina  9 726  4 017  11 333  10 720  12 116  9 082  1 391   712   965  1 488  1 052  1 225
Bolivia, Plurinational State of   513   423   643   859  1 060  1 750   5 -  3 -  29 - - -
Brazil  45 058  25 949  48 506  66 660  65 272  64 045  20 457 - 10 084  11 588 - 1 029 - 2 821 - 3 496
Chile  15 518  12 887  15 725  23 444  28 542  20 258  9 151  7 233  9 461  20 252  22 330  10 923
Colombia  10 596  7 137  6 746  13 405  15 529  16 772  2 486  3 348  6 893  8 304 -  606  7 652
Ecuador  1 058   308   163   644   585   703   48a   51a   136a   65a -  14a   62a
Guyana   178   164   198   247   276   240a - - - - - -
Paraguay   209   95   216   557   480   382   8 - - - - -
Peru  6 924  6 431  8 455  8 233  12 240  10 172   736   411   266   113 -  57   136
Suriname -  231 -  93 -  248   70   62   113 - - - -  3   1 -  0
Uruguay  2 106  1 529  2 289  2 504  2 687  2 796 -  11   16 -  60 -  7 -  5 -  16
Venezuela, Bolivarian Republic of  1 741 - 2 169  1 849  3 778  3 216  7 040  1 598  2 236  1 776 - 1 141  2 460  2 152
Central America  36 046  21 954  29 692  31 985  26 632  49 036  1 368  9 439  15 427  12 897  22 761  13 620
Belize   170   109   97   95   194   89   3   0   1   1   1   1
Costa Rica  2 078  1 347  1 466  2 176  2 332  2 652   6   7   25   58   428   273
El Salvador   903   366 -  230   219   482   140 -  80 - -  5   0 -  2   3
Guatemala   754   600   806  1 026  1 245  1 309   16   26   24   17   39   34
Honduras  1 006   509   969  1 014  1 059  1 060 -  1   4 -  1   2   55   26
Mexico  28 313  17 331  23 353  23 354  17 628  38 286  1 157  9 604  15 050  12 636  22 470  12 938
Nicaragua   626   434   508   968   805   849   19 -  29   18   7   44   64
Panama  2 196  1 259  2 723  3 132  2 887  4 651   248 -  174   317   176 -  274   281
Caribbean  81 698  72 282  63 946  80 808  87 169  109 692  58 693  41 668  70 998  69 658  79 282  82 332
Anguilla   101   44   11   39   44   56   2   0   0   0   0 -
Antigua and Barbuda   161   85   101   68   134   138   2   4   5   3   4   4
Aruba   15 -  11   187   488 -  326   163   3   1   3   3   3   4
Bahamas  1 512   873  1 148  1 533  1 073  1 111   410   216   150   524   132   277
Barbados   464   247   290   725   516   376a -  6 -  56 -  54 -  25   89   3a
British Virgin Islands  51 722a  46 503a  50 142a  58 429a  72 259a  92 300a  44 118a  35 143a  53 883a  56 414a  64 118a  68 628a
Cayman Islands  19 634a  20 426a  8 659a  14 702a  6 808a  10 577a  13 377a  6 311a  16 946a  11 649a  13 262a  12 704a
Curaçao   147   55   89   69   57   27 -  1   5   15 -  30   12 -  20
Dominica   57   43   25   14   23   18   0   1   1   0   0   0
Dominican Republic  2 870  2 165  1 896  2 275  3 142  1 991 -  19 -  32 -  23 -  25 -  27a -  21a
Grenada   141   104   64   45   34   78   6   1   3   3   3   3
Haiti   29   56   178   119   156   190 - - - - - -
Jamaica  1 437   541   228   218   490   567   76   61   58   75   3 -  2
Montserrat   13   3   4   2   3   2   0   0   0   0   0   0
Saint Kitts and Nevis   184   136   119   112   94   112   6   5   3   2   2   2
Saint Lucia   166   152   127   100   80   88   5   6   5   4   4   4
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines   159   111   97   86   115   127   0   1   0   0   0   0
Sint Maarten   86   40   33 -  48   14   58   16   1   3   1 -  4   2
Trinidad and Tobago  2 801   709   549  1 831  2 453  1 713   700 - -  1 060  1 681   742
Oceania  2 318  1 942  2 640  2 283  3 299  2 698  1 097   66   654   918  1 652  1 047
Cook Islands - -  6a - - - -   963a   13a   540a   814a  1 307a   887a
Fiji   341   164   350   403   376   272 -  8   3   6   1   2   4
French Polynesia   14   22   64   136   156   119a   30   8   38   27   43   36a
Kiribati   3   3 -  0a   0a   1a   9a   1 -  1 -  0 - -  0a -  0a
Marshall Islands   40a -  11a   27a   34a   27a   23a   35a -  25a -  11a   29a   24a   19a
Micronesia, Federated States of -  5a   1a   1a   1a   1a   1a - - - - - -
Nauru   1a   1a - - - - - - - - - -
New Caledonia  1 746  1 182  1 863  1 768  2 564  2 065a   64   58   76   41   175   97a
Niue - - - - - -   4a -  0a - -  1a - -
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Annex table 1.  FDI flows, by region and economy, 2008-2013 (concluded)
(Millions of dollars)
Region/economy
FDI inflows FDI outflows
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Palau   6a   1a   5a   5a   5a   6a   0a - - - - -
Papua New Guinea -  30   423   29 -  310   25   18   0   4   0   1   89 -
Samoa   49   10   1   15   24   28 -   1 -   1   9   0
Solomon Islands   95   120   238   146   68   105   4   3   2   4   3   2
Tonga   4 -  0   7   28   8   12a   2   0   2   1   1a   1a
Vanuatu   44   32   41   58   38   35   1   1   1   1   1   0
Transition economies  117 692  70 664  70 573  94 836  84 159  107 967  61 655  48 270  57 891  73 380  53 799  99 175
South-East Europe  7 014  5 333  4 242  5 653  2 593  3 716   511   168   318   256   132   80
Albania   974   996  1 051   876   855  1 225   81   39   6   30   23   40
Bosnia and Herzegovina  1 002   250   406   493   366   332   17   6   46   18   15 -  13
Serbia  2 955  1 959  1 329  2 709   365  1 034   283   52   189   170   54   13
Montenegro   960  1 527   760   558   620   447   108   46   29   17   27   17
The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia   586   201   212   468   93   334 -  14   11   2 -  0 -  8 -  2
CIS   109 113  64 673  65 517  88 135  80 655  103 241  60 998  48 120  57 437  72 977  53 371  98 982
Armenia   944   760   529   515   489   370   19   50   8   78   16   16
Azerbaijan   14   473   563  1 465  2 005  2 632   556   326   232   533  1 192  1 490
Belarus  2 188  1 877  1 393  4 002  1 464  2 233   31   102   51   126   156   173
Kazakhstan  16 819  14 276  7 456  13 760  13 785  9 739  3 704  4 193  3 791  5 178  1 959  1 948
Kyrgyzstan   377   189   438   694   293   758 -  0 -  0   0   0 -  0 -  0
Moldova, Republic of   711   208   208   288   175   231   16   7   4   21   20   28
Russian Federation  74 783  36 583  43 168  55 084  50 588  79 262  55 663  43 281  52 616  66 851  48 822  94 907
Tajikistan   376   95   8   70   233   108 - - - - - -
Turkmenistan  1 277a  4 553a  3 631a  3 399a  3 117a  3 061a - - - - - -
Ukraine  10 913  4 816  6 495  7 207  7 833  3 771  1 010   162   736   192  1 206   420
Uzbekistan   711a   842a  1 628a  1 651a   674a  1 077a - - - - - -
Georgia  1 564   659   814  1 048   911  1 010   147 -  19   135   147   297   113
Memorandum
Least developed countries (LDCs)b  18 931  18 491  19 559  22 126  24 452  27 984 - 1 728  1 092   375  4 297  4 454  4 719
Landlocked developing countries (LLDCs)c  27 884  27 576  22 776  35 524  33 530  29 748  4 178  4 990  5 219  6 101  2 712  3 895
Small island developing States (SIDS)d  8 711  4 575  4 548  6 266  6 733  5 680  1 299   269   331  1 818  2 246  1 217
Source: UNCTAD FDI-TNC-GVC Information System, FDI database (www.unctad.org/fdistatistics).
a    Estimates.  
b    Least developed countries include Afghanistan, Angola, Bangladesh, Benin, Bhutan, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, the Central African Republic, Chad, the Comoros, the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, the Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Kiribati, the Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, 
Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Myanmar, Nepal, Niger, Rwanda, Samoa (which, however, graduated from LDC status effective 1 January 2014), São Tomé and Príncipe, Senegal, 
Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Timor-Leste, Togo, Tuvalu, Uganda, the United Republic of Tanzania, Vanuatu, Yemen and Zambia.
c   Landlocked developing countries include Afghanistan, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bhutan, the Plurinational State of Bolivia, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, the Central African Republic, Chad, 
Ethiopia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, the Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Lesotho, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Malawi, Mali, the Republic of Moldova, Mongolia, Nepal, 
Niger, Paraguay, Rwanda, South Sudan, Swaziland, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Uzbekistan, Zambia and Zimbabwe.
d    Small island developing States include Antigua and Barbuda, the Bahamas, Barbados, Cabo Verde, the Comoros, Dominica, Fiji, Grenada, Jamaica, Kiribati, Maldives, the Marshall Islands, 
Mauritius, the Federated States of Micronesia, Nauru, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, São Tomé and Príncipe, 
Seychelles, Solomon Islands, Timor-Leste, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tuvalu and Vanuatu.
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Annex table 2.  FDI stock, by region and economy, 1990, 2000, 2013
(Millions of dollars)
Region/economy
FDI inward stock FDI outward stock
1990 2000 2013 1990 2000 2013
World 2 078 267 7 511 300  25 464 173   2 087 908  8 008 434  26 312 635 
Developed economies 1 563 939 5 681 797 16 053 149 1 946 832 7 100 064 20 764 527
Europe  808 866 2 471 019 9 535 639  885 707 3 776 300 12 119 889
European Union  761 821 2 352 810 8 582 673  808 660 3 509 450 10 616 765
Austria  10 972  31 165  183 558  4 747  24 821  238 033
Belgium   - -  924 020 - - 1 009 000
Belgium and Luxembourg  58 388  195 219 -  40 636  179 773 -
Bulgaria   112  2 704  52 623   124   67  2 280
Croatia ..  2 796  32 484 ..   824  4 361
Cyprus ..a,b  2 846a  21 182   8   557a  8 300
Czech Republic  1 363  21 644  135 976 ..   738  21 384
Denmark  9 192  73 574  158 996a  7 342  73 100  256 120a
Estonia -  2 645  21 451 -   259  6 650
Finland  5 132  24 273  101 307  11 227  52 109  162 360
France  97 814  390 953 1 081 497a  112 441  925 925 1 637 143a
Germany  111 231  271 613  851 512a  151 581  541 866 1 710 298a
Greece  5 681  14 113  27 741  2 882  6 094  46 352
Hungary   570  22 870  111 015   159  1 280  39 613
Ireland  37 989  127 089  377 696  14 942  27 925  502 880
Italy  59 998  122 533  403 747  60 184  169 957  598 357
Latvia -  2 084  15 654 -   23  1 466
Lithuania -  2 334  17 049 -   29  2 852
Luxembourg - -  141 381 - -  181 607
Malta   465  2 263  14 859a ..   193  1 521a
Netherlands  68 701  243 733  670 115  105 088  305 461 1 071 819
Poland   109  34 227  252 037   95  1 018  54 974
Portugal  10 571  32 043  128 488   900  19 794  81 889
Romania   0  6 953  84 596   66   136  1 465
Slovakia   282  6 970  58 832 ..   555  4 292
Slovenia  1 643  2 893  15 235   560   768  7 739
Spain  65 916  156 348  715 994  15 652  129 194  643 226
Sweden  12 636  93 791  378 107  50 720  123 618  435 964
United Kingdom  203 905  463 134 1 605 522  229 307  923 367 1 884 819
Other developed Europe  47 045  118 209  952 966  77 047  266 850 1 503 124
Gibraltar   263a   642a  2 403a - - -
Iceland   147   497  10 719   75   663  12 646
Norway  12 391  30 265  192 409a  10 884  34 026  231 109a
Switzerland  34 245  86 804  747 436  66 087  232 161 1 259 369
North America  652 444 2 995 951 5 580 144  816 569 2 931 653 7 081 929
Canada  112 843  212 716  644 977  84 807  237 639  732 417
United States  539 601 2 783 235 4 935 167  731 762 2 694 014 6 349 512
Other developed countries  102 629  214 827  937 365  244 556  392 111 1 562 710
Australia  80 364  118 858  591 568  37 505  95 979  471 804
Bermuda -   265a  2 664 -   108a   835
Israel  4 476  20 426  88 179  1 188  9 091  78 704
Japan  9 850  50 322  170 929a  201 441  278 442  992 901a
New Zealand  7 938  24 957  84 026  4 422  8 491  18 465
Developing economies  514 319 1 771 479 8 483 009  141 076  887 829 4 993 339
Africa  60 675  153 742  686 962  20 229  38 858  162 396
North Africa  23 962  45 590  241 789  1 836  3 199  30 635
Algeria  1 561a  3 379a  25 298a   183a   205a  1 737a
Egypt  11 043a  19 955  85 046   163a   655  6 586
Libya   678a   471  18 461  1 321a  1 903  19 435
Morocco  3 011a  8 842a  50 280a   155a   402a  2 573a
Sudan   55a  1 398a  29 148 - - -
Tunisia  7 615  11 545  33 557   15   33   304
Other Africa  36 712  108 153  445 173  18 393  35 660  131 761
West Africa  14 013  33 010  145 233  2 202  6 381  15 840
Benin -  173a   213  1 354   2a   11   149
Burkina Faso   39a   28  1 432   4a   0   277
Cabo Verde   4a   192a  1 576 - - -  0a
Côte d’Ivoire   975a  2 483  8 233   6a   9   177
Gambia   157   216   754a - - -
Ghana   319a  1 554a  19 848a - -   118a
Guinea   69a   263a  3 303a ..   12a   144a
Guinea-Bissau   8a   38   112 - -   6
Liberia  2 732a  3 247  6 267   846a  2 188  4 345
Mali   229a   132  3 432   22a   1   49
Mauritania   59a   146a  5 499a   3a   4a   43a
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Annex table 2.  FDI stock, by region and economy, 1990, 2000, 2013 (continued)
(Millions of dollars)
Region/economy
FDI inward stock FDI outward stock
1990 2000 2013 1990 2000 2013
Niger   286a   45  4 940   54a   1   14
Nigeria  8 539a  23 786  81 977  1 219a  4 144  8 645
Senegal   258a   295  2 696   47a   22   412
Sierra Leone   243a   284a  2 319a - - -
Togo   268a   87  1 494 - -  10  1 460
Central Africa  3 808  5 732  61 946   372   681  2 903
Burundi   30a   47a   16a   0a   2a   1a
Cameroon  1 044a  1 600a  6 239a   150a   254a   717a
Central African Republic   95a   104a   620a   18a   43a   43a
Chad   250a   576a  4 758a   37a   70a   70a
Congo   575a  1 889a  23 050a - - - 
Congo, Democratic Republic of the   546   617  5 631a -   34a  1 136a
Equatorial Guinea   25a  1 060a  15 317a   0a -  2a   3a
Gabon  1 208a -  227a  5 119a   167a   280a   920a
Rwanda   33a   55   854 - -   13
São Tomé and Principe   0a   11a   345a - - -
East Africa  1 701  7 202  46 397   165   387  2 160
Comoros   17a   21a   107a - - -
Djibouti   13a   40  1 352 - - -
Eritrea ..   337a   791a - - -
Ethiopia   124a   941a  6 064a - - -
Kenya   668a   932a  3 390a   99a   115a   321a
Madagascar   107a   141  6 488a   1a   10a   6a
Mauritius   168a   683a  3 530a   1a   132a  1 559a
Seychelles   213   515  2 256   64   130   271
Somalia ..a,b   4a   883a - - -
Uganda   6a   807  8 821 - -   2
United Republic of Tanzania   388a  2 781  12 715 - - -
Southern Africa  17 191  62 209  191 597  15 653  28 210  110 858
Angola  1 024a  7 978a  2 348   1a   2a  11 964
Botswana  1 309  1 827  3 337   447   517   750
Lesotho   83a   330  1 237   0a   2   205
Malawi   228a   358  1 285a - ..a,b   119a
Mozambique   25  1 249  20 967   2a   1   24
Namibia  2 047  1 276  4 277   80   45   32
South Africa  9 207  43 451  140 047a  15 004  27 328  95 760a
Swaziland   336   536   838a   38   87   76a
Zambia  2 655a  3 966a  14 260 - -  1 590
Zimbabwe   277a  1 238a  3 001   80a   234a   337
Asia  340 270 1 108 173 5 202 188  67 010  653 364 3 512 719
East and South-East Asia  302 281 1 009 804 4 223 370  58 504  636 451 3 153 048
East Asia  240 645  752 559 2 670 165  49 032  551 714 2 432 635
China  20 691a  193 348  956 793a  4 455a  27 768a  613 585a
Hong Kong, China  201 653  491 923 1 443 947  11 920  435 791 1 352 353
Korea, Democratic People’s Republic of   572a  1 044a  1 878a - - -
Korea, Republic of  5 186  43 740  167 350  2 301  21 500  219 050
Macao, China  2 809a  2 801a  21 279a - -  1 213a
Mongolia   0a   182a  15 471 - -   552
Taiwan Province of China  9 735a  19 521  63 448a  30 356a  66 655  245 882a
South-East Asia  61 636  257 244 1 553 205  9 471  84 736  720 413
Brunei Darussalam   33a  3 868  14 212a   0a   512   134a
Cambodia   38a  1 580  9 399a ..   193   465a
Indonesia  8 732a  25 060a  230 344a   86a  6 940a  16 070a
Lao People’s Democratic Republic   13a   588a  2 779a   1a   20a -  16a
Malaysia  10 318  52 747a  144 705a   753  15 878a  133 996a
Myanmar   281  3 211  14 171 - - -
Philippines  3 268a  13 762a  32 547a   405a  1 032a  13 191a
Singapore  30 468  110 570  837 652  7 808  56 755  497 880
Thailand  8 242  31 118  185 463a   418  3 406  58 610a
Timor-Leste - -   230 - -   83
Viet Nam   243a  14 739a  81 702 - - -
South Asia  6 795  29 834  316 015   422  2 949  125 993
Afghanistan   12a   17a  1 638a - - -
Bangladesh   477a  2 162  8 596a   45a   69   130a
Bhutan   2a   4a   163a - - -
India  1 657a  16 339  226 748   124a  1 733  119 838
Iran, Islamic Republic of  2 039a  2 597a  40 941 ..   572a  3 725a
Maldives   25a   128a  1 980a - - -
Nepal   12a   72a   514a - - -
/…
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Annex table 2.  FDI stock, by region and economy, 1990, 2000, 2013 (continued)
(Millions of dollars)
Region/economy
FDI inward stock FDI outward stock
1990 2000 2013 1990 2000 2013
Pakistan  1 892  6 919  27 589   245   489  1 731
Sri Lanka   679a  1 596  7 846a   8a   86   569a
West Asia  31 194  68 535  662 803  8 084  13 964  233 678
Bahrain   552  5 906  17 815   719  1 752  10 751
Iraq ..a,b ..a,b  15 295a - -  1 984a
Jordan  1 368a  3 135  26 668   158a   44   525
Kuwait   37a   608a  21 242a  3 662a  1 428a  40 247a
Lebanon   53a  14 233  55 604a   43a   352  8 849a
Oman  1 723a  2 577a  19 756 - -  6 289
Qatar   63a  1 912  29 964a -   74  28 434a
Saudi Arabia  15 193a  17 577  208 330a  2 328a  5 285a  39 303a
State of Palestine -   647a  2 750a - ..a,b   181a
Syrian Arab Republic   154a  1 244  10 743a   4a   107a   421a
Turkey  11 150a  18 812  145 467  1 150a  3 668  32 782
United Arab Emirates   751a  1 069a  105 496   14a  1 938a  63 179a
Yemen   180a   843  3 675a   5a   12a   733a
Latin America and the Caribbean  111 373  507 344 2 568 596  53 768  195 339 1 312 258
South and Central America  103 311  428 929 1 842 626  52 138  104 646  647 088
South America  74 815  308 949 1 362 832  49 346  96 046  496 692
Argentina  9 085a  67 601  112 349  6 057a  21 141  34 080
Bolivia, Plurinational State of  1 026  5 188  10 558   7a   29   8
Brazil  37 143  122 250  724 644  41 044a  51 946  293 277
Chile  16 107a  45 753  215 452   154a  11 154  101 933
Colombia  3 500  11 157  127 895   402  2 989  39 003
Ecuador  1 626  6 337  13 785   18a   252a   687a
Falkland Islands (Malvinas)   0a   58a   75a - - -
Guyana   45a   756a  2 547a -   1a   2a
Paraguay   418a  1 219  4 886   134a   214   238a
Peru  1 330  11 062  73 620a   122   505  4 122a
Suriname - -   910 - - -
Uruguay   671a  2 088  20 344a   186a   138   428a
Venezuela, Bolivarian Republic of  3 865  35 480  55 766  1 221  7 676  22 915
Central America  28 496  119 980  479 793  2 793  8 600  150 396
Belize   89a   301  1 621   20a   43   53
Costa Rica  1 324a  2 709  21 792   44a   86  1 822
El Salvador   212  1 973  8 225   56a   104   2
Guatemala  1 734  3 420  10 256 ..   93   472
Honduras   293  1 392  10 084 - -   353
Mexico  22 424  101 996  389 083  2 672a  8 273  143 907
Nicaragua   145a  1 414  7 319 - -   230
Panama  2 275  6 775  31 413 - -  3 556
Caribbean  8 062  78 415  725 971  1 630  90 693  665 170
Anguilla   11a   231a  1 107a -   5a   31a
Antigua and Barbuda   290a   619a  2 712a -   5a   104a
Aruba   145a  1 161  3 634 -   675   689
Bahamas   586a  3 278a  17 155a -   452a  3 471a
Barbados   171   308  4 635a   23   41  1 025a
British Virgin Islands   126a  32 093a  459 342a   875a  67 132a  523 287a
Cayman Islands  1 749a  25 585a  165 500a   648a  20 788a  129 360a
Curaçao - -   717a - -   56a
Dominica   66a   275a   665a -   3a   33a
Dominican Republic   572  1 673  25 411 -   572a   921a
Grenada   70a   348a  1 430a -   2a   53a
Haiti   149a   95  1 114 ..   2a   2a
Jamaica   790a  3 317  12 730a   42a   709a   401
Montserrat   40a   83a   132a -   0a   1a
Netherlands Antillesc   408a   277 -   21a   6a - 
Saint Kitts and Nevis   160a   487a  1 916a -   3a   56a
Saint Lucia   316a   807a  2 430a -   4a   65a
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines   48a   499a  1 643a -   0a   5a
Sint Maarten - -   278a - -   8a
Trinidad and Tobago  2 365a  7 280a  23 421a   21a   293a  5 602a
Oceania  2 001  2 220  25 262   68   267  5 965
Cook Islands   1a   218a   836a - -  1a  5 037a
Fiji   284   356  3 612   25a   39   52 
French Polynesia   69a   139a   803a - -   251a
Kiribati - -   14a - -   1a
Marshall Islands   1a   218a  1 029a - ..a,b   181a
/…
World Investment Report 2014: Investing in the sDGs: An Action Plan 212
Annex table 2.  FDI stock, by region and economy, 1990, 2000, 2013 (concluded)
(Millions of dollars)
Region/economy
FDI inward stock FDI outward stock
1990 2000 2013 1990 2000 2013
Nauru ..a,b ..a,b ..a,b   18a   22a   22a
New Caledonia   70a   67a  12 720a - - - 
Niue -   6a ..a,b -   10a   22a
Palau   2a   4a   37a - - - 
Papua New Guinea  1 582a   935  4 082a   26a   210a   315a
Samoa   9a   77   282 - -   21 
Solomon Islands -   106a  1 040 - -   38 
Tonga   1a   15a   132a - - - 
Vanuatu -   61a   578 - -   23 
Transition economies   9  58 023  928 015 ..  20 541  554 769
South-East Europe ..  2 886  58 186 ..   16  3 336
Albania -   247  6 104a .. -   244a
Bosnia and Herzegovina -  1 083a  8 070a - -   199a
Montenegro - -  5 384a - -   47a
Serbia -  1 017a  29 269 - -  2 557
The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia ..   540  5 534 -   16   102
CIS    9  54 375  858 153 ..  20 408  550 068
Armenia   9a   513  5 448 -   0   186
Azerbaijan -  3 735  13 750 -   1  9 005
Belarus ..  1 306  16 729 ..   24   677
Kazakhstan -  10 078  129 554 -   16  29 122
Kyrgyzstan -   432  3 473 -   33   1
Moldova, Republic of -   449  3 668 -   23   136
Russian Federation -  32 204  575 658a -  20 141  501 202a
Tajikistan ..   136  1 625 - - -
Turkmenistan ..   949a  23 018a - - -
Ukraine ..  3 875  76 719 ..   170  9 739
Uzbekistan -   698a  8 512a - - -
Georgia ..   762  11 676 -   118  1 365
Memorandum
Least developed countries (LDCs)d  11 051  36 631  211 797  1 089  2 683  23 557
Landlocked developing countries (LLDCs)e  7 471  35 790  285 482   844  1 305  42 883
Small island developing States (SIDS)f  7 136  20 511  89 548   220  2 033  13 383
Source:  UNCTAD FDI-TNC-GVC Information System, FDI database (www.unctad.org/fdistatistics).
a    Estimates.  
b    Negative stock value.  However, this value is included in the regional and global total.   
c  This economy dissolved on 10 October 2010.
d    Least developed countries include Afghanistan, Angola, Bangladesh, Benin, Bhutan, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, the Central African Republic, Chad, the Comoros, the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, the Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Kiribati, the Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, 
Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Myanmar, Nepal, Niger, Rwanda, Samoa (which, however, graduated from LDC status effective 1 January 2014), São Tomé and Príncipe, Senegal, 
Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Timor-Leste, Togo, Tuvalu, Uganda, the United Republic of Tanzania, Vanuatu, Yemen and Zambia.
d    Landlocked developing countries include Afghanistan, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bhutan, the Plurinational State of Bolivia, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, the Central African Republic, Chad, 
Ethiopia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, the Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Lesotho, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Malawi, Mali, the Republic of Moldova, Mongolia, Nepal, 
Niger, Paraguay, Rwanda, South Sudan, Swaziland, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Uzbekistan, Zambia and Zimbabwe.
f     Small island developing States include Antigua and Barbuda, the Bahamas, Barbados, Cabo Verde, the Comoros, Dominica, Fiji, Grenada, Jamaica, Kiribati, Maldives, the Marshall Islands, 
Mauritius, the Federated States of Micronesia, Nauru, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, São Tomé and Príncipe, 
Seychelles, Solomon Islands, Timor-Leste, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tuvalu and Vanuatu.
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Annex table 3. Value of cross-border M&As, by region/economy of seller/purchaser, 2007–2013
(Millions of dollars)
Region / economy Net sales
a Net purchasesb
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013  2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
World 1 045 085  626 235  285 396  349 399  556 051  331 651  348 755 1 045 085  626 235  285 396  349 399  556 051  331 651  348 755
Developed economies  915 675  479 687  236 505  260 391  438 645  268 652  239 606  870 435  486 166  191 637  225 830  430 134  183 914  151 752
Europe  565 152  175 645  139 356  127 606  214 420  144 651  132 963  593 585  382 058  133 024  44 682  171 902  38 504  6 798
European Union  533 185  260 664  119 344  118 328  185 332  128 630  120 813  538 138  322 169  120 722  23 489  140 634  15 660 -  786
Austria  9 661  1 327  2 067   354  7 002  1 687   148  5 923  3 243  3 309  1 525  3 733  1 835  8 813
Belgium   733  3 995  12 375  9 449  3 946  1 786  6 429  9 269  30 775 - 9 804   477  7 841 - 1 354  13 251
Bulgaria   959   227   191   24 -  96   31 -  52   20   39   2   17 - - -  0
Croatia   674   274 -   201   92   81   100 -   12   8   325 - -   5
Cyprus  1 301   853   47   693   782   51  1 417  5 879  8 875   647 -  562  3 738  8 060   652
Czech Republic   246   276  2 473 -  530   725   37  1 617   572   72  1 573   14   26   474  4 012
Denmark  7 158  5 962  1 270  1 319  7 958  4 759  1 341  3 339  2 841  3 337 - 3 601 -  133   553   214
Estonia -  59   110   28   3   239   58 -  39 -   7 -  0   4 -  1   1 -  36
Finland  8 571  1 163   382   336  1 028  1 929 -  35 - 1 054  12 951   641  1 015  2 353  4 116  1 754
France  30 145  6 609   609  3 573  23 161  12 013  8 953  73 312  66 893  42 175  6 180  37 090 - 3 051  2 177
Germany  37 551  34 081  12 753  10 577  13 440  7 793  16 739  59 904  63 785  26 985  7 025  5 656  15 674  6 829
Greece  1 379  7 387  2 074   283  1 204   35  2 488  1 502  3 484   387   553 -  148 - 1 561 - 1 015
Hungary  2 068  1 728  1 853   223  1 714   96 - 1 108   1   41   0   799   17 -  7 -
Ireland   811  3 025  1 712  2 127  1 934  12 096  11 147  7 340  3 505 -  664  5 143 - 5 648  2 629 - 4 091
Italy  27 211 - 5 116  2 341  6 329  15 095  5 286  5 910  62 173  20 976  17 165 - 5 190  3 902 - 1 633  2 440
Latvia   47   195   109   72   1   1   4   4 - -  30   40 -  3 - -
Lithuania   35   172   23   470   386   39   30 -   31 - -  0   4 -  3   10
Luxembourg  7 379 - 3 510   444  2 138  9 495  6 461   177   16  5 906   54  1 558  1 110 - 4 247  3 794
Malta -  86 -   13   315 -   96   7 - -  25 -   235 -  16   25   22
Netherlands  162 533 - 9 443  18 114  4 162  14 076  17 637  22 896  4 291  48 521 - 3 222  16 418 - 3 841 - 1 092 - 3 243
Poland   680  1 507   666  1 195  9 963   824   434   189  1 090   229   201   511  3 399   243
Portugal  1 574 - 1 312   504  2 772   911  8 225  7 465  4 071  1 330   723 - 8 965  1 642 - 4 735 -  603
Romania  1 926  1 010   331   148   88   151 -  45 -   4   7   24 - - -
Slovakia   66   136   21 -   0   126   541 - - -   10 -  18 -  30 -
Slovenia   57   418 -   332   51   330   30   74   320   251 -  50 -  10 - -
Spain  57 440  37 041  31 849  10 348  17 716  4 978  5 185  40 015 - 12 160 -  507  2 898  15 505 - 1 621 - 7 348
Sweden  3 151  17 930  2 175   527  7 647  5 086 -  76  30 983  6 883  9 819   918 - 2 381   151 - 4 994
United Kingdom  169 974  154 619  24 920  60 886  46 774  36 936  29 110  230 314  52 768  27 639 - 3 521  69 704 - 1 926 - 23 671
Other developed Europe  31 967 - 85 019  20 011  9 278  29 088  16 021  12 150  55 448  59 889  12 302  21 193  31 268  22 845  7 584
Andorra - - - - -   12 - - - - -   166 - -
Faeroe Islands -   0 -   85 - - - - - - - -   13   35
Gibraltar -   212 - - -   19   50   116 -  13   253   8  1 757 -  527 -  48
Guernsey   31   36  2 011   175   25  1 294   17  7 383   890  4 171  10 338 - 1 183  1 968 -  768
Iceland -  227 - -   14 -   11 -  4 770   744 -  806 -  221 -  437 - 2 559   126
Isle of Man   221   35   114   157 -  217   55   1   535   324   137   852 -  736 -  162 -  850
Jersey   816   251   414   81   88   133 -   537 -  686   401  1 054  5 192  3 564  2 015
Liechtenstein - - - - - - -   270 -   12 - - - -
Monaco   437 - - -   30 - - - -   1   100   16 -   2
Norway  7 659  15 025  1 867  7 445  9 517  5 862  7 874  9 162  7 556   391 - 3 905  5 661  4 191   87
Switzerland  23 032 - 100 578  15 606  1 321  19 647  8 635  4 208  32 675  51 074  7 742  12 967  20 832  16 357  6 984
North America  281 057  257 478  78 270  97 766  180 302  95 656  82 910  230 393  18 280  41 856  121 461  173 157  113 486  89 106
Canada  99 682  35 147  12 431  13 307  33 344  29 484  23 342  46 864  44 247  17 538  35 744  36 049  37 580  30 180
United States  181 375  222 331  65 838  84 459  146 958  66 172  59 567  183 529 - 25 967  24 317  85 717  137 107  75 907  58 926
Other developed countries  69 466  46 564  18 879  35 019  43 923  28 345  23 733  46 457  85 828  16 757  59 687  85 076  31 924  55 848
Australia  44 751  33 730  22 534  27 192  34 671  23 959  11 923  43 309  18 823 - 3 471  15 623  6 453 - 7 023 - 5 260
Bermuda   480  1 006   883 -  405   121   905  3 273 - 38 408  2 064  2 981  1 935  2 468  3 249  4 412
Israel  1 064  1 443  1 351  1 207  3 663  1 026  3 339  8 166  11 054   183  5 929  8 720 - 2 210   676
Japan  19 132  9 909 - 5 833  7 261  4 671  1 791  4 271  29 607  49 826  17 307  31 268  62 372  37 795  55 122
New Zealand  4 039   476 -  55 -  235   797   664   928  3 782  4 061 -  243  4 933  5 063   113   899
Developing economies  97 023  120 669  41 999  84 913  84 645  56 147  112 969  146 269  116 419  77 800  101 605  105 381  127 547  129 491
Africa  5 325  24 540  5 903  7 410  8 634 - 1 254  3 848  10 356  8 266  2 577  3 792  4 393   629  3 019
North Africa  2 267  19 495  2 520  1 066  1 353 -  388  2 969  1 401  4 729  1 004  1 471   17   85   459
Algeria -   82 - - - -   10 -  47 - - - - -   312
Egypt  1 798  18 903  1 680   120   609 -  705  1 836  1 448  4 678   76  1 092 - -  16 -
Libya   200   307   145   91   20 - - -   51   601   377 - - -
Morocco   269   80   691   846   274   296  1 092 - -   324 -   17   101   147
Sudan - - - -   450 - - - - - - - - -
Tunisia -   122   4   9 -   21   31 - -   3   2 - - -
Other Africa  3 058  5 045  3 383  6 343  7 281 -  865   879  8 955  3 537  1 573  2 322  4 376   543  2 560
Angola - -  475 -  471  1 300 - - - -  60 - - - -   69 -
Botswana   1 -   50 -   6   7 - -   3 - - -  14   10   3
Burkina Faso -   20 - - -   1   0 - - - - - - -
Cameroon -   1   1 -   0 - - - - - - - - -
Congo -   435 - - -   7 - - - - - - - -
Congo, Democratic Republic of the - -   5   175 - - -  51 -  45 - - - -   19 -
Côte d’Ivoire - -   10 - -   0 - - - - - - - -
Equatorial Guinea - - 2 200 - - - - - - - - - - - -
Eritrea - - -   12 -  254 -  54 - - - - - - - -
Ethiopia - - - -   146   366 - - - - - - - -
Gabon   82 - - - - - - -  16 - - - - - -
Ghana   122   900   0 - -  3 -   15 - - -   1 - - -
Guinea - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Kenya   396 - - -   19   86   103 -   18 - - -  3 - -
Liberia - - -   587 - - - - - - - - - -
Madagascar - - - - - -   12 - - - - - - -
/…
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Annex table 3. Value of cross-border M&As, by region/economy of seller/purchaser, 2007–2013 (continued)
(Millions of dollars)
Region / economy Net sales
a Net purchasesb
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013  2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Malawi   5 -   0   0 - -   20 - - - - - - -
Mali - - - - - - - - - - - - -   2
Mauritania   375 - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Mauritius   8   26   37   176   6   13 -   253   136   16   433 -  173 -  418   65
Mozambique   2 - -   35   27   3   2 - - - - - - -
Namibia   2   15   59   104   40   15   6 - - - - - - -
Niger - - - - - - -  1 - - - - - -  185 -
Nigeria   485 -  597 -  197   476   539 -  159   537   196   418   25 -   1   40   241
Rwanda -   6   9 - -   69   2 - - - - - - -
Senegal   80 - - -  457 - - - - - - - - - -
Seychelles   89   49 -   19 - - -   0   66   13   5 -  78   189   1
Sierra Leone   31   40 -   13   52 - - - - - - - - -
South Africa  1 374  6 815  3 860  3 570  6 673 -  968   214  8 646  2 873  1 504  1 619  4 291   825  2 246
Swaziland - - - - - - - - - -   6 - - -
Togo - - - - - - - -   20 - -   353 -  5 -
Uganda -   1 - - - -   15 - - -   257 - - -
United Republic of Tanzania - -   2   60   0   36 - - - - - - - -
Zambia   8   1   11   272 -   8 -   25 -   16   2 - - -
Zimbabwe   0   7   6 -   27 -  296   5 -  44   1 -  1 - - - -
Asia  68 930  85 903  38 993  38 667  56 732  33 418  47 504  98 606  103 539  70 088  80 332  83 013  93 230  107 915
East and South-East Asia  41 374  55 421  29 287  27 972  32 476  22 377  40 655  25 795  60 664  41 456  67 896  70 122  78 736  98 217
East Asia  24 049  30 358  16 437  18 641  14 699  11 987  27 423  1 774  41 318  36 836  53 444  52 057  62 005  70 587
China  8 272  17 768  11 362  7 092  12 083  9 531  26 866  1 559  35 834  23 444  30 524  37 111  37 930  50 195
Hong Kong, China  7 778  8 661  3 185  13 113  2 157  2 948   459 - 9 077  1 074  6 462  13 255  10 125  16 076  16 784
Korea, Republic of   101  1 219  1 962 - 2 063  2 550 - 1 528 -  615  8 377  5 247  6 601  9 952  4 574  5 754  3 765
Macao, China   157   593 -  57   33   34   30   213 -   0 -  580   52 -   10 -
Mongolia   7 -   344   57   88   82 -  77 -   106 -  24 - - - -
Taiwan Province of China  7 735  2 117 -  360   409 - 2 212   925   578   915 -  943   932 -  339   247  2 235 -  157
South-East Asia  17 325  25 063  12 850  9 331  17 776  10 390  13 232  24 021  19 346  4 620  14 452  18 065  16 731  27 630
Brunei Darussalam   0 -   3 - - -   0 - -   10 - - - -
Cambodia   3   30 -  336   5   50 -  100   12 - - - -   0 - -
Indonesia   753  2 879   817  1 416  6 826   477   844   474   757 - 2 381   197   409   315  2 923
Lao People’s Democratic Republic - - -   110   6 - - - - - - - - -
Malaysia  5 260  2 990   354  2 837  4 450   721 -  749  4 010  9 457  3 293  2 416  4 137  9 251  1 862
Myanmar -  1 - -  0 - - - - - - - - - - -
Philippines  1 175  3 988  1 476   329  2 586   411   890 - 2 514 -  150   57   19   479   682   71
Singapore  7 700  14 106  9 893  3 884  1 730  8 037  10 950  21 762  7 919  2 775  8 953  8 044   802  6 269
Thailand  1 991   150   351   461   954 -  65   40   42  1 339   865  2 810  4 996  5 659  16 498
Viet Nam   445   921   293   289  1 175   908  1 245   247   25 -   57 -   21   7
South Asia  6 027  12 884  5 931  5 634  13 093  2 821  4 784  28 786  13 376   347  26 870  6 288  3 104  1 621
Bangladesh   4 -   10   13 - -   13 - - -   1 - - -
Iran, Islamic Republic of -   765 - - -   16 - - - - - - - -
India  4 805  10 317  5 877  5 613  12 798  2 805  4 763  28 774  13 370   347  26 886  6 282  3 103  1 619
Maldives -   3 - - - - - - - - -  3 - - -
Nepal -   13 - -   4 - - - - - - - - -
Pakistan  1 213  1 377 - -  0   247 -  153   8 - - - -  13 - -   2
Sri Lanka   6   409   44   9   44   153 -  0   12   6 - -   6   1 -
West Asia  21 529  17 598  3 775  5 061  11 163  8 219  2 065  44 025  29 499  28 285 - 14 434  6 604  11 390  8 077
Bahrain   63   335 -   452   30 - -  111  1 545  3 451   155 - 3 662 - 2 691   527   317
Iraq -   34 -   11   717  1 727   324   33 - - - - -  14   8
Jordan   760   877   30 -  99   183   22 -  5   45   322 - -  29   37 -  2 -
Kuwait  3 963   506 -  55   460   16  2 230   414  2 003  3 688   441 - 10 793  2 078   376   258
Lebanon -  153   108 -   642   46   317 -   210 -  233   253   26   836   80 -
Oman   621   10 -   388 - -  774 -   79   601   893 -  530   222   354 -  20
Qatar -   124   298   12   28   169 -  6 797  6 028  10 276   626 -  790  7 971  3 078
Saudi Arabia   125   330   42   297   657  1 429   291  16 010  1 518   121  1 698   107   294   520
Syrian Arab Republic - -   2   66 - - - - - - - - - -
Turkey  15 150  13 982  3 159  2 058  8 930  2 690   867   767  1 495 - -  38   908  2 012   590
United Arab Emirates   856  1 292   299   755   556   366   286  16 536  12 629  16 145 - 1 732  5 896 -  207  3 326
Yemen   144 - -   20 -   44 - - - - - - - -
Latin America and the Caribbean  22 534  10 969 - 2 901  29 992  19 256  24 050  61 613  37 032  3 708  4 961  17 485  18 010  33 673  18 479
South America  15 940  4 205 - 3 879  18 659  14 833  20 259  17 063  12 020  5 068  4 771  13 719  10 312  23 719  12 516
Argentina   989 - 1 757   97  3 457 -  295   360 -  76   587   259 -  80   514   102  2 754   99
Bolivia, Plurinational State of -  77   24 -  4 -  16 -   1   74 - - - - -   2 -
Brazil  7 642  1 900   84  10 115  15 112  18 087  9 996  10 794  5 480  2 518  9 030  5 541  7 401  2 971
Chile  1 998  3 252  1 301   826 -  197 -  78  2 299   466   47  1 707   882   628  10 248  2 771
Colombia  4 813 -  46 - 1 633 - 1 296 - 1 216  1 974  3 881  1 177   16   211  3 210  5 085  3 007  6 406
Ecuador   29   0   6   357   167   140   108 -   0 - -   40 - -
Falkland Islands (Malvinas) -   48 - - - - - - - - - - - -
Guyana   3   1   1 -   3 - - - - - -   0   3 -
Paraguay   10   4 -  60 -  1   0 - - - - - - - - -
Peru  1 135   430   38   612   512 -  67   618 -   623   417   77   171   319   225
Suriname - - - - -   3 - - - - - - - -
Uruguay   158   20   2   448   747   89   162 - - -   7   13   0   8
Venezuela, Bolivarian Republic of -  760   329 - 3 710  4 158 - -  249 - - 1 003 - 1 358 -  2 - - 1 268 -  16   35
Central America  4 317  2 900   182  8 853  1 222  1 841  16 845  16 863 -  780  3 354  2 949  4 736  6 887  3 585
Belize -   0 -   1 -   60 - -  43 -   2 - - - -
Costa Rica -  34   405 -   5   17   120   191 -  16 - - - -   354   50
El Salvador   835 -   30   43   103 -  1 -   550 - - - -   12 -
Guatemala   5   145 -   650   100 -  213   411   140 - - - - - -
/…
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Annex table 3. Value of cross-border M&As, by region/economy of seller/purchaser, 2007–2013 (concluded)
(Millions of dollars)
Region / economy Net sales
a Net purchasesb
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013  2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Honduras   140 - -   1   23 - - - - - - - -   104
Mexico  3 144  2 306   129  7 989  1 143  1 116  15 896  17 629 -  190  3 187  2 896  4 274  6 504  3 845
Nicaragua - - -  1 -   71   0   130 - - - - - - -
Panama   226   44   23   164 -  235   758   216 - 1 397 -  590   165   53   462   18 -  414
Caribbean  2 277  3 864   796  2 480  3 201  1 950  27 706  8 149 -  579 - 3 164   817  2 962  3 067  2 378
Anguilla - - - - - - - -   30 - -  10   3 - -
Antigua and Barbuda   1 - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Bahamas -   41 -   82   212   145 -  2 370  1 438 -  243   112 -  350   228 -  10
Barbados   217   207 -   328 - - -   3   3   8 - - - -  86
British Virgin Islands   559  1 001   204   391   631   32  26 958  5 085 - 2 375 - 1 579   21   733  1 968  1 869
Cayman Islands -   487   3   84 -  112   130   40   757  2 544 - 1 363   743  1 188   909   444
Dominican Republic   42 -  108   0   7   39  1 264   213   93 - -   31 - - -
Haiti - -   1   59 - - - - - - - - - -
Jamaica   595 - - -   9 - -   105   14   28   1 - -   15
Netherlands Antillesc - -   2   19   235   276   16 -   14 -  30 -  156   52 -  158 -
Puerto Rico   862 -   587  1 037  1 214   88  1 079 -  261 - 2 454   22   77   202   120 -  9
Saint Kitts and Nevis - - - - - - - - -   0 -  0 - - -
Trinidad and Tobago -  2 236 - -   973   16 -  600 -  2   207 -  10 - -  15 - -  244
Turks and Caicos Islands - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
US Virgin Islands - - -   473 - - - - -   4 -  1 150 -   400
Oceania   234 -  742   4  8 844   23 -  67   4   275   906   174 -  4 -  35   15   78
American Samoa - - - - -   11 - - - - - - -  29   86
Fiji   12   2 -   1 - -   0 - - - - - - -
French Polynesia - - - - - - - - -   1 - -   44 -
Marshall Islands   45 - - - - - - -   136   0 - -  35 -   3
Micronesia, Federated States of - - - - - - - - - - - - -   4
Nauru - - - - - - - - -   172 - - - -
Norfolk Island - - - - - - - - - - - -   0 -
Papua New Guinea   160 -  758   0  8 843   5 -  78 -   275  1 051 - -  4 - - -
Samoa   3   13 - - - - - - -  324 - - - - -  14
Solomon Islands   14 - - -   19 - - - - - - - - -
Tokelau - - - - - - - - -   1 - - - -
Tuvalu - - - - - - - -   43 - - - - -
Vanuatu - -   4 - - -   3 - - - - - - -
Transition economies  32 388  25 879  6 893  4 095  32 762  6 852 - 3 820  18 620  11 005  7 789  5 378  13 378  9 296  56 970
South-East Europe  1 511   587   529   65  1 367   3   16  1 031 -  9 -  174 -   51   2 -
Albania   164   3   146 - - - - - - - - - - -
Bosnia and Herzegovina  1 014   9   8 - -   1   6 - - - - -   1 -
Montenegro   0 -   362 - - - -   4 - - - - - -
Serbia   280   501   10   19  1 340   2   9  1 038 -  7 -  174 -   51   1 -
Serbia and Montenegro -   7   3 - - - - - -  3 - - - - -
The Former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia
  53   67 -   46   27 - - - - - - - - -
Yugoslavia (former) - - - - - - - -  11 - - - - - -
CIS  30 824  25 188  6 349  4 001  31 395  6 849 - 3 838  17 590  11 014  7 963  5 378  13 139  9 294  56 970
Armenia   423   204 - -   26   23 - - - - - -   0 -
Azerbaijan -   2 -   0 - - - -   519 - -   2   748 -
Belarus  2 500   16 -   649   10 -   13 - - - - - -   215
Kazakhstan   727   398  1 621   101   293 -  831   217  1 833  1 634 -  1 462  8 088 -  32 -
Kyrgyzstan   209 - -   44   72 -  5 - - - - - - - -
Moldova, Republic of   24   4 - - -  9 - - - - - - - - -
Russian Federation  25 120  18 606  4 579  2 882  29 589  7 228 - 3 901  15 497  7 869  7 957  3 875  4 943  8 302  56 158
Tajikistan   5 - - -   14 - - - - - - - - -
Ukraine  1 816  5 931   145   322  1 400   434 -  169   260   993   6   40   106   276   597
Uzbekistan -   25   4   1 - -   3 - - - - - - -
Georgia   53   104   14   30 -   1   2 - - - -  0   188 - -
Unspecified - - - - - - -  9 761  12 645  8 170  16 586  7 158  10 894  10 541
Memorandum
Least developed countries (LDCs)d   668 - 2 552 -  765  2 204   501   374   26 -  80 -  261   16   259   353 -  102 -  12
Landlocked developing countries  (LLDCs)e  1 395   778  1 983   615   700 -  574   258  1 814  2 262 -  9  1 727  8 076   544   6
Small island developing States (SIDS)f  1 144  1 819   41  9 448  1 223   97 -  596  3 004  2 772 -  16   542 -  651 -  2 -  266
Source:  UNCTAD FDI-TNC-GVC Information System, cross-border M&A database (www.unctad.org/fdistatistics).
a  Net sales by the region/economy of the immediate acquired company.
b  Net purchases by region/economy of the ultimate acquiring company.
c  This economy dissolved on 10 October 2010.
d    Least developed countries include Afghanistan, Angola, Bangladesh, Benin, Bhutan, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, the Central African Republic, Chad, the Comoros, the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, the Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Kiribati, the Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, 
Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Myanmar, Nepal, Niger, Rwanda, Samoa (which, however, graduated from LDC status effective 1 January 2014), São Tomé and Principe, Senegal, 
Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Timor-Leste, Togo, Tuvalu, Uganda, the United Republic of Tanzania, Vanuatu, Yemen and Zambia.
e   Landlocked developing countries include Afghanistan, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bhutan, the Plurinational State of Bolivia, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, the Central African Republic, Chad, 
Ethiopia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, the Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Lesotho, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Malawi, Mali, the Republic of Moldova, Mongolia, Nepal, 
Niger, Paraguay, Rwanda, South Sudan, Swaziland, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Uzbekistan, Zambia and Zimbabwe.
f    Small island developing States include Antigua and Barbuda, the Bahamas, Barbados, Cabo Verde, the Comoros, Dominica, Fiji, Grenada, Jamaica, Kiribati, Maldives, the Marshall Islands, 
Mauritius, the Federated States of Micronesia, Nauru, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, São Tomé and Principe, 
Seychelles, Solomon Islands, Timor-Leste, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tuvalu and Vanuatu.
Note:  Cross-border M&A sales and purchases are calculated on a net basis as follows: Net cross-border M&A sales in a host economy = Sales of companies in the host economy to 
foreign TNCs (-) Sales of foreign affiliates in the host economy; Net cross-border M&A purchases by a home economy = Purchases of companies abroad by home-based TNCs 
(-) Sales of foreign affiliates of home-based TNCs. The data cover only those deals that involved an acquisition of an equity stake of more than 10 per cent.
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Annex table 4.  Value of cross-border M&As, by sector/industry, 2007–2013
(Millions of dollars)
Sector/industry
Net salesa Net purchasesb
2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Total 1045 085 626 235 285 396 349 399 556 051 331 651 348 755 1045 085 626 235 285 396 349 399 556 051 331 651 348 755
Primary 93 918 89 682 52 891 67 605 149 065 51 521 67 760 120 229 47 203 28 446 46 861 93 236 3 427 27 229
Agriculture, hunting, forestry and fisheries 9 006 2 920  730 2 524 1 426 7 585 7 422 1 078 2 313 1 783  408  381 -1 423  318
Mining, quarrying and petroleum 84 913 86 761 52 161 65 081 147 639 43 936 60 338 119 152 44 890 26 663 46 453 92 855 4 850 26 911
Manufacturing 329 135 195 847 74 871 133 936 203 319 113 110 125 684 217 712 137 715 37 889 128 194 224 316 138 230 96 165
Food, beverages and tobacco 49 040 10 618 5 117 35 044 48 394 18 526 53 355 35 233 -42 860 - 467 33 629 31 541 31 748 35 790
Textiles, clothing and leather 14 977 3 840  426  668 4 199 2 191 4 545 -1 946 - 51  555 2 971 2 236 2 466 1 757
Wood and wood products 1 202 1 022  645  804 5 060 4 542 2 828 2 780  434 1 450 8 471 3 748 3 589 3 044
Publishing and printing  601 - 347 -  5 - 190  31  20  78 - 284  30  906 - 112  65  16
Coke, petroleum products and nuclear fuel 5 768  90 1 506 1 964 -1 430 -1 307 - 663 7 202 -3 356 - 844 -6 767 -2 625 -3 748 -2 003
Chemicals and chemical products 103 990 76 637 28 077 33 708 77 201 38 524 33 949 89 327 60 802 26 539 46 889 91 138 41 485 28 339
Rubber and plastic products 2 527 1 032  1 5 475 2 223 1 718  760 1 691  461 - 285  127 1 367  581  368
Non-metallic mineral products 36 913 27 103 2 247 6 549  927 1 619 5 733 17 502 23 013 - 567 5 198 1 663  755 3 609
Metals and metal products 84 012 19 915 - 966 6 710 5 687 9 662 9 490 46 492 23 018 2 746 5 171 19 449 9 820  647
Machinery and equipment -25 337 8 505 2 180 6 412 14 251 1 291 5 296 -34 240 8 975 1 815 5 989 14 564 12 836 6 804
Electrical and electronic equipment 46 852 22 834 19 789 21 375 28 279 22 219 7 538 40 665 48 462 4 335 11 816 38 561 26 823 13 506
Motor vehicles and other transport equipment -2 364 13 583 12 539 8 644 4 299 6 913 1 234 1 065 9 109  73 6 737 10 899 5 039 1 058
Other manufacturing 10 955 11 015 3 309 6 578 14 420 7 181 1 598 11 862 9 992 2 509 7 059 11 888 6 773 3 229
Services 622 032 340 706 157 635 147 857 203 667 167 020 155 311 707 144 441 317 219 062 174 344 238 499 189 993 225 361
Electricity, gas and water 108 003 48 128 59 062 -6 602 21 100 11 984 9 988 45 036 26 551 44 514 -14 759 6 758 3 116 7 739
Construction 16 117 4 582 11 646 10 763 3 074 2 253 3 174 7 047 -2 890 -2 561 -1 995 -1 466 2 772 4 868
Trade 33 875 29 258 3 631 7 278 15 645 12 730 -4 165 -4 590 18 851 3 203 6 029 6 415 23 228 -1 591
Accommodation and food service activities  872 6 418  995 1 937 1 494 - 411 4 537 -6 903 3 511  354  854  684 -1 847  925
Transportation and storage 32 242 14 800 5 468 10 795 16 028 10 439 5 732 18 927 7 236 3 651 7 652 8 576 9 336 3 146
Information and communication 47 371 29 122 45 076 19 278 25 174 35 172 31 317 32 645 49 854 38 843 19 313 23 228 17 417 26 975
Finance 306 249 108 472 13 862 59 270 64 279 39 512 49 292 562 415 316 903 123 704 139 648 166 436 116 121 155 996
Business services 60 455 88 745 14 675 30 661 48 321 43 723 43 819 48 944 32 923 7 760 16 878 26 353 18 854 26 642
Public administration and defense  793 4 209 1 271 1 380 2 910 3 602 4 078 -2 484 -11 118 - 594 -4 147 - 288 -1 165 -1 049
Education  807 1 225  509  881  953  213  76  42  155  51  266  347  317 -1 040
Health and social services 4 194 3 001  653 9 936 2 947 6 636 4 091 7 778 - 620  187 3 815  729  954 2 315
Arts, entertainment and recreation 4 114 1 956  525 1 565 1 404  971 1 591  262 1 116 - 47  635  526  275  406
Other service activities 6 940  793  263  715  339  196 1 780 -1 973 -1 154 - 3  155  199  615  29
Source:  UNCTAD FDI-TNC-GVC Information System, cross-border M&A database (www.unctad.org/fdistatistics).
a  Net sales in the industry of the acquired company.
b  Net purchases by the industry of the acquiring company.
Note:  Cross-border M&A sales and purchases are calculated on a net basis as follows: Net Cross-border M&As sales by sector/industry = Sales of companies in the industry of the 
acquired company to foreign TNCs (-) Sales of foreign affiliates in the industry of the acquired company; net cross-border M&A purchases by sector/industry = Purchases of 
companies abroad by home-based TNCs, in the industry of the acquiring company (-) Sales of foreign affiliates of home-based TNCs, in the industry of the acquiring company. 
The data cover only those deals that involved an acquisition of an equity stake of more than 10%.
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Annex table 6.  Value of greenfield FDI projects, by source/destination, 2007–2013
(Millions of dollars)
World as destination World as source
Partner region/economy 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
By source By destination
World  880 832 1 413 540 1 008 273  860 905  902 365  613 939  672 108  880 832 1 413 540 1 008 273  860 905  902 365  613 939  672 108
Developed countries  632 655 1 027 852  734 272  625 190  636 843  413 541  458 336  310 109  425 276  318 385  298 739  297 581  224 604  215 018
Europe  414 450  599 130  445 470  384 529  355 244  231 327  256 094  222 398  317 370  200 298  168 435  176 488  136 320  125 087
European Union  374 544  548 639  412 323  352 752  327 446  214 416  229 275  216 647  307 460  194 248  161 758  172 635  133 181  121 601
Austria  14 783  22 426  10 057  9 309  8 309  4 641  5 395  3 144  3 028  1 717  2 289  4 134  1 579  1 095
Belgium  6 569  12 860  8 872  5 817  6 030  3 703  4 241  8 149  10 797  3 796  6 067  3 351  2 575  2 980
Bulgaria   81   286   30   147   121   81   217  7 695  11 231  4 780  3 680  5 300  2 756  1 906
Croatia  2 909  3 261   146  1 071   105   175   240  1 795  3 194  1 707  2 397  1 798  1 141  1 039
Cyprus   428   323   856   543  4 379  1 561   974   465   629   249   720   385   204   152
Czech Republic  5 158  4 615  1 729  2 298  2 109  2 184  1 960  7 491  5 684  4 575  7 733  4 874  2 690  3 805
Denmark  7 375  13 944  9 951  4 534  8 151  7 597  7 050  2 001  1 968  2 195   457   794   850   743
Estonia  2 654   559   188  1 088   358   259   861   840  1 481  1 260   947   883   997   788
Finland  13 189  11 071  3 628  4 351  5 891  4 795  6 751  1 269  2 415  1 208  1 692  2 153  1 691  2 461
France  55 234  89 486  66 071  52 054  49 030  27 881  30 710  19 367  24 114  11 371  9 109  10 519  7 072  9 354
Germany  73 929  98 526  73 239  72 025  69 841  50 718  48 478  16 417  30 620  19 585  17 081  18 504  12 210  10 722
Greece  1 700  4 416  1 802  1 300  1 450  1 574   763  5 096  5 278  2 090  1 123  2 377  1 553  3 092
Hungary  1 913  4 956  1 159   431  1 245  1 055   599  9 550  9 031  3 739  7 557  3 213  2 502  2 118
Ireland  7 629  9 510  14 322  5 743  4 704  5 630  4 346  4 679  8 215  4 932  4 453  6 982  5 045  4 577
Italy  22 961  41 297  29 744  23 431  23 196  21 334  21 124  11 760  12 618  10 471  11 365  5 692  4 037  3 919
Latvia   284   660   761   821   279   75   149   717  2 545   828   965   717  1 042   656
Lithuania   303   723   305   252   158   640   273  1 485  1 542  1 238  1 558  7 304  1 271   971
Luxembourg  9 097  14 103  10 879  7 085  9 418  5 802  4 315   695   431   759   731   290   270   336
Malta   68   212   773   12   566   68   46   299   395   467   300   174   308   199
Netherlands  24 566  39 940  32 555  19 651  17 697  9 441  13 731  5 840  9 438  9 459  8 469  5 650  4 075  7 119
Poland  2 252  1 790  1 241  2 238   850  1 409   855  18 776  31 977  14 693  11 566  13 024  11 891  7 960
Portugal  4 522  11 162  7 180  5 088  2 153  2 058  2 087  6 476  6 785  5 443  2 665  1 732  1 231  1 474
Romania   108   430   131   708   129   127   293  21 006  30 474  15 019  7 764  16 156  9 852  9 210
Slovakia   474   135   393  1 314   277   356   246  5 485  3 350  3 152  4 149  5 664  1 420  1 758
Slovenia   683  1 658   586   536   346   335   165  1 037   612   282   748   692   469   175
Spain  31 236  45 465  42 209  37 687  29 365  18 000  24 617  23 529  27 530  15 984  16 444  11 501  11 918  13 271
Sweden  11 875  21 448  15 508  14 895  13 906  7 152  10 385  4 372  2 930  2 827  2 364  3 160  1 354  1 027
United Kingdom  72 562  93 379  78 009  78 322  67 382  35 765  38 406  27 209  59 149  50 423  27 367  35 611  41 177  28 696
Other developed Europe  39 906  50 491  33 147  31 777  27 798  16 911  26 819  5 751  9 911  6 050  6 676  3 853  3 139  3 486
Andorra -   14   30   145   18   114 - - -   20   5 - -   1
Iceland  1 545   568   123   633   433   39  4 215   53  1 077 -   705   203   136   248
Liechtenstein   74   105   136   111   133   92   39   131   8 -   9 - -   115
Monaco   6   15   34   48   258 -   32   71   234   43   33   123   38   17
Norway  10 792  12 058  10 588  5 433  6 634  3 325  2 999   794  3 200  2 334  2 243   830   583  1 279
San Marino - - - - -   3 - - - - - - - -
Switzerland  27 489  37 732  22 236  25 408  20 323  13 339  19 535  4 703  5 391  3 654  3 682  2 698  2 382  1 826
North America  145 789  299 570  196 675  164 915  185 207  123 651  134 222  54 485  71 110  85 957  80 779  100 002  63 504  67 277
Canada  14 748  43 513  30 928  20 023  28 507  19 146  14 187  8 630  15 763  14 084  17 789  27 256  8 447  15 098
United States  131 040  256 058  165 747  144 892  156 700  104 504  120 035  45 855  55 347  71 873  62 990  72 746  55 058  52 179
Other developed countries  72 416  129 152  92 126  75 746  96 392  58 563  68 020  33 226  36 795  32 131  49 525  21 091  24 779  22 653
Australia  14 191  31 052  18 421  12 441  14 486  10 456  8 939  22 816  22 624  19 990  41 253  12 245  16 488  10 552
Bermuda  3 937  3 440  8 108  1 573  1 198   844  1 943   15 -   1   165   6   14   4
Greenland   214   35 - - - - - - - -   457 - - -
Israel  4 347  12 725  2 726  6 655  3 447  2 816  3 134   457   853  3 333   856   696  1 692  1 148
Japan  49 189  81 290  61 868  54 210  76 176  42 891  51 701  7 768  11 287  8 240  6 407  6 177  5 273  9 700
New Zealand   537   611  1 004   867  1 085  1 555  2 303  2 171  2 030   568   388  1 967  1 312  1 249
Developing economies  228 856  361 610  254 896  215 212  247 631  190 448  195 161  499 559  880 220  634 961  510 098  547 047  349 946  429 221
Africa  5 564  12 765  13 386  14 517  35 428  7 764  15 807  82 133  160 790  91 629  81 233  81 130  47 455  53 596
North Africa  2 639  5 207  2 396  1 095   746  2 735  1 496  49 382  63 135  41 499  24 542  11 931  15 946  10 569
Algeria   60   620   16 -   130   200   15  8 952  19 107  2 380  1 716  1 204  2 370  4 286
Egypt  1 880  3 498  1 828   990   76  2 523  1 132  12 780  13 376  20 678  12 161  6 247  10 205  3 035
Libya - -   19 - - - -  4 061  3 004  1 689  1 858   49   98   121
Morocco   50   619   393   58   87   12   115  5 113  16 925  6 189  4 217  2 535  1 398  2 461
South Sudan - - - - - - -   19  1 181   54   139   235   382   180
Sudan   42 - - -   432 - - -  1 612  2 025  2 440   58   66   55
Tunisia   609   471   140   47   21 -   235  18 458  7 931  8 484  2 010  1 602  1 426   432
Other Africa  2 925  7 558  10 990  13 422  34 682  5 029  14 311  32 751  97 655  50 130  56 692  69 199  31 509  43 028
Angola   39   78   15   494 -   362   112  8 138  11 204  5 536  1 147   305  3 022   552
Benin - - - - - - - -   9 -   14   46   17   160
Botswana - -   11   9   138   70   36   344  2 220   349   660   492   148   103
Burkina Faso - - - - - - -   9   281   272   479   165   1   217
Burundi - - - - -   12   11 -   19   47   25   41   19   66
 /…
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Annex table 6.  Value of greenfield FDI projects, by source/destination, 2007–2013 (continued)
(Millions of dollars)
World as destination World as source
Partner region/economy 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
By source By destination
Cabo Verde - - - - - - -   9   128 -   38   62 -   8
Cameroon - -   19 - - - -  2 460   351  1 155  5 289  4 272   566   502
Central African Republic - - - - - - -   361 - - - -   59 -
Chad - - - - - - - -   758   402 -   135   101   150
Comoros - - - - - - -   9   9 - -   7   138   11
Congo - - - - - - -   198   9  1 281 -   37   119   434
Congo, Democratic Republic of  -   161 -   7 - - -  1 238  3 294   43  1 238  2 242   517   556
Côte d’ Ivoire -   13   10   19 -   48   326   71   372   131   261   937  1 038  1 873
Djibouti - - - - - - -   5  1 555  1 245  1 255 -   25   180
Equatorial Guinea - - - - - -   12 -   6  1 300   9  1 881   2   13
Eritrea -   3 - - - - - - - - - - - -
Ethiopia -   18   12 - -   54   70   919   762   321   290   630   441  4 510
Gabon - - - -   9 - -   328  3 298   927  1 231   219   267   46
Gambia - - - - - - -   9   31   31   405   26   200   9
Ghana - -   7   15   51   51   28   129  4 918  7 059  2 689  6 431  1 319  2 780
Guinea - - - - - - - - -   61  1 411   548   33   35
Guinea-Bissau - - - - - - -   361 -   19 - - - -
Kenya   198   616   314  3 920   421   835   441   332   549  1 896  1 382  2 855   988  3 644
Lesotho - - - - - - -   51   16   28   51   710   10 -
Liberia - - - - - - - -  2 600   821  4 591   287   53   558
Madagascar - - - - - - -  3 335  1 325   365 -   140   363   182
Malawi -   9   9 - -   2 - -   19   713   314   454   24   559
Mali -   19   10   19   9 -   11 -   172   59   13   0   794   13
Mauritania - - - - - - -   37   272 -   59   279   361   23
Mauritius   38   307  1 809  2 642  3 287   149  3 252   481   317   147   71  1 749   142   49
Mozambique - - - - -   59 -  2 100  6 600  1 539  3 278  9 971  3 456  6 108
Namibia -   23 - - -   344   420   473  1 907  1 519   390   832   777  1 057
Niger - - - - - - - -  3 319 -   100   277 -   350
Nigeria   190   698   659  1 048  1 046   723  3 061  3 213  27 381  7 978  8 340  4 543  4 142  5 983
Reunion - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Rwanda - -   26 - -   19 -   283   252   312  1 839   779   110   424
São Tomé and Principe - - - - - - -   2   351 - - - -   150
Senegal - - - -   10   8   389   536  1 281   548   883   69  1 238  1 260
Seychelles - - - - - - -   125   130   1   121   9   43   156
Sierra Leone - - - - - - - -   73   260   230   212   119   611
Somalia - - - - - - - -   361 -   59 -   44   381
South Africa  2 393  4 841  7 820  5 146  29 469  2 082  5 833  5 247  13 533  7 695  6 819  12 430  4 777  5 643
Swaziland - - - - - - - -   23   12 -   646   7   150
Togo   49   94   142   34   214   19   122   351   146   26 - -   411   363
Uganda   9   40   28   9 - -   7   291  3 057  2 147  8 505  2 476   569   752
United Republic of Tanzania   9   9   57   49   27   24   138   327  2 492   623  1 077  3 806  1 137   852
Zambia - -   9 - -   168   33   422  1 276  2 375  1 376  2 366   840  1 074
Zimbabwe -   629   34   10 - -   8   557   979   889   754  5 834  3 074   480
Asia  211 077  329 843  226 047  178 906  191 076  173 175  161 096  349 751  583 342  424 092  313 488  331 839  231 496  227 492
East and South-East Asia  130 227  154 975  122 130  123 597  115 164  110 393  106 067  243 703  321 831  251 936  202 925  205 922  147 303  146 465
East Asia  83 797  107 698  83 957  87 393  86 185  71 304  83 494  127 920  151 963  135 605  117 637  119 919  93 099  82 464
China  32 765  47 016  25 496  20 684  40 140  19 227  19 295  104 359  126 831  116 828  96 749  100 630  73 747  69 473
Hong Kong, China  17 313  15 528  17 468  8 147  13 023  11 953  49 225  4 742  7 164  9 073  8 217  7 127  7 960  5 137
Korea, Democratic People’s Republic of - - - - - - -   560   533   228 -   59 -   227
Korea, Republic of  21 928  33 775  29 119  30 285  20 896  30 031  9 726  9 108  11 828  4 583  3 601  7 087  6 279  4 731
Macao, China -   2 - - - - -  4 224   909   310   282   430  2 382   257
Mongolia - - -   150 - - -   448   330   302  1 608   183   122   595
Taiwan Province of China  11 792  11 377  11 875  28 127  12 126  10 094  5 248  4 477  4 367  4 280  7 179  4 403  2 608  2 045
South-East Asia  46 430  47 277  38 173  36 203  28 979  39 089  22 573  115 783  169 868  116 331  85 288  86 003  54 204  64 001
Brunei Darussalam -   77 - -   2 - -   722   435   470   156  5 969   77   45
Cambodia -   51   149 - - -   184   261  3 581  3 895  1 759  2 365  1 625  1 956
Indonesia  1 824   393  1 043   415  5 037   843   395  18 512  36 019  29 271  13 740  24 152  16 881  9 983
Lao People’s Democratic Republic -   192 - - - - -  1 371  1 151  2 118   335   980   589   458
Malaysia  26 806  13 818  14 904  21 319  4 140  18 458  2 557  8 318  23 110  13 580  15 541  13 694  6 827  5 536
Myanmar   20 - - -   84 -   160   378  1 434  1 889   449   712  2 029  13 444
Philippines  1 541   563  1 410  1 790   324   629   504  15 509  14 800  9 719  4 645  2 813  4 263  2 988
Singapore  13 432  21 444  12 985  8 631  13 308  16 537  12 633  24 979  13 983  12 940  16 992  20 562  9 838  8 378
Thailand  2 159  7 936  6 032  3 128  4 443  2 432  5 072  6 601  15 122  7 678  8 641  4 121  5 699  5 645
Timor-Leste - - - - - - - - - -  1 000 -   116 -
Viet Nam   647  2 804  1 651   920  1 643   190  1 070  39 133  60 234  34 772  22 030  10 634  6 259  15 570
South Asia  24 343  39 788  23 226  21 115  32 560  27 714  15 789  55 632  87 161  68 983  55 433  58 669  39 525  24 499
Afghanistan - - - -   8 -   15   6   269  2 978   634   305   245   320
Bangladesh -   72   37   103   109   144   1   53   860   645  2 720   490  2 361   872
 /…
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Annex table 6.  Value of greenfield FDI projects, by source/destination, 2007–2013 (continued)
(Millions of dollars)
World as destination World as source
Partner region/economy 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
By source By destination
Bhutan - - - - - - - - -   135   83   86   39   183
India  18 136  38 039  17 338  20 250  31 589  24 891  14 740  43 445  70 207  55 156  44 491  48 921  30 947  17 741
Iran, Islamic Republic of  6 137   429  5 743   535   515  1 578 -  6 217  6 911  2 982  3 034  1 812 -   79
Maldives - - - - - - -   206   462   453  2 162  1 012   329   107
Nepal -   2 -   6   31   125   232   3   740   295   340   128 -   853
Pakistan   40  1 220   42   153   227   106   686  5 049  6 390  3 955  1 255  2 399  4 315  3 033
Sri Lanka   29   27   66   68   82   871   115   652  1 323  2 383   714  3 517  1 290  1 312
West Asia  56 507  135 081  80 691  34 195  43 352  35 069  39 240  50 417  174 350  103 173  55 130  67 248  44 668  56 527
Bahrain  8 995  15 987  14 740  1 070   912  1 145   598   820  8 050  2 036  1 997  3 931  3 535  1 154
Iraq   42 -   20 -   48 -   52   474  23 982  12 849  5 486  10 597   976  14 998
Jordan   244   627  1 650   591   52  1 037   105  1 250  11 903  2 506  2 824  3 250  1 401  10 946
Kuwait  2 936  16 108  4 585  2 850  4 502  1 331  10 833   373  2 256   987   673   494  1 051  2 183
Lebanon   596   626   639   246   301   393   153   428  1 292  1 772  1 336   531   201   104
Oman   87   84  3 110   39   165   101   479  1 794  8 954  5 608  4 255  5 043  4 970  2 641
Qatar   972  8 839  13 663  2 891  13 044  8 749  1 546  1 368  19 021  21 519  5 434  4 362  2 172  1 573
Saudi Arabia  2 089  5 795  6 105  1 441  5 027  2 389  2 746  14 630  36 718  14 860  8 139  15 766  8 393  6 430
State of Palestine - - - - -   15 -   52  1 050   16   15 - -   8
Syrian Arab Republic -   326   59 -   193   0   0  1 854  4 949  3 134  2 165  1 315   10 -
Turkey  2 399  4 464  4 068  4 031  3 155  3 216  6 864  14 655  17 127  23 859  8 917  10 323  9 540  9 491
United Arab Emirates  38 147  82 175  32 053  21 034  15 954  16 684  15 844  12 372  36 218  13 067  12 870  11 623  12 053  6 821
Yemen -   49 -   2 -   9   20   347  2 830   961  1 019   11   366   178
Latin America and the Caribbean  12 215  18 926  15 442  21 773  20 776  9 508  18 257  63 442  131 592  117 061  113 098  130 791  69 731  145 066
South America  8 539  16 196  12 040  18 602  10 520  6 715  11 864  39 422  83 232  81 409  89 861  96 732  50 071  67 334
Argentina   625   470  1 118  1 284   871  1 422  1 381  5 466  7 193  9 217  7 112  12 000  6 004  4 342
Bolivia, Plurinational State of - - - - - -   66   49   789  1 947   797   305   10  1 028
Brazil  4 372  11 073  7 736  10 323  4 649  3 200  6 865  17 516  40 201  40 304  43 860  56 888  26 373  29 055
Chile  2 239   855  1 758  2 564  1 578  1 106  1 566  3 093  6 360  12 888  5 874  13 814  10 233  10 212
Colombia   139   500   102  3 390  1 020   884  1 111  3 986  8 281  2 945  10 616  6 892  2 909  11 479
Ecuador   89   67   330   166   60   38 -   518   511   348   132   648   603   784
Guyana - - - - - - -   10  1 000   12   160   15   302   38
Paraguay - - - - - - -   607   378   83  3 873   108   287   395
Peru   315   17   108   25   380   12   391  2 974  9 859  11 831  11 956  4 074  2 184  6 340
Suriname - - - - - - - -   101 - -   384   34   13
Uruguay   25   3   49   3   5 -   4  2 910  4 381   504   749  1 030   720  1 620
Venezuela, Bolivarian Republic of   735  3 211   840   847  1 956   53   480  2 293  4 179  1 331  4 732   574   413  2 029
Central America  2 880  1 186  2 459  2 869  9 820  2 441  5 785  21 438  41 320  31 929  20 025  25 614  17 217  68 714
Belize - - - -   5 - - - -   3   5 -   241   100
Costa Rica   95   6   45   63   11   1   110  2 157   570  1 427  1 981  3 364   476   825
El Salvador   102 -   281   147   20 -   55   356   562   716   276   462   171   863
Guatemala   79   58   131   86   125   211   222   979   905  1 330   963   209   53  1 059
Honduras   61 - - - -   40   378   951  1 089   126   226   551   43   549
Mexico  2 444   990  1 923  2 101  9 498  2 184  4 954  13 652  34 896  25 059  14 809  18 741  15 401  23 101
Nicaragua   54   67 -   251 - -   31   62   185   877   280   274   135  40 602
Panama   47   65   80   220   161   5   35  3 282  3 114  2 391  1 485  2 013   697  1 616
Caribbean   795  1 544   944   302   437   353   609  2 581  7 039  3 723  3 212  8 445  2 444  9 018
Antigua and Barbuda - - - - - - - -   82 - - - - -
Aruba - - - - - - - -   64 -   6   25   70 -
Bahamas   19   18   42 -   2   7   97   18   61   5   64   333   24   15
Barbados   2 - -   5   26   19 - - -   29   137   303   16 -
Cayman Islands   166   554   853   52   243   297   41   36   326   104   253   349   351   6
Cuba -   77 - -   21 -   0   127  2 703  1 015  1 567   465   223   195
Dominica - - - - - - -   63 - - - - - -
Dominican Republic   498 -   30   25 - - -   749  2 044  1 399   330  5 143   584  2 684
Grenada - - - - - - -   3 - -   5   5   30   0
Guadeloupe - - - - - - - -   267 - -   25 - -
Haiti - - -   9 - -   10 -   2   110   59   376   2   426
Jamaica   2   889   17   160   128   30   460   29   317   41   23   491   13  1 363
Martinique   63 - -   13 - - -   35 -   6 - -   23 -
Puerto Rico   20   6   4   36   18 -   1   713   739   716   570   752   926  2 530
Saint Kitts and Nevis - - - - - - - - - - - -   64 -
Saint Lucia - - - - - - -   12 -   3   144   64 -   65
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Trinidad and Tobago   26 - -   3 - - -   797   372   296   22   114   119  1 514
Turks and Caicos Islands - - - - - - - -   64 -   34 - -   221
Oceania -   76   20   16   351 - -  4 234  4 496  2 179  2 279  3 287  1 265  3 067
Fiji - -   2   8 - - -   206   117   339 -   179   41   13
French Polynesia - -   10 - - - - - - -   108 - - -
 /…
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Annex table 6.  Value of greenfield FDI projects, by source/destination, 2007–2013 (concluded)
(Millions of dollars)
World as destination World as source
Partner region/economy 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
By source By destination
Micronesia, Federated States of - - - - - - - - - - - -   156 -
New Caledonia - - - -   202 - -  3 800  1 400   22 -   8 - -
Papua New Guinea -   73 -   8   149 - -   228  2 438  1 786  1 944  3 050  1 068  3 054
Samoa -   2 - - - - - -   500 - - - - -
Solomon Islands - -   8 - - - - -   42   32   228   51 - -
Transition economies  19 321  24 077  19 105  20 503  17 891  9 950  18 611  71 164  108 044  54 926  52 067  57 736  39 389  27 868
South-East Europe   31   658   326   485   202   82   220  11 399  18 167  6 192  5 241  7 464  7 568  5 851
Albania - - -   105 - -   3  4 454  3 505   124   68   525   288   57
Bosnia and Herzegovina -   7 -   16   2   9   26  2 623  1 993  1 368   283  1 253  1 287   880
Montenegro - - -   7 - -   9   694   851   120   380   436   355   613
Serbia   31   651   314   356   150   74   84  3 131  9 196  3 816  4 040  4 295  4 459  3 721
The former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia - -   12   1   49 -   99   497  2 622   763   470   956  1 179   579
CIS  19 290  23 337  18 746  20 009  17 514  9 620  18 360  58 431  87 069  44 336  45 809  48 292  31 397  20 757
Armenia -   51 -   9   83   171 -   434   690  1 003   265   805   434   773
Azerbaijan  4 307  1 223  3 779   580   435  3 246   221  1 999  1 921  1 939   711  1 289  1 573   964
Belarus   76  1 323   391  2 091   133   91   540   487   977  1 134  1 888  1 268   787   581
Kazakhstan   109   411   706   636   383   138   221  4 251  17 844  1 949  2 536  7 816  1 191  1 370
Kyrgyzstan -   60   30 - - - -  3 362   539   50 -   358   83   49
Moldova, Republic of -   557 - -   0 -   3   162   163   488   301   320   118   285
Russian Federation  13 657  16 976  13 055  15 476  15 527  5 019  16 185  38 157  51 949  29 792  34 519  22 781  18 537  12 213
Tajikistan -   82   10 - - - -   327   226   570   3  1 076   669   44
Turkmenistan - - - - - - -  1 051  3 974  1 433   458  1 926   8 -
Ukraine  1 142  2 656   776  1 218   954   954  1 191  7 185  7 686  4 561  4 061  3 094  3 192  4 191
Uzbekistan - - - - -   0 -  1 016  1 101  1 418  1 068  7 560  4 806   289
Georgia -   82   33   8   174   248   31  1 334  2 808  4 398  1 017  1 980   424  1 261
Memorandum
Least developed countries (LDCs)a   168   798   502   732   923  1 005  1 528  21 220  55 740  34 229  39 853  33 647  21 923  39 043
Landlocked developing countries(LLDCs)b  4 425  3 290  4 675  1 429  1 137  4 005  1 033  18 840  47 069  25 449  28 026  39 438  17 931  17 211
Small island developing States (SIDS)c   87  1 290  1 877  2 825  3 592   205  3 809  2 187  5 325  3 132  5 957  7 429  2 298  6 506
Source:  UNCTAD, based on information from the Financial Times Ltd, fDi Markets (www.fDimarkets.com).
a  Least developed countries include: Afghanistan, Angola, Bangladesh, Benin, Bhutan, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, the Central African Republic, Chad, the Comoros, the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, the Gambia, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Kiribati, the Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, 
Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mozambique, Myanmar, Nepal, Niger, Rwanda, Samoa (which, however, graduated from LDC status effective 1 January 2014), São Tomé and Principe, Senegal, 
Sierra Leone, Solomon Islands, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, Timor-Leste, Togo, Tuvalu, Uganda, the United Republic of Tanzania, Vanuatu, Yemen and Zambia.
b  Landlocked developing countries include: Afghanistan, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bhutan, Bolivia, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, the Central African Republic, Chad, Ethiopia, Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, the Lao People’s Democratic Republic, Lesotho, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Malawi, Mali, the Republic of Moldova, Mongolia, Nepal, Niger, Paraguay, 
Rwanda, South Sudan, Swaziland, the Republic of Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Uzbekistan, Zambia and Zimbabwe.
c  Small island developing States include: Antigua and Barbuda, the Bahamas, Barbados, Cabo Verde, the Comoros, Dominica, Fiji, Grenada, Jamaica, Kiribati, Maldives, Marshall Islands, 
Mauritius, the Federated States of Micronesia, Nauru, Palau, Papua New Guinea, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, São Tomé and Principe, 
Seychelles, Solomon Islands, Timor-Leste, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tuvalu and Vanuatu.
Note:  Data refer to estimated amounts of capital investment. 
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Annex table 7. list of IIAs at end 2013a
BITs Other IIAsb Total
Afghanistan 3 4 7
Albania 43 7 50
Algeria 47 8 55
Angola 8 7 15
Anguilla - 1 1
Antigua and Barbuda 2 9 11
Argentina 58 15 73
Armenia 40 3 43
Aruba - 1 1
Australia 22 14 36
Austria 66 61 127
Azerbaijan 46 4 50
Bahamas 1 9 10
Bahrain 29 15 44
Bangladesh 28 4 32
Barbados 10 9 19
Belarus 60 4 64
Belgiumc 93 61 154
Belize 7 9 16
Benin 16 9 25
Bermuda - 1 1
Bhutan - 2 2
Bolivia, Plurinational State of 17 12 29
Bosnia and Herzegovina 38 5 43
Botswana 8 7 15
Brazil 14 16 30
British Virgin Islands - 1 1
Brunei Darussalam 8 16 24
Bulgaria 68 62 130
Burkina Faso 14 9 23
Burundi 7 9 16
Cambodia 21 14 35
Cameroon 16 6 22
Canada 30 17 47
Cape Verde 9 6 15
Cayman Islands - 1 1
Central African Republic 4 5 9
Chad 14 6 20
Chile 50 28 78
China 130 17 147
Colombia 8 20 28
Comoros 6 10 16
Congo 14 5 19
Congo, Democratic Republic of the 16 10 26
Cook Islands - 2 2
Costa Rica 21 17 38
Côte d’Ivoire 10 10 20
Croatia 58 62 120
Cuba 58 3 61
Cyprus 27 62 89
Czech Republic 79 62 141
Denmark 55 62 117
Djibouti 9 10 19
/…
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Annex table 7. list of IIAs at end 2013 (continued)
BITs Other IIAsb Total
Dominica 2 9 11
Dominican Republic 15 4 19
Ecuador 18 8 26
Egypt 100 13 113
El Salvador 22 9 31
Equatorial Guinea 9 5 14
Eritrea 4 6 10
Estonia 27 63 90
Ethiopia 29 6 35
Fiji - 3 3
Finland 71 62 133
France 102 62 164
Gabon 14 6 20
Gambia 16 7 23
Georgia 31 4 35
Germany 134 62 196
Ghana 26 7 33
Greece 43 62 105
Grenada 2 9 11
Guatemala 19 11 30
Guinea 20 7 27
Guinea-Bissau 2 8 10
Guyana 8 10 18
Haiti 7 9 16
Honduras 11 10 21
Hong Kong, China 16 4 20
Hungary 58 62 120
Iceland 9 30 39
India 84 12 96
Indonesia 64 14 78
Iran, Islamic Republic of 61 2 63
Iraq 7 6 13
Ireland - 62 62
Israel 37 5 42
Italy 93 62 155
Jamaica 17 9 26
Japan 22 17 39
Jordan 53 9 62
Kazakhstan 45 7 52
Kenya 14 7 21
Kiribati - 2 2
Korea, Democratic  People’s Republic of 24 - 24
Korea, Republic of 91 13 104
Kuwait 74 14 88
Kyrgyzstan 29 7 36
Lao People’s Democratic Republic 24 15 39
Latvia 44 62 106
Lebanon 50 8 58
Lesotho 3 7 10
Liberia 4 7 11
Libya 35 11 46
Liechtenstein - 1 1
/…
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Annex table 7. list of IIAs at end 2013 (continued)
BITs Other IIAsb Total
Lithuania 54 62 116
LuxembourgC 93 62 155
Macao, China 2 2 4
Madagascar 9 5 14
Malawi 6 9 15
Malaysia 68 21 89
Maldives - 3 3
Mali 17 8 25
Malta 22 62 84
Mauritania 20 7 27
Mauritius 40 10 50
Mexico 29 15 44
Moldova, Republic of 39 4 43
Monaco 1 - 1
Mongolia 43 3 46
Montenegro 18 4 22
Montserrat - 9 9
Morocco 63 9 72
Mozambique 25 7 32
Myanmar 7 14 21
Namibia 14 7 21
Nauru - 2 2
Nepal 6 3 9
Netherlands 97 62 159
New Caledonia - 1 1
New Zealand 5 12 17
Nicaragua 18 11 29
Niger 5 9 14
Nigeria 24 8 32
Norway 15 28 43
Oman 34 14 48
Pakistan 46 7 53
Palestinian Territory 3 7 10
Panama 24 10 34
Papua New Guinea 6 3 9
Paraguay 24 15 39
Peru 31 27 58
Philippines 37 13 50
Poland 62 62 124
Portugal 55 62 117
Qatar 49 14 63
Romania 82 62 144
Russian Federation 72 3 75
Rwanda 7 10 17
Saint Kitts and Nevis - 9 9
Saint Lucia 2 9 11
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines 2 9 11
Samoa - 2 2
San Marino 8 - 8
São Tomé and Principe 1 3 4
Saudi Arabia 24 14 38
Senegal 25 9 34
/…
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Annex table 7. list of IIAs at end 2013 (concluded)
BITs Other IIAsb Total
Serbia 51 4 55
Seychelles 4 9 13
Sierra Leone 3 7 10
Singapore 41 26 67
Slovakia 55 62 117
Slovenia 38 62 100
Solomon Islands - 2 2
Somalia 2 5 7
South Africa 43 10 53
South Sudan - 1 1
Spain 82 62 144
Sri Lanka 28 5 33
Sudan 27 10 37
Suriname 3 10 13
Swaziland 6 10 16
Sweden 69 62 131
Switzerland 119 31 150
Syrian Arab Republic 42 5 47
Taiwan Province of China 23 5 28
Tajikistan 34 7 41
Thailand 39 21 60
The former Yugoslav Republic of  Macedonia 39 5 44
Timor-Leste 3 1 4
Togo 4 9 13
Tonga 1 2 3
Trinidad and Tobago 13 9 22
Tunisia 55 9 64
Turkey 89 19 108
Turkmenistan 25 6 31
Tuvalu - 2 2
Uganda 15 8 23
Ukraine 73 5 78
United Arab Emirates 45 14 59
United Kingdom 105 62 167
United Republic of Tanzania 19 7 26
United States 46 64 110
Uruguay 30 17 47
Uzbekistan 50 5 55
Vanuatu 2 2 4
Venezuela, Bolivarian Republic of 28 4 32
Viet Nam 60 17 77
Yemen 37 6 43
Zambia 11 8 19
Zimbabwe 30 8 38
Source: UNCTAD, IIA database. 
a  The number of BITs and “other IIAs” in this table do not add up to the total number of BITs and “other IIAs” as stated in the text, because some economies/territories have concluded 
agreements with entities that are not listed in this table. Because of ongoing reporting by member States and the resulting retroactive adjustments to the UNCTAD database, the data 
differ from those reported in WIR13.
b  These numbers include agreements concluded by economies as members of a regional integration organization. 
c  BITs concluded the Belgo-Luxembourg Economic Union. 
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WIR 2010: Investing in a Low-carbon Economy
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WIR 2001: Promoting Linkages 
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